Cognitive science has recently made some startling discoveries about temporal experience, and these discoveries have been drafted into philosophical service. We survey recent appeals to cognitive science in the philosophical debate over whether time objectively passes. Since this research is currently in its infancy, we identify some directions for future research.

We use the hierarchical nature of Bayesian perceptual inference to explain a fundamental aspect of the temporality of experience, namely the phenomenology of temporal flow. The explanation says that the sense of temporal flow in conscious perception stems from probabilistic inference that the present cannot be trusted. The account begins by describing hierarchical inference under the notion of prediction error minimization, and exemplifies distrust of the present within bistable visual perception and action initiation. Distrust of the present is then discussed (...) in relation to previous research on temporal phenomenology. Finally, we discuss how there may be individual differences in the experience of temporal flow, in particular along the autism spectrum. The resulting view is that the sense of temporal flow in conscious perception results from an internal, inferential process. (shrink)

Remembering that there’s a difference between intellectual and perceptual attention can help us avoid miscommunication due to meaning different things by the same terms, which has been a particular problem during the last hundred years or so of the study of attention. I demonstrate this through analyzing in depth one such miscommunication that occurred in a philosophical criticism of the influential psychological text, Inattentional Blindness. But after making the distinction between perceptual attention and intellectual attention, and after making an effort (...) to keep this distinction in mind, we are still faced with the problem of specifying what makes intellectual attention distinct from perceptual attention. In the second half of this article, I discuss the range of proposals about how to understand intellectual attention that are present in the literature, and the problems with them. I do this with the aim of stimulating further discussion about how best to conceptualize intellectual attention, although I do not settle that further question within this paper. (shrink)

This paper is about whether shifts in attention can alter what it is like to think. I begin by taking up the hypothesis that attention structures consciousness into a centre and a periphery, following Watzl's (2014; 2017) understanding of the distinction between the centre and periphery of the field of consciousness. Then I show that introspection leads to divided results about whether attention structures conscious thought into a centre and a periphery -- remarks by Martin (1997) and Phillips (2012) suggest (...) a negative answer, whereas remarks by Maher (1923) and Chudnoff (2013) suggest a positive answer. Lastly, I argue that there is behavioural evidence that lends weight to the 'yes' side of the introspective dispute. My argument makes use of Garavan's (1998) study of forming and maintaining two mental counts at once. (shrink)

Duration distortions familiar from trauma present an apparent counterexample to what we might call the naive view of duration perception. I argue that such distortions constitute a counterexample to naiveté only on the assumption that we perceive duration absolutely. This assumption can seem mandatory if we think of the alternative, relative view as limiting our awareness to the relative durations of perceptually presented events. However, once we recognize the constant presence of a stream of non-perceptual conscious mental activity, we can (...) provide an attractive, purely relative account of temporal distortions quite consistent with the naive view. I also consider (and reject) a second empirical challenge to the naive view arising from the so-called ‘oddball effect’. I conclude by tentatively pointing to further empirical data, traditionally accounted for in terms of an internal clock model of timing, which, I suggest, may be understood more illuminatingly by appeal to the idea that we perceive duration in part relative to concurrent non-perceptual mental activity. (shrink)

While we perceive events in our environment through multiple sensory systems, we nevertheless perceive all of these events as occupying a single unified timeline. Time, as we perceive it, is unified. I argue that existing accounts of the perceived unity of time fail. Instead, the perceived unity of time must be constructed by integrating our initially fragmented timekeeping capacities. However, existing accounts of multimodal integration do not tell us how this might occur. Something new is needed. I finish the paper (...) by articulating the hurdles that must be overcome to provide an account of the perceived unity of time. (shrink)

A central feature of our waking mental experience is that our attention naturally toggles back and forth between “external” and “internal” stimuli. In the midst of an externally demanding task, attention can involuntarily shift internally with no clear reason how or why thoughts momentarily shifted inward. In the case of external attention, we are typically exploring and encoding aspects of our external world, whereas internal attention often involves searching for and retrieving potentially relevant information from our memory networks. Cognitive science (...) has traditionally focused on understanding forms of internal and external attention separately, leaving a mystery about what sparks the seemingly automatic shifts between the two. Specifically, what shifts attentional focus from being outward‐directed to being inward‐directed? We present a candidate mechanism: Familiarity‐detection. (shrink)

This paper has two aims. First, to bring together the models of temporal phenomenology on offer and to present these using a consistent set of distinctions and terminologies. Second, to examine the methodologies currently practiced in the development of these models. To that end we present an abstract characterisation in which we catalogue all extant models. We then argue that neither of the two extreme methodologies currently discussed is suitable to the task of developing a model of temporal phenomenology. An (...) entirely top-down methodology is largely insensitive to empirical findings, while one that is entirely bottom-up is insensitive to both introspective evidence and more general philosophical considerations. We recommend a methodology that falls between these two extremes. (shrink)

Why does time seem to fly by when we are absorbed? The case of listening to music is of particular interest, given that listening to music itself requires experiencing time. In this paper, I argue that neither the prevailing psychological model nor some initially appealing alternative explanations can account for the experience of time flying by in cases where, like listening to music, the activity we are absorbed in itself requires experiencing time. I then put forward a novel view on (...) which the fragmentation of felt time is what best explains these cases. More specifically, I develop a view on which attentive engagement fragments felt time such that we experience the activity we are engaged in as if it is located in a temporally isolated branch or fragment of the main timeline. Time then seems to pass only in this branch, creating the sensation — upon integration — that less time has passed in the main timeline. In support of this proposal, I draw upon ideas in the empirical literature, and I suggest some underlying neuropsychological mechanisms that might serve to implement the model. I then extend the fragmentation model to cases where thinking about time makes it feel as though more of it passes. I end the paper by examining the possibility that an analogous model holds for the case of space. (shrink)

Resumen: Propongo una crítica a la noción de serialidad en la comprensión del concepto de tiempo en el contexto de los estudios cartesianos. En el debate entre los defensores del tiempo continuo y quienes defienden un tiempo discreto, sostengo que ninguna de estas posiciones tiene en cuenta que la serialidad se enmarca en una noción de tiempo que se concibe como divisible y numerable y que no pertenece intrínsecamente a la naturaleza de la experiencia temporal del cogito. Mi propuesta consiste (...) en comenzar a desarrollar la caracterización de dicho tiempo experiencial y cogitativo.: My aim is to criticize the notion of seriality embedded in the understanding of time within the framework of Cartesian studies. I hold that neither those who defend that time is continuous nor those who think that it is discrete take into account the fact that seriality is rooted in a conception of time conceived as divisible and numerable that does not belong intrinsically to the nature of the experience of time of the cogito. I propose to advance towards a characterization of such experiential and cogitative time. (shrink)

The way we represent and perceive time has crucial implications for studying temporality in conscious experience. Contrasting positions posit that temporal information is separately abstracted out like any other perceptual property through specialized mechanisms or that time is represented through the temporality of experiences themselves. To add to this debate, we investigate alterations in felt time in conditions where only conscious visual experience is altered through perceptual switches while a bistable figure remains physically unchanged. We predicted that if perceived time (...) is a function of temporally evolving conscious content, then a break in it (here via a perceptual switch) would also lead to a break in felt time. In three experiments, we showed participants a Necker cube that was manipulated to induce a perceptual switch (experiments 1(a) and 1(b)) or left to switch on its own (experiment 2). We asked participants to report both perceptual switches and felt durations (experiments 1(a) and 2) or only estimate time (experiment 1(b)). Over these three experiments, we find evidence of contraction of felt time in trials with a perceptual switch, consistent with the idea that perceived time is a function of temporally evolving conscious experience. Additionally, we present a phenomenological demonstration to support our empirical data. Overall, the study provides evidence for temporal mirroring and isomorphism in visual experience, arguing for a link between the timing of experience and time perception. (shrink)

This paper explores the use of perhaps the most ubiquitous phrase in time perception literature, i.e., ‘there is no sense organ for time’. I argue here that its usage often highlights several misguided notions about how we perceive time and thus creates a problem in studying it. In this commentary three such underlying notions are discussed which are often drawn as conclusions from the lack of a sensory system to perceive time. These are that time is generated or created separately (...) by the brain, that time perception is different from other kinds of perception and that the study of time is hampered by the lack of a dedicated sense organ. These notions are discussed and argued against. It is claimed that a sense organ for time is not possible, nor does this exclude time from our percepts in general. Moreover, rather than creating a problem, a lack of a sense organ for time offers an opportunity to theorize about our experiences across perceptual modalities and cognitive mechanisms. I conclude by suggesting an end to using this phrase and instead seeing mental time as existing across our experiences. (shrink)