In his early writings, Kant says that the solution to the puzzle of how morality can serve as a motivating force in human life is nothing less than the “philosophers’ stone.” In this dissertation I show that for years Kant searched for the philosophers’ stone in the concept of “respect” (Achtung), which he understood as the complex effect practical reason has on feeling. -/- I sketch the history of that search in Chapters 1-2. In Chapter 3 I show that Kant’s (...) analysis in Groundwork I is incomplete because it does not explain how respect functions as a feeling in motivating choice. In Chapter 4 I argue that Kant’s subsequent attempt to sidestep this explanation in Groundwork III is unsuccessful, and that his position remains open to a skeptical threat. The argument in the second Critique, which I reconstruct in Chapters 5-6, overcomes this threat, and in doing so explains how the feeling of respect is both painful and pleasurable. -/- In the course of defending these claims, I provide an alternative reading of the shift in Kant’s ethical project from the Groundwork of 1785 to the second Critique of 1788 Against a common view in the literature, I argue that the shift does not concern the direction of Kant’s deduction (from freedom to morality, or morality to freedom); rather, it concerns his view of human sensibility and the resources he thinks we have to make our practical self-understanding intelligible. In the second Critique, I argue, Kant develops a novel approach to moral feeling from the perspective of the human agent; and this in turn clears room in his ethics for a new kind of a priori knowledge—namely, knowledge of what the activity of practical reason must feel like. By way of conclusion, I offer a few reasons for why the form of Kant’s argument in the second Critique is still relevant today, as it shows why we can only address moral skepticism from a first-personal perspective. (shrink)

With the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, John Rawls not only rejuvenated contemporary political philosophy but also defended a Kantian form of Enlightenment liberalism called “justice as fairness.” Enlightenment liberalism stresses the development and exercise of our capacity for autonomy, while Reformation liberalism emphasizes diversity and the toleration that encourages it. These two strands of liberalism are often mutually supporting, but they conflict in a surprising number of cases, whether over the accommodation of group difference, the design (...) of civic education, or the promotion of liberal values internationally. During the 1980’s, however, Rawls began to jettison key Kantian characteristics of his theory, a process culminating in the 1993 release of Political Liberalism and completing the transformation of justice as fairness into a Reformation liberalism. -/- Reconstructing Rawls argues that this transformation was a tragic mistake because it jeopardized the most important features of his theory, viz. the lexical priorities of right, liberty, and fair equality of opportunity as well as the difference principle. Controversially, this book contends that Rawls’s so-called “political turn,” motivated by a newfound interest in diversity and the accommodation of difference, has been unhealthy for autonomy-based liberalism and has pushed liberalism more broadly towards cultural relativism, be it in the guise of liberal multiculturalism or critiques of cosmopolitan distributive-justice theories. The book then demonstrates that the central elements of justice as fairness can only be defended within the context of a Kantian Enlightenment liberalism and that Rawls’s hope for a more pluralistic grounding for his theory, endorsed by a wide variety of belief systems present in modern democratic societies, is illusory. -/- Reconstructing Rawls is the first book to systematically compare Rawls’s and Kant’s theories and the first to offer an internal critique and reconstruction of justice as fairness, reconceiving it as a comprehensive, universalistic Kantian liberalism. By doing so, it gives us both the vision of a liberal world order—“a republicanism of all states, together and separately,” as Kant put it—and a mode of justification addressed to all men and women, not as members of particular nations, races, and faiths, but as human beings, as citizens of the world. In short, it reclaims Rawls for the Enlightenment. (shrink)

Neuroscientific claims have a significant impact on traditional philosophy. This essay, focusing on the field of moral neuroscience, discusses how and why philosophy can contribute to neuroscientific progress. First, viewing the interactions between moral neuroscience and moral philosophy, it becomes clear that moral philosophy can and does contribute to moral neuroscience in two ways: as explanandum and as explanans. Next, it is shown that moral philosophy is well suited to contribute to moral neuroscience in both of these two ways in (...) the context of the problem of ecological validity. Philosophy can play the role of an agent for ecological validity, since traditional philosophy shapes and reflects part of our social reality. Finally, based on these arguments, I tentatively sketch how a Kantian account of moral incentive can play this role. (shrink)

This study argues that the notion of transparency requires reconsideration as an essence of ethical agency. It provides a brief explication of the concept of transparency, rooted in the principle of human dignity of Immanuel Kant, and suggests that it has been inadequately appreciated by media ethics scholars and instructors more focused on relatively simplistic applications of his categorical imperative. This study suggests that the concept's Kantian roots raise a radical challenge to conventional understandings of human interaction and, by extension, (...) what it means to exercise freedom. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 795-810, December 2021.

Purpose: The objective of this study is to determine the importance of supplementary medical ethics course for resident physicians. In this study, we assessed the current state of their knowledge of medical ethics and aimed to improve and deepen their understanding of clinical scenarios to increase their awareness of the link between the practice of medicine and ethical issues. Methods: The course was held for groups of 10-12 people for 3 days a week for a total of 6 hours. Tests (...) given prior to and following completion of the course were used to assess the effectiveness of a medical ethics training course in which 120 resident physicians completed. The evaluation was made on the basis of the same pre-and post-tests (14 scenarios) and direct observation of participants. Result and Discussion: The average age was 28.23 ± 4.08 and 25% were female and 75% were male. Of the participants, 68.3% were training to be internists, 24.2% were training to be surgeons, and 7.5% were training in laboratory medicine. There was a significant statistical difference between the mean total scores of both tests (p=0.00). After completing the course, residents took into account the medical ethical principles while discussing ethical decisions. Conclusion: After finishing the course, participants defended their responses in regard to issues of medical ethics more carefully and articulated their thoughts more clearly. Our experience demonstrated that the trainees benefited from a structured curriculum in medical ethics. We believe that the development and implementation of our course may serve as a case study for training resident physicians in medical ethics. (shrink)

U trećem odseku Zasnivanja metafizike morala Kant nastoji da, na osno­ vu ideje o nužnom pretpostavljanju slobode, pruži dedukciju vrhovnog moralnog prin­ cipa i da dokaže njegovo objektivno važenje. Tri godine kasnije, u Kritici praktičkog -/- uma, on eksplicitno poriče mogućnost izvođenja navedene dedukcije i promenom meto­ doloških postavki pokušava da pokaže da svest o moralnom zakonu kao činjenici uma -/- predstavlja osnovu za dedukciju slobode. U ovom radu ćemo zastupati stav da direktan -/- kontrast između dva Kantova teksta jasno (...) pokazuje da je došlo do radikalnog preokre­ -/- ta u njegovoj misli. Cilj ovog teksta je da pokaže da je Kant imao razloge da bude neza­ -/- dovoljan dedukcijom moralnog zakona ponuđenom u Zasnivanju metafizike morala, što -/- ga je navelo da promeni svoj argumentativni tok prilikom pisanja druge Kritike. (shrink)

This dissertation concerns the methodology Kant employs in the first two sections of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Groundwork I-II) with particular attention to how the execution of the method of analysis in these sections contributes to the establishment of moral metaphysics as a science. My thesis is that Kant had a detailed strategy for the Groundwork, that this strategy and Kant’s reasons for adopting it can be ascertained from the Critique of Pure Reason (first Critique) and his (...) lectures on logic, and that understanding this strategy gains us interpretive insight into Kant’s moral metaphysics. At the most general level of methodology, Kant says there are four steps for the establishment of any science: 1) make distinct the idea of the natural unity of its material 2) determine the special content of the science 3) articulate the systematic unity of the science 4) critique the science to determine its boundaries The first two of these steps are accomplished by the genetically scholastic method of analysis, paradigmatically the method whereby confused and obscure ideas are made clear and distinct, thereby logically perfecting them and transforming them into possible grounds of cognitive insight that are potentially complete and adequate to philosophical purposes. The analysis of Groundwork I is a paradigmatic analysis that makes distinct what is contained in common understanding, i.e. its Inhalt or intension, making distinct the higher partial concepts that together define the concept of morality. The analysis of Groundwork II is an employment more specifically of the method of logical division, which makes distinct what is contained under the concept, i.e. its Umfang, by which the extension or object of morality is determined. Part I introduces Kant’s conception of moral metaphysical science and why he took it to be in need of establishment, explains the general method for establishing science and the scholastic method of analysis by which its first two steps are to be accomplished, then provides an interpretation of Groundwork I as an execution of this method. Part II details Kant’s determination of the special content of moral science in Groundwork II in relation to the central problem for moral metaphysics – how synthetic a priori practical cognition is possible. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the German philosopher, is considered as the father of modern ethics and one of the great philosophers in the history of philosophy. He wanted to establish a firm foundation for moral philosophy. He contributed something new to modern ethics which was not attempted by earlier ethicists. He wanted to show by using reason that morality is based on a single supreme universal principle, which is binding to all rational beings. Precisely, Kant wanted to establish the first principle (...) of morality which neglects all consideration of self-interest and even particular human problems. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claimed that his intention is to seek out and establish the supreme principle of morality, and that supreme principle is the categorical imperative. He puts the supreme principle of morality or the categorical imperative in at least five ways. These are formula of universal law (FUL), formula of universal law (FLN), formula of humanity (FH), formula of humanity (FA), and formula of realm of ends (FRE). However, Kant affirms that there is one canonical and general formulation of the categorical imperative and it is the FUL. For him, the other formulas are not distinct ethical principles; rather they are the reformulations or variant formulations of the single categorical imperative. Kant put this position in his works, The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. So, in this paper, I will mainly concentrate on the fundamental doctrine of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. As I have tried to make clear before, Kant’s aim in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is to search for and establish the supreme principle of morality (i.e., categorical imperative). He attempted to do this at the end of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. But, to me, the way he attempted to justify the categorical imperative is problematic. Thus, in this paper, I argue that Kant did not put the categorical imperative or morality on a solid ground. (shrink)

Kant holds that the applicability of the moral ‘ought’ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify “cognitive control” in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing.

This essay explores Hannah Arendt’s contribution to our understanding of the rhetorical as opposed to the aesthetic quality of public speech, with an emphasis upon her conception of opinion and glory. Arendt’s focus on the revelatory quality of public action in speech is widely understood to preclude or seriously limit its communicative aspect. I argue that this is a misunderstanding, and that accepting it would reduce speech not merely to the discussion of a sharply limited set of topics, but to (...) no topics at all. Public action is speech that reveals the speaker as “answering, talking back and measuring up to whatever happened or was done.” Such revelatory speech is most appropriately judged by the standard of the glorious and the inglorious. Because such speech must inform as well as reveals, so does glorious or great speech rise to the level of greatness in part because of what is said, to whom, where, and how. Arendt’s understanding of this is shown to have significant parallels to the ordinary language philosophy of Stanley Cavell. (shrink)

It is commonly held that Kant ventured to derive morality from freedom in Groundwork III. It is also believed that he reversed this strategy in the second Critique, attempting to derive freedom from morality instead. In this paper, I set out to challenge these familiar assumptions: Kant’s argument in Groundwork III rests on a moral conception of the intelligible world, one that plays a similar role as the ‘fact of reason’ in the second Critique. Accordingly, I argue, there is no (...) reversal in the proof-structure of Kant’s two works. (shrink)

Kant's aim in Section III of the Groundwork is to establish the supreme principle of morality. To accomplish his aim he finds it necessary to present a justification of freedom. Commentators generally regard Kant's overall argument as a failure, because they regard his justification of freedom as a failure. In this paper I shall present three arguments. First, I shall argue that commentators, for the most part, look to the wrong text for Kant's Groundwork justification of freedom. They look to (...) pars. 10–16 for an argument for freedom, but the collection of propositions, which Kant presents there, is aimed at showing something other than freedom. Second, I shall argue that to the extent that they look to the correct text, namely, par. 4, they misinterpret Kant. Third, I shall set out and evaluate the actual justification of freedom which Kant presents in par. 4. (shrink)

Three alternative models of the relationship between genetic counselors and clients are typified by the paternalistic professional, the expert consultant, and the autonomous client. Kant's principle of autonomy stipulates that the agent with rational will is to be treated as an end in itself rather than merely as a means to an end. Mutual respect between two such autonomous agents, in our case a genetic counselor and a client, will dictate elements of the clinical encounter.

ABSTRACTIn this article, I will identify two key normative principles at the core of Robert L. Simon’s mutualist theory of sport, namely, the respect-for-the-opponent principle and the idea that sport is a practice aimed at pursuing excellence. The former is a Kantian principle grounded in human beings’ rationality, and the latter is an Aristotelian principle related to the development of excellences as a means to human flourishing. After having presented and analyzed both principles, I will critically evaluate Simon’s attempt to (...) combine them within his mutualist approach. To conclude, I will highlight the challenges that mutualism should face to complete such a combination more successfully.Abbreviation: Categorical imperative. (shrink)

En el prólogo a la Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres Kant advierte sobre la diferencia entre una reflexión sobre el fundamento de la moral y la idea de cómo ‘aplicar’ el principio de la moralidad a la vida cotidiana de los humanos. Según su propio punto de vista, la pregunta de cómo implementar la moral en la vida práctica supone la necesidad de adoptar la perspectiva de una antropología pragmática. En ese sentido, el objeto de este ensayo es (...) hacer una lectura pragmática del concepto de ciudadanía de Kant, desde la cual se comprende mejor su convicción de que lo político debe construirse sobre el fundamento de la moral: el respeto por la dignidad humana. Este punto de vista pragmático me permitirá aclarar: a) por qué piensa Kant que las graves dificultades de la política estriban en la tarea saber y poder establecer las medidas necesarias para garantizar el respeto a los derechos fundamentales, y b) de qué manera el concepto kantiano de ciudadanía cimenta la idea del reconocimiento mutuo de derechos y deberes. Para ello divido este ensayo en tres apartados: 1. Las ideas de derechos humanos y ciudadanos, y el concepto de derecho cosmopolita. 2. El concepto de ciudadanía a la luz de su concepto de un estado republicano; y 3. Cómo fue concebida por Kant la noción de ciudadanía para gente común y corriente, con sentido común. (shrink)

The inconsistency between pro-environmental attitudes and behaviours, known as the “attitude-behaviour” gap, is exceptionally pronounced in scenarios associated with “green” choice. The current literature offers numerous explanations for the reasons behind the “attitude-behaviour” gap, however, the generalisability of these explanations is complex. In addition, the answer to the question of whether the gap occurs between attitudes and intentions, or intentions and behaviours is also unknown. In this study, we propose the moral dimension as a generalisable driver of the “attitude-behaviour” gap (...) and investigate its effectiveness in predicting attitudes, pro-environmental intentions and subsequent behaviours. We do so by using Hunt–Vitell’s moral philosophy-based framework of ethical decision-making, which conceptualises morality as the central decision-making parameter. The results from 557 US MTurk participants revealed that the manipulation of moral dimensions, specifically deontology and teleology, impacted ethical evaluation of presented dilemmas, however, failed to translate into subsequent intentions and behaviours. This finding suggests (i) that the moral dimension has an effect in shaping attitudes toward environmental issues, and (ii) that gap occurs between attitudes and intentions rather than intentions and behaviours. Further investigation of what strengthens and/or overrides the effects of the moral dimension would help understand the reasons why moral attitudes do not always translate into subsequent intentions and behaviours in the pro-environmental domain. (shrink)

This paper will show that if we take conventional ethics seriously, then there is no moral justification for business profits. To show this, we explore three conventional ethical theories, namely Christian ethics, Kantian ethics and Utilitarian ethics. Since they essentially reject self-interest, they also reject the essence of business: the profit motive. To illustrate the relationship, we will concretize how the anti-egoist perspective expresses itself in business and business ethics. In business, we look at what many businesses regard as proof (...) of their virtue. In business ethics, we look at what many business ethicists say about the relationship between morality and self-interest and, thus, the profit motive. Ultimately, we will argue that conventional ethics can, at most, only justify the means of business, but not the end of business. (shrink)

Não apenas distantes no tempo, Kant e Levinas são distantes em suas respectivas propostas de ética. Este trabalho visa analisar reflexivamente os princípios morais dos dois autores com o intuito de introduzir o acadêmico aos conceitos fundamentais em dois grandes expoentes da ética. Desta forma, Kant propõe uma moral baseada na razão (pura prática), livre de toda inclinação sensível. Nada alheio a razão pode fundar uma lei. Por conseguinte, o único princípio da determinação da vontade é a lei moral, de (...) forma que ser moral é ser racional. Logo, na medida em que as máximas do agir concordarem com a lei moral expressa no imperativo categórico tem-se uma ação com valor moral. Levinas, por sua vez, faz uma crítica a toda à tradição ética pelo fato de ter subjugado o outro ao Eu. Na tradição o outro foi reduzido a “objeto”, a conceito. Por isso, para Levinas, a ética é filosofia primeira, na qual afirma que o outro interpela e causa irrecusavelmente responsabilidade por ele. Tal responsabilidade é fundada antes mesmo do sujeito se constituir como Eu consciente. Logo, o rosto do outro é um mandamento que exige minha responsabilidade. (shrink)

Kant offers the following argument for the formula of humanity (FH): Each rational agent necessarily conceives of her own rational nature as an end in itself and does so on the same grounds as every other rational agent, so all rational agents must conceive of one another's rational nature as an end in itself. As it stands, the argument appears to be question-begging and fallacious. Drawing on resources from the formula of universal law (FUL) and Kant's claims about the primacy (...) of duties to oneself, I propose a contractualist reconstruction of this puzzling line of reasoning. (shrink)

The contradiction in conception test is one of two tests posed by Kant’s Formula of the Law of Nature. This article proposes a new interpretation of this test: a causal-teleological version of the Logical Contradiction Interpretation. Its distinctive feature is that it identifies causal and teleological implications in the thought of a universal law of nature. A causal-teleological version of LCI has two advantages. While the established view of the Groundwork’s applications of the CC test is a hybrid view that (...) treats the Groundwork’s arguments as different in kind, a causal-teleological version of LCI unifies the Groundwork’s applications of the CC test. Relatedly, a causal-teleological version of LCI provides a solution to the problem of how the CC test can confirm the impermissibility of a self-directed maxim. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende apresentar uma análise comparativa entre as obras de fundamentação da moralidade e o escrito sobre a religião no que tange à estrutura da ação por dever. Tal análise se justifica em vista de Kant, no escrito sobre a religião, apresentar a definição da ação por dever e da ação moralmente má nos termos de hierarquia e ordem moral dos móbiles, formulação que, aparentemente, não é apresentada no âmbito da fundamentação da moral. Dessa análise se sobressai, ainda, a (...) necessidade de, ao menos amplamente, fornecer dados quanto à função e o aparecimento da noção de ordem moral dos móbiles no interior do discurso moral kantiano. (shrink)

I. Kant hat mit seiner universalistischen, formalistischen und kognitivistischen Konzeption moralisch-praktischer Gründe in Gegenüberstellung zu seiner instrumentalistischen Konzeption nicht-moralisch-praktischer Gründe eine Begrifflichkeit geschaffen, die es erlaubt, handlungsleitende Überzeugungen hinsichtlich ihres Geltungsanspruchs und ihrer Verbindlichkeit zu differenzieren. Von einem ‚Sollen‘ spricht Kant in beiden Fällen. Nicht nur der kategorische Imperativ, der unbedingt gebietet, „ich soll niemals anders verfahren als so, daß ich auch wollen könne, meine Maxime solle ein allgemeines Gesetz werden“ , sondern auch hypothetische Imperative, die bedingt gebieten, „ich soll (...) etwas thun, darum weil ich etwas anderes will“, nehmen bei Kant die normative Form eines ‚Sollens‘ an. In beiden Fällen ergehen also Forderungen an die Vernunft, doch es ist alles andere als klar, in welcher Beziehung diese Sollensformen zueinander stehen. Bestünde gar keine solche Beziehung, so träte praktische Vernunft im Plural auf – wohlgemerkt in einer einzigen Person, welcher sich der Sinn beider Imperativformen erschlossen hat. Da eine solche Form von Schizophrenie der Willensbestimmung nicht der Kantischen Vorstellung von praktischer Vernunft entspricht, stellt sich die Frage nach der Einheit von bedingtem und unbedingtem Sollen. (shrink)

Veterinary ethics is a coordination of ethical principles that apply morals, values and judgements to the practice of veterinary profession. Veterinary ethics cover its practical application in veterinary practices as well as on its history, philosophy, theology, and sociology. Veterinary ethics combine veterinary professional ethics and the focus of animal ethics. It can be inferred as a critical manifestation on the provision of veterinary services in hold of the profession’s responsibilities to animal kind and mankind. Many ethical issues arise in (...) a business unit in veterinary practice. Whenever such issues arise, it may lead to dilemmas, then proper and well-thought out ethical decision is to be made. Ethical decision making process in a business unit in veterinary practice is the use of ethical theories, principles, and rules by veterinary professionals and paraprofessionals in resolving ethical dilemmas in the veterinary practice. In order to resolve ethical dilemmas, being aware of and revelation to ethical theories is essential. Thoughtfulness of animal welfare and ethical issues is an essential component of a good ethical veterinary practice. This article reviews and discusses the ethics and major steps engaged in the ethical decision-making process in a business unit in veterinary practice. Strong commitment to the role, organization’s commitment to ethics and staff support could lower the levels of moral stress while facing ethical dilemma in a veterinary practice. Though using the ethical frameworks portrayed may not change the actual decisions finally reached by veterinary professionals, a good knowledge of ethical issues is imperative for client communication, better job satisfaction and preserving a positive public outline for both the individual and the veterinary practice. (shrink)

Both metaethicists and Kant scholars alike use the phrase ‘Kantian constructivism’ to refer to a kind of austere constructivism that holds that substantive ethical conclusions can be derived from the practical standpoint of rational agency as such. I argue that this widespread understanding of Kant is incompatible with Kant’s claim that the Categorical Imperative is a synthetic a priori practical judgement. Taking this claim about the syntheticity of the Categorical Imperative seriously implies that moral judgements follow from extra-logical but necessary (...) principles. These principles have to do not with the laws of practical thinking but the laws of practical thought about an object. I conclude that historical Kant was not what has come to be called a ‘Kantian constructivist’. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...) equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In the first part (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In this second part, I shall outline a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls. (shrink)

Kant considers eudaimonism as his main opponent and he assumes that his ethics is the only viable alternative to eudaimonism. He does not explicitly address theories differing from both eudaimonism and from his own. I argue that whilst Kant and Act-Consequentialists advocate different normative principles, their positions share the important abstract feature that they establish what is to be done from a rational principle and not based on what is in the self-interest of the respective agent, as Kant thinks eudaimonism (...) does. Act-Consequentialism is thus closer to Kant’s ethics than is often assumed. I will demonstrate and vindicate this point with a new interpretation of the Fact of Reason. This reading also establishes that the notion of a Fact of Reason is less contentious than many of Kant’s critics believe. We should not expect that the Fact establishes Kantianism. Instead, the Fact is only supposed to count against a specific competing view of morality, namely, eudaimonism. Act-Consequentialists can accept the Fact as well. (shrink)

The traditional understanding of Kant and Kierkegaard is that their views on the good will and inwardness, respectively, commit them to denying moral luck in an attempt to isolate an omnipotent moral subject from involvement with the external world. This leaves them vulnerable to the criticism that their ethical thought unrealistically insulates morality from anything that happens in the world. On the interpretation offered here, inwardness and the good will are not contrasted with worldly happenings, but are instead a matter (...) of worldly happenings that exhibit a particular temporal structure. Kant and Kierkegaard should not be understood as denying moral luck. (shrink)

In The Sources of Normativity Korsgaard introduces her conception of practical identities understood as the source of moral obligations. This conception forms a point of transition from Korsgaard’s theory of action to her solution to the problem of the authority of moral norms. In order to describe how universal categorical reasoning is compatible with the moral content of particular practical decisions, Korsgaard needs to show how our contingent practical identities can be reconciled with what she defines as the universally shared (...) identity that expresses our humanity. To make this reconciliation work, she devises an argument for the public shareability of reasons amended by her reinterpretation of the Kantian as if principle. I suggest that, in doing so, Korsgaard steps too far away from Kant’s architectonic approach to the question of why moral norms bind us, and that, consequently, the Korsgaardian reconciliation between the two kinds of identities, as it stands, cannot be accomplished. (shrink)

The conception of two kinds of practical identities, which Korsgaard introduces in the Sources of Normativity, helps her explain how universal categorical reasoning is compatible with the moral content of individual practical decisions. Based on this conception, she devises an interpretation of the Kantian as if principle amended by her argument for the public shareability of reasons. I suggest that, in doing so, Korsgaard steps too far away from Kant’s architectonic approach to the question of why moral norms bind us, (...) and that, as a result, the Korsgaardian explanation, as it stands, cannot be accomplished. (shrink)

This dissertation attempts to preserve the central tenets of a global moral theory called “the capabilities approach” as defended by Martha Nussbaum, but to do so in a way that better realizes its own goals of identifying gender injustices and gaining cross-cultural support by providing an alternative defense of it. Capabilities assess an individual’s well-being based on what she is able to do (actions) and who she is able to be (states of existence). Nussbaum grounds her theory in the intuitive (...) idea that each and every person is worthy of equal respect and dignity. The problem with grounding a theory in a version of intuitionism is that it runs the risk of authoritarian moral reasoning. I argue Nussbaum, in fact, is the final arbiter who decides which intuitions are mistaken, which are not, and how to interpret what people say to fit into her own framework. This method of justifying capabilities is most problematic in cases of social inequality whereby dominant group members do not feel they need to check their intuitions against non-dominant group members, and even if they did, they are not forced to take the non-dominant group’s intuitions seriously. I find capabilities as a global moral theory to be very promising, and I agree with Nussbaum that a list of capabilities is beneficial for identifying people who are not able to live a truly dignified human life. However, I am also sympathetic to the criticism of defending capabilities using a version of intuitionism. So, I offer an alternative method of justifying the capabilities rooted in the discourse ethics tradition. This method seeks all persons that are affected by the outcome to freely and equally share their opinion. This avoids the charge of authoritarian moral reasoning, because (1) it seeks perspectives other than simply one’s own, but unlike traditional ethics, it (2) pays special attention to the ways in which power relations shape dialogue. Ultimately, I hope to have preserved the central tenets of the capabilities approach while better realizing Nussbaum’s commitment to defending a theory that is gender sensitive and has gained cross-cultural support. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem por objetivo demonstrar o lugar próprio do sentimento moral [das moralische Gefühl] na filosofia prática de Kant. Sentimento moral e respeito pela lei são equivalentes, sendo, esse respeito, o único e autêntico motivo moral sem, contudo, referir-se a um objeto empírico. Assim, o respeito é o efeito da lei moral produzido em nossa sensibilidade moral, sem a qual o conceito de dever seria inviável. Uma ação por respeito à lei possui valor moral porque a lei torna-se (...) o motivo do agir. Isso também pode ser chamado de interesse prático, ou seja, é a possibilidade de efetivação da lei. Sem interesse prático (ou sem sentimento moral), não teríamos ações por dever, mas, por conseguinte, mera legalidade. (shrink)

Current literature on ethical leadership and unethical leadership reflects a Western-based private sector perspective, pointing toward a compliance-oriented understanding of ethical and unethical leadership. As today’s executives increasingly have to ethically lead across different cultures and sectors, it becomes vitally important to develop a more holistic picture how ethical and unethical leadership is perceived in the Western and Eastern cultural cluster and the private and the public/social sector. Addressing this issue, the present study aims to identify cross-cultural and cross-sectoral commonalities (...) and differences in international executives’ perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership. Findings from in-depth interviews (N = 36) with executives from Western and Eastern cultures working in the private or the public/social sector reveal collectively held perceptions of ethical leadership (including leader honesty, integrity, concern for responsibility/sustainability, and people orientation) and of unethical leadership (referring to leader dishonesty, corruption, egocentrism, and manipulation). Results indicate limited support for a compliance-oriented perspective on ethical and unethical leadership but yield a much greater trend toward a value-oriented perspective. Concrete practice examples illustrate these different perspectives. Cultural and sectoral particularities of executive perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership are discussed. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that the Commodification Objection, locates a phenomenon of real moral significance. In defending the Commodification Objection, I review three common criticisms of it, which claim firstly, that commodification doesn’t always lead to instrumentalization; secondly, that commodification isn’t the only route to such an outcome; and finally, that the Commodification Objection applies only to persons, and human organs are not persons. In response, I conclude that moral significance does not require that an undesirable outcome be a (...) necessary consequence of the phenomenon under examination; the relative likelihood of an undesirable mode of regard arising provides a morally-relevant distinguishing marker for assessing the comparative moral status of social institutions and arrangements; and sales in blood products are sufficiently distinct from sales of everyday artefacts and sufficiently close to personhood to provide genuine grounds for concern. Accordingly, criticisms of the Commodification Objection do not provide grounds for rejecting the claim that human organ sales in general and compensation for blood plasma donation in particular can have morally pernicious ‘commodificatory effects’ upon our attitudes, for what human organ sales provide is a distinctive ethical hazard. (shrink)

Las antinomias de la razón ocupan un lugar destacado en el sistema crítico de Kant. El conflicto de la razón consigo misma es lo que despierta al Profesor de Königsberg del “sueño dogmático” y lo conduce a la elaboración del idealismo trascendental. Sin embargo, las antinomias de la razón práctica no han ocupado el mismo lugar que aquellas del uso teórico. De hecho, muchos estudiosos de la obra kantiana consideran que no hay, en sentido estricto, una antinomia de la razón (...) en su uso práctico. El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar que hay una antinomia de la razón práctica. Particularmente, mostremos por qué la antinomia de la razón práctica se debe entender a la luz del concepto kantiano de absurdum practicum. (shrink)

Dramatic changes or revolutions in a field of science are often made by outsiders or 'trespassers,' who are not limited by the established, 'expert' approaches. Each essay in this diverse collection shows the fruits of intellectual trespassing and poaching among fields such as economics, Kantian ethics, Platonic philosophy, category theory, double-entry accounting, arbitrage, algebraic logic, series-parallel duality, and financial arithmetic.

I offer you some theories of intellectual obligations and rights (virtue Ethics): initially, RBT (a Right to Believe Truth, if something is true it follows one has a right to believe it), and, NDSM (one has no right to believe a contradiction, i.e., No right to commit Doxastic Self-Mutilation). Evidence for both below. Anthropology, Psychology, computer software, Sociology, and the neurosciences prove things about human beliefs, and History, Economics, and comparative law can provide evidence of value about theories of rights. (...) However, insofar as we have methods within Philosophy to help us formulate precise concepts of 'belief' and 'rights', methods that also help us to prove links (or absence thereof) amongst families of concepts of rights and belief, our discipline is in and of itself capable of sound reasoning about issues as puzzling as the following. Suppose a Jane who does not believe in God yet who believes she ought to so believe: Jane is undergoing doxastic moral regret (moral regret for lack of faith). We have all known such Janes and perhaps at one time or another even been one. Paradox: given RBT and NDSM, Jane as described not only does not exist, Jane cannot exist. Thus, to enrich the ways in which Philosophy need not get all its evidence from other academic disciplines, I present a brief introduction to what I call Neutral Universal Frames (NUFs). NUFs solve hard puzzles about interactions among modal concepts of belief and rights, concepts that occur in RBT, NDSM and the description of our Janes. NUFs for theories precisely articulated via any two or more modal concepts are a powerful and immensely general set of tools enabling us to define rich theories of truth ("models on frames") to test philosophical theories for internal consistency and to prove the existence of connections (or absence thereof) amongst alternative articulations of philosophical theories. NUFs thereby add to the constructive knowledge producing way Logics intersect with Philosophy of Religion. And we will soon see why Jane, be she named 'Jane' or known simply as you: cannot exist. Read on at your own risk. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

In the first of the three essays of Theory and Practice published in 1793, Kant took the task to answer some objections that Ch. Garve, Kant’s contemporary popular philosopher, had raised against his ethical theory a couple of years earlier. One of these, the most important one in my view, has to do with the problem of, as Garve puts it, “how anyone can become aware of having performed his duty quite unselfishly”. In this paper, my aim is to recover (...) the pertinence of this text by showing two things. First, that this essay is part of a controversy between Garve and Kant that transcends, historically and philosophically, Theory and Practice itself; and second, that Kant fails to succeed in this controversy against Garve due to a confession that he makes during the discussion, for this statement runs against that which has the intend to be demonstrate by the argument of the “fact of pure reason”. (shrink)

El presente artículo propone pensar un modo de articulación de los dominios teórico y práctico de la filosofía crítica de Kant a partir de los diferentes tipos de operaciones sintéticas de la subjetividad (esquema, analogía y típica) que cada una de las dos primeras críticas ponen en juego. Se sostiene que el dominio teórico obtiene su caracterización a partir de las operaciones sintéticas de carácter esquemático, y que el dominio práctico la obtiene, por su parte, a partir de dos tipos (...) de operaciones sintéticas: primero, de la analogía en tanto que simulación práctica que regula el dominio teórico (KrV), y segundo, de la típica del juicio práctico en la que, por medio de síntesis de lo heterogéneo, el sujeto se abre a una determinación suprasensible que excede sus meras potencialidades naturales (KpV). (shrink)

Contra aquellas lecturas formalistas de la filosofía práctica deKant, se asume una lectura de su propuesta ética a partir delconcepto de máxima. Al referirnos a la moral kantiana comouna moral de máximas, se postula un modelo específico dela acción racional, el cual posibilita la aplicación de la leymoral. La máxima, dentro de este modelo de acción, sirvecomo principio práctico subjetivo de la acción a partir delcual se aplica el imperativo categórico, como su principiopráctico objetivo. Esto implica que la propuesta de (...) Kant noexcluye el contexto práctico en el que se quiere realizar laacción, así como tampoco la situación específica del agenteque la pretende realizar. (shrink)