- Understanding conative phenomenology: lessons from Ricœur.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):537-557.details
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Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.details
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The apparent illusion of conscious deciding.Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.details
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Addictive actions.Edmund Henden - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):362-382.details
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Revisionist Accounts of Free Will: Origins, Varieties, and Challenges.Manuel Vargas - 2011 - In Robert Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will, 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press.details
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Free will and the unconscious precursors of choice.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):365-384.details
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Towards a Radically Pragmatic Theory of If-Conditionals.Gunnar Björnsson - 2011 - In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. Emerald Group Publishing.details
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Arguments for incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Personal autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Deciding: how special is it?Alfred R. Mele - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):359-375.details
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What Should we Believe About Free Will?Jeremy Byrd - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):505-522.details
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Free Will, Determinism, and Epiphenomenalism.Mark Balaguer - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.details
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(1 other version)Intuition, Orthodoxy, and Moral Responsibility.John Ross Churchill - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (2):179-199.details
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Are intentions in tension with timing experiments?Marcela Herdova - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):573-587.details
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(1 other version)Morality in times of naturalising the mind – an overview.Christoph Lumer - 2014 - In Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. Boston ; Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 3-42.details
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Responsabilidade moral depois da neurociência.Lincoln Frias - 2013 - Filosofia Unisinos 14 (1).details
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Can Conscious Agency Be Saved?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):33-45.details
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Responsible choices, desert-based legal institutions, and the challenges of contemporary neuroscience.Michael S. Moore - 2012 - Social Philosophy and Policy 29 (1):233-279.details
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Free will in everyday life: Autobiographical accounts of free and unfree actions.Tyler F. Stillman, Roy F. Baumeister & Alfred R. Mele - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):381 - 394.details
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Emergent Properties.Hong Yu Wong - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The BCN challenge to compatibilist free will and personal responsibility.Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters - 2009 - Neuroethics 3 (2):121-133.details
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(1 other version)Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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On Second Thought, Libet-style Unreflective Intentions May Be Compatible With Free Will.Nick Byrd - 2021 - Logoi 39 (23):17-28.details
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Intention at the Interface.Ellen Fridland - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):481-505.details
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Free Will is Not a Testable Hypothesis.Robert Northcott - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):617-631.details
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Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It.Andrea Lavazza - 2016 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 10.details
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Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21.details
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Neuroscience and Conscious Causation: Has Neuroscience Shown that We Cannot Control Our Own Actions?Grant S. Shields - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):565-582.details
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Proximal Intentions, Non-executed Proximal Intentions and Change of Intentions.Ariel Furstenberg - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):1-10.details
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Neurolaw and Neuroprediction: Potential Promises and Perils.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):631-642.details
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(2 other versions)Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency.Paul Katsafanas - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 219.details
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On being able to intend.Alfred R. Mele - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):51-71.details
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Imitation, conscious will and social conditioning.Daniel Rueda Garrido - 2020 - Mind and Society 20 (1):85-102.details
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¿Los experimentos de Libet niegan la existencia de la voluntad libre?Victor Manuel Romero Sánchez - 2016 - Signos Filosóficos 18 (36).details
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Trigger warning: no proximal intentions required for intentional action.Marcela Herdova - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):364-383.details
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How do you know that you settled a question?Tillmann Vierkant - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):199-211.details
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Why 'Willusionism' Leads to 'Bad Results': Comments on Baumeister, Crescioni, and Alquist.Eddy Nahmias - 2009 - Neuroethics 4 (1):17-24.details
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Practical Perspective Compatibilism.Sofia Jeppsson - 2012 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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(1 other version)Free Will and Neuroscience.Alfred Mele - 2013 - Philosophic Exchange 43 (1).details
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Don’t panic: Self-authorship without obscure metaphysics1.Adina L. Roskies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):323-342.details
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An action theoretic problem for intralevel mental causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):89-105.details
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Can Autonomous Agents Without Phenomenal Consciousness Be Morally Responsible?László Bernáth - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):1363-1382.details
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Mental imagery and the illusion of conscious will.Paulius Rimkevičius - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4581-4600.details
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From My Arm Rising to Me Raising It: a Taxonomy of Behaviors and Actions.Joana Rigato - 2019 - Kairos 22 (1):132-160.details
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On snubbing proximal intentions.Alfred R. Mele - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2833-2853.details
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Conscious thought is for facilitating social and cultural interactions: How mental simulations serve the animal–culture interface.Roy F. Baumeister & E. J. Masicampo - 2010 - Psychological Review 117 (3):945-971.details
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Intention, Emotion, and Action: A Neural Theory Based on Semantic Pointers.Tobias Schröder, Terrence C. Stewart & Paul Thagard - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (5):851-880.details
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