Photomechanical reprint of papers from 1970 to 1992 mostly in English, some in German or French: Foreword 1–4; LAW AS PRACTICE ‘La formation des concepts en sciences juridiques’ 7–33, ‘Geltung des Rechts – Wirksamkeit des Rechts’ 35–42, ‘Macrosociological Theories of Law’ 43–76, ‘Law & its Inner Morality’ 77–89, ‘The Law & its Limits’ 91–96; LAW AS TECHNIQUE ‘Domaine »externe« & domaine »interne« en droit’ 99–117, ‘Die ministerielle Begründung’ 119–139, ‘The Preamble’ 141–167, ‘Presumption & Fiction’ 169–185, ‘Legal Technique’187–198; LAW AS LOGIC (...) ‘Moderne Staatlichkeit und modernes formales Recht’ 201–207, ‘Heterogeneity & Validity of Law’ 209–218, ‘Leibniz & die Frage der rechtlichen Systembildung’ 219–232, ‘Law & its Approach as a System’ 233–255, ‘Logic of Law & Judicial Activity’ 258–288, ‘Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law’ 289–293, ‘The Nature of the Judicial Application of Norms’ 295–314; LAW AS EXPERIENCE ‘The Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning’317–374, ‘The Ontological Foundation of Law’ 375–390, ‘Is Law a System of Enactments?’ 391–398, ‘The Uniqueness of National Legal Cultures’ 399–411, ‘Institutions as Systems’ 413–424; LAW AS HISTORY ‘From Legal Customs to Legal Folkways’ 427–436, ‘Anthropological Jurisprudence?’ 437–457, ‘Law as a Social Issue’ 459–475, ‘Law as History?’477–484, ‘Rechtskultur – Denkkultur’ 485–489; w/ Curriculum Vitae & Bibliography, as well as Index & Indexes of normative materials & of names. (shrink)

1. Law and morals as two systems of norms, and the inner morality of law 2. Law as a value bearer and as a mere external indicator 3. The inner and external moral credit of legislator 4. The inner morality of law. As to the last paragraph, the most striking feature of the inner morality of law is that it is such a possible characteristic, surplus quality which is not a sine qua non, which law is conceivable without. However, it (...) is a question whether law can long do without it? In principle, the legislator is free in deciding on what legal consequence he attaches to what course of conduct14 and it is also desirable that legal concepts be freed from moral overtones. Nevertheless, the legal complex cannot be torn out of its social context, nor can it steadily conflict with other complexes (religions, moral, or political values, norms and ideologies) law is to develop in living interrelationship with. Otherwise, it is subject to danger that (I) law-observance in average cases is weakened; (2) the reified functioning of and approach to law are strengthened and make law alienated; and (3) it blurs the social objectives the law intends to serve and, especially in hard cases, makes its application rootless and floating. A pathological situation only becomes more pathological, if the pathology of contents is accompanied by the pathology of means. Or, it brings the promise of real solution closer, if the adequateness of means also provides, by the strength of publicity, for the direct mobilization of society. That explains why it is a topical question what I have proposed to term the inner morality of law. [For the text, see my L&Ph, 77–89] . (shrink)

The essay surveys recent developments in ontology and defends a strategy for improvement of ontologies based on ontological realism. As a thought experiment, we consider central theses of Aristotelian metaphysics, and show how they fall short of what we believe to be the requirements of ontology today. Above all, Aristotle provides us with no strategy for the reconciliation of common-sense realism and scientific realism where these diverge. We focus specifically on shortfalls in Aristotle’s treatment of individual accidents, especially in regard (...) to the category of place. We then show how Aristotle’s metaphysics needs to be supplemented by a theory of holes, of fiat boundaries, of granularity, and of vagueness. (shrink)

Some forty years ago, Norman Malcolm and Charles Hartshorne, philosophers from two distinctive schools of thought, championed, independently of each other, a form of ontological argument based on chapter III of Anselm’s Proslogion as well as on various chapters of Reply to Gaunilo.1 While different aspects of the argument are emphasized by Malcolm and Hartshorne, this second form of the ontological argument hinges on the following two points: (1) necessary existence is constitutive of the concept of God,2 and (2) therefore, (...) in understanding the concept of God, one understands that God necessarily exists in fact or in actuality. Whereas Malcolm vacillates between affirming only (1) and both (1) and (2),3 Hartshorne affirms both (1) and (2); however, he holds that Anselm’s formulation of the actual existence of God is somewhat confused. My argument here is that while (1) has some sense, (2) is a confusion arising from confounding the logical or conceptual existence of God with the actual existence of God.4. (shrink)

Along with many other languages, English has a relatively straightforward grammatical distinction between mass-occurrences of nouns and their countoccurrences. As the mass-count distinction, in my view, is best drawn between occurrences of expressions, rather than expressions themselves, it becomes important that there be some rule-governed way of classifying a given noun-occurrence into mass or count. The project of classifying noun-occurrences is the topic of Section II of this paper. Section III, the remainder of the paper, concerns the semantic differences between (...) nouns in their mass-occurrences and those in their count-occurrences. As both the name view and the mixed view are, in my opinion, subject to serious difficulties discussed in Section III.1,I defend a version of the predicate view. Traditionally, nouns in their singular count-occurrences are also analyzed as playing the semantic role of a predicate. How, then, does the predicate view preserve the intuitive difference between nouns in their mass- and those in their count-occurrences? I suggest, in Section III.2, that there are different kinds of predicates: mass-predicates, e.g. ‘is hair’, singular count-predicates, e.g. ‘is a hair’, and plural count-predicates, e.g. ‘are hairs’. Mass-predicates and count-predicates, in my view, are not reducible to each other. The remainder of Section III takes a closer look at the differences and interrelations between these different kinds of predicates. Mass-predicates and count-predicates differ from each other truth-conditionally, and these truth-conditional differences turn out to have interesting implications, in particular concerning the part-whole relation and our practices of counting. But mass- and count-predicates are also related to each other through systematic entailment relations; these entailment relations are examined in Section III.4. (shrink)

Syllogisms with or without negative terms are studied by using Gergonne's ideas. Soundness, completeness, and decidability results are given.

This thesis is an exercise in comparative metaontology. I am centrally concerned with how one might choose between competing metaontological theories. To make my project tractable, I compare two contemporary metaontological approaches dominant in the literature: neo-Quineanism (N-Q) and neo-Aristotelianism (N-A). Peter van Inwagen, a representative of N-Q, claims that ontological inquiry should be conducted in the quantifier-variable idiom of first-order predicate logic; to know what exists, or what a theory says exists, we read our commitments off the regimented sentences (...) that we affirm as true. E.J. Lowe, a representative of N-A objects to N-Q and claims that ontology should be done directly; that it is a mostly a priori activity which is the indispensable intellectual foundation for all rational inquiry. Both metaontological accounts are questionable and there seems to be no decisive way to choose between them. I claim, however, that considerations concerning the explanatory nature of ontology is a key and under-studied factor with respect to ontological method, pointing a way to a possible candidate for metaontological theory choice. I conclude that van Inwagen’s N-Q metaontology is wanting in many respects and further, that he does not provide adequate reasons to dispense with explanation as a feature of ontological inquiry. While explanatory considerations are central to Lowe’s N-A metaontology, I claim that the best that can be hoped for with his particular approach is a form of explanatory antirealism. (shrink)

Philosophers, psychologists, economists and other social scientists continue to debate the nature of human well-being. We argue that this debate centers around five main conceptualizations of well-being: hedonic well-being, life satisfaction, desire fulfillment, eudaimonia, and non-eudaimonic objective-list well-being. Each type of well-being is conceptually different, but are they empirically distinguishable? To address this question, we first developed and validated a measure of desire fulfillment, as no measure existed, and then examined associations between this new measure and several other well-being measures. (...) In addition, we explored associations among all five types of well-being. We found high correlations among all measures of well-being, but generally correlations did not approach unity, even when correcting for unreliability. Furthermore, correlations between well-being and related constructs (e.g., demographics, personality) depended on the type of well-being measured. We conclude that empirical findings based on one type of well-being measure may not generalize to all types of well-being. (shrink)

Descartes claims that the passions of the soul are “all in their nature good” even though they exaggerate the value of their objects, have the potential to deceive us, and often mislead us. What, then, can he mean by this? In this paper, I argue that these effects of the passions are only problematic when we incorrectly take their goodness to consist in their informing us of harms and benefits to the mind-body composite. Instead, the passions are good in their (...) motivational function, which they carry out by representing objects and situations as having various properties and thereby appearing to be “reasons of goodness.” Further, I argue that the main way in which the passions are problematic is merely an occasional physiological byproduct of a well- functioning system. I show, therefore, that the passions’ motivational function, representationality, and accompanying physiology are all significant and interrelated aspects of their goodness. (shrink)

This Master's Thesis discusses the nature of the Eucharistic Sacrifice in the systematic theology of two German scholars; Lutheran theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg and Roman Catholic theologian Joseph Ratzinger, the latter perhaps better known as pope (emeritus) Benedict XVI.

A commonly accepted feature of commonsense morality is that there are some acts that are supererogatory or beyond the call of duty. Recently, philosophers have begun to ask whether something like supererogation might exist in other normative domains such as epistemology and esthetics. In this paper, I will argue that there is good reason to think that sporting supererogation exists. I will then argue that recognizing the existence of sporting supererogation is important because it highlights the value of sport as (...) a mutual pursuit of excellence and reinforces the value of sportsmanship. (shrink)

Francis Hutcheson's theory of perception, as put forth in his Synopsis of Metaphysics, bears a striking similarity to that of John Locke. In particular, Hutcheson and Locke both have at the centre of their theories the notion of ideas as representational entities acting as the direct objects of all of our perceptions. On first consideration, one might find this similarity wholly unremarkable, given the popularity of Locke's Essay. But the Essay was published in 1689 and the Synopsis in 1742, and (...) during these years Berkeley had published a substantive attack on Locke's representative realism and the sceptical conclusions he saw it implying. Further, Hume had argued in 1739 that in accepting a Lockean account of perception, we (at least when thinking as philosophers in our studies) are left without any sure knowledge of external objects, even their existence. Despite this, Hutcheson apparently feels no obligation to address either Berkeley's idealism or Hume's scepticism in the Synopsis. The question addressed in this article is, Why did he not see any force to such arguments, and thus why did he feel no onus to attempt to offer an explicit refutation of Berkeley and Hume? (shrink)

The article deals with problems of incommensurability and meaning change in thecontext of scientific dynamics. Its main topic is a proposal made by Putnam basedon his version of the principle of charity. It is shown that this proposal does not workas a general principle for the understanding of theory change, for it leads in some cases to an unconvincing interpretation of now discarded theories and is even uncharitable. So it could be polemically described as a kind of defamation ('üle Nachrede') (...) of these theories. This will be demonstrated in two case studies. The first one sketches the development of economic value theory, while the second deals with the development of the concept of probability. (shrink)

Heidegger revisits German idealism after the “turn” in his thought in the mid-1930’s. There are a couple of reasons for this. One is philosophical, if not “theological” in his sense of that term. The other is personal. This later reason is emphasized by Otto Pöggeler, who suggests that after 1945 Heidegger sought to understand what had gone wrong in the tragic European debacle. Heidegger will lay the blame at the doorstep of what he terms onto-theology and the subjectivism he sees (...) as endemic to the German idealist tradition, above all as exemplified in Hegel’s “onto-theo-ego-logy.” The article explores Heidegger’s reading of this tradi­tion of German philosophy as it begins with Leibniz and culminates in Nietzsche. It is the Event itself that makes possible the overcoming of metaphysics and its onto-theology. As Heidegger says in Contributions to Philosophy (From the Event), the ens realissimum (das Seiendste) “is” no more. It is the Event (Ereignis) that is the “most real,” since it is the Event that shows up and manifests itself as the revelation of the truth of Beinge in Da-sein, the being that is there in the Event. (shrink)

Discussion of the Cambridge Platonists, by Constantinos Patrides and others, is often vitiated by the mistaken contrasts drawn between those philosophers and late antique Platonists such as Plotinus. I draw attention especially to Patrides’s errors, and argue in particular that Plotinus and his immediate followers were as concerned about this world and our immediate duties to our neighbours as the Cambridge Platonists. Even the doctrine of deification is one shared by all Platonists, though it is also here that genuine differences (...) between pre-Christian and Christian exegesis can be found. All, it can be said, hope and expect to join ‘the dance of immortal love’, but Christian Platonists had a deeper sense of God’s ‘humility’ in His Word’s material and temporal manifestation. Not Olympian Zeus but the Crucified Christ was their preferred image of divine involvement, and their better guide to heaven. (shrink)

In this essay I bring Gregory Bateson together with Deleuze and Guattari (primarily with the latter) to show their ecological compatibility, especially with Guattari’s ecosophy. I do this against the backdrop of the Anthropocene which presents us not only with a ‘climate’ of post-truth and political corruption, but also with the so-called climate crisis. In the context of these two broad examinations, I ask what can an artisan-artist-designer do given this problematic context? My reply is to call on ‘speculative design’ (...) by an ‘avant-garde without authority’ to expose the symptoms of the Anthropocene era. (shrink)

forall x: Dortmund is an adaptation and German translation of forall x: Calgary. As such, it is a full-featured textbook on formal logic. It covers key notions of logic such as consequence and validity, the syntax of truth-functional (propositional) logic and truth-table semantics, the syntax of first-order (predicate) logic with identity and first-order interpretations, formalizing German in TFL and FOL, and Fitch-style natural deduction proof systems for both TFL and FOL. It also deals with some advanced topics such as the (...) syntax and (Kripke-)semantics of modal logic. The book is provided in PDF and in LaTeX source code. A booklet with solutions for the exercises in the book is available. (shrink)

In this paper I examine how Brailas conceives of Modern-Greek identity. After an introduction, I look at Brailian texts where it is emphasized that Hellenism and Christianity are the two components of Greek national identity. Does this mean, though, that for Brailas these two elements express a similar mode of being? There are passages that can support this claim. Still, Brailas’ reader should not suppose that the Corfiote philosopher uncritically assumes a linear transition from Hellenism to Christianity. But if Christianity (...) denotes the emergence of something new in history, how can it be compatible with Hellenism? Brailas’ answer is that as with the Mosaic Law, Christianity did not come to abolish Hellenism, but to fulfill it. Furthermore, the association of Christianity with Hellenism enabled the latter to survive throughout history both in the West and the East. Besides, for Brailas variety has always constituted the “harmony of Hellenism”. (shrink)

Nous nous proposons dřétudier la possible filiation entre le livre dřartiste, pratique artistique née dans les années 1960, et certains romans anglophones contemporains dont les auteurs affichent un intérêt certain pour lřaspect visuel et matériel du livre. Peut-on pour autant affirmer que les procédés auxquels ils ont recours ont été influencés par les livres dřartiste? Nous tenterons également de montrer en quoi cette question peut aussi être valable pour le médium de la bande dessinée.

Ovaj rad bavi se presjekom umjetnosti, imaginacije, emocija i etičkog obrazovanja iz perspektive inovativne sinteze kognitivne teorije emocija i Gestalt pedagogije. Jedan od elemenata ove sinteze kognitivna je teorija emocija kakvu podržava Martha Nussbaum. Emocije se shvaćaju kao procjene koje se odnose na percepciju svijeta oko nas. Emocije su naši stavovi, razumijevanja i evaluacije svijeta iz perspektive naših ciljeva i projekata. To se pokazalo kao odlična polazišna točka za proučavanje emocija i drugih domena unutar etike obrazovanja. U ovom radu uvodim (...) pojam ‘iskustvene imaginacije’ i ukazujem na njezine metodologije koje smo razvili kao dio istraživanja preklapanja Gestalt pedagogije, kognitivne teorije emocija i pristupa etici iz perspektive umijeća življenja. Potom predstavljam sintezu kognitivne teorije emocija i Gestalt pedagogije, nakon čega razjašnjavam koncept iskustvene imaginacije, naglašavam njezinu ulogu u etičkom obrazovanju te zaključujem s nekolicinom osvrta na pristup umijeća življenja etici i etičkom obrazovanju. The paper discusses the intersection between art, imagination, emotions, and ethical education from the perspective of an innovative synthesis of cognitive theory of emotion and Gestalt pedagogy. One of the elements of this synthesis is the cognitive theory of emotion as endorsed by Martha Nussbaum. Emotions are understood as evaluative judgments that are related to our perception of the world around us. Emotions are our attitudes, understandings, and assessments of the world from the perspective of our goals and projects. This proves an excellent starting point from which to address them as an essential part of ethics education. Next, art and imagination are considered as a vehicle by which to address emotions and other domains within ethics education. Here, I introduce the concept of “experiential imagining” and point to the methodologies that sustain it. I have developed this concept as part of my research on the overlap between Gestalt pedagogy, cognitive theory of emotion, and the art of life approaches to ethics. Next, I present the synthesis between cognitive theory of emotion and Gestalt pedagogy. I then illuminate the concept of experiential imagination, emphasise its role in ethics education, and conclude with some reflections on the art of life approach to ethics and ethics education. (shrink)

El artículo parte señalando el significado fenomenológico originario del "espacio sagrado", presente en toda tradición religiosa. Tal "espacio", constituye el ámbito privilegiado de la celebración ritual, por la cual los fieles creyentes se conectan con una experiencia "teo-fánica". De ahí que la etimología del término latino "fanum" tenga la connotación de "templo" o "lugar sagrado" y que la referencia a esa "teo-fanía" acontecida "in illo tempore", en ese lugar, tenga una fuerza "fanatizadora". Aquí, pues, se estudia esa perspectiva religiosa referida (...) al "espacio sagrado" en algunos aspectos de cuatro tradiciones religiosas no cristianas: Hinduismo, Budismo, Islam y en la tradición religiosa mapuche. Se muestra también el proceso "interiorizador" del espacio sagrado que se da en algunas de esas tradiciones religiosas, particularmente en la espiritualidad "mística". (shrink)

As comunidades cristãs dos primeiros séculos comungavam da ideia que a ECCLESIA era um corpo jurisdicional múltiplo e ordenado por uma teologia em construção, formado por comunidades locais. As palavras “ortodoxo” e “católico” não são apenas nomes, tão pouco um adendo ou um complemento, mas a essência que espelha o que cada fiel pensava de si. Usados indistintamente no Primeiro Milênio pelo Oriente e Ocidente, os qualificativos “ortodoxo” e “católico”, a partir dos primeiros cismas, eram aplicados com mais precisão para (...) expressar identificações. O termo ‘católico’, no grego clássico, universal, era usado como substantivo e adjetivo e especificava uma das notas importantes da ECCLESIA O presente artigo tem como objetivo, ao elucidar os conceitos de ‘ortodoxia, catolicismo, unidade e cisma’, à luz da Teologia Oriental, transpor para uma hermenêutica contemporânea de ecumenismo, o significado dos conceitos comuns entre as Igrejas Ortodoxas e Católica, em vista da retomada do Diálogo Teológico, iniciado após o Tomos Agape, entre os expoentes Oriental e Ocidental da mesma Ecclesia Universa. (shrink)