Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Self-Interpretation as First-Person Mindshaping: Implications for Confabulation Research.Derek Strijbos & Leon de Bruin - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):297-307.
    It is generally acknowledged that confabulation undermines the authority of self-attribution of mental states. But why? The mainstream answer is that confabulation misrepresents the actual state of one’s mind at some relevant time prior to the confabulatory response. This construal, we argue, rests on an understanding of self-attribution as first-person mindreading. Recent developments in the literature on folk psychology, however, suggest that mental state attribution also plays an important role in regulating or shaping future behaviour in conformity with normative expectations. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • Rational Agency and the Struggle to Believe What Your Reasons Dictate.Brie Gertler - forthcoming - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford University Press.
    According to an influential view that I call agentialism, our capacity to believe and intend directly on the basis of reasons—our rational agency—has a normative significance that distinguishes it from other kinds of agency (Bilgrami 2006, Boyle 2011, Burge 1996, Korsgaard 1996, Moran 2001). Agentialists maintain that insofar as we exercise rational agency, we bear a special kind of responsibility for our beliefs and intentions; and it is only those attitudes that represent the exercise of rational agency that are truly (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • XIII—Self-Knowledge, Transparency, and Self-Authorship.Sacha Golob - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3_pt_3):235-253.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 115, Issue 3pt3, Page 235-253, December 2015.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Is There Anything to the Authority Thesis?Wolfgang Barz - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:125-143.
    Many philosophical theories of self-knowledge can be understood as attempts to explain why self-ascriptions enjoy a certain kind of authority that other-ascriptions lack (the Authority Thesis). The aim of this paper is not to expand the stock of existing explanations but to ask whether the Authority Thesis can be adequately specified. To this end, I identify three requirements that must be met by any satisfactory specification. I conclude that the search for an adequate specification of the Authority Thesis leads to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Inner Speech and Metacognition: A Defense of the Commitment-Based Approach.Víctor Fernández Castro - 2019 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology (3):245-261.
    A widespread view in philosophy claims that inner speech is closely tied to human metacognitive capacities. This so-called format view of inner speech considers that talking to oneself allows humans to gain access to their own mental states by forming metarepresentation states through the rehearsal of inner utterances (section 2). The aim of this paper is to present two problems to this view (section 3) and offer an alternative view to the connection between inner speech and metacognition (section 4). According (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • No Intentions in the Brain: A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Science of Intention.Annemarie Kalis - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Empowering Theory of Trust.Victoria McGeer & Philip Pettit - 2017 - In Paul Faulkner & Thomas W. Simpson (eds.), The Philosophy of Trust. Oxford University Press. pp. 14-34.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Hard Problem of Responsibility.Victoria McGeer & Philip Pettit - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 1. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Mental Muscles and the Extended Will.Tillmann Vierkant - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):1-9.
    In the wake of Clark and Chalmers famous argument for extended cognition some people have argued that willpower equally can extend into the environment (e.g. Heath and Anderson in The thief of time: philosophical essays on procrastination. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 233–252, 2010). In a recent paper Fabio Paglieri (Consciousness in interaction: the role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp 179–206, 2012) provides an interesting argument to the effect that there might (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Self Knowledge and Knowing Other Minds: The Implicit / Explicit Distinction as a Tool in Understanding Theory of Mind.Tillmann Vierkant - 2012 - British Journal of Developmental Psychology 30 (1):141-155.
    Holding content explicitly requires a form of self knowledge. But what does the relevant self knowledge look like? Using theory of mind as an example, this paper argues that the correct answer to this question will have to take into account the crucial role of language based deliberation, but warns against the standard assumption that explicitness is necessary for ascribing awareness. It argues in line with Bayne that intentional action is at least an equally valid criterion for awareness. This leads (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Reflections on the Authority of Personal Experience.Trudy Govier - unknown
    The authority of first person claims may be understood from an epistemic perspective or as a matter of social practice. Building on accounts of Hume, Nagel, and several more recent authors, it is argued that this authority should be understood as limited. To extend it beyond notions of what it is like to experience something, we shift from what should be a narrow subjective edge to a territory of objective claims, thereby reasoning incorrectly. A relevant application is the supposed authority (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.
    We argue that intentions are beliefs—beliefs that are held in light of, and made rational by, practical reasoning. To intend to do something is neither more nor less than to believe, on the basis of one’s practical reasoning, that one will do it. The identification of the mental state of intention with the mental state of belief is what we call strong cognitivism about intentions. It is a strong form of cognitivism because we identify intentions with beliefs, rather than maintaining (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Making Up Your Mind: How Language Enables Self‐Knowledge, Self‐Knowability and Personhood.Philip Pettit - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):3-26.
    If language is to serve the basic purpose of communicating our attitudes, we must be constructed so as to form beliefs in those propositions that we truthfully assert on the basis of careful assent. Thus, other things being equal, I can rely on believing those things to which I give my careful assent. And so my ability to assent or dissent amounts to an ability to make up my mind about what I believe. This capacity, in tandem with a similar (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Corporate Responsibility Revisited.Philip Pettit - 2009 - Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 38 (2):159-176.
    This paper responds to four commentaries on “Responsibility Incorporated”, restating, revising, and expanding on existing work. In particular, it looks again at a set of issues related primarily to responsibility at the individual level; it reconsiders responsibility at the corporate level; it examines the connection of this discussion to issues of responsibility in law and politics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Mind-Making Practices: The Social Infrastructure of Self-Knowing Agency and Responsibility.Victoria McGeer - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):259-281.
    This paper is divided into two parts. In Section 1, I explore and defend a “regulative view” of folk-psychology as against the “standard view”. On the regulative view, folk-psychology is conceptualized in fundamentally interpersonal terms as a “mind-making” practice through which we come to form and regulate our minds in accordance with a rich array of socially shared and socially maintained sense-making norms. It is not, as the standard view maintains, simply an epistemic capacity for coming to know about the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Transparent Emotions? A Critical Analysis of Moran's Transparency Claim.Naomi Kloosterboer - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):246-258.
    I critically analyze Richard Moran's account of knowing one's own emotions, which depends on the Transparency Claim for self-knowledge. Applied to knowing one's own beliefs, TC states that when one is asked “Do you believe P?”, one can answer by referencing reasons for believing P. TC works for belief because one is justified in believing that one believes P if one can give reasons for why P is true. Emotions, however, are also conceptually related to concerns; they involve a response (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Knowing Your Own Beliefs.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):41-62.
    To believe is to possess a wide variety of dispositions pertinent to the proposition believed. Among those dispositions are self-ascriptive dispositions. Consequently, being disposed to self-ascribe belief that P is partly constitutive of believing that P. Such self-ascriptive dispositions can be underwritten by any of a variety of mechanisms, acting co-operatively or competitively. But since self-ascriptive dispositions are only partly constitutive of belief, there can be cases in which the self-ascriptive dispositions splinter away from the remaining dispositions. It is then (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Does Confabulation Pose a Threat to First-Person Authority? Mindshaping, Self-Regulation and the Importance of Self-Know-How.Leon de Bruin & Derek Strijbos - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):151-161.
    Empirical evidence suggests that people often confabulate when they are asked about their choices or reasons for action. The implications of these studies are the topic of intense debate in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. An important question in this debate is whether the confabulation studies pose a serious threat to the possibility of self-knowledge. In this paper we are not primarily interested in the consequences of confabulation for self-knowledge. Instead, we focus on a different issue: what confabulation implies for (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Groups with Minds of Their Own Making.Leo Townsend - 2020 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (1):129-151.
    According Philip Pettit, suitably organised groups not only possess ‘minds of their own’ but can also ‘make up their minds’ and 'speak for themselves'--where these two capacities enable them to perform as conversable subjects or 'persons'. In this paper I critically examine Pettit's case for group personhood. My first step is to reconstruct his account, explaining first how he understands the two capacities he considers central to personhood – the capacity to ‘make up one’s mind’, and the capacity to ‘speak (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Delusions and Not-Quite-Beliefs.Maura Tumulty - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):29-37.
    Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of many delusions is no different in kind from the irrationality that marks many non-pathological states typically treated as beliefs. She takes this to secure the doxastic status of those delusions. Bortolotti’s approach has many benefits. For example, it accounts for the fact that we can often make some sense of what deluded subjects are up to, and helps explain why some deluded subjects are helped by cognitive behavioral therapy. But there is an alternative approach (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Moral Self-Knowledge in Kantian Ethics.Emer O’Hagan - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):525-537.
    Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as sound moral practice requires moral (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Complementarity of Mindshaping and Mindreading.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):533-549.
    Why do we engage in folk psychology, that is, why do we think about and ascribe propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, intentions etc. to people? On the standard view, folk psychology is primarily for mindreading, for detecting mental states and explaining and/or predicting people’s behaviour in terms of them. In contrast, McGeer (1996, 2007, 2015), and Zawidzki (2008, 2013) maintain that folk psychology is not primarily for mindreading but for mindshaping, that is, for moulding people’s behavior and minds (e.g., (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mental Agency as Self-Regulation.Leon de Bruin, Fleur Jongepier & Derek Strijbos - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):815-825.
    The article proposes a novel approach to mental agency that is inspired by Victoria McGeer’s work on self-regulation. The basic idea is that certain mental acts leave further work to be done for an agent to be considered an authoritative self-ascriber of corresponding dispositional mental states. First, we discuss Richard Moran’s account of avowals, which grounds first-person authority in deliberative, self-directed agency. Although this view is promising, we argue that it ultimately fails to confront the empirical gap between occurrent judgments (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Managing Mismatch Between Belief and Behavior.Maura Tumulty - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):261-292.
    Our behavior doesn't always match the beliefs attributed to us, and sometimes the mismatch raises questions about what our beliefs actually are. I compare two approaches to such cases, and argue in favor of the one which allows some belief-attributions to lack a determinate truth-value. That approach avoids an inappropriate assumption about cognitive activity: namely, that whenever we fail in performing one cognitive activity, there is a distinct cognitive activity at which we succeed. The indeterminacy-allowing approach also meshes well with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Value of Reactive Attitudes: Critical Response to Christine Tappolet's Emotions, Values and Agency.Victoria McGeer - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):512-519.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Can We Be Self-Deceived About What We Believe? Self-Knowledge, Self-Deception, and Rational Agency.Mathieu Doucet - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (S1):E1-E25.
    Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first-order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self-knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self-knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Knowing Why.Ryan Cox - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (2):177-197.
    In this essay, I argue that we have a non-inferential way of knowing particular explanations of our own actions and attitudes. I begin by explicating and evaluating Nisbett and Wilson’s influential argument to the contrary. I argue that Nisbett and Wilson’s claim that we arrive at such explanations of our own actions and attitudes by inference is not adequately supported by their findings because they overlook an important alternative explanation of those findings. I explicate and defend such an alternative explanation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Private Persons and Minimal Persons.Elijah Millgram - 2014 - Journal of Social Philosophy 45 (3):323-347.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Delusions and Dispositionalism About Belief.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628.
    The imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states by giving folk-psychological norms a significant role in the individuation of attitudes. When such norms individuate belief, deluded subjects will not count as believing their delusions. In general, dispositionalism won't confer genuinely doxastic status more often than do (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations