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  1. Sincerity and the Reliability of Testimony: Burge on the A Priori Basis of Testimonial Entitlement.Graham Peter - forthcoming - In Andreas Stokke & Eliot Michaelson (eds.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    According to the Acceptance Principle, a person is entitled to accept a proposition that is presented as true (asserted) and that is intelligible to him or her, unless there are stronger reasons not to. Burge assumes this Principle and then argues that it has an apriori justification, basis or rationale. This paper expounds Burge's teleological reliability framework and the details of his a priori justification for the Principle. It then raises three significant doubts.
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  • Grading the Quality of Evidence of Mechanisms.Stefan Dragulinescu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Kent
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  • Evidentialism, Knowledge, and Evidence Possession.Timothy Perrine - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (4):433-449.
    Evidentialism has shown itself to be an important research program in contemporary epistemology, with evidentialists giving theories of virtually every important topic in epistemology. Nevertheless, at the heart of evidentialism is a handful of concepts, namely evidence, evidence possession, and evidential fit. If evidentialists cannot give us a plausible account of these concepts, then their research program, with all its various theories, will be in serious trouble. In this paper, I argue that evidentialists has yet to give a plausible account (...)
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  • Anti‐Reductionism and Expected Trust.Sanford C. Goldberg - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
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  • Looking Beyond Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism.Felix Bräuer - forthcoming - Episteme:1-19.
    Under which conditions are we epistemically justied to believe that what other people tell us is true? Traditionally, the answer has either been reductionist or anti-reductionist: Either our justication reduces to non-testimonial reasons, or we have a presumptive, though defeasible, right to believe what we are told. However, different cases pull in different directions. Intuitively, someone asking for the time is subject to different epistemic standards than a surgeon consulting a colleague before a dangerous operation. Following this line of thought, (...)
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