- The Essences of Fundamental Properties.Jennifer Wang - 2019 - Metaphysics 2 (1):40-54.details
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The epistemological objection to modal primitivism.Jennifer Wang - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 8):1887-1898.details
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Nominalist dispositional essentialism.Lisa Vogt - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Perceiving Potentiality: A Metaphysics for Affordances.Barbara Vetter - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1177-1191.details
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Recent Work: Modality without Possible Worlds.Barbara Vetter - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):742-754.details
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Counterpossibles (not only) for dispositionalists.Barbara Vetter - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2681-2700.details
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Dispositions without Conditionals.Barbara Vetter - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):129-156.details
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Explanatory dispositionalism: What anti-humeans should say.Barbara Vetter - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2051-2075.details
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A plenitude of powers.Barbara Vetter - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 6):1365-1385.details
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Is act-consquentialism self-effacing?Nikhil Venkatesh - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):718-726.details
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Holism Resurfacing: How Far Should We Go With It?Márta Ujvári - 2021 - Metaphysica 22 (2):133-155.details
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Metaphysical Explanation Separated from Grounding.Márta Ujvári - 2020 - Metaphysica 21 (1):55-69.details
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Power Worlds and the Problem of Individuation.Matthew Tugby - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):269-282.details
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Simultaneity in dispositional interaction?Matthew Tugby - 2010 - Ratio 23 (3):322-338.details
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Grounding theories of powers.Matthew Tugby - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11187-11216.details
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Modal Platonism and the Problem of Negativity.Matthew Tugby - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):465-476.details
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On the Reality of Intrinsically Finkable Dispositions.Matthew Tugby - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):623-631.details
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Platonic Dispositionalism.Matthew Tugby - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):fzt071.details
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Abduction and the Scientific Realist Case for Properties.Matthew Tugby - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (1):123-145.details
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The Individuation of Causal Powers by Events (and Consequences of the Approach).Brandon N. Towl - 2010 - Metaphysica 11 (1):49-61.details
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Emergent substance.Patrick Toner - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):281 - 297.details
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The Role Functionalist Theory of Absences.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):505-519.details
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Powerful qualities and pure powers.Henry Taylor - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1423-1440.details
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Powerful Qualities, Phenomenal Concepts, and the New Challenge to Physicalism.Henry Taylor - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):53-66.details
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Powerful qualities, the conceivability argument and the nature of the physical.Henry Taylor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1895-1910.details
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A new solution to the regress of pure powers.Henry Taylor - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):709-718.details
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Czy współczesne nauki przyrodnicze mogą inspirować filozoficzny i teologiczny namysł nad przyczynowością?Mariusz Tabaczek - 2018 - Scientia et Fides 6 (2):147-180.details
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Formas del respeto y diversidad sexual. ¿Es descartable la tolerancia?Manfred Svensson & Eduardo Fuentes - 2019 - Filosofia Unisinos 20 (1):36-45.details
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Truthmaker Internalism and the Mind-Dependence of Propositions.Robin Stenwall - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):59-76.details
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Nomological Resemblance.Robin Stenwall - 2012 - Metaphysica 14 (1):31-46.details
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A Multiply Qualified Conditional Analysis of Disposition Ascription: Mapping the Conceptual Topography of Ceteris Paribus.Jesse R. Steinberg & Alan M. Steinberg - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):777-793.details
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No work for a theory of epistemic dispositions.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3477-3498.details
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In Defence of Pan-Dispositionalism.Simon Bostock - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (2):139-157.details
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Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False.Itay Shani - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):294-298.details
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Aim that Bow! An Interactivist Gaze at the Problem of Intentional Tracking.Itay Shani - 2011 - Axiomathes 21 (1):67-97.details
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Why Live Forever? What Metaphysics Can Contribute.Aaron Segal - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):185-204.details
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Humeanisms: metaphysical and epistemological.Aaron Segal - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):905-925.details
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Causal essentialism and mereological monism.Aaron Segal - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):227-255.details
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The Powerlessness of Necessity.Markus Schrenk - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):725-739.details
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Teleology and the Dispositional Theory of Causation in Thomas Aquinas.Stephan Schmid - 2011 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 14 (1):21-39.details
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Interfering with nomological necessity.Markus Schrenk - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):577-597.details
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Hic Rhodos, hic salta: From reductionist semantics to a realist ontology of forceful dispositions.Markus Schrenk - 2009 - In G. Damschen, K. Stueber & R. Schnepf (eds.), Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. De Gruyter. pp. 143-167.details
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Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered.Robert Schroer - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.details
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Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge.Andrea Sauchelli - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):345-359.details
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Events, agents, and settling whether and how one intervenes.Jason D. Runyan - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1629-1646.details
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The dynamical essence of powers.Andrea Roselli & Christopher Austin - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5):14951-14973.details
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Why Causal Evidencing of Risk Fails. An Example from Oil Contamination.Elena Rocca & Rani Lill Anjum - 2019 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 22 (2):197-213.details
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Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions.Luke Robinson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):289-309.details
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Naturalized Metaphysics.Jack Ritchie - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (5):673-685.details
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Functional Properties are Epiphenomenal.Matthew Rellihan - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1171-1195.details
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