Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Safety, domination, and differential support.Charles Neil - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1139-1152.
    In a recent paper “Safety, Sensitivity, and Differential Support” (Synthese, December 2017), Jose Zalabardo argues that (contra Sosa in Philos Perspect 33(13):141–153,1999) sensitivity can be differentially supported as the correct requirement for propositional knowledge. Zalabardo argues that safety fails to dominate sensitivity; specifically: some cases of knowledge failure can only be explained by sensitivity. In this paper, I resist Zalabardo’s conclusion that domination failure confers differential support for sensitivity. Specifically, I argue that counterexamples to sensitivity undermine differential support for sensitivity. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Justificação, Probabilidade e Independência.André Neiva & Tatiane Marks - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):207-230.
    Epistemic justification has been widely accepted as both a gradational and relational notion. Given those properties, a natural thought is to take degrees of epistemic justification to be probabilities. In this paper, we present a simple Bayesian framework for justification. In the first part, after putting the model in an evidentialist form, we distinguish different senses of “being evidence for” and “confirming”. Next, we argue that this conception should accommodate the two relevant kinds of qualitative confirmation or evidential support. In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Why Intuition?Jennifer Nado - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):15-41.
    In this paper I will argue that this entire dialectic is somewhat misguided. The mental states which are generally assumed to fall under the category of ‘intuition’ likely comprise a highly heterogeneous group; from the point of view of psychology or of neuroscience, in fact, ‘intuitions’ appear to be generated by several fundamentally different sorts of mental processes. If this is correct, then the term ‘intuition’ may simply carve things too broadly. I will argue that it is a mistake to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Review: Emotion and Value. Edited by Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd. [REVIEW]Hichem Naar & Christine Tappolet - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):675-678.
    © The Authors 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] is widely accepted that emotions have something to do with values. The major task of contemporary philosophy of emotion is to say precisely what that something is. How exactly are emotions related to evaluative properties? Unsurprisingly, there are various ways they may be related. First, emotions might themselves be bearers of value. It might be a good thing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3777-3795.
    Do privacy rights restrict what is permissible to infer about others based on statistical evidence? This paper replies affirmatively by defending the following symmetry: there is not necessarily a morally relevant difference between directly appropriating people’s private information—say, by using an X-ray device on their private safes—and using predictive technologies to infer the same content, at least in cases where the evidence has a roughly similar probative value. This conclusion is of theoretical interest because a comprehensive justification of the thought (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.
    This paper argues that just as full beliefs can constitute knowledge, so can properties of your credence distribution. The resulting notion of probabilistic knowledge helps us give a natural account of knowledge ascriptions embedding language of subjective uncertainty, and a simple diagnosis of probabilistic analogs of Gettier cases. Just like propositional knowledge, probabilistic knowledge is factive, safe, and sensitive. And it helps us build knowledge-based norms of action without accepting implausible semantic assumptions or endorsing the claim that knowledge is interest-relative.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   86 citations  
  • When Do Replies to the Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism Beg the Question?Justin Morton - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):265-280.
    ABSTRACTSome proponents of the evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism believe that replies that assume substantive moral claims beg the question. In this paper, I give a new account of what's wrong with such replies. On this account, many realists beg the question when they rely on substantive moral claims in their replies to the argument, but naturalists do not. While this account generalizes to some other domains, it allows perceptual and inductive realism to remain undebunked.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The Explanationist and the Modalist.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Episteme:1-16.
    Recent epistemology has witnessed a substantial opposition between two competing approaches to capturing the notion of non-accidentality in the analysis of knowledge: the explanationist and the modalist. According to the latest advocates of the former, S knows that p if and only if S believes that p because p is true. According to champions of the latter, S knows that p if and only if S's belief that p is true in a relevant set of possible worlds. Because Bogardus and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.
    This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • A new solution to the safety dilemma.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-17.
    Despite the substantial appeal of the safety condition, Kelp (J Philos Res 34:21–31, 2009; Am Philos Q 53:27–37; Good Thinking. A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology, Routledge, London, 2018) has raised a difficult challenge for safety-theoretic accounts of knowledge. By combining Gettier-style fake barn cases with epistemic Frankfurt cases, he concludes that no formulation of safety can be strong enough to predict ignorance in the former and weak enough to accommodate knowledge in the latter. In this note, my contribution is two-fold. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Knowing Without Evidence.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):309-331.
    In this paper, I present counterexamples to the evidence thesis, the thesis that S knows that p at t only if S believes that p on the basis of evidence at t. The outline of my paper is as follows. In section 1, I explain the evidence thesis and make clear what a successful counterexample to the evidence thesis will look like. In section 2, I show that instances of non-occurrent knowledge are counterexamples to the evidence thesis. At the end (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • Deriving Actuality from Possibility.Mohsen Moghri - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):393-402.
    Many believe that the world exists without a cause or reason. Most of them reject an explanation for the whole concrete world because they accept the traditional idea that concrete existence comes only from things that concretely exist. But I provide reasons for thinking that the world might be actual as a result of a feature that is not concrete but abstract. I begin by outlining ideas that some followers of the Platonic Theory of Forms have developed about whether actuality (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Do evolutionary debunking arguments rest on a mistake about evolutionary explanations?Andreas L. Mogensen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1799-1817.
    Many moral philosophers accept the Debunking Thesis, according to which facts about natural selection provide debunking explanations for certain of our moral beliefs. I argue that philosophers who accept the Debunking Thesis beg important questions in the philosophy of biology. They assume that past selection can explain why you or I hold certain of the moral beliefs we do. A position advanced by many prominent philosophers of biology implies that this assumption is false. According to the Negative View, natural selection (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Evolutionary debunking arguments and the proximate/ultimate distinction.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):196-203.
    Many philosophers believe that natural selection explanations debunk our moral beliefs or would do so if moral realism were true, relying on the assumption that explanations of this kind show that moral facts play no role in explaining human moral beliefs. Here I argue that this assumption rests on a confusion of proximate and ultimate explanatory factors. Insofar as evolutionary debunking arguments hinge on the assumption that moral facts play no role in explaining human moral beliefs, these arguments fall short.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • An Argument for External World Skepticism from the Appearance/Reality Distinction.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (4):368-383.
    In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge that cannot be resolved by denying skeptical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Skilful reflection as a master virtue.Chienkuo Mi & Shane Ryan - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2295-2308.
    This paper advances the claim that skilful reflection is a master virtue in that skilful reflection shapes and corrects the other epistemic and intellectual virtues. We make the case that skilful reflection does this with both competence-based epistemic virtues and character-based intellectual virtues. In making the case that skilful reflection is a master virtue, we identify the roots of ideas central to our thesis in Confucian philosophy. In particular, we discuss the Confucian conception of reflection, as well as different levels (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • “We Now Control Our Evolution”: Circumventing Ethical and Logical Cul-de-Sacs of an Anticipated Engineering Revolution.Lantz Fleming Miller - 2014 - Science and Engineering Ethics 20 (4):1011-1025.
    Philosophers, scientists, and other researchers have increasingly characterized humanity as having reached an epistemic and technical stage at which “we can control our own evolution.” Moral–philosophical analysis of this outlook reveals some problems, beginning with the vagueness of “we.” At least four glosses on “we” in the proposition “we, humanity, control our evolution” can be made: “we” is the bundle of all living humans, a leader guiding the combined species, each individual acting severally, or some mixture of these three involving (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The demandingness of Nozick’s ‘Lockean’ proviso.Josh Milburn - 2016 - European Journal of Political Theory 15 (3):276-292.
    Interpreters of Robert Nozick’s political philosophy fall into two broad groups concerning his application of the ‘Lockean proviso’. Some read his argument in an undemanding way: individual instances of ownership which make people worse off than they would have been in a world without any ownership are unjust. Others read the argument in a demanding way: individual instances of ownership which make people worse off than they would have been in a world without that particular ownership are unjust. While I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • In defense of non-reactive attitudes.Per-Erik Milam - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):294-307.
    Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, then we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. Proponents suggest that reactive attitudes can be replaced in our emotional repertoire by non-reactive analogues. In this paper, I dispute and reject a common challenge to abolitionism according to which the reactive attitudes are necessary for protesting unfairness and maintaining social harmony. While other abolitionists dispute the empirical basis of this objection, I focus on its implications. I argue that even if non-reactive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Gert on Subjective Practical Rationality.Christian Miller - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):551-561.
    The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Another view of translation manuals and the study of science.Steven I. Miller & Marcel Fredericks - 1997 - Synthese 113 (2):171-193.
    The article argues for the possibility of translation manuals having an implicit internal structure. This structure is composed of specific methodological assumptions and techniques. Using the (N)-type and (G)-type distinction developed by Fuller for the study of scientific behavior, it is shown that these are incomplete characterizations of translation manuals. A more complete characterization must involve an analysis of how the presence or absence of methodological rules influences the interpretation of specific research questions. It is further argued that while Quine's (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Reliabilism and Privileged Access.Kourken Michaelian - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:69-109.
    Reliabilism is invoked by a standard causal response to the slow switching argument for incompatibilism about mental content externalism and privileged access. Though the response in question is negative, in that it only establishes that, given such an epistemology, externalism does not rule privileged access out, the appeal to reliabilism involves an assumption about the reliability of introspection, an assumption that in turn grounds a simple argument for the positive conclusion that reliabilism itself implies privileged access. This paper offers a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • In defence of gullibility: The epistemology of testimony and the psychology of deception detection.Kourken Michaelian - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):399-427.
    Research in the psychology of deception detection implies that Fricker, in making her case for reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, overestimates both the epistemic demerits of the antireductionist policy of trusting speakers blindly and the epistemic merits of the reductionist policy of monitoring speakers for trustworthiness: folk psychological prejudices to the contrary notwithstanding, it turns out that monitoring is on a par (in terms both of the reliability of the process and of the sensitivity of the beliefs that it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Cognitive Penetration and the Tribunal of Experience.Jona Vance - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):641-663.
    Perception purports to help you gain knowledge of the world even if the world is not the way you expected it to be. Perception also purports to be an independent tribunal against which you can test your beliefs. It is natural to think that in order to serve these and other central functions, perceptual representations must not causally depend on your prior beliefs and expectations. In this paper, I clarify and then argue against the natural thought above. All perceptual systems (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Is Life’s Meaning Ultimately Unthinkable?: Guy Bennett-Hunter on the Ineffable.Thaddeus Metz - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1247-1256.
    In this critical notice of Guy Bennett-Hunter’s book _Ineffability and Religious Experience_, I focus on claims he makes about what makes a life meaningful. According to Bennett-Hunter, for human life to be meaningful it must obtain its meaning from what is beyond the human and is ineffable, which constitutes an ultimate kind of meaning. I spell out Bennett-Hunter’s rationale for making this claim, raise some objections to it, and in their wake articulate an alternative conception of ultimate meaning.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Fission and personal identity over time.Trenton Merricks - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (2):163-186.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • A Defence of Lichtenberg.Giovanni Merlo - 2019 - Episteme:1-16.
    Cartesians and Lichtenbergians have diverging views of the deliverances of introspection. According to the Cartesians, a rational subject, competent with the relevant concepts, can come to know that he or she thinks – hence, that he or she exists – on the sole basis of his or her introspective awareness of his or her conscious thinking. According to the Lichtenbergians, this is not possible. This paper offers a defence of the Lichtenbergian position using Peacocke and Campbell's recent exchange on Descartes'scogitoas (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts.Guido Melchior - 2015 - Episteme 12 (4):479-496.
    Offering a solution to the skeptical puzzle is a central aim of Nozick's sensitivity account of knowledge. It is well-known that this account faces serious problems. However, because of its simplicity and its explanatory power, the sensitivity principle has remained attractive and has been subject to numerous modifications, leading to a of sensitivity accounts. I will object to these accounts, arguing that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face two problems. First, they deliver a far too heterogeneous picture of higher-level beliefs about (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Sensitivity has Multiple Heterogeneity Problems: a Reply to Wallbridge.Guido Melchior - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1741-1747.
    In this paper, I defend the heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge against an objection that has been recently proposed by Wallbridge in Philosophia. I argue in, 479–496, 2015) that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face a heterogeneity problem when it comes to higher-level knowledge about the truth of one’s own beliefs. Beliefs in weaker higher-level propositions are insensitive, but beliefs in stronger higher-level propositions are sensitive. The resulting picture that we can know the stronger propositions without being in a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The Contingent Unknowability of Facts and its Relation with Informal, Epistemological Contexts.Stanley Kreiter Bezerra Medeiros - 2017 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 21 (1):61-76.
    This paper focuses on elements that are involved in a specific type of judgment, namely, those involving facts that, in virtue of contingent reasons, are out of our epistemic reach. Its goal is to propose a philosophical explanation about why we, in informal contexts, take some facts as contingently unknowable. In order to accomplish that goal, we develop a theory that defines contingently unknowable facts in a very specific way. We establish three clauses that are jointly necessary and sufficient — (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • “A Great Adventure of the Soul”: Sri Aurobindo’s Vedāntic Theodicy of Spiritual Evolution.Swami Medhananda - 2022 - International Journal of Hindu Studies 25 (3):229-257.
    This article reexamines Sri Aurobindo’s multifaceted response to the problem of evil in The Life Divine. According to my reconstruction, his response has three key dimensions: first, a skeptical theist refutation of arguments from evil against God’s existence; second, a theodicy of “spiritual evolution,” according to which the experience of suffering is necessary for the soul’s spiritual growth; and third, a panentheistic conception of the Divine Saccidānanda as the sole reality which playfully manifests as everything and everyone in the universe. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Disappearance of Ignorance. [REVIEW]Robin McKenna - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):4-20.
    Keith DeRose’s new book The Appearance of Ignorance is a welcome companion volume to his 2009 book The Case for Contextualism. Where latter focused on contextualism as a view in the philosophy of language, the former focuses on how contextualism contributes to our understanding of some perennial epistemological problems, with the skeptical problem being the main focus of six of the seven chapters. DeRose’s view is that a solution to the skeptical problem must do two things. First, it must explain (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Illness Narratives and Epistemic Injustice: Toward Extended Empathic Knowledge.Seisuke Hayakawa - 2021 - In Karyn L. Lai (ed.), Knowers and Knowledge in East-West Philosophy: Epistemology Extended. Springer Nature. pp. 111-138.
    Socially extended knowledge has recently received much attention in mainstream epistemology. Knowledge here is not to be understood as wholly realised within a single individual who manipulates artefacts or tools but as collaboratively realised across plural agents. Because of its focus on the interpersonal dimension, socially extended epistemology appears to be a promising approach for investigating the deeply social nature of epistemic practices. I believe, however, that this line of inquiry could be made more fruitful if it is connected with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Two skeptical arguments or only one?Kevin McCain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):289-300.
    The first step in responding to the challenge of external world skepticism is to get clear on the structure of the skeptic’s argument. The most prominent varieties of skeptical arguments either rely on closure principles or underdetermination principles. The relationship between these two sorts of arguments is contentious. Some argue that these arguments can independently motivate skepticism. Others argue that they are really equivalent. I argue that although these two arguments are distinct, their independence is not as obvious as some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Davies on Easy Knowledge.Mark McBride - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1):1-20.
    Stewart Cohen considers a case where his son wants a red table for his room. Cohen and his son go to the furniture store. Cohen’s son is concerned that the table his father is considering purchasing, which appears red, may in fact be white with red lights shining on it. Cohen responds with the following reasoning: The table looks red. The table is red. If the table is red, then it is not white with red lights shining on it. The (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Blame for constitutivists: Kantian constitutivism and the victim’s special standing to complain.Erasmus Mayr - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):117-129.
    Constitutivists about moral norms are often suspected of providing an overly “self-centered” account of morality which does not take seriously enough morality’s interpersonal nature. This worry see...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Survival and separation.Steve Matthews - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (3):279-303.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Deepfakes, Fake Barns, and Knowledge from Videos.Taylor Matthews - 2023 - Synthese 201 (2):1-18.
    Recent develops in AI technology have led to increasingly sophisticated forms of video manipulation. One such form has been the advent of deepfakes. Deepfakes are AI-generated videos that typically depict people doing and saying things they never did. In this paper, I demonstrate that there is a close structural relationship between deepfakes and more traditional fake barn cases in epistemology. Specifically, I argue that deepfakes generate an analogous degree of epistemic risk to that which is found in traditional cases. Given (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • What really matters.Raymond Martin - 2008 - Synthese 162 (3):325 - 340.
    What really matters fundamentally in survival? That question—the one on which I focus—is not about what should matter or about metaphysics. Rather, it is a factual question the answer to which can be determined, if at all, only empirically. I argue that the answer to it is that in the case of many people it is not one’s own persistence, but continuing in ways that may involve one’s own cessation that really matters fundamentally in survival. Call this the surprising result. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Knowing Possibilities and the Possibility of Knowing: A Further Challenge for the Anti-Realist.Peter Marton - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (2):493-504.
    Knowing that some state of affairs—expressed by a proposition, p—is possible, and the possibility that one knows that p have, quite obviously, different meanings. This paper focuses only on their logical relationship—whether they entail one another. I will argue for the following three claims: the basic verificationist principles of anti-realism, at least in their simplest forms, and in conjunction with some other, intuitively reasonable principles, do entail that these two concepts are substitutionally equivalent. Our pre-theoretical expectations question this outcome, as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Fission rejuvenation.Raymond Martin - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (1):17-40.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Calling the Skeptic’s Bluff: Brains, Vats, and Irrelevance.Peter Marton - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):477-488.
    Dogmatists often exploit the skeptical argument based on the brains-in-a-vat scenario as a test case for their epistemological enterprises. I argue that this ‘argument’ does not deserve our attention, so it should not be used as a test case. I first show that the possibilities of empirical knowledge and of skeptical scenarios are inconsistent. If so, the BIV-skeptic must make the case for preferring such scenarios over the possibility of empirical knowledge. The central argument of my paper is that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Causal Tracking Reliabilism and the Lottery Problem.Mark Mcevoy - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):73-92.
    The lottery problem is often regarded as a successful counterexample to reliabilism. The process of forming your true belief that your ticket has lost solely on the basis of considering the odds is, from a purely probabilistic viewpoint, much more reliable than the process of forming a true belief that you have lost by reading the results in a normally reliable newspaper. Reliabilism thus seems forced, counterintuitively, to count the former process as knowledge if it so counts the latter process. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Achilles versus the tortoise: The battle over modus ponens (an aristotelian argument).Peter Marton - 2004 - Philosophia 31 (3-4):383-400.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Asymmetry arguments.Berislav Marušić - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1081-1102.
    In the First Meditation, the Cartesian meditator temporarily concludes that he cannot know anything, because he cannot discriminate dreaming from waking while he is dreaming. To resist the meditator’s conclusion, one could deploy an asymmetry argument. Following Bernard Williams, one could argue that even if the meditator cannot discriminate dreaming from waking while dreaming, it does not follow that he cannot do it while awake. In general, asymmetry arguments seek to identify an asymmetry between a bad case that is entertained (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The knower paradox and epistemic closure.Stephen Maitzen - 1998 - Synthese 114 (2):337-354.
    The Knower Paradox has had a brief but eventful history, and principles of epistemic closure (which say that a subject automatically knows any proposition she knows to be materially implied, or logically entailed, by a proposition she already knows) have been the subject of tremendous debate in epistemic logic and epistemology more generally, especially because the fate of standard arguments for and against skepticism seems to turn on the fate of closure. As far as I can tell, however, no one (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • I—How Both You and the Brain in a Vat Can Know Whether or Not You Are Envatted.Ofra Magidor - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):151-181.
    Epistemic externalism offers one of the most prominent responses to the sceptical challenge. Externalism has commonly been interpreted as postulating a crucial asymmetry between the actual-world agent and their brain-in-a-vat counterpart: while the actual agent is in a position to know she is not envatted, her biv counterpart is not in a position to know that she is envatted, or in other words, only the former is in a position to know whether or not she is envatted. In this paper, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Epistemology in the face of strong sociology of knowledge.James Maffie - 1999 - History of the Human Sciences 12 (4):21-40.
    Advocates of the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge contend that its four defining tenets entail the elimination and replacement tout court of epistemology by strong sociology of knowledge. I advance a naturalistic conception of both substantive and meta-level epistemological inquiry which fully complies with these four tenets and thereby shows that the strong programme neither entails nor even augurs the demise of epistemology.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • On Social Defeat.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):719-734.
    Influential cases have been provided that seem to suggest that one can fail to have knowledge because of the social environment. If not a distinct kind of social defeater, is there a uniquely social phenomenon that defeats knowledge? My aim in this paper is to explore these questions. I shall argue that despite initial appearances to the contrary, we have no reason to accept a special class of social defeater, nor any essentially social defeat phenomenon. We can explain putative cases (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation