- Perception is not all-purpose.Bence Nanay - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):4069-4080.details
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Negative actions.Benjamin Mossel - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (2):307-333.details
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Language and Intelligence.Carlos Montemayor - 2021 - Minds and Machines 31 (4):471-486.details
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The structure of instrumental practical reasoning.Christian Miller - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):1–40.details
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Motivation in agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.details
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Self-control, motivational strength, and exposure therapy.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):359-375.details
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Surrounding Free Will: A Response to Baumeister, Crescioni, and Alquist. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2010 - Neuroethics 4 (1):25-29.details
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Self-deception and selectivity.Alfred R. Mele - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2697-2711.details
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Motivation and Agency: Replies: 1. Reply to Wayne Davis. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):295 - 311.details
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Persisting intentions.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):735–757.details
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On Pereboom’s Disappearing Agent Argument.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):561-574.details
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On snubbing proximal intentions.Alfred R. Mele - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2833-2853.details
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Moral responsibility and agents' histories.Alfred Mele - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161 - 181.details
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Moral responsibility and agents’ histories.Alfred Mele - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161-181.details
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Motivation and Agency: Precis.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):243-247.details
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Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21.details
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Luck and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):543-557.details
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Libertarianism and Human Agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):72-92.details
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Intentional action: Controversies, data, and core hypotheses.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):325-340.details
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Free will and moral responsibility: does either require the other?Alfred Mele - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):297-309.details
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Free will and luck: Reply to critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.details
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Discussion – Velleman on action and agency. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):249 - 261.details
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Decisions, intentions, and free will.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):146-162.details
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Direct control.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):275-290.details
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Crimes of Negligence: Attempting and Succeeding. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2012 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):387-398.details
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Agents' abilities.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):447–470.details
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Can one decide to do something without forming an intention to do it?John McGuire - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):269-278.details
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Because I Believe It’s the Right Thing to Do.Joshua May - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):791-808.details
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Acting for the right reasons.Julia Markovits - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242.details
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No reason for identity: on the relation between motivating and normative reasons.Susanne Mantel - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):49-62.details
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Data and phenomena in conceptual modelling.Benedikt Löwe & Thomas Müller - 2011 - Synthese 182 (1):131-148.details
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A regulative theory of basic intentional omissions.Philippe A. Lusson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8399-8421.details
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The independence of (in)coherence.Wooram Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6563-6584.details
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Can imagination be unconscious?Amy Kind - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13121-13141.details
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Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar.Mark Jago - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):278-283.details
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Agency and Embodiment: Groups, Human–Machine Interactions, and Virtual Realities.Johannes Himmelreich - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):197-213.details
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Trigger warning: no proximal intentions required for intentional action.Marcela Herdova - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):364-383.details
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Resolving two tensions in (Neo-)Aristotelian approaches to self-control.Matthew Haug - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (4):685-700.details
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Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW]Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):175-209.details
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Modest libertarianism and practical reason.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):201-216.details
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On the Reason View of Freedom and Semi-Compatibilism.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (4):343-353.details
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Authenticity-sensitive preferentism and educating for well-being and autonomy.Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 42 (1):85-106.details
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Is Synchronic Self-Control Possible?Julia Haas - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2):397-424.details
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Is Remembering to do a Special Kind of Memory?Thor Grünbaum & Søren Kyllingsbæk - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):385-404.details
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Intending to benefit from wrongdoing.Robert E. Goodin & Avia Pasternak - 2016 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 15 (3):280-297.details
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What desires are, and are not.Alan H. Goldman - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):333-352.details
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In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations.Carl Ginet - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):229 - 237.details
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Lenman on externalism and amoralism: An interplanetary exploration.Joshua Gert & Alfred Mele - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):275-283.details
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Breaking the law of desire.Joshua Gert - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (3):295-319.details
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Moral Responsibility, Voluntary Control, and Intentional Action.Kyle G. Fritz - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):831-855.details
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