- Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.details
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Robustness Revised: Frankfurt Cases and the Right Kind of Power to Do Otherwise.Seth Shabo - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):89-106.details
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Is “Free Will” an Emergent Property of Immaterial Soul? A Critical Examination of Human Beings’ Decision-Making Process(es) Followed by Voluntary Actions and Their Moral Responsibility.Satya Sundar Sethy & M. Suresh - 2021 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 38 (3):491-505.details
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Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.details
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The Spectrum of Responsibility Ascription for End Users of Neurotechnologies.Andreas Schönau - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):423-435.details
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Reconsidering Autotelic Play.Stephen E. Schmid - 2009 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 36 (2):238-257.details
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Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
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Endorsement and Autonomous Agency.François Schroeter - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):633-659.details
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Basic deviance reconsidered.Markus E. Schlosser - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):186–194.details
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Beyond Autotelic Play.Stephen E. Schmid - 2011 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 38 (2):149-166.details
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Agent-causation and agential control.Markus Ernst Schlosser - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3-21.details
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Omissions and causalism.Carolina Sartorio - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):513-530.details
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Transparency and introspective unification.Kateryna Samoilova - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
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Intention as action under development: why intention is not a mental state.Devlin Russell - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):742-761.details
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Controlling Core Knowledge: Conditions for the Ascription of Intentional States to Self and Others by Children.James Russell - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):167 - 196.details
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A conditional theory of trying.David-Hillel Ruben - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):271-287.details
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The self-referentiality of intentions.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 97 (1):11-51.details
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Shared agency and contralateral commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.details
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IV—Agency and Embodied Cognition.Komarine Romdenh‐Romluc - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):79-95.details
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The limits of limited-blockage Frankfurt-style cases.Michael Robinson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):429-446.details
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Bayesian Sensorimotor Psychology.Michael Rescorla - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (1):3-36.details
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A Defense of Free Will Skepticism: Replies to Commentaries by Victor Tadros, Saul Smilansky, Michael McKenna, and Alfred R. Mele on Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):617-636.details
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Akrasia, dispositions and degrees.Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2000 - Erkenntnis 53 (3):285-308.details
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Trying slips: Can Davidson and Hornsby account for mistakes and slips?Kay Peabody - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):173-216.details
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Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.details
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Deviant Formal Causation.Sarah K. Paul - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24.details
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The Omissions Account of the Knobe Effect and the Asymmetry Challenge.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):550-571.details
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False consciousness of intentional psychology.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):271-295.details
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The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.details
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The content of intentions.Elisabeth Patherie - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (4):400-432.details
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La dynamique des intentions.Élisabeth Pacherie - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (3):447-.details
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Can Conscious Agency Be Saved?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):33-45.details
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Hierarchy of Idea-Guided Action and Perception-Guided Movement.Sasha Ondobaka & Harold Bekkering - 2012 - Frontiers in Psychology 3.details
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A Case for Epistemic Agency.Dustin Olson - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):449-474.details
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Requirements of intention in light of belief.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2471-2492.details
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Intending Recalcitrant Social Ends.Carlos Núñez - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):477-498.details
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Intending Recalcitrant Social Ends.Carlos Núñez - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):477-498.details
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No achievement beyond intention: A new defence of robust virtue epistemology.Jesús Navarro - 2015 - Synthese 192 (10):3339-3369.details
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Perception is not all-purpose.Bence Nanay - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):4069-4080.details
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Action-oriented Perception.Bence Nanay - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):430-446.details
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Agency, authorship, and illusion.Eddy Nahmias - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):771-785.details
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On trying to save the simple view.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.details
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On Trying to Save the Simple View.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.details
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Emotion: More like Action than Perception.Hichem Naar - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2715-2744.details
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The modularity of the motor system.Myrto Mylopoulos - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):376-393.details
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Intentions and Motor Representations: the Interface Challenge.Myrto Mylopoulos & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):317-336.details
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A cognitive account of agentive awareness.Myrto Mylopoulos - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):545-563.details
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Action, control and sensations of acting.Benjamin Mossel - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (2):129-180.details
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Mental Causation, Autonomy and Action Theory.Dwayne Moore - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):53-73.details
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Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy.Joëlle Proust - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):717-743.details
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