The 2009 pandemic of influenza A (H1N1) was relatively mild, but a subsequent outbreak of pandemic influenza could be much worse. According to projections from the Department of Health and Human Services, the potential health consequences of a severe (1918-like) influenza pandemic in the United States could be literally overwhelming: up to 1.9 million deaths; 90 million people sick; 45 million people needing outpatient care; 9.9 million people hospitalized, of whom 1.485 million would need treatment in an intensive care unit (...) (ICU); and 742,500 patients needing mechanical ventilators. Even a less cataclysmic, moderate pandemic (like 1958 or 1968) would result in 209,000 deaths; 90 million people sick; 45 million people needing outpatient care; 865,000 people hospitalized, of whom 128,750 would need treatment in an ICU; and 64,875 patients needing mechanical ventilators. (shrink)

The 2009 pandemic of influenza A was relatively mild, but a subsequent outbreak of pandemic influenza could be much worse. According to projections from the Department of Health and Human Services, the potential health consequences of a severe influenza pandemic in the United States could be literally overwhelming: up to 1.9 million deaths; 90 million people sick; 45 million people needing outpatient care; 9.9 million people hospitalized, of whom 1.485 million would need treatment in an intensive care unit ; and (...) 742,500 patients needing mechanical ventilators. Even a less cataclysmic, moderate pandemic would result in 209,000 deaths; 90 million people sick; 45 million people needing outpatient care; 865,000 people hospitalized, of whom 128,750 would need treatment in an ICU; and 64,875 patients needing mechanical ventilators. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 2, February 2020, Page 35-38.

This comment on the case presented in ‘Cholera and Nothing More’ argues that the physicians at this public-health centre did not have an ordinary clinician's obligations to promote the health of the people who came to them for care, as they were instead set up to serve a laudable and urgent public-health goal, namely, controlling a cholera outbreak. It argues that, nonetheless, these physicians did have some limited moral duties to care for other diseases they encountered—some ancillary-care duties—arising from their (...) voluntarily entering into a kind of intimate relationship with the patients they took in, one in which those patients effectively waive certain rights to bodily and medical privacy. (shrink)

Some argue that the concept of medical need is inadequate to inform the design of a universal health care system—particularly an institutional rather than a residual system. They argue that the concept contradicts the idea of comprehensiveness; leads to unsustainable expenditures; is too indeterminate for policy; and supports only a prioritarian distribution. I argue that ‘comprehensive’ understood as ‘including the full continuum of care’ and ‘medically necessary’ understood as ‘prioritized by medical criteria’ are not contradictory, and that UHC is a (...) solution to the problem of sustainability, not its cause. Those who criticize ‘medical need’ for indeterminacy are not transparent about the source of their commitment to their standards of determinacy: they promote standards that are higher than is necessary for legitimate policy, ignoring opportunity costs. Furthermore, the indeterminacy of concepts affects all risk-sharing systems and all systems that rely on medical standard of care. I then argue that the concept of need in itself does not imply a minimal sufficientist standard or a prioritarian distribution; neither does the idea of legitimate public policy dictate that public services be minimalist. The policy choice for a system of health care that is comprehensive and offers as good care as can be achieved when delivered on equal terms and conditions for all is a coherent option. (shrink)

Medical resource allocation is a controversial topic, because in the end it prioritises some peoples’ medical problems over those of others. This is less controversial when there is a clear clinical reason for such a prioritisation, but when such a reason is not available people might perceive it as deeming certain individuals more important than others. This article looks at the role of social utility in medical resource allocation, in a situation where the clinical outcome would be identical if either (...) person received the treatment. This situation is explored with a focus on the United Kingdom, but its conclusions have wider applications to any system where healthcare is tax-payer funded. The article proposes an experience adjusted life years system, and discusses its strengths and weaknesses. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to investigate the views of healthcare professionals in Portugal about healthcare rationing, and compare them with the views of college students. A self-administered questionnaire was used to collect data from a sample of 60 healthcare professionals and 180 college students. Respondents faced a hypothetical rationing dilemma where they had to order four patients and justify their choices. Multinomial logistic regressions were used to test for differences in orderings, and content analysis to categorize the (...) written justifications. The findings suggest that both groups appeared to support three main rationing principles: health maximization, priority to the severely ill and priority to the young. However, professionals seemed to give less weight to the latter principle. In conclusion, professionals have similar views to students about healthcare rationing, though may be slightly less inclined to give priority to the young. (shrink)

In “Conceptions of Care,” Tove Pettersen discusses and articulates select ways in which care can be comprehended. Several difficulties related to an altruistic understanding of care are examined before the author presents the case for a more favorable concept: mature care. Mature care is intended to take into account the interests of both parties to the caring relationship. This understanding of care facilitates the expression of the relational and reciprocal aspects of caring while emphasizing the equal worth of all involved. (...) Also attended to is the embeddedness of care in wider cultural and political contexts. (shrink)

In this short response to Kerstein and Bognar, we clarify three aspects of the complete lives system, which we propose as a system of allocating scarce medical interventions. We argue that the complete lives system provides meaningful guidance even though it does not provide an algorithm. We also defend the investment modification to the complete lives system, which prioritizes adolescents and older children over younger children; argue that sickest-first allocation remains flawed when scarcity is absolute and ongoing; and argue that (...) Kerstein and Bognar are mistaken to base their allocation principles on differences in personhood. (shrink)

In this Commentary, I propose an ethical framework for ethical discussions around the allocation of scarce resources in COVID-19 response. The framework incorporates four principles: beneficence (benefiting people by saving lives or years of life), equality, remedying disadvantage, and recognizing past conduct. I then discuss how the framework interacts with ethical constraints against using people as a mere means and against causing death. The commentary closes by criticizing the equation of deontological ethics with random or first-come, first-served allocation and of (...) allocation that aims to save more lives or years of life with utilitarianism.. (shrink)

In a severe influenza pandemic, hospitals will likely experience serious and widespread shortages of patient pulmonary ventilators and of staff qualified to operate them. Deciding who will receive access to mechanical ventilation will often determine who lives and who dies. This prospect raises an important question whether pandemic preparedness plans should include some process by which individuals affected by ventilator rationing would have the opportunity to appeal adverse decisions. However, the issue of appeals processes to ventilator rationing decisions has been (...) largely neglected in state pandemic planning efforts. If we are to devise just and effective plans for coping with a severe influenza pandemic, more attention to the issue of appeals processes for pandemic ventilator rationing decisions is needed. Arguments for and against appeals processes are considered, and some suggestions are offered to help efforts at devising more rational pandemic preparedness plans. (shrink)

If the resources used to wage wars could be spent elsewhere and save more lives, does this mean that wars are unjustified? This article considers this question, which has been largely overlooked by Just War Theorists and pacifists. It focuses on whether the opportunity costs of war lead to a form of pacifism, which it calls ‘Opportunity Costs Pacifism’. The article argues that Opportunity Costs Pacifism is, at the more ideal level, compelling. It suggests that the only plausible response to (...) Opportunity Costs Pacifism applies in highly nonideal circumstances. This has major implications for Just War Theory and pacifism since it is only at the highly nonideal level that war can be justified. (shrink)

Improving public understanding and acceptance are critical for promoting coronavirus vaccination. However, how to promote COVID-19 vaccine programs remains controversial due to various ethical issues. This study, thus, aimed to survey the acceptance of COVID-19 vaccines among Japanese citizens and discuss relevant ethical issues. A cross-sectional survey was conducted via an online platform. An anonymous, quantitative, self-administered online questionnaire was sent to 6965 registered Japanese residents, which included questions regarding the respondent’s general knowledge, experience, and opinions of vaccines, vaccine development, (...) COVID-19, and COVID-19 vaccines. Of the 1569 respondents, 730 and 839 were categorized into the younger and older groups, respectively. Most of the respondents possessed general knowledge of COVID-19 vaccines and their features. Of the respondents, 57.8% definitely agreed or somewhat agreed to receive COVID-19 vaccines. The older group showed significantly greater willingness to receive vaccines and higher literacy regarding vaccines in general. Possible reasons for the older group’s greater willingness to receive COVID-19 vaccines are a high risk of severe COVID-19 infection and their past accumulated experience of receiving various vaccinations. Although active public intervention could increase vaccination rates, most of the respondents did not agree with mandatory vaccination. Furthermore, a gap between the participants in the COVID-19 vaccine trials and the prioritized population in real-world vaccination should be adjusted in future vaccine development. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 3, March 2020, Page 63-65.

Introduction Hundreds of thousands of premature neonates born in low-income countries are implicitly denied treatment each year. Studies from India show that treatment is rationed even for neonates born at 32 gestational age weeks (GAW), and multiple external factors influence treatment decisions. Is withholding of life-saving treatment for children born between 28 and 32 GAW acceptable from an ethical perspective? Method A seven-step impartial ethical analysis, including outcome analysis of four accepted priority criteria: severity of disease, treatment effect, cost effectiveness (...) and evidence for neonates born at 28 and 32 GAW. Results The ethical analysis sketches out two possibilities: (a) It is not ethically permissible to limit treatment to neonates below 32 GAW when assigning high weight to health maximisation and overall health equality. Neonates below 32 GAW score high on severity of disease and efficiency and cost-effectiveness of treatment if one gives full weight to early years of a newborn life. It is in the child's best interest to be treated. (b) It can be considered ethically permissible if high weight is assigned to reducing inequality of welfare and maximising overall welfare and/or not granting full weight to early years of newborns is considered acceptable. From an equity-motivated health and welfare perspective, we would not accept (b), as it relies on accepting the lack of proper welfare policies for the poor and disabled in India. Conclusion Explicit priority processes in India for financing neonatal care are needed. If premature neonates are perceived as worth less than other patient groups, the reasons should be explored among a broad range of stakeholders. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Compassionate Use beschreibt die Anwendung zulassungsüberschreitender Arzneimittel für Patient*innengruppen, die an einer lebensbedrohlichen oder zu einer schweren Behinderung führenden Erkrankung leiden, ohne dass eine alternative Therapieoption besteht. An Ärzt*innen vorbei werden solche Programme ausschließlich von Pharmaunternehmen initiiert, was viele ethische Konflikte mit sich bringt. Eine neue Dimension erreichte das 2020 gestartete Programm für _Onasemnogenum abeparvovecum_ zur Therapie von Spinaler Muskelatrophie bei Kindern, welches die Krankheit nach nur einmaliger Gabe stoppen sollte. Die globale Allokation von nur 100 zur Verfügung gestellten (...) Dosierungen per Losverfahren stellte ein Novum bei der Allokation in Compassionate Use-Programmen dar und wurde vielfach kritisiert. Diese Arbeit untersucht mögliche alternative Allokationsprinzipien auf das Beispiel von _Onasemnogenum abeparvovecum_. Für jedes in Frage kommende Prinzip der Allokation medizinischer Güter bestehen Aspekte, die im Hinblick auf die drängende Zeit und die globale Verteilung bedacht werden müssen. Dies lässt einige Prinzipien wie First-Come-First-Served vernachlässigbar erscheinen. Verbliebene Prinzipien werden hierarchisch geordnet, um einen Algorithmus abzuleiten, der eine Alternative zum Losverfahren darstellen kann. Eine Kombination von Teilnahmebereitschaft bei Forschung, Dringlichkeit und Erfolgsaussicht (bezogen auf die Existenz supportiver Therapieoptionen) kann in ähnlichen Fällen bei zukünftigen globalen Compassionate Use-Programmen bei Kindern erwogen werden. Da universelle Algorithmen nur schwer definierbar sind, sollten Allokationskriterien in jedem Fall durch ein unabhängiges Expert*innengremium diskutiert werden. Sowohl die Konstitution eines solchen Gremiums sowie deren verpflichtende Konsultierung sind gefordert, um für Entlastung aller Beteiligten zu sorgen und Willkür vorzubeugen. (shrink)

Definition of the problem Compassionate use is the use of unapproved drugs in groups of patients suffering from a disease that, in the absence of an alternative treatment option, is life-threatening or leads to severe disability. Physicians are not in charge because access to the drug is only granted by pharmaceutical companies, which comes along with many ethical issues. Launched in 2020, the program of Onasemnogenum abeparvovecum against spinal muscular atrophy in children reached a new dimension. The intent of this (...) drug is to stop the progression of the disease with just a single dose, but the company limited the doses in the program to only 100. The global allocation was by lottery, which was considered a novelty in compassionate use history and therefore widely criticized. This paper investigates alternative allocation principles. Arguments Each possible principle is accompanied by many aspects that need to be considered with regard to urgency and global distribution. This makes some principles like first-come-first-served seem negligible. Remaining principles are ordered hierarchically to derive an algorithm that can represent an alternative to a lottery. A combination of willingness to participate in research, urgency, and likelihood of success (relative to the availability of supportive treatment options) may be considered in similar cases in future global compassionate use programs with children. Conclusion Since universal algorithms are difficult to define, allocation criteria should always be discussed by an independent panel of experts. Both the constitution of such a panel and its mandatory consultation are necessary in order to decrease the burden for all those involved and to prevent arbitrariness. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEin niedriger sozialer Status ist oft mit erhöhter Morbidität und Mortalität verbunden. In dem Beitrag wird versucht, diese „gesundheitliche Ungleichheit“ aus sozial-epidemiologischer Sicht zu bewerten. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die Frage nach der Verantwortung für die erhöhte gesundheitliche Gefährdung der unteren Statusgruppen. Nur ein kleiner Teil der gesundheitlichen Ungleichheit kann durch das Gesundheitsverhalten erklärt werden. Umso wichtiger sind andere Ursachen. Dazu gehören die sozialen Unterschiede bei den Belastungen in der Wohnumgebung, bei den Arbeitsbedingungen und auch beim Zugang zur gesundheitlichen Versorgung. (...) Diese sozial-epidemiologischen Ergebnisse lassen sich gut in die gesundheitsethische Diskussion integrieren. Die Frage, wer für welchen Teil der gesundheitlichen Ungleichheit verantwortlich ist, löst oft heftige Kontroversen aus. Sie sind nur dann zu lösen, wenn die sozial-epidemiologische und die gesundheitsethische Diskussion besser miteinander vernetzt werden. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has been overwhelming public health-care systems around the world. With demand exceeding the availability of medical resources in several regions, hospitals have been forced to invoke triage. To ensure that this difficult task proceeds in a fair and organised manner, governments scrambled experts to draft triage guidelines under enormous time pressure. Although there are similarities between the documents, they vary considerably in how much weight their respective authors place on the different criteria that they propose. Since most (...) of the recommendations do not come with ethical justifications, analysing them requires that one traces back these criteria to their underlying theories of distributive justice. In the literature, COVID-19 triage has been portrayed as a value conflict solely between utilitarian and egalitarian elements. While these two accounts are indeed the main antipodes, I shall show that in fact all four classic theories of distributive justice are involved: utilitarianism, egalitarianism, libertarianism, and communitarianism. Detecting these in the documents and classifying the suggested criteria accordingly enables one to understand the balancing between the different approaches to distributive justice—which is crucial for both managing the current pandemic and in preparation for the next global health crisis. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has raised a host of ethical challenges, but key among these has been the possibility that health care systems might need to ration scarce critical care resources. Rationing p...

Volume 20, Issue 3, March 2020, Page 65-68.

After witnessing extraordinary scientific and regulatory efforts to speed development of and access to new COVID-19 interventions, patients facing other serious diseases have begun to ask “where’s...

Transplantation programs commonly rely on clinicians’ judgments about patients’ social support (care from friends or family) when deciding whether to list them for organ transplantation. We examine whether using social support to make listing decisions for adults seeking transplantation is morally legitimate, drawing on recent data about the evidence-base, implementation, and potential impacts of the criterion on underserved and diverse populations. We demonstrate that the rationale for the social support criterion, based in the principle of utility, is undermined by its (...) reliance on tenuous evidence. Moreover, social support requirements may reinforce transplant inequities, interfere in patients’ personal relationships, and contribute to biased and inconsistent listing procedures. As such, accommodating the needs of patients with limited social support would better balance ethical commitments to equity, utility, and respect for persons in transplantation. We suggest steps for researchers, transplantation programs, and policymakers to improve fair use of social support in transplantation. (shrink)

Aim To explore the way people living with HIV and healthcare providers in Togo judge the priority of HIV-infected patients regarding the allocation of antiretroviral drugs. Method From June to September 2015, 200 adults living with HIV and 121 healthcare providers living in Togo were recruited for the study. They were presented with stories of a few lines depicting the situation of an HIV-infected patient and were instructed to judge the extent to which the patient should be given priority for (...) antiretroviral drugs. The stories were composed by systematically varying the levels of four factors: the severity of HIV infection, the financial situation of the patient, the patient's family responsibilities and the time elapsed since the first consultation. Results Five clusters were identified: 65% of the participants expressed the view that patients who are poor and severely sick should be treated as a priority, 13% prioritised treatment of patients who are poor and parents of small children, 12% expressed the view that the poor should be treated as a priority, 4% preferred that the sickest be treated as a priority and 6% wanted all patients to get treatment. Conclusions WHO's guideline regarding antiretroviral therapy allocation currently in use in many African countries does not reflect the preferences of Togolese people living with HIV. For most HIV-infected patients in Togo, patients who cannot get treatment on their own should be treated as a priority. (shrink)

Critical-care decision making is highly complex, given the need for health care providers and organizations to consider, and constructively respond to, the diverse interests and perspectives of a variety of legitimate stakeholders. Insights derived from an identified set of ethics-related considerations have the potential to meaningfully inform inclusive and deliberative policy development that aims to optimally balance the competing obligations that arise in this challenging, clinical decision-making domain. A potential, constructive outcome of such policy engagement is the collaborative development of (...) an as-fair-as-possible dispute resolution process that incorporates an appropriated-justified, defensible critical-care obligation threshold. (shrink)

BackgroundThe contemporary frameworks for clinical research require informed consent for research participation that includes disclosure of material information, comprehension of disclosed information and voluntary consent to research participation. There is thus an urgent need to test, and an ethical imperative, to test, modify or refine medications or healthcare plans that could reduce patient morbidity, lower healthcare costs or strengthen healthcare systems.MethodsConceptual review.DiscussionAlthough some allocation principles seem better than others, no single moral principle allocates interventions justly, necessitating combining the moral principles (...) into multiprinciple allocation systems. The urgency notwithstanding, navigating ethical challenges related to conducting corona virus disease (COVID-19) clinical trials is mandatory, in order to safeguard the safety and welfare of research participants, ensure autonomy of participants, reduce possibilities for exploitation and ensure opportunities for research participation. The ethical challenges to can be categorized as challenges in allocation of resources for research; challenges of clinical equipoise in relation to the research questions; challenges of understanding disclosed information in potential participants; and challenges in obtaining informed consent.ConclusionTo navigate these challenges, stakeholders need a delicate balance of moral principles during allocation of resources for research. Investigators need to apply information processing theories to aid decision-making about research participation or employ acceptable modifications to improve the informed consent process. Research and ethics committees should strengthen research review and oversight to ensure rigor, responsiveness and transparency. (shrink)

We present the perspective of a Bioethics Consultation Service operating in an urban hospital in Dayton, Ohio, USA, as it adapted to treating Sars-CoV-2 patients throughout 2020. Since the first case of COVID-19 was reported in Ohio on 9 March 2020, until 1 January 2021, the Bioethics Consultation Service was consulted 60 times, a 22.5% increase from the same period of 2019. The most common diagnoses requiring consultation included end-stage renal disease requiring dialysis, out-of-hospital cardiac arrest, and sepsis. Only 10% (...) of consultations were for patients hospitalized with COVID-19. This is a qualitative analysis of the cases we saw and a discussion of factors that affected our service while adapting to COVID-19 standards of care. (shrink)

According to the widely accepted principles of beneficence and distributive justice, I argue that healthcare providers and facilities have an ethical duty to reduce the ecological footprint of the services they provide. I also address the question of whether the reductions in footprint need or should be patient-facing. I review Andrew Jameton and Jessica Pierce’s claim that achieving ecological sustainability in the healthcare sector requires rationing the treatment options offered to patients. I present a number of reasons to think that (...) we should not ration health care to achieve sufficient reductions in a society’s overall consumption of ecological goods. Moreover, given the complexities of ecological rationing, I argue that there are good reasons to think that the ethical duty to reduce the ecological footprint of health care should focus on only nonpatient-facing changes. I review a number of case studies of hospitals who have successfully retrofitted facilities to make them more efficient and reduced their resource and waste streams. (shrink)

Accelerated COVID-19 vaccine development represents an important accomplishment and a milestone in the history of vaccine evolution. However, the vaccine’s scarcity made its equitable global allocation and distribution ambiguous. Despite the initial pledges from wealthy countries for fairness and inclusivity towards the poorer ones, the policies followed diverged significantly. Wealthy countries have vastly superior access to vaccines in a reality likened to an ethical disaster. This paper calls for the need for fair global vaccine allocation and distribution and examines the (...) barriers that were met along the way, originating from different points, such as the nationalistic approach on the matter that most wealthy countries have adopted or the inability of poor countries to purchase or manufacture vaccines. Further, a suggestion regarding the ethical principles and values that ought to guide global vaccine allocation and distribution is provided with a higher priority given to helping the worst-off, saving the most lives, protecting people in high risk, such as frontline healthcare professionals, and minimising social gaps, along with an ethical theoretical background for each prioritisation. It is not too late for wealthy countries to realise that vaccine inequity prolongs pandemics, so that they change their policies in favour of the global common good that will not only provide immediate universal benefits but will also serve as a guide for future pandemic crises. (shrink)

BackgroundIn the initial phase of the Covid-19 pandemic, difficult decisions had to be made on the allocation of testing resources. Similar situations can arise in future pandemics. Therefore, careful consideration of who should be tested is an important part of pandemic preparedness. We focus on four ethical aspects of that problem: how to prioritize scarce testing resources, the regulation of commercial direct-to-consumer test services, testing of unauthorized immigrants, and obligatory testing.Main textThe distribution of scarce resources for testing: We emphasize the (...) use of needs-based criteria, but also acknowledge the importance of choosing a testing strategy that contributes efficiently to stopping the overall spread of the disease. Commercial direct-to-consumer test services: Except in cases of acute scarcity, such services will in practice have to be allowed. We propose that they should be subject to regulation that ensures test quality and adequate information to users. Testing of unauthorized immigrants, their children and other people with unclear legal status: Like everyone else, these individuals may be in need of testing, and it is in society’s interest to reach them with testing in order to stop the spread of the disease. A society that offers comprehensive medical services to unauthorized immigrants is in a much better position to reach them in a pandemic than a society that previously excluded them from healthcare. Obligatory testing: While there are often strong reasons for universal testing in residential areas or on workplaces, there are in most cases better ways to achieve testing coverage than to make testing mandatory.ConclusionIn summary, we propose (1) decision-making primarily based on needs-based criteria, (2) strict regulation but not prohibition of direct-to-consumer test services, (3) test services offered to unauthorized immigrants, preferably as part of comprehensive medical services, and (4) broad outreach of testing services whenever possible, but in general not obligatory testing. (shrink)

What challenges must a principle of need for prioritisations in health care meet in order to be plausible and practically useful? Some progress in answering this question has recently been made by Hope, Østerdal and Hasman. This article continue their work by suggesting that the characteristic feature of principles of needs is that they are sufficientarian, saying that we have a right to a minimally acceptable or good life or health, but nothing more. Accordingly, principles of needs must answer two (...) distributive questions: when do we have sufficient and how should we prioritise among those who do not yet have a sufficiency? Furthermore, it is argued that Roger Crisp’s theory of need, which combines sufficientarianism with prioritarianism below the threshold of need, is better equipped than alternatives to answer these questions as well as meeting the challenges formulated by Hope, Østerdal and Hasman. However, Crisp’s theory faces two major challenges. First, it has to say something about the currency of distribution: a principle of need must be complemented either with a theory on the human good or a theory about the proper goals of health care. Second, it has to say something about where the threshold should be set. However, any attempt to set a threshold seems morally arbitrary in the light of the sufficientarian idea that those just above the threshold never should be given priority over those just below the threshold. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to show how, on a wide variety of issues, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein broke new ground with the established Orthodox rabbinic consensus and blazed a new trail in Jewish medical ethics. Rabbi Feinstein took power away from the rabbis and let patients decide their treatment, he opened the door for a Jewish approach to palliative care, he supported the use of new technologies to aid in reproduction, he endorsed altruistic living organ donation and recognized brain (...) death (thus laying the groundwork for Orthodox Jewish acceptance of heart transplantation), he downplayed the value of social worth in triage decisions, and was a fierce defender of the rights of the fetus. I develop broader theological principles from Rabbi Feinstein's ethical positions and compare them to those of his Jewish and Christian contemporaries. (shrink)

Next SectionBackground International and national agencies play a major role in setting HIV care-and-treatment priorities in low-income-countries. Little is known about priority setting at lower health-system levels. The objective of this article is to explore experiences of HIV priority decisions, at what levels these decisions are made and how they might influence the distribution of health benefits in a high-endemic region in Tanzania. Methods This is a qualitative study using observations, key documents and semistructured focus-group and individual interviews (43) with (...) health workers, patients and administrators at one regional and one district hospital. The analysis was based on an editing analysis style. Results Health workers did not perceive themselves as bedside rationing agents and they reported following national recommendations and felt they have little impact on important priority decisions. Health benefit distributions were largely determined by priority decisions made at a national level. External factors, such as eligibility criteria, inadequate funding and barriers to access seemed to play a major role in the actual distribution of health services and benefits in the region. Patient groups who were actually given high priority were the sickest patients, those living near a facility and those who could afford long journeys and frequent visits. Low-priority groups were those experiencing other co-morbidities or treatment failure, children, asymptomatic patients and the poorest. Conclusions/significance The interaction of priority setting across health-system levels and their impact on distribution of health outcomes in the population has been underestimated. The distributional pattern of health outcomes calls for further normative assessment. (shrink)

Waiting time is widely used in health and social policy to make resource allocation decisions, yet no general account of the moral significance of waiting time exists. We provide such an account. We argue that waiting time is not intrinsically morally significant, and that the first person in a queue for a resource does not ipso facto have a right to receive that resource first. However, waiting time can and sometimes should play a role in justifying allocation decisions. First, there (...) is a duty of fairness prohibiting line-cutting where a sufficiently just queue exists. Second, waiting time has several morally attractive features that can justify its incorporation into allocation schemes. Where candidates are in relevantly similar circumstances, allocating by waiting time is relatively efficient, maximizes distribution equality relative to other Pareto efficient distributions, and treats candidates fairly. The claim that allocation using waiting time is fair is controversial. Some have claimed that formal lotteries are a fairer way to select among equal beneficiaries. We argue that lotteries are no fairer than allocation based on waiting time when it is equiprobable how a prospective queue will be ordered. In practice, lotteries share many of the disadvantages of queues; which is fairer will depend on contingent features of the allocation scenario. The upshot is that first-come, first-served is in fact a just way to allocate resources in many of the cases where it seems pre-theoretically compelling, and waiting time has unique normative properties which frequently justify its incorporation into resource allocation schemes. (shrink)

During the recent debates on whether to prioritize health care workers for COVID-19 vaccines, two main lines of arguments emerged: one centered on maximizing health and one centered on reciprocity. In this article, we scrutinize the argument from reciprocity. The notions of fittingness and proportionality are fundamental for the act of reciprocating. We consider the importance of these notions for various arguments from reciprocity, showing that the arguments are problematic. If there is a plausible argument for reciprocity during the pandemic, (...) this is most likely one that centers on the risk that health care workers take on while working. We argue that the scope of this argument is not plausibly extended only to health care workers. Other essential workers at risk are in the position to make the same arguments. We also argue that there is no compelling argument from reciprocity that makes reciprocating with vaccines, rather than by other means, necessary. Furthermore, allocating vaccines based on reciprocity will conflict with utility-maximizing. Given the weak state of the arguments, overriding concerns for utility seem unreasonable. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 12, Page 46-47, December 2011.

Background: Existing ethical guidelines recommend that, all else equal, past receipt of a medical resource (e.g. a scarce organ) should not be considered in current allocation decisions (e.g. a repeat transplantation).DiscussionOne stated reason for this ethical consensus is that formal theories of ethics and justice do not persuasively accept or reject repeated access to the same medical resources. Another is that restricting attention to past receipt of a particular medical resource seems arbitrary: why couldn't one just as well, it is (...) argued, consider receipt of other goods such as income or education? In consequence, simple allocation by lottery or first-come-first-served without consideration of any past receipt is thought to best afford equal opportunity, conditional on equal medical need. There are three issues with this view that need to be addressed. First, public views and patient preferences are less ambiguous than formal theories of ethics. Empirical work shows strong preferences for fairness in health care that have not been taken into account: repeated accessto resources has been perceived as unfair. Second, while difficult to consider receipt of many other prior resources including non-medical resources, this should not be used a motive for ignoring the receipt of any and all goods including the focal resource in question. Third, when all claimants to a scarce resource are equally deserving, then use of random allocation seems warranted. However, the converse is not true: mere use of a randomizer does not by itself make the merits of all claimants equal.SummaryMy conclusion is that not ignoring prior receipt of the same medical resource, and prioritizing those who have not previously had access to the medical resource in question, may be perceived as fairer and more equitable by society. (shrink)

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 2, Page 165-189, May 2022. It is generally acknowledged that a certain amount of state intervention in health and health care is needed to address the significant market failures in these sectors; however, it is also thought that the primary rationale for state involvement in health must lie elsewhere, for example in an egalitarian commitment to equalizing access to health care for all citizens. This paper argues that a complete theory of justice in (...) health can be derived from a commitment to correcting market failure, or in other words promoting Pareto-efficiency, in the domain of health. This approach can address familiar problems around access to care, as well as problems related to resource allocation and rationing, the control of health care costs, and the foundations of public health. Egalitarian theories of justice in health cannot make sense of the depth and pervasiveness of state involvement in health and health care; only a theory rooted in the need to correct market failure can. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to study the relationship between Epicureanism and pandemic priority-setting and to explore whether Epicurus's philosophy is compliant with the later developed utilitarianism. We find this aim interesting because Epicurus had a different way of valuing death than our modern society does: Epicureanism holds that death—understood as the incident of death—cannot be bad (or good) for those who die (self-regarding effects). However, this account is still consistent with the view that a particular death can be (...) bad for everyone else but those who die, such as family, friends, and society (other-regarding effects). During the pandemic, the focus has been on the number of deaths more than on the suffering and reduced well-being of those infected and the rest of society. However, since the pandemic requires prioritization, it is, on a utilitarian account, important to consider priorities that do the most good overall. In this article, we approach the harm of death from an Epicurean point of view, seeking to flesh out potential implications for pandemic priority-setting, and healthcare in general, using a case study of COVID-19 priority-setting. We also explore whether this would conflict with utilitarianism. We conclude that an Epicurean pandemic priority-setting approach would be different but, surprisingly, not radically different from many of the actual priority-setting decisions we saw under the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

This article argues that values that apply to health care allocation entail the possibility of “spectrum arguments,” and that it is plausible that they often fail to determine a best alternative. In order to deal with this problem, a two-step process is suggested. First, we should identify the Strongly Uncovered Set that excludes all alternatives that are worse than some alternatives and not better in any relevant dimension from the set of eligible alternatives. Because the remaining set of alternatives often (...) contain more than one element, we need some complementary method of selecting a unique alternative. In order to address this issue, I suggest that we must invoke caps on the values that are used to evaluate alternatives, and that these caps must be grounded in collective commitments. (shrink)

In this paper, we point out that explainability is useful but not sufficient to ensure the legitimacy of algorithmic decision systems. We argue that the key requirements for high-stakes decision systems should be justifiability and contestability. We highlight the conceptual differences between explanations and justifications, provide dual definitions of justifications and contestations, and suggest different ways to operationalize justifiability and contestability.

In a crisis, societal needs take precedence over a patient’s best interests. Triage guidelines, however, differ on whether limited resources should focus on maximizing lives or life-years. Choosing between these two approaches has implications for neonatology. Neonatal units have ventilators, some adaptable for adults. This raises the question of whether, in crisis conditions, guidelines for treating extremely premature babies should be altered to free-up ventilators. Some adults who need ventilators will have a survival rate higher than some extremely premature babies. (...) But surviving babies will likely live longer, maximizing life-years. Empiric evidence demonstrates that these babies can derive significant survival benefits from ventilation when compared to adults. When “triaging” or choosing between patients, justice demands fair guidelines. Premature babies do not deserve special consideration; they deserve equal consideration. Solidarity is crucial but must consider needs specific to patient populations and avoid biases against people with disabilities and extremely premature babies. (shrink)