Dans la première partie de son article « Une morale est-elle compatible avec le scepticisme? », Jules Vuillemin propose une interprétation du scepticisme de Pyrrhon d’Élis et s’interroge sur sa compatibilité avec une vie morale. La présente contribution s’attache à resituer la lecture de Vuillemin dans l’histoire du pyrrhonisme ainsi que dans les débats récents à son sujet, et à la discuter en la comparant au néo-pyrrhonisme de Sextus Empiricus. À suivre Vuillemin, Pyrrhon suspend son jugement par rapport à tout, (...) y compris ses impressions. Cette suspension universelle provoquerait une impassibilité totale et fournirait une ligne de conduite, mais serait assez difficile à adopter. Nous suggérons que suspendre son jugement sur ses propres impressions n’est pas difficile, mais impossible ; que la façon dont, selon Vuillemin, cette suspension fournirait au sceptique une ligne de conduite implique une contradiction ; et qu’il existe une autre façon d’expliquer comment le sceptique peut, dans certaines limites, maintenir une ligne de conduite. (shrink)

Scepticism is central to Nietzsche’s philosophical project, both as a tool of criticism and, through its role in self-transformation, as a tool for responding to criticism. While its importance in his thought and its complexity have been acknowledged, exactly what kind of scepticism Nietzsche calls for still stands in need of analysis. Jessica Berry’s [Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011] comparison between Nietzsche and Pyrrhonian scepticism recognized the importance of the practical dimension of Nietzschean (...) scepticism but distorted Nietzsche’s philosophy in attempting to paint it as Pyrrhonian in character. Earlier discussions recognize Nietzsche’s opposition to Pyrrhonian suspension of judgement and tranquillity. They have not, however, explored in sufficient detail Nietzsche’s sceptical practice and how it affects the individual. In this article, I combine Berry’s emphasis on scepticism as a practice with attention to the important differences between Nietzsche and Pyrrhonism. I outline Nietzsche’s scepticism as a transformative practice, arguing that its differences from Pyrrhonian scepticism are as illuminating as any similarities. The scepticism that Nietzsche advocates involves not just destruction of our beliefs but destruction of who we are, and at the same time as cultivating the capacity to do without certainty, requires an experimental engagement with our drives – allowing the creation of new values. (shrink)

In this chapter, I explicate several general views and arguments that bear on the notion and contemporary theories of human welfare, as found in two foundational Daoist texts, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. Ideas drawn from the Daodejing include its objections to desire theories of human welfare and its distinction between natural and acquired desires. Insights drawn from the Zhuangzi include its arguments against the view that death is bad for the dead, its attempt to develop a workable theory of (...) well-being for those who are skeptical about such theories, and the prudential benefits of what I call "philosophical double-vision.". (shrink)

This article explores Spinoza's distinctive contribution to the eudaimonistic tradition, which considers happiness (eudaimonia) to be the highest good. Most (if not all) ancient eudaimonists endorse some sort of hierarchy between mind and body, where one is always dependent on, or subordinate to, the other. In particular, many of them endorse ethical intellectualism, where mental things are considered more valuable than bodily ones. I argue that Spinoza, in contrast, considers mind and body ontologically and ethically identical and equal, thereby bringing (...) something new to this ethical tradition. (shrink)

Virtue ethics is frequently billed as a remedy to the problems of deontological and consequentialist ethics that Bernard Williams identified in his critique of “the morality system.” But how far can virtue ethics be relied upon to avoid these problems? What does Williams’s critique of the morality system mean for virtue ethics? To answer this question, we offer a more principled characterisation of the defining features of the morality system in terms of its organising ambition—to shelter life against luck. This (...) reveals the system to be multiply realisable: the same function can be served by substantively different but functionally equivalent ideas. After identifying four requirements that ethical thought must meet to function as a morality system, we show that they can also be met by certain constellations of virtue-ethical ideas. We thereby demonstrate the possibility of virtue-ethical morality systems raising problems analogous to those besetting their deontological and consequentialist counterparts. This not only widens the scope of Williams’s critique and brings out the cautionary aspect of his legacy for virtue ethics. It also offers contemporary virtue ethicists a more principled understanding of the functional features that mark out morality systems and lie at the root of their problems, thereby helping them to avoid or overcome these problems. (shrink)

Cet article cherche à montrer qu’amour et politique sont étroitement liés dans le De natura rerum de Lucrèce. D’une part, l’amour-passion, au Livre IV, se révèle aussi vain que le désir du pouvoir politique; d’autre part, le livre V oppose implicitement le désir sexuel des premiers êtres humains au « bien commun » qui gouverne les organisations sociales. En outre, la description, au livre IV, d’une sexualité exempte de passion, ou amour libre, caractérisée par un désir mutuel et un plaisir (...) partagé, fait office de contre-modèle ou de paradigme alternatif face à l’aliénation et à la violence politiques et sociales. En d’autres termes, l’objet de cet article est de montrer qu’amour, sexe et politique font l’objet chez Lucrèce d’une même approche, où l’on peut voir à la fois une composante importante de sa thérapie de l’âme et une profonde défiance à l’égard de la vie sociale et des activités politiques. (shrink)

Method in philosophical counselling is still a contentious topic. That is, there is no consensus on whether the philosophical counsellor should have a method in her practice to help the counsellee resolve philosophical problems. Some philosophical counsellors claim that there should not be any rigid adherence to method(s) as this will render philosophy too dogmatic. Philosophical counselling, in light of this view, promotes a kind of mutual philosophising sans definite goal with the counsellee. What I call "dissentient philosophical counselling" takes (...) this claim even further: the philosophical counsellor lives/practices her philosophical counselling, that is, she embodies and practices philosophy as a way of life. This view is posed as a response to contemporary conceptualisations of philosophical counselling where the philosophical counsellor might stand in a disembodied relationship with her method(s) and tries to have a conversation "from nowhere". Dissentient philosophical counselling, even though more focused on living philosophically , still suffers from certain shortcomings. In this paper, I firstly showcase how even the seemingly innocuous but important question "How might one live?" suffers from a lack of much needed nuance. And secondly, I introduce, via a fictional narrative, a provisional way of practicing this reworked dissentient philosophical counselling. I do this by, firstly, introducing African conversational philosophy, via its method of conversationalism, and secondly, I introduce a peculiar version of Pyrrhonian scepticism especially regarding the notion of bios adoxastōs (life without dogma). (shrink)

Emotions have often been considered a threat to morality and rationality; in the Romantic tradition, passions were placed at the center of both human individuality and moral life. This ambivalence has led to an ambiguity between the terms of emotions for vices and virtues. Epicureans and Stoics have argued that emotions are irrational. The Stoics believed that virtue is nothing but knowledge, and emotions are essentially irrational beliefs. Skeptics believed that beliefs were responsible for pain, recommending rejection of opinions of (...) any kind. These schools emphasized the general value of "ataraxia", the absence of mental disturbance, the philosophy being regarded as therapy for the cleansing of the emotions in the soul. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27533.77282. (shrink)

An overview of the ancient philosophers and their philosophical system (divided into the fields of logic, physics, and ethics) comprising the living, organic, enduring, and evolving body of interrelated ideas identifiable as the Stoic perspective.

Emoțiile au fost considerate adesea o amenințare pentru moralitate și raționalitate; în tradiția romantică, pasiunile au fost așezate atât în centrul individualității umane cât și al vieții morale. Această ambivalență a dus la o ambiguitate între termenii emoțiilor pentru vicii și virtuți. Epicureismul și stoicii au susținut că emoțiile sunt iraționale. Stoicii considerau că virtutea nu este altceva decât cunoașterea, iar emoțiile sunt în mod esențial credințe iraționale. Scepticii considerau că credințele sunt responsabile de durere, recomandând respingerea opiniilor de orice (...) fel. Aceste școli au subliniat valoarea generală a „ ataraxiei ”, absența perturbării mentale, filosofia fiind privită ca terapie pentru curățarea emoțiilor din suflet. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.25383.29608 . (shrink)

This paper provides an overview of women's engagement with Stoic ethics in early modern England (c. 1600–1700). It builds on recent literature in the field by demonstrating that there is a positive gender‐inclusive narrative to be told about Stoic philosophy in this time—one that incorporates women's specific concerns and responds to women's lived experiences. To support this claim, we take an interdisciplinary approach and examine several different genres of women's writing in the period, including letters, poems, plays, educational texts, and (...) moral essays. In these writings, we argue, a distinctive conception of Stoic therapy emerges. Women embrace well‐known aspects of the Stoic philosophy—such as living in agreement with nature, the importance of self‐government, and the ideal of freedom from the passions—but they also allow room for the cultivation of eupatheiai or life‐affirmative feelings, such as feelings of respect, affection, and good will toward other people. (shrink)

أي نوعٍ من الحياة هذا الذي يسوقه إلينا الفكر الفلسفي؟ هل هو النوع الأفضل كما أعلن «سقراط» قبل أكثر من ألفي عام تقريبًا؟ وهل الحياة الفلسفية يمكن أن تكون حقًا حياةً ذات معنى حقيقي؟ وبأي معنى يُمكن أن نفهم عبارة «معنى الحياة» ذاتها؟ الإجابة التي يحملها هذا المقال قد تكون صادمة للمشتغلين بالبحث الفلسفي، أو لأولئك الذين يعتقدون أن الفلسفة يمكن أن تُقدم لنا أية إجابات نهائية وقاطعة حول تساؤلاتنا عن معنى الحياة، لاسيما وأن هذه الإجابة تصدر عن متخصصٍ في (...) الفلسفة، ودارسٍ لها ومشتغلٍ بها لما يقرب من أربعين عامًا. ومؤدى هذه الإجابة باختصار أن ثمة إخفاقات متتالية للمشروع الفلسفي في إضفاء معنى على الحياة يتسم بالثبات والشمولية، حتى بالنسبة لأولئك الذين مارسوا التفكير والبحث الفلسفي كتخصص وما زالوا يُمارسونه! (shrink)

L’objet de cet article est d’analyser la version formulaire la plus connue de l’éthique épicurienne, souvent appelée dans la littérature critique tetrapharmakos ou quadruple remède. On tentera de trancher la question de l’authenticité de cette formule, et d’en déduire certains éléments concernant la pédagogie éthique épicurienne et le rôle qu’y jouent abrégés et florilèges.

Books and journal articles have become the dominant modes of presentation in contemporary philosophy. This historically contingent paradigm prioritises textual expression and assumes a distinction between philosophical practice and its presented product. Using Socrates and Diogenes as exemplars, we challenge the presumed supremacy of the text and defend the importance of ways of life as modes of practiced presentation. We argue that text cannot capture the embodied activity of philosophy without remainder, and is therefore limited and incomplete. In particular, we (...) contend that a static text is essentially alienated from our practices of philosophising, words cannot unambiguously represent lives, and practiced presentation enriches our understanding beyond words alone. After discussing some pedagogical implications, we conclude with a plea for a pluralistic approach that recognises lives as legitimate and valuable modes of philosophical presentation. (shrink)

Self-care apps are booming. Early iterations of this technology focused on tracking health and fitness routines, but recently some developers have turned their attention to the cultivation of character, basing their conceptual resources on the Hellenistic tradition (Stoic Meditations™, Stoa™, Stoic Mental Health Tracker™). Those familiar with the final writings of Michel Foucault will notice an intriguing coincidence between the development of these products and his claims that the Hellenistic tradition of self-cultivation has much to offer contemporary life. In this (...) article, I explore Foucault’s cryptic remarks on this topic, and argue that today’s self-care developers can improve future products by paying attention to the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation he identifies as especially important. (shrink)

The Cynic exhortation to live according to nature is far from transparent. I defend a traditional interpretation: to live in accordance with nature is to live in accordance with human nature, which is to live as a rational animal. After discussing methodological concerns, I consider the theriophilic proposal that the ideal Cynic lives like an animal. I marshal evidence against this view and in favor of the alternative of Cynics as rational animals. Finally, I anticipate and address the concern that (...) mine is an unduly idealized and Stoicized account. (shrink)

Les émotions ont souvent été considérées comme une menace pour la moralité et la rationalité ; dans la tradition romantique, les passions étaient placées au centre de l'individualité humaine et de la vie morale. Cette ambivalence a conduit à une ambiguïté entre les termes des émotions pour les vices et les vertus. Spinoza déclare que les systèmes éthiques fondés sur l'auto-préservation tiennent également compte des éléments sociaux et culturels. Spinoza nous dit que le bonheur est le pouvoir d'être libéré de (...) la tyrannie des émotions négatives. Le bonheur n'est pas une récompense pour la vertu : c'est la vertu elle-même. Les sentiments sont nécessaires étant une expression mentale des émotions. À ce niveau, il est possible pour les émotions, à travers les sentiments, de prendre soin de son soi. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.29121.07527. (shrink)

sat es beatus (Catull. 23.27)In the aggressively philosophical poem 23, Catullus attempts to change Furius’ mind about how he perceives his poverty, ‘advice’ which has been identified as either Stoic or Epicurean. Irrespective of the precise school of thought, it is clear that the poet ridicules Furius in eudaimonistic language. The poet of social commentary seeks to define thebeatus uir. In fact, the termbeatushas rich philosophical resonance and Catullus uses it in several other poems where attitudes to wealth form a (...) significant backdrop to the poet's social posturing. Catullus was no philosopher. He employs the language and ideas of different schools, and, while his work does not reflect a coherent philosophical position, he was writing at a time when public discourse increasingly drew upon philosophical language and topoi. I will examine Catullus’ use of the termbeatusin poems 9, 10, 22 and 23 to demonstrate that the poet draws a contrast between its different meanings across these pairs of adjacent poems. I will argue that Catullus contrasts the eudaimonistic and material meanings of the word to show the differences between clear-sighted wisdom and deceptive pleasures, between the good life and a life filled with goods. (shrink)

This paper argues that the concept of dignity should be understood as a concept that we use to describe an aggregate of values and qualities of a person or thing that deserves esteem and respect. The primary value that creates the right to have dignity is life. The degree of dignity a life form has depends on its place in the evolutionary scale. Human beings are the highest form of life so they possess the highest degree of dignity.

Lucrèce débute son livre III du poème De rerum natura par l’éloge des enseignements d’Épicure - qui effacent la peur de la mort, des fantômes et des dieux - et la description des sentiments suscités par les principes épicuriens. Il écrit, dans les vers 28-30, qu’il ressent à la fois une volupté divine (divina voluptas), allusion probable au plaisir catastématique qui permet d’approcher la quiétude de la divinité, et l’horreur (horror). La formule est énigmatique, voire même contradictoire. En effet les (...) occurrences d’horror dans le De rerum natura démontrent que le terme est lié surtout à la crainte de la mort, des fantômes et des dieux, autrement dit la même peur que les épicuriens veulent éliminer pour donner accès à la volupté divine. Dans cet article, nous étudions cette formule de DRN III, 28-30 et nous proposons une nouvelle solution à sa contradiction interne, qui n’est qu’apparente. Cette solution est fondée sur l’hypothèse d’un emploi thérapeutique de la poétique du sublime. (shrink)

Em busca da felicidade do indivíduo, Epicuro aborda os diversos aspectos que considera contribuírem para ela: prazer, quietude, conhecimento, segurança, amizade, justiça. Neste texto pretendemos, de forma sucinta, mostrar de que modo estes vários elementos se relacionam entre si e, sobretudo, de que modo o conceito de justiça deste filósofo contribui para a felicidade humana, não sendo um conceito tradicional.

Clinical ethics committees aim to resolve conflict, facilitate communication and ease moral distress in health care. Dialogue in committee discussions is complex and involves a balance between implicitly and explicitly expressed values of patients, families and professionals. Evaluating effectiveness and concrete outcomes is challenging and most studies focus on broad benefits such as quality of care and reduction of unnecessary or unwanted treatments. In this paper we propose ‘physician satisfaction’ as a valuable outcome. We refer to the clinical ethics approach (...) followed at one large paediatric hospital in Australia, propose reasons for the often-expressed feeling of satisfaction and discuss why this feeling matters. We conclude that physician satisfaction is a valid measure of an effective ethics consultation because it implies the person has been listened to and respected by others, and has perhaps developed greater understanding of and insights into their own work and values, and those of others. (shrink)

The existential risk posed by ubiquitous artificial intelligence (AI) is a subject of frequent discussion with descriptions of the prospect of misuse, the fear of mass destruction, and the singularity. In this paper I address an under-explored category of existential risk posed by AI, namely emotional risk. Values are a main source of emotions. By challenging some of our most essential values, AI systems are therefore likely to expose us to emotional risks such as loss of care and loss of (...) meaning. Part one presents a study of a leading bank in Germany where an AI system was implemented to replace humans in decision-making processes. Part two explains why humans actively make use of values to make decisions. Part three shows the connection between values and emotions. Part four relates parts two and three to the bank study by giving concrete examples of how the employees saw their roles as workers, and how the relationships to their customers changed emotionally after the AI system was implemented to make decisions. (shrink)

The ageing populations of the Western world present a wide range of economic, social, and cultural implications, and given the challenges posed by deteriorating maintenance ratios, the scenario is somewhat worrying. In this paper, I investigate whether Martha C. Nussbaum's capabilities approach could secure dignity for older people in long‐term care, despite the per capita decreases in resources. My key research question asks, ‘What implications does Nussbaum's list of central human capabilities have for practical social care?’ My methodology combines Nussbaum's (...) list with ethnographic data gathered from a Finnish sheltered home for older people. On the basis of this study, it seems that the capabilities approach is a plausible framework for the ethics of care because it highlights differences in the ability to function and thus differences in opportunities to pursue a good life. The ideas presented in this article could assist social policy planners and executives in creating policies and practices that help old people to maintain their dignity until the end of their days. (shrink)

This essay is dedicated to exploring the experience of multiple, perhaps conflicting, emotions occurring at the same time. Though this experience is part of our common language, such as when we speak of feeling conflicted or torn, philosophical accounts of the emotions and the research on these accounts tends to approach emotion sequentially, as a process of one emotion after another. This essay thus offers an account of simultaneous emotions in the work of two thinkers, Thomas Aquinas and Zhuangzi 莊子, (...) focused on the coincidence of grief and joy as found in exemplary persons. I argue that both Aquinas and Zhuangzi offer accounts which acknowledge the reality of simultaneous emotions, and both offer different explanations of how this is possible, as well as how these emotions are moderated or forgotten. (shrink)

Inspired by a passage from Kate Chopin’s The Awakening, this article considers the possibility of a “medical sublime.” It works through a history of the sublime in theory and in the arts, from ancient times to the present. It articulates therapeutic dimensions of the sublime and gives contemporary examples of its medical relevance. In addition, it develops the concept of sublime-based stress-reduction workshops and programs. These workshops bring the sublime out of the library and the museum into the lives of (...) the healthcare community—patients, families, clinicians, staff, concerned others—in the service of better navigating human vulnerability and finitude. Opening the cannon of aesthetic theory and the arts as resources for the human condition is at the heart of health humanities. The sublime can be an invaluable tool in this task. (shrink)

Tomando como ponto de partida o conto de Ann Beattie, “Learning to Fall”, o presente texto considera as possibilidades pedagógico-morais abertas à literatura ao traçar um diagnóstico crítico, e negativo, a respeito das falhas das filosofias morais tradicionais quanto ao aspecto mais vulnerável de nossa humanidade, insistindo na importância de um aprendizado amplo, lento e disciplinado de nossas “quedas” através de leituras e amizades essencialmente literárias.

Depuis Homère, les penseurs de l’antiquité se sont intéressés à la nature, à l’usage et au contrôle de la colère. Cet article porte sur le plus ancien ouvrage sur le sujet qui ait survécu de l’antiquité jusqu’à nous, à savoir le traité Sur la Colère de Philodème, un important philosophe épicurien, actif en Italie du Sud au ier siècle av. J.-C. De façon générale, il s’agit dans cet article de présenter, du point de vue historique, sémantique et méthodologique, le contexte (...) de l’analyse par Philodème de la colère, ainsi que de reconstruire l’essentiel de son argumentation contre différents adversaires. La question comporte un débat sur la bonne façon de traiter la colère ; l’explication que donne Philodème de la nature, des symptômes et des conséquences de cette émotion ; la distinction qu’il opère entre colère naturelle (orge) et non naturelle (thymos), ainsi que son affirmation, que le sage peut à l’occasion resssentir la première, mais jamais la seconde ; enfin, sa réfutation de trois arguments en forme d’epilogismos qui soutiennent que le sage ne sera pas moins sujet à la colère que n’importe qui. (shrink)

This article analyses the set of ethical questions underlying the emergence of the modern politics of security, as articulated, in particular, in the work of Thomas Hobbes. An ethic is here understood – in line with its ancient philosophical use and the interpretation advanced by authors such as Michel Foucault and Pierre Hadot – as a domain of reflections and practices related to the cultivation and conversion of the self. The article aims to demonstrate that, besides attending to the physical (...) safety of the state and its citizens, modern apparatuses of security are also crucially implicated in the formation of their subjects as ethical and autonomous individuals. To substantiate this thesis, the article first illustrates how, since the first appearance of the term in the vocabulary of Western thought – and in Seneca’s work in particular – theories of security have been intimately tied to the cultivation of the self. It thus interprets Hobbes’s reflections on the subject as the upshot of a substantive, if implicit, re-articulation of Seneca’s ethic of security, by focusing on the two authors’ respective understandings of autonomy, the world, ascesis, and politics. Overall, it is suggested that the differences between the two authors testify to a wider political-historical shift: in modern regimes of governmentality, the ethical dimension of security no longer defines the rightful exercise of political power, but rather appears as an object of social and economic governance. (shrink)