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An Excess of Meaning: Conceptual Over-Interpretation in Confabulation and Schizophrenia.Joshua A. Bergamin - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):163-176.details
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Is there a problem about intentionality?Ansgar Beckermann - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (1):1-24.details
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Analogue Magnitude Representations: A Philosophical Introduction.Jacob Beck - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):829-855.details
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How to do things with nonwords: pragmatics, biosemantics, and origins of language in animal communication.Dorit Bar-On - 2021 - Biology and Philosophy 36 (6):1-25.details
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Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.details
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Minimal theory of mind – a Millikanian Approach.Nimra Asif - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-26.details
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Strong liberal representationalism.Marc Artiga - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (3):645-667.details
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Informational Theories of Content and Mental Representation.Marc Artiga & Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (3):613-627.details
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Creativity: Self-Referential Mistaking, Not Negating. [REVIEW]Victoria N. Alexander - 2013 - Biosemiotics 6 (2):253-272.details
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Teleosemantics without natural selection.Marshall Abrams - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (1):97-116.details
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Constancy Mechanisms and the Normativity of Perception.Zed Adams & Chauncey Maher - 2017 - In Zed Adams & Jacob Browning (eds.), Giving a Damn: Essays in Dialogue with John Haugeland. Cambridge, MA: MIT Pres.details
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Consciousness and Mind.Carolyn Dicey Jennings - forthcoming - In Marcus Rossberg (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.details
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The function of perceptual learning.Zoe Jenkin - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):172-186.details
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A Deflationary Account of Mental Representation.Frances Egan - 2020 - In Joulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Dołrega & Tobias Schlicht (eds.), What Are Mental Representations? New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Perceptual representations: a teleosemantic answer to the breadth-of-application problem.Peter Https://Orcidorg288X Schulte - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (1):119-136.details
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Naturalizing the content of desire.Peter Https://Orcidorg288X Schulte - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):161-174.details
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Las filósofas que nos formaron: injusticias, retos y posibilidades en la filosofía.Aurora Georgina Bustos Arellano & Mayra Jocelin Martínez Martínez - 2022 - Monterrey, Nuevo León, México: Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León.details
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Determination and mental causation.Sara Worley - 1997 - Erkenntnis 46 (3):281-304.details
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Scepticism About Reflexive Intentions Refuted.Maciej Witek - 2009 - Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 5 (1):69-83.details
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What Is Information? Three Concepts.William F. Harms - 2006 - Biological Theory 1 (3):230-242.details
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Purpose and content.J. T. Whyte - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):45-60.details
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Greatest surprise reduction semantics: an information theoretic solution to misrepresentation and disjunction.D. E. Weissglass - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2185-2205.details
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The fragmentary model of temporal experience and the mirroring constraint.Gerardo Alberto Viera - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):21-44.details
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Comment on Ryder's SINBAD neurosemantics: Is teleofunction isomorphism the way to understand representations?Marius Usher - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):241-248.details
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Compositionality and Sandbag Semantics.Elmar Geir Unnsteinsson - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3329-3350.details
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What In Nature Is The Compulsion Of Reason?Kenneth A. Taylor - 2000 - Synthese 122 (1-2):209-244.details
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Intentionality and partial belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7).details
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Reflections on Meaning.Eric Swanson - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):131-134.details
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Malfunction Defended.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2501-2522.details
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John Maynard Smith’s notion of animal signals.Ulrich E. Stegmann - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (5):1011-1025.details
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Deacon’s Challenge: From Calls to Words.Kim Sterelny - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):271-282.details
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Content, Control and Display: The Natural Origins of Content.Kim Sterelny - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):549-564.details
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Modelling ourselves: what the free energy principle reveals about our implicit notions of representation.Matt Sims & Giovanni Pezzulo - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7801-7833.details
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A continuum of intentionality: linking the biogenic and anthropogenic approaches to cognition.Matthew Sims - 2021 - Biology and Philosophy 36 (6):1-31.details
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Bodily skill and internal representation in sensorimotor perception.David Silverman - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):157-173.details
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Ground grounded.Theodore Sider - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):747-767.details
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Content in Simple Signalling Systems.Nicholas Shea, Peter Godfrey-Smith & Rosa Cao - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1009-1035.details
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Making it mental: in search for the golden mean of the extended cognition controversy.Itay Shani - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):1-26.details
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First-person representations and responsible agency in AI.Miguel Ángel Sebastián & Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7061-7079.details
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Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition.Tobias Schlicht & Tobias Starzak - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):89-113.details
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How Frogs See the World: Putting Millikan’s Teleosemantics to the Test.Peter Schulte - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):483-496.details
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Does Separating Intentionality From Mental Representation Imply Radical Enactivism?Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, Philosopher, and Mathematician King.Malcolm Schofield - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):108-112.details
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Whose purposes? Biological teleology and intentionality.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4507-4524.details
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On the nature, pathology, and etiology of delusions: comments on Miyazono’s delusions and beliefs.Eisuke Sakakibara - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-8.details
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Where Concepts Come from: Learning Concepts by Description and by Demonstration.Dylan Sabo - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):531-549.details
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SINBaD neurosemantics: A theory of mental representation.Dan Ryder - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):211-240.details
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The Hard Problem of Content is Neither.William Max Ramsey - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.details
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Why Does Time Seem to Pass?Simon Prosser - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):92-116.details
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