- Mind and Brain States.Inês Hipólito - 2015 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 44 (2):102-111.details
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A promissory note is paid, but has this bought into an illusion?Philip N. Hineline - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):650-651.details
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Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.details
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Imaginability, conceivability, possibility and the mind-body problem.Christopher S. Hill - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.details
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The distant blast of Lloyd Morgan's Canon.Cecilia Heyes - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):256-257.details
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Imagination and imitation: Input, acid test, or alchemy?C. M. Heyes - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):131-132.details
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The ethics of autism.Kristien Hens, Ingrid Robeyns & Katrien Schaubroeck - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 14 (1):e12559.details
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Practicing safe epistemology.David Henderson & Terence E. Horgan - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):227 - 258.details
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Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324.details
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Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.details
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The Value of Literature for Consciousness Research and Ethics.Mette Leonard Høeg - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (1):138-162.details
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Do we know how happy we are? On some limits of affective introspection and recall.Daniel M. Haybron - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):394–428.details
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Why and How. The Future of the Central Questions of Consciousness.Marek Havlík, Eva Kozáková & Jiří Horáček - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8:279552.details
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Do Personality Features Influence Our Intuitions of the Mind-Body Problem? A Pilot Study.Marek Havlík, Karolína Mladá, Iveta Fajnerová & Jiří Horáček - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Why isn't my pocket calculator a thinking thing?Larry Hauser - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (1):3-10.details
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The sense of thinking.Larry Hauser - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (1):21-29.details
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Reaping the whirlwind: Reply to Harnad's Other Bodies, Other Minds. [REVIEW]Larry Hauser - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (2):219-37.details
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Radical Interpretation and The Aggregation Problem.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):283-303.details
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Posthuman learning: AI from novice to expert?Cathrine Hasse - 2019 - AI and Society 34 (2):355-364.details
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What is the intentional stance?Gilbert Harman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.details
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The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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Seeing the Animal: On the Ethical Implications of De-animalization in Intensive Animal Production Systems.Jes Lynning Harfeld, Cécile Cornou, Anna Kornum & Mickey Gjerris - 2016 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 29 (3):407-423.details
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Philosophical Ethology: On the Extents of What It Is to Be a Pig.Jes Harfeld - 2011 - Society and Animals 19 (1):83-101.details
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Phenomenal fallacies and conflations.Gilbert Harman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):256-257.details
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Psychology as moral rhetoric.Rom Harré - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):595-596.details
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Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. [REVIEW]Stevan Harnad - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (1):43-54.details
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(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics.Gilbert Harman - 1987 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics. London: Academic Press. pp. 55–81.details
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Minds, machines and Turing: The indistinguishability of indistinguishables.Stevan Harnad - 2000 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (4):425-445.details
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Intention and empathy.Kevin Harrelson - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (8):1162-1184.details
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“How monkeys see the world.” Why monkeys?A. H. Harcourt - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):160-161.details
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First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.details
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Epiphenomenalism and the reduction of experience.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):680-680.details
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Do Animals Feel Pain?Peter Harrison - 1991 - Philosophy 66 (255):25-40.details
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Communication versus discrimination.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):649-650.details
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Computation is just interpretable symbol manipulation; cognition isn't.Stevan Harnad - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):379-90.details
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How autistics see the world.Francesca Happé & Ulta Frith - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):159-160.details
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The relatively happy fish.Chad Hansen - 2003 - Asian Philosophy 13 (2 & 3):145 – 164.details
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Neurophenomenology and the Spontaneity of Consciousness.Robert Hanna & Evan Thompson - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):133-162.details
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Kantian non-conceptualism.Robert Hanna - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.details
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Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content.Robert Hanna - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):323 - 398.details
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Bevissthet.Mette Kristine Hansen - 2020 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 55 (4):253-268.details
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Do Plants Feel Pain?Adam Hamilton & Justin McBrayer - 2020 - Disputatio 12 (56):71-98.details
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Is Consciousness Vague?Geoffrey Hall - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):670-684.details
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The Process-Oriented Conception of Truth in William James.J. Edward Hackett - 2020 - Process Studies 49 (2):209-233.details
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The language game of responsible agency and the problem of free will: How can epistemic dualism be reconciled with ontological monism?Jürgen Habermas - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):13 – 50.details
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Are we ready to bootstrap neurophysiology into an understanding of perception?Ralph Norman Haber - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (2):263-264.details
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Capgras delusion: An interactionist model.Garry Young - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):863-876.details
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On how a child’s awareness of thinking informs explanations of thought insertion.Garry Young - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):848-862.details
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Pain, qualia, and the explanatory gap.Donald F. Gustafson - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.details
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Pain, qualia, and the explanatory gap.Don Gustafson - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.details
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