- Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.Timothy Bowen - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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The “Non-atheistic-thesis-of-Cartesian-metaphysics”.Rodrigo Alfonso González - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (3):213-222.details
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Heat and Pain Identity Statements and the Imaginability Argument.Michal Polák - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (2):(A1)5-31.details
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Max Black's objection to mind-body identity.Ned Block - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:3-78.details
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Are Phenomenal Concepts Perspectival?Andreas Elpidorou - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):43-53.details
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Consciousness, type physicalism, and inference to the best explanation.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):266-304.details
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Kripke's proof is ad hominem not two-dimensional.David Papineau - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):475–494.details
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Possibility and imagination.Alex Byrne - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):125–144.details
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Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.details
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Intuition and Modal Error.George Bealer - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemology: new essays.Quentin Smith (ed.) - 2008 - New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.details
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Taking referentialism seriously: A response to the modal argument.Brendan O'sullivan - 2010 - Theoria 76 (1):54-67.details
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Why Panpsychism Doesn’t Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.details
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Why Panpsychism doesn't Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.details
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On the Possibility of Skeptical Scenarios.Peter Kung - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):387-407.details
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Conceiving of Pain.Brendan O'Sullivan & Peter Hanks - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):351-376.details
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Forms of Luminosity.Hasen Khudairi - 2017details
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A Posteriori Physicalism and the Discrimination of Properties.Philip Woodward - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):121-143.details
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How to be a (sort of) A Priori physicalist.D. Gene Witmer - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):185-225.details
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The Hard Problem Isn’t Getting any Easier: Thoughts on Chalmers’ “Meta-Problem”.Ben White - 2020 - Philosophia 49:495-506.details
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Physicalism Requires Functionalism: A New Formulation and Defense of the Via Negativa.Justin Tiehen - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):3-24.details
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Conceptualizing physical consciousness.James Tartaglia - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):817-838.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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How Physicalists Can—and Cannot—Explain the Seeming “Absurdity” of Physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):681-703.details
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
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Two Conceivability Arguments Compared.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):27-44.details
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Expanding Observability via Human-Machine Cooperation.Petr Spelda & Vit Stritecky - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (3):819-832.details
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The Problem of Modally Bad Company.Tom Schoonen - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (4):639-659.details
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Practical rationality is a problem in the philosophy of mind.Timothy Schroeder - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):394-409.details
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Grounded Shadows, Groundless Ghosts.Ezra Rubenstein - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (3):723-750.details
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Conceivability, Possibility and Materialism.Karol Polcyn - 2020 - Diametros 19 (73):20-34.details
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An analysis of the binding problem.Jan Plate - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):773 – 792.details
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A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.details
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The blurred line between epistemic and metaphysical modalities in the modal epistemology of imagination.Iñaki Xavier Larrauri Pertierra - 2022 - Philosophical Forum 53 (4):227-258.details
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Capacitism as a New Solution to Mary's puzzle.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations 14 (32):252-263.details
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Modal arguments against materialism.Michael Pelczar - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):426-444.details
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Absent Qualia and Categorical Properties.Brendan O’Sullivan - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):353-371.details
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Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):364–380.details
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Grounding, physicalism and necessity.Donnchadh O'Conaill - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (7):713-730.details
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Persistence and the First-Person Perspective.Dilip Ninan - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (4):425-464.details
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Atsisveikinant su svajone: kodėl suvokiamumo argumentai nepajėgia atskleisti sąmonės metafizikos.Luis Alejandro Murillo-Lara - 2023 - Problemos 104:119-131.details
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Thought experiments in personal identity: A dialogue with Beck, Wagner and Wilkes.Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera - 2017 - South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):456-469.details
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Herméneutique cosmique.Brian McLaughlin - 2000 - Philosophiques 27 (1):63-76.details
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A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to Block's harder problem.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204.details
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Mary Meets Molyneux: The Explanatory Gap and the Individuation of Phenomenal Concepts.Macdonald Cynthia - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):503-524.details
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What it is like.Haoying Liu - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Taking type-b materialism seriously.Janet Levin - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):402-425.details
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Tye's ptolemaic revolution (review of consciousness revisited: Materialism without phenomenal concepts).Janet Levin - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):98-117.details
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The evidential status of philosophical intuition.Janet Levin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224.details
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Imaginability, Possibility, and the Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.Janet Levin - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):391-421.details
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