- Normative Reasons without (Good) Reasoning.Artūrs Https://Orcidorg Logins - 2019 - Ethics 130 (2):208-210.details
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The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View.Oded Na'aman - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):245-269.details
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The fitting resolution of anger.Oded Na’Aman - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2417-2430.details
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Ecumenical epistemic instrumentalism.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2613-2639.details
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The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.details
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Shame and Attributability.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2019 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 6. Oxford University Press.details
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Sentimentalism about Moral Understanding.Nathan Robert Howard - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1065-1078.details
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Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?Davide Fassio - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3253-3283.details
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The fitting attitudes analysis of value: an explanatory challenge.Kent Hurtig - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3241-3249.details
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Fittingness.Christopher Howard - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12542.details
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Normative Alethic Pluralism.Filippo Ferrari - 2018 - In Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Cham, Switzerland and Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 145-168.details
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Evaluative Beliefs First.Ben Bramble - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8.details
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Fitting Attitude Theory and the Normativity of Jokes.Stephanie Patridge & Andrew Jordan - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1303-1320.details
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Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding.Karl Schafer - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):639-663.details
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Reasoning with Reasons.Daniel Star - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 241-59.details
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The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.details
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Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought.McHugh Conor - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
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There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.Barry Maguire - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):779-805.details
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Right in some respects: reasons as evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.details
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Reasons or Fittingness First?Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):212-229.details
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What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.details
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Reasons to Desire and Desiring at Will.Victor M. Verdejo - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (3):355-369.details
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Two Kinds of Ethical Intuitionism: Brentano’s and Reid’s.Olson Jonas - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):106-119.details
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The right and the wrong kind of reasons.Jan Gertken & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12412.details
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What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.details
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Fitting belief.Conor McHugh - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):167-187.details
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Fitting Attitude Theories of Value.Daniel Jacobsen - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The New Explanatory Objection Against the Fitting Attitude Account of Value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1845-1860.details
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All Reasons are Fundamentally for Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).details
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The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1207-1221.details
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Naturalizing the contributory.Philip Fox - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6275-6298.details
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Alethic Pluralism and the Value of Truth.Filippo Ferrari - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1):1–25.details
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A puzzle about enkratic reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3177-3196.details
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Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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Redundant Reasons.Daniel Wodak - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):266-278.details
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Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore’s Paradox?Christopher Cowie - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1685-1702.details
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A Working Test for Well-being.Tobias A. Fuchs - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (2):129-142.details
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Fittingness, Value and trans-World Attitudes.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.details
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Encroachment on Emotion.James Fritz - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):515-533.details
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Recognition, second‐personal authority, and nonideal theory.Stephen Darwall - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):562-574.details
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How to Understand Rule-Constituted Kinds.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):7-27.details
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No Reasons to Believe the False.Javier González Prado - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):703-722.details
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Who’s on first.Daniel Wodak - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15.details
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Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14 (2).details
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Skepticism about reasons for emotions.Hichem Naar - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):108-123.details
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Fitting prepositional gratitude to god is metaphysically impossible.Marcus William Hunt - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 89 (2):153-170.details
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No Reasons to Believe the False.Javier González De Prado Salas - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):703-722.details
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Disagreement about Taste and Alethic Suberogation.Filippo Ferrari - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):516-535.details
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On the fittingness of agential evaluations.Roberto Keller - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):251–268.details
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Moral affordances and the demands of fittingness.Fabienne Peter - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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