Kripke’s theory of truth, 690–716; 1975) has been very successful but shows well-known expressive difficulties; recently, Field has proposed to overcome them by adding a new conditional connective to it. In Field’s theories, desirable conditional and truth-theoretic principles are validated that Kripke’s theory does not yield. Some authors, however, are dissatisfied with certain aspects of Field’s theories, in particular the high complexity. I analyze Field’s models and pin down some reasons for discontent with them, focusing on the meaning of the (...) new conditional and on the status of the principles so successfully recovered. Subsequently, I develop a semantics that improves on Kripke’s theory following Field’s program of adding a conditional to it, using some inductive constructions that include Kripke’s one and feature a strong evaluation for conditionals. The new theory overcomes several problems of Kripke’s one and, although weaker than Field’s proposals, it avoids the difficulties that affect them; at the same time, the new theory turns out to be quite simple. Moreover, the new construction can be used to model various conceptions of what a conditional connective is, in ways that are precluded to both Kripke’s and Field’s theories. (shrink)

An external characterization of the inductive sets on countable abstract structures is presented. The main result is an abstract version of the classical Suslin-Kleene characterization of the hyperarithmetical sets.

We present game-theoretic characterizations of the complexity/expressibility measures “dimension” and “the number of variables” as Least Fixed Point queries. As an example, we use these characterizations to compute the dimension and number of variables of Connectivity and Connectivity.

We investigate a theory of Frege structures extended by the Myhill-Flagg hierarchy of implications. We study its relation to a property theory with an approximation operator and we give a proof theoretical analysis of the basic system involved. MSC: 03F35, 03D60.

The complexity of the set of truths of arithmetic is determined for various theories of truth deriving from Kripke and from Gupta and Herzberger.

In this paper we study several translations that map models and formulae of the language of second-order arithmetic to models and formulae of the language of truth. These translations are useful because they allow us to exploit results from the extensive literature on arithmetic to study the notion of truth. Our purpose is to present these connections in a systematic way, generalize some well-known results in this area, and to provide a number of new results. Sections 3 and 4 contain (...) some recursion- and proof-theoretic results about Kripke-style fixed-point theories of truth. Section 5 shows how to derive full second-order arithmetic from principles of truth. Section 6 investigates the proof-theoretic strength of disquotation without an arithmetical base theory. (shrink)

In ordinal analysis of impredicative theories so-called collapsing functions are of central importance. Unfortunately, the definition procedure of these functions makes essential use of uncountable cardinals whereas the notation system that they call into being corresponds to a recursive ordinal. It has long been claimed that, instead, one should manage to develop such functions directly on the basis of admissible ordinals. This paper is meant to show how this can be done. Interpreting the collapsing functions as operating directly on admissible (...) sets also renders a new and perspicuous approach to well-ordering proofs possible. MSC: 03F15, 03F35. (shrink)

We give a sufficient condition for a countable model M of PA to be expandable to an ω-model of AST with absolute Ω-orderings. The condition is in terms of saturation schemes or, equivalently, in terms of the ability of the model to code sequences which have some kind of definition in (M, ω). We also show that a weaker scheme of saturation leads to the existence of wellorderings of the model with nice properties. Finally, we answer affirmatively the question of (...) whether the intersection of all β-expansions of a β-expandable model M is the set RA(M, ω)--the ramified analytical hierarchy over (M, ω). The results are based on forcing constructions. (shrink)

The context for this paper is Feferman's theory of explicit mathematics, T 0 . We address a problem that was posed in [6]. Let MID be the principle stating that any monotone operation on classifications has a least fixed point. The main objective of this paper is to show that T 0 + MID, when based on classical logic, also proves the existence of non-monotone inductive definitions that arise from arbitrary extensional operations on classifications. From the latter we deduce that (...) MID, when adjoined to classical T 0 , leads to a much stronger theory than T 0. (shrink)

Set theory, it has been contended, developed from its beginnings through a progression ofmathematicalmoves, despite being intertwined with pronounced metaphysical attitudes and exaggerated foundational claims that have been held on its behalf. In this paper, the seminal results of set theory are woven together in terms of a unifying mathematical motif, one whose transmutations serve to illuminate the historical development of the subject. The motif is foreshadowed in Cantor's diagonal proof, and emerges in the interstices of the inclusion vs. membership (...) distinction, a distinction only clarified at the turn of this century, remarkable though this may seem. Russell runs with this distinction, but is quickly caught on the horns of his well-known paradox, an early expression of our motif. The motif becomes fully manifest through the study of functionsof the power set of a set into the set in the fundamental work of Zermelo on set theory. His first proof in 1904 of his Well-Ordering Theoremis a central articulation containing much of what would become familiar in the subsequent development of set theory. Afterwards, the motif is cast by Kuratowski as a fixed point theorem, one subsequently abstracted to partial orders by Bourbaki in connection with Zorn's Lemma. Migrating beyond set theory, that generalization becomes cited as the strongest of fixed point theorems useful in computer science.Section 1 describes the emergence of our guiding motif as a line of development from Cantor's diagonal proof to Russell's Paradox, fueled by the clarification of the inclusion vs. membership distinction. Section 2 engages the motif as fully participating in Zermelo's work on the Well-Ordering Theorem and as newly informing on Cantor's basic result that there is no bijection. Then Section 3 describes in connection with Zorn's Lemma the transformation of the motif into an abstract fixed point theorem, one accorded significance in computer science. (shrink)

We prove that the set of properties describable by a uniform sequence of first-order sentences using at most k + 1 distinct variables is exactly equal to the set of properties checkable by a Turing machine in DSPACE[n k ] (where n is the size of the universe). This set is also equal to the set of properties describable using an iterative definition for a finite set of relations of arity k. This is a refinement of the theorem PSPACE = (...) VAR[O[1]] [8]. We suggest some directions for exploiting this result to derive trade-offs between the number of variables and the quantifier depth in descriptive complexity. (shrink)

A theory of the transfinite Tarskian hierarchy of languages is outlined and compared to a notion of partial truth by Kripke. It is shown that the hierarchy can be embedded into Kripke's minimal fixed point model. From this results on the expressive power of both approaches are obtained.

We use connections between conjunctive game formulas and the theory of inductive definitions to define the notions of a coinductive formula and its approximations. Corresponding to the theory of conjunctive game formulas we develop a theory of coinductive formulas, including a covering theorem and a normal form theorem for many sorted languages. Applying both theorems and the results on "model interpolation" obtained in this paper, we prove a many-sorted interpolation theorem for ω 1 ω-logic, which considers interpolation with respect to (...) the language symbols, the quantifiers, the identity, and countably infinite conjunction and disjunction. (shrink)

The choice construct (choose x: φ(x)) is useful in software specifications. We study extensions of first-order logic with the choice construct. We prove some results about Hilbert's ε operator, but in the main part of the paper we consider the case when all choices are independent.

This book is a contribution to the flourishing field of formal and philosophical work on truth and the semantic paradoxes. Our aim is to present several theories of truth, to investigate some of their model-theoretic, recursion-theoretic and proof-theoretic aspects, and to evaluate their philosophical significance. In Part I we first outline some motivations for studying formal theories of truth, fix some terminology, provide some background on Tarski’s and Kripke’s theories of truth, and then discuss the prospects of classical type-free truth. (...) In Chapter 4 we discuss some minimal adequacy conditions on a satisfactory theory of truth based on the function that the truth predicate is intended to fulfil on the deflationist account. We cast doubt on the adequacy of some non-classical theories of truth and argue in favor of classical theories of truth. Part II is devoted to grounded truth. In chapter 5 we introduce a game-theoretic semantics for Kripke’s theory of truth. Strategies in these games can be interpreted as reference-graphs of the sentences in question. Using that framework, we give a graph-theoretic analysis of the Kripke-paradoxical sentences. In chapter 6 we provide simultaneous axiomatizations of groundedness and truth, and analyze the proof-theoretic strength of the resulting theories. These range from conservative extensions of Peano arithmetic to theories that have the full strength of the impredicative system ID1. Part III investigates the relationship between truth and set-theoretic comprehen- sion. In chapter 7 we canonically associate extensions of the truth predicate with Henkin-models of second-order arithmetic. This relationship will be employed to determine the recursion-theoretic complexity of several theories of grounded truth and to show the consistency of the latter with principles of generalized induction. In chapter 8 it is shown that the sets definable over the standard model of the Tarskian hierarchy are exactly the hyperarithmetical sets. Finally, we try to apply a certain solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes to the case of truth, namely Quine’s idea of stratification. This will yield classical disquotational theories that interpret full second-order arithmetic without set parameters, Z2- . We also indicate a method to recover the parameters. An appendix provides some background on ordinal notations, recursion theory and graph theory. (shrink)

This paper presents and defends a way to add a transparent truth predicate to classical logic, such that and A are everywhere intersubstitutable, where all T-biconditionals hold, and where truth can be made compositional. A key feature of our framework, called STTT (for Strict-Tolerant Transparent Truth), is that it supports a non-transitive relation of consequence. At the same time, it can be seen that the only failures of transitivity STTT allows for arise in paradoxical cases.

We investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense: only the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to be true in (...) KF and conjectured that the detour through classical logic in KF is dispensable. We refute Reinhardt's Conjecture, and provide a direct axiomatization PKF of Kripke's theory in partial logic. We argue that any natural axiomatization of Kripke's theory in Strong Kleene logic has the same proof-theoretic strength as PKF, namely the strength of the system RA< ωω ramified analysis or a system of Tarskian ramified truth up to ωω. Thus any such axiomatization is much weaker than Feferman's axiomatization KF in classical logic, which is equivalent to the system RA<ε₀ of ramified analysis up to ε₀. (shrink)

Minimal predicates P satisfying a given first-order description φ(P) occur widely in mathematical logic and computer science. We give an explicit first-order syntax for special first-order ‘PIA conditions’ φ(P) which guarantees unique existence of such minimal predicates. Our main technical result is a preservation theorem showing PIA-conditions to be expressively complete for all those first-order formulas that are preserved under a natural model-theoretic operation of ‘predicate intersection’. Next, we show how iterated predicate minimization on PIA-conditions yields a language MIN(FO) equal (...) in expressive power to LFP(FO), first-order logic closed under smallest fixed-points for monotone operations. As a concrete illustration of these notions, we show how our sort of predicate minimization extends the usual frame correspondence theory of modal logic, leading to a proper hierarchy of modal axioms: first-order-definable, first-order fixed-point definable, and beyond. (shrink)

The context for this paper is Feferman's theory of explicit mathematics, a formal framework serving many purposes. It is suitable for representing Bishop-style constructive mathematics as well as generalized recursion, including direct expression of structural concepts which admit self-application. The object of investigation here is the theory of explicit mathematics augmented by the monotone fixed point principle, which asserts that any monotone operation on classifications (Feferman's notion of set) possesses a least fixed point. To be more precise, the new axiom (...) not merely postulates the existence of a least solution, but, by adjoining a new functional constant to the language, it is ensured that a fixed point is uniformly presentable as a function of the monotone operation. The upshot of the paper is that the latter extension of explicit mathematics (when based on classical logic) embodies considerable proof-theoretic strength. It is shown that it has at least the strength of the subsystem of second order arithmetic based on Π 1 2 comprehension. (shrink)

This paper presents several proof-theoretic results concerning weak fixed point theories over second order number theory with arithmetic comprehension and full or restricted induction on the natural numbers. It is also shown that there are natural second order theories which are proof-theoretically equivalent but have different proof-theoretic ordinals.

This isnotabout the symbolic manipulation of functions so popular these days. Rather it is about the more abstract, but infinitely less practical, problem of the primitive. Simply stated:Given a derivativef: ℝ → ℝ, how can we recover its primitive?The roots of this problem go back to the beginnings of calculus and it is even sometimes called “Newton's problem”. Historically, it has played a major role in the development of the theory of the integral. For example, it was Lebesgue's primary motivation (...) behind his theory of measure and integration. Indeed, the Lebesgue integral solves the primitive problem for the important special case whenfis bounded. Yet, as Lebesgue noted with apparent regret, there are very simple derivatives = 0,F=x2sinforx≠ 0) which cannot be inverted using his integral.The general problem of the primitive was finally solved in 1912 by A. Denjoy. But his integration process was more complicated than that of Lebesgue. Denjoy's basic idea was to first calculate the definite integralf dxover as many intervals as possible, using Lebesgue integration. Then, he showed that by using these results, the definite integral could be found over even more intervals, either by using the standard improper integral technique of Cauchy, or an extension technique developed by Lebesgue. (shrink)

We do a quantitative analysis of modal logic. For example, for each Kripke structure M, we study the least ordinal μ such that for each state of M, the beliefs of up to level μ characterize the agents' beliefs (that is, there is only one way to extend these beliefs to higher levels). As another example, we show the equivalence of three conditions, that on the face of it look quite different, for what it means to say that the agents' (...) beliefs have a countable description, or putting it another way, have a "countable amount of information". The first condition says that the beliefs of the agents are those at a state of a countable Kripke structure. The second condition says that the beliefs of the agents can be described in an infinitary language, where conjunctions of arbitrary countable sets of formulas are allowed. The third condition says that countably many levels of belief are sufficient to capture all of the uncertainty of the agents (along with a technical condition). The fact that all of these conditions are equivalent shows the robustness of the concept of the agents' beliefs having a "countable description". (shrink)

In philosophical logic necessity is usually conceived as a sentential operator rather than as a predicate. An intensional sentential operator does not allow one to express quantified statements such as 'There are necessary a posteriori propositions' or 'All laws of physics are necessary' in first-order logic in a straightforward way, while they are readily formalized if necessity is formalized by a predicate. Replacing the operator conception of necessity by the predicate conception, however, causes various problems and forces one to reject (...) many philosophical accounts involving necessity that are based on the use of operator modal logic. We argue that the expressive power of the predicate account can be restored if a truth predicate is added to the language of first-order modal logic, because the predicate 'is necessary' can then be replaced by 'is necessarily true'. We prove a result showing that this substitution is technically feasible. To this end we provide partial possible-worlds semantics for the language with a predicate of necessity and perform the reduction of necessities to necessary truths. The technique applies also to many other intensional notions that have been analysed by means of modal operators. (shrink)

The classical theory of definitions bans so-called circular definitions, namely, definitions of a unary predicate P, based on stipulations of the form $$Px =_{\mathsf {Df}} \phi,$$where ϕ is a formula of a fixed first-order language and the definiendumP occurs into the definiensϕ. In their seminal book The Revision Theory of Truth, Gupta and Belnap claim that “General theories of definitions are possible within which circular definitions [...] make logical and semantic sense” [p. IX]. In order to sustain their claim, they (...) develop in this book one general theory of definitions based on revision sequences, namely, ordinal-length iterations of the operator which is induced by the definition of the predicate. Gupta-Belnap’s approach to circular definitions has been criticised, among others, by D. Martin and V. McGee. Their criticisms point to the logical complexity of revision sequences, to their relations with ordinary mathematical practice, and to their merits relative to alternative approaches. I will present an alternative general theory of definitions, based on a combination of supervaluation and ω-length revision, which aims to address some criticisms raised against revision sequences, while preserving the philosophical and mathematical core of revision. (shrink)

We consider fixed point logics, i.e., extensions of first order predicate logic with operators defining fixed points. A number of such operators, generalizing inductive definitions, have been studied in the context of finite model theory, including nondeterministic and alternating operators. We review results established in finite model theory, and also consider the expressive power of the resulting logics on infinite structures. In particular, we establish the relationship between inflationary and nondeterministic fixed point logics and second order logic, and we consider (...) questions related to the determinacy of games associated with alternating fixed points. (shrink)

Michael Kremer defines fixed-point logics of truth based on Saul Kripke’s fixed point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. Kremer axiomatizes the strong Kleene fixed-point logic of truth and the weak Kleene fixed-point logic of truth, but leaves the axiomatizability question open for the supervaluation fixed-point logic of truth and its variants. We show that the principal supervaluation fixed point logic of truth, when thought of as consequence relation, is highly complex: it is not even analytic. We also (...) consider variants, engendered by a stronger notion of ‘fixed point’, and by variant supervaluation schemes. A ‘logic’ is often thought of, not as a consequence relation, but as a set of sentences – the sentences true on each interpretation. We axiomatize the supervaluation fixed-point logics so conceived. (shrink)

We show that the set of ultimately true sentences in Hartry Field's Revenge-immune solution model to the semantic paradoxes is recursively isomorphic to the set of stably true sentences obtained in Hans Herzberger's revision sequence starting from the null hypothesis. We further remark that this shows that a substantial subsystem of second-order number theory is needed to establish the semantic values of sentences in Field's relative consistency proof of his theory over the ground model of the standard natural numbers: -CA0 (...) (second-order number theory with a -comprehension axiom scheme) is insufficient. We briefly consider his claim to have produced a solution to the semantic paradoxes by introducing this conditional. We remark that the notion of a operator can be introduced in other settings. (shrink)

A function is recursive (in given operations) if its values are computed explicitly and uniformly in terms of other "previously computed" values of itself and (perhaps) other "simultaneously computed" recursive functions. Here, "explicitly" includes definition by cases. We investigate those recursive functions on the structure $\mathbf{N} = \langle \omega, 0, \operatorname{succ,pred}\rangle$ that are computed in terms of themselves only, without other simultaneously computed recursive functions.

In this paper first order theories for nonmonotone inductive definitions are introduced, and a proof-theoretic analysis for such theories based on combined operator forms a la Richter with recursively inaccessible and Mahlo closure ordinals is given.

We show that several theorems on ordinal bounds in different parts of logic are simple consequences of a basic result in the theory of global inductive definitions.

§0. Introduction. In [16], Barwise described his graduate study at Stanford. He told of his interactions with Kreisel and Scott, and said how he chose Feferman as his advisor. He began working on admissible fragments of infinitary logic after reading and giving seminar talks on two Ph.D. theses which had recently been completed: that of Lopez-Escobar, at Berkeley, on infinitary logic [46], and that of Platek [58], at Stanford, on admissible sets.Barwise's work on infinitary logic and admissible sets is described (...) in his thesis [4], the book [13], and papers [5]—[16]. We do not try to give a systematic review of these papers. Instead, our goal is to give a coherent introduction to infinitary logic and admissible sets. We describe results of Barwise, of course, because he did so much. In addition, we mention some more recent work, to indicate the current importance of Barwise's ideas. Many of the central results are stated without proof, but occasionally we sketch a proof, to indicate how the ideas fit together.Chapters 1 and 2 describe infinitary logic and admissible sets at the time Barwise began his work, circa 1965. From Chapter 3 on, we survey the developments that took place after Barwise appeared on the scene.§1. Background on infinitary logic. In this chapter, we describe the situation in infinitary logic at the time that Barwise began his work. We need some terminology. By a vocabulary, we mean a set L of constant symbols, and relation and operation symbols with finitely many argument places. As usual, by an L-structureM, we mean a universe set M with an interpretation for each symbol of L. (shrink)

We study a system, μŁΠ, obtained by an expansion of ŁΠ logic with fixed points connectives. The first main result of the paper is that μŁΠ is standard complete, i.e., complete with regard to the unit interval of real numbers endowed with a suitable structure. We also prove that the class of algebras which forms algebraic semantics for this logic is generated, as a variety, by its linearly ordered members and that they are precisely the interval algebras of real closed (...) fields. This correspondence is extended to a categorical equivalence between the whole category of those algebras and another category naturally arising from real closed fields. Finally, we show that this logic enjoys implicative interpolation. (shrink)