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Switch to: References
Citations of:
L'argomentazione dimostrativa in Aristotele
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 82 (3):423-424 (1977)
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Throughout more than two millennia philosophers adhered massively to ideal standards of scientific rationality going back ultimately to Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora . These standards got progressively shaped by and adapted to new scientific needs and tendencies. Nevertheless, a core of conditions capturing the fundamentals of what a proper science should look like remained remarkably constant all along. Call this cluster of conditions the Classical Model of Science . In this paper we will do two things. First of all, we will (...) |
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In this paper I show that Proclus is an adherent of the Classical Model of Science as set out elsewhere in this issue (de Jong and Betti 2008), and that he adjusts certain conditions of the Model to his Neoplatonic epistemology and metaphysics. In order to show this, I develop a case study concerning philosophy of nature, which, despite its unstable subject matter, Proclus considers to be a science. To give this science a firm foundation Proclus distills from Plato’s Timaeus (...) |
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In Sophistical Refutations 8 Aristotle claims that every sophistical refutation depends on a false belief which is implicitly held by the victim of the fallacy and can normally be elicited from him as an explicit additional premiss. In this case the fallacious argument will be turned into a valid one, albeit with a false premiss. The paper discusses the nature of the FVP and tries to discover how it works when it tacitly causes the false appearance of a fallacious argument. |
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This volume examines the entire logical and philosophical production of Nikolai A. Vasil’ev, studying his life and activities as a historian and man of letters. Readers will gain a comprehensive understanding of this influential Russian logician, philosopher, psychologist, and poet. The author frames Vasil’ev’s work within its historical and cultural context. He takes into consideration both the situation of logic in Russia and the state of logic in Western Europe, from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of (...) |
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‘Injustiça epistêmica’ é o termo usado por Miranda Fricker para descrever um tipo de injustiça que ocorre quando excluímos a contribuição de uma ou mais pessoas à produção, disseminação e manutenção do conhecimento. Em seu livro de mesmo nome (2007), e em uma série de outros trabalhos, Fricker examina de que modo interações interpessoais e sistemas sociais estruturais podem ser responsáveis por influenciar nossa prática cotidiana, consciente ou não, de atribuir status epistêmico a membros de uma comunidade. Seu trabalho se (...) |
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Tomamos como texto de referencia Sobre la generación y la corrupción 2. 10 para establecer el uso de la demostración científica. Aristóteles establece los principios de la generación en GC 1 pero en adelante construye genuinas demostraciones científicas apoyándose precisamente en aquellos principios. Reconstruiremos un pasaje puntual de GC 2. 10 para defender la hipótesis del uso real de la demostración científica en los tratados científicos. La particularidad específica de este trabajo es que esta demostración científica apunta a hacer explícita, (...) |
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Aristotle's cognitive ideal is a form of understanding that requires a sophisticated grasp of scientific first principles. At the end of the Analytics, Aristotle tells us that we learn these principles by induction. But on the whole, commentators have found this an implausible claim: induction seems far too basic a process to yield the sort of knowledge Aristotle's account requires. In this paper I argue that this criticism is misguided. I defend a broader reading of Aristotelian induction, on which there's (...) |
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This paper offers a reconstruction of Alessandro Piccolomini's philosophy of mathematics, and reconstructs the role of Themistius and Averroes in the Renaissance debate on Aristotle's theory of proof. It also describes the interpretative context within which Piccolomini was working in order to show that he was not an isolated figure, but rather that he was fully involved in the debate on mathematics and physics of Italian Aristotelians of his time. The ideas of Lodovico Boccadiferro and Sperone Speroni will be analysed. (...) |
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What is meant under the genuine title of Aristotle’s ta Analytika is rarely properly understood. Presumably, his analytics was inspired by the method of geometric analysis. For Aristotle, this was a regressive or heuristic procedure, departing from a proposed conclusion and asking which premises could be found in order to syllogize, demonstrate or explain it. The terms that form categorical and modal propositions play a fundamental role in analytics. Aristotle introduces letters in lieu of the triples of terms constituting the (...) |
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ABSTRACTIn this paper, I explore the contrast drawn by Aristotle in two parallel passages of the Posterior Analytics between ‘signs’ and ‘demonstration’. I argue that while at APo. I.6 Aristotle contrasts demonstration proper with a deductively valid sign-syllogism, at APo. II.17 the contrast is rather between a demonstration proper and a deductively invalid sign-syllogism. |
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The article examines the relevance of Aristotle’s analysis that concerns the syllogistic figures. On the assumption that Aristotle’s analytics was inspired by the method of geometric analysis, we show how Aristotle used the three terms, when he formulated the three syllogistic figures. So far it has not been appropriately recognized that the three terms — the major, the middle and the minor one — were viewed by Aristotle syntactically and predicatively in the form of diagrams. Many scholars have misunderstood Aristotle (...) |
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In the Posterior Analytics (I 6, 75a18–27) Aristotle discusses a puzzle which endangers the possibility of inferring a non-necessary conclusion. His solution relies on the distinction between the necessity of the conclusion's being the case and the necessity of admitting the conclusion once one has admitted the premisses. The former is a factual necessity, whereas the latter is meant to be a normative or deontic necessity that is independent of the facts stated by the premisses and the conclusion. This paper (...) |
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Aristotle's philosophically most explicit and sophisticated account of the concept of a (primary-)universal proof is found, not in "Analytica Posteriora" 1.4, where he introduces the notion, but in 1.5. In 1.4 Aristotle merely says that a universal proof must be of something arbitrary as well as of something primary and seems to explain primacy in extensional terms, as concerning the largest possible domain. In 1.5 Aristotle improves upon this account after considering three ways in which we may delude ourselves into (...) |
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Offers an extremely bold, far-reaching, and unsuspected thesis in the history of philosophy: Aristotelianism was a dominant movement of the British philosophical landscape, especially in the field of logic, and it had a long survival. British Aristotelian doctrines were strongly empiricist in nature, both in the theory of knowledge and in scientific method; this character marked and influenced further developments in British philosophy at the end of the century, and eventually gave rise to what we now call British empiricism, which (...) |
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