Debates about dual-use research often turn on the potential for scientific research to be used to benefit or harm humanity. This dual-use potential is conventionally understood as the product of the magnitude of the harms and benefits of dual-use research, multiplied by their likelihood. This account, however, neglects important social aspects of the use of science and technology. In this paper, I supplement existing conceptions of dual-use potential to account for the social context of dual-use research. This account incorporates relational (...) and positional concerns that feature in the success or failure of dual-use. I then defend this account against foreseeable objections. (shrink)

This study explores the impact of both individual ethics (IE) and organizational ethics (OE) on ethical intention (EI). Ethical intention, or the individual's intention to engage in ethical behavior, is useful as a dependent variable because it relates to behavior which can be an expression of values, but also is influenced by organizational and societal variables. The focus is on EI in international business decision-making, since the international context provides great latitude in making ethical decisions. Results demonstrate that both IE (...) and OE influence EL Ethical congruence is also discussed as a positive influence. Younger managers are more influenced by OE than older managers. The findings call for creating governance mechanisms to enhance ethical congruence, thereby increasing the likelihood of managers making ethical choices in organizational decision-making. (shrink)

This essay explores the nexus between Buddhist discourse, moral reasoning, and aspects of indigenous ethnopsychology in a Shan community in northern Thailand. I suggest that these three strands of thought are routinely braided together in intricate ways and, furthermore, that some version of this conceptual arrangement is necessary in order for any moral thinking to take place. That is, all moral thought entails some conception of the way the world is structured (a conception that may or may not be based (...) on religion) and some ethnotheory of human nature, both of which are culturally mediated. Finally, I discuss the implications of this view for our understanding of human agency and autonomy. (shrink)

Barresi & Moore's account has at least two implications for moral psychology. First, it appears to provide support for cognitive theories of moral competence. Second, their claim that the development of social understanding depends upondomain-generalchanges in cognitive ability appears to oppose the idea that moral competence is under-pinned by a moral module.

How should knowledge be analyzed? Compositionally, as having constituents like belief and justification, or as an atomic concept? In making arguments for or against these perspectives, epistemologists have begun to use experimental evidence from developmental psychology and developmental linguistics. If we were to conclude that knowledge were developmentally prior to belief, then we might have a good basis to claim that belief is not a constituent of knowledge. In this review, I present a broad range of developmental evidence from the (...) past decade and discuss some of the implications it has for the proper analysis of knowledge. The orthodox perspective from the developmental literature was one where children fail to understand belief and knowledge concepts until later in childhood, with typical asymmetries in belief attribution and knowledge attribution. But what emerges from both a discussion of newer findings and a contextualization of older findings is a picture of development whereby core competence with belief and knowledge concepts emerges much earlier than previously thought that apparent failures in later childhood may be explained by other aspects of development than conceptual development and that there is no clear evidence that knowledge attributions emerge earlier than belief attributions. (shrink)

Recent research in empirical moral psychology attempts to understand (rather than place judgment on) the salient normative differences that laypeople have when making moral decisions by using survey methodology that is based on the operationalized principles from moral theories. The PPIMT is the first measure designed to assess respondents’ preference for the precepts implied in the three dominant moral theories: virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism. The current study used a latent modeling approach to determine the most theoretically and psychometrically-sound model (...) for the PPIMT using a combined sample of college students from a southeastern university in U.S. and MTurk respondents. The PPIMT model fit was acceptable (χ2 = 84.125, df = 40, p = 0.001; RMSEA = 0.052, 90%CI = 0.037 to 0.068; CFI = 0.980; SRMR = 0.035) with four items for Virtue, four items for Deontology, and three items for Consequentialism. (shrink)

Moral purism is a commonly held view on moral worthiness and how to identify it in concrete cases. Moral purists long for a moral world in which (business) people—at least sometimes—act morally worthy, but in concrete cases they systematically discount good deeds as grounded in self-interest. Moral purism evokes moral cynicism. Moral cynicism is a problem, both in society at large and the business world. Moral cynicism can be fought by refuting moral purism. This article takes issue with moral purism. (...) The common strategy to tackle moral purism is to reject the exclusion thesis which states that self-interest and the ‘pure’ moral motive (and thus moral worthiness) exclude each other. We develop a different strategy. We argue that moral purists are mistaken in the way they judge moral worthiness in concrete cases. They employ the wrongprocedureand the wrongcriteria.We develop a proper procedure and proper criteria. We build on Kant, who we argue is unfairly regarded as the champion of moral purism. In order to see how Kant can develop a consistent (non-purist) philosophy, the exclusion thesis must be embedded in Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Properly embedded, Kant turns out to be both anti-purist and anti-cynical. (shrink)

In this article we describe our approach to understanding wrongdoing in medical research and practice, which involves the statistical analysis of coded data from a large set of published cases. We focus on understanding the environmental factors that predict the kind and the severity of wrongdoing in medicine. Through review of empirical and theoretical literature, consultation with experts, the application of criminological theory, and ongoing analysis of our first 60 cases, we hypothesize that 10 contextual features of the medical environment (...) (including financial rewards, oversight failures, and patients belonging to vulnerable groups) may contribute to professional wrongdoing. We define each variable, examine data supporting our hypothesis, and present a brief case synopsis from our study that illustrates the potential influence of the variable. Finally, we discuss limitations of the resulting framework and directions for future research. (shrink)

The starting-point of this article is Graham Richards’ (1995) claim that American psychology includes a moral project present even before the discipline got underway as a modern institution. We accept this, but identify a different kind of moral project, stemming from the radical critique of morality by Ralph Waldo Emerson, rather than the moral aims of Noah Porter and James McCosh. This leads to a morality based on (but not reducible to) psychological events, and worked out, not in academic psychology, (...) but in the practical disciplines of counselling and psychotherapy. We trace its elaboration from Freud to the writings and practice of Albert Ellis and Carl Rogers. The critique is of a traditional morality of obligation with its discourse of ‘shoulds’ and ‘oughts’. A parallel is drawn with a similar (and contemporaneous) critique in moral philosophy. (shrink)

The object of this essay is to explore the central role played by the ‘ethic of care’ in debates within and beyond feminist legal theory. The author claims that the ethic of care has attracted feminist legal scholars in particular, as a means of resolving the theoretical, political and strategic difficulties to which the perceived ‘crisis of subjectivity’ in feminist theory has given rise. She argues that feminist legal scholars are peculiarly placed in relation to this crisis because of their (...) reliance on the social ‘woman’ whose interests are the predominant concern of feminist legal engagement. With the problematisation of subjectivity, the object of feminist legal attention disappears and it is in attempts to deflect the negative political consequences of this that the ethic of care has been invoked, the author argues, unsuccessfully. The essay concludes with suggestions as to how the feminist project in law might proceed in the wake of the crisis of subjectivity and the failure of the ethic of care to resolve it. (shrink)

The past two decades have been a time of heightened interest in the moral aspects of the practice of medicine. This interest has been reflected in medical education by the establishment of medical humanities programs in both preclinical and clinical education in many medical schools. It has also been reflected in the literature with a dramatic increase in journal articles on medical ethics as well as the development of medical ethics in textbooks. A number of journals have developed that are (...) specifically devoted to medical ethics, including The Journal of Medical Ethics, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, The Journal of Medical Humanities, Theoretical Medicine, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, just to name a few. The literature includes both theoretical foundations and conceptual analyses of particular issues as well as practical advice and general suggestions for how to implement programs in medical humanities. (shrink)

Humans expect resources to be distributed fairly. They also show biases to construe all acts as intentional. This study investigates whether every unequal distribution is initially assumed to be intentional unfairness. Study 1 presents a control group of adults with a movie showing one individual accidentally receiving less reward than expected for a task. The experimental group was shown the same scenario, except that the individual was now in the presence of an additional person who received the full reward. Despite (...) the similarity of the scenarios, as predicted, participants in the control condition responded as if the disappointing reward was accidental, while those in the experimental condition responded as if the act was intentional: Their tendency to avoid the “perpetrator” did not differ from that of participants in another control condition who saw an intentionally unfair reward distribution. In Study 2, 7- and 8-year-old children’s results replicated those of adults. Implications for social and moral cognition are discussed. (shrink)

Using the lens of positive organizational ethics, we theorized that empathy affects decisions in ethical dilemmas that concern the well-being of not only the organization but also other stakeholders. We hypothesized and found that empathetic managers were less likely to comply with requests by an authority figure to cut the wages of their employees than were non-empathetic managers. However, when an authority figure requested to hold wages constant, empathy did not affect wage cut decisions. These findings imply that empathy can (...) serve as a safeguard for ethical decision making in organizations during trying times without generally undermining organizational effectiveness. We conclude by discussing the implications of our research. (shrink)

The field of behavioral ethics has seen considerable growth over the last few decades. One of the most significant concerns facing this interdisciplinary field of research is the moral judgment-action gap. The moral judgment-action gap is the inconsistency people display when they know what is right but do what they know is wrong. Much of the research in the field of behavioral ethics is based on early work in moral psychology and American psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg’s foundational cognitive model of moral (...) development. However, Kohlberg’s model of moral development lacks a compelling explanation for the judgment-action gap. Yet, it continues to influence theory, research, teaching, and practice in business ethics today. As such, this paper presents a critical review and analysis of the pertinent literature. This paper also reviews modern theories of ethical decision making in business ethics. Gaps in our current understanding and directions for future research in behavioral business ethics are presented. By providing this important theoretical background information, targeted critical analysis, and directions for future research, this paper assists management scholars as they begin to seek a more unified approach, develop newer models of ethical decision making, and conduct business ethics research that examines the moral judgment-action gap. (shrink)

Kantian ethics is based on a metaphysical conception of autonomy that may seem difficult to reconcile with the empirically-based science of psychology. I argue that, although not formally developed, a Self-Determination Theory (SDT) perspective of ethics can broaden the field of Kantian-based moral psychology and specify what it means, motivationally, to have autonomy in the application of a moral norm. More specifically, I argue that this is possible when a moral norm is fully endorsed by the self through a process (...) of internalization that is energized by intrinsic motivation and is facilitated by the fulfillment of the basic needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness. The conditions of the fulfillment of these needs may even implicitly reveal which norms will be integrated and treated as moral norms. I conclude that SDT offers a motivational approach that is useful in understanding the development of moral norms. (shrink)

This qualitative research study examines moral responsiveness and thinking in a mixed gender class of primary school children over a period o f four and a half years. It sets out to track development in children’s moral awareness, looking at gains and losses from middle to late childhood, and focusing on cognitive skills, notions of moral rectitude, and interpersonal relationships and friendship. The first part of the study is designed to offer a theoretical background to inform interpretation of the data (...) in the second part. It examines major issues in morality and moral education in the context of significant recent debates across several disciplines, including developmental psychology, philosophy, sociology and education; it also offers a theoretical perspective on children’s ability to think together about morality in a community of enquiry and on related issues of pedagogy. Through interpretation of transcripts, the second part o f the study analyses the children’s thinking, in response to a wide range of content, on issues of justice, freedom and responsibility, rights and duties, inclusiveness, and friendship. Gender differences, most notably the reticence of girls to express themselves in a mixed gender group after about age ten, are also examined. The study demonstrates how, through participation in a community of ethical enquiry such as Thinking Time - Philosophy with Children, children become more thoughtful and develop respect and responsiveness to others as well as other traits of character that are central to democratic citizenship. (shrink)

Bu makale, ahlaki gelişim düzeyleri ile mükemmeliyetçilikleri çeşitli değişkenler açısından inceleyen saha araştırmasının bulgularını içermektedir. Araştırma, 2011- 2012 Eğitim Öğretim Yılı Bahar Yarıyılında, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Üniversitesi, Eğitim Fakültesi'nde çeşitli programlarda 1. sınıfta öğrenim gören 222'si kız 130'u erkek toplam 352 öğrenciyle gerçekleştirilmiştir. Katılımcıların yaş ortalaması ise 18.20'dir. Veri toplama aracı olarak, Değerlerin Belirlenmesi Testi Çok Boyutlu Mükemmeliyetçilik Ölçeği ve Kişisel Bilgi Formu kullanılmıştır. Öğrencilerin mükemmeliyetçilik ölçeğinin kendine yönelik, diğerlerine yönelik, sosyal olarak belirlenen alt ölçeklerinden ve ölçeğin toplamından aldıkları puanların, (...) öğrenim gördükleri programa göre anlamlı düzeyde farklılaşmadığı bulunmuştur. Öğrencilerin algıladıkları ebeveyn tutumuna, üniversiteye gelene kadar yaşamlarının çoğunu geçirdikleri yerleşim yerine ve cinsiyetine göre ahlaki gelişim düzeyleri arasında ve mükemmeliyetçilik ölçeğinden aldıkları puanlar arasında anlamlı farklılıklara rastlanmamıştır. Ayrıca öğrencilerin ahlaki gelişim düzeyleri ile mükemmeliyetçilik ölçeği alt ölçekleri ve toplam puanları arasında ise anlamlı ilişkilerin olmadığı bulunmuştur. Yukarıda değinilen sonuçlar ışığında uygulama sürecine ve ileride yapılacak araştırmalara ilişkin öneriler getirilmiştir. (shrink)

مطالعه روابط دین و فلسفه سابقه‌ای دیرین در آثار حکمای مسلمان دارد. شاید بتوان فارابی را پیشگام فیلسوفان مسلمان در ارائه یک نظریه هماهنگ و فراگیر در باب مناسبات دین و فلسفه قلمداد کرد. وی ضمن باور به یگانگی آموزه‌های این دو منظومه فکری، دین را تجلی تعلیمی و تأدیبی حکمت می‌داند. حکمت عملی به عنوان بخشی از حکمت مطلق که با زبان حقیقت و برهان سخن می‌گوید، از این قاعده مستثنی نیست. از همین رهگذر تعالیم دینی ناظر به افعال (...) ارادی انسان را همان آموزه‌های حکمت عملی می‌داند که به زبان تمثیل و با روش اقناعی القاء شده است و وجه عملی دین، یعنی شریعت را آموزه‌های حکمی مقدر به اعراض و احوال زمانی-مکانی معرفی می‌کند و با پیش‌کشیدن عناصر فراتاریخی-ماوراء طبیعی می‌کوشد تا اعتبار، شمول و دوام آموزه‌های شریعت تبیین نماید. از این رو از طریق اتصال وحیانی اعتبار و شمول آموزه‌های عملی دین را تأمین کرده و با طرح فقاهت به عنوان تکمله‌ای بر ختم نبوت دوام شریعت را تضمین می‌نماید. (shrink)

Examining folk intuitions about philosophical questions lies at the core of experimental philosophy. This requires both a good account of what intuitions are and methods allowing to assess them. We propose to combine philosophical and psychological conceptualisations of intuitions by focusing on three of their features: immediacy, lack of inferential relations, and stability. Once this account of intuition is at hand, we move on to propose a methodology that can test all three characteristics without eliminating any of them. In the (...) final part of the paper, we propose implementations of the new methodology as applied to the experimental investigation of the so-called overdemandingness objection to consequentialism. (shrink)

Is there an end to our scientific quest? This question that continues to divide the scientific community between those who believe that the progress of science is infinite and those who think that we already understand how the universe works and no major discoveries are to be expected in the future. This article explores the philosophical worldview of modern science that has given rise to this question. It argues that an approach to knowledge that focuses on the process of construction (...) of knowledge rather than its products offers a possibility of definitively answering this question and opening paths for a more rational approach in advancing and managing the scientific progress. (shrink)

The enthusiasm for a positivistic approach to sexuality education has begun to subside. Recognizing that sexuality is more than a biological phenomenon, and that education is more than just information, sexuality educators throughout North America are now acknowledging the importance of values. There are two problems, however, with the philosophical orientation on values within the literature. The first problem is the pervasive view that teachers should remain neutral to facilitate value clarification. The commitment to neutrality is often based on an (...) appreciation and respect for pluralism, on the subjective nature of values, and on the integrity of persons. The commitment to neutrality, however, confuses pluralism with relativism, subjectivity with subjectivism, and integrity with validity. (shrink)

This thesis focuses on the evolution of human social norm psychology. More precisely, I want to show how the emergence of our distinctive capacity to follow social norms and make social normative judgments is connected to the lineage explanation of our capacity to form shared intentions, and how such capacity is related to a diverse cluster of prototypical moral judgments. I argue that in explaining the evolution of this form of normative cognition we also require an understanding of the developmental (...) trajectory of this capacity. For this purpose, the thesis is organized as follow. In the first chapter, I make some methodological remarks and provide the general overview and plan for the dissertation. In the second chapter, I explain what my explanatory target is and why it matters. On the view I am defending, shared intentional psychology gives rise to a special form of psychology that enables us to engage in social normative thinking. These norms are represented as shared intentional states. Moral psychology, in contrast, is more diverse. For moral judgments define a quite heterogeneous class of mental states—although some moral judgments may involve the representation and execution of norms, certainly not all of them do. I show that although much of our distinctive social norm psychology can be explained within the framework of shared intentionality, moral judgments cannot be unified in the same way. In the third chapter, I provide the baseline of social-cognitive capacities that serve as starting point for my lineage explanation. I argue that hominin social cognition was for a very long period of our evolutionary history essentially a matter of low-level cognitive and motivational processes. On this picture, bottom-up affective processes regulated the social lives of early hominins without requiring any special top-down mechanism of normative thinking such as a capacity for understanding and representing social norms. In the fourth chapter, I argue that human-like social norm psychology evolved as a result of the selective pressures that gave rise to shared intentionality, especially the demands that came from collective hunting. Yet collective hunting was not the whole story of the evolution of shared intentionality, for our capacity to form shared intentional mental states emerged from the interplay between the selective pressures that led to cooperative breeding in humans as well as organized, goal-oriented, collective hunting. Thus, I propose an evo-devo account of shared intentionality and its normative dimension since I argue that explaining the evolution of this particular form of normative thinking crucially depends on information about the developmental trajectory of this capacity. Finally, in the fifth chapter, I focus on how social norms are acquired and how the way we learn them gives rise to some prototypical cluster of moral judgments. Thus, this chapter returns to some of themes and arguments of the first chapter by explaining how the distinction between moral judgments and nonmoral judgments can be culturally transmitted. (shrink)

A diferencia de otras teorías psicológicas del funcionamiento moral, que no han tomado en cuenta los desarrollos recientes de la neurociencia, la Teoría de la ética triuna intenta aprovechar ciertos hallazgos cruciales sobre las estructuras neurobiológicas del cerebro humano. Esto implica, entre otras cosas, prestar atención no sólo al razonamiento moral deliberativo, y a las decisiones conscientes, sino sobre todo a las posturas emocionales y a los procesos tácitos o intuitivos que motivan, y explican, la mayor parte del comportamiento moral. (...) Basándose en la Teoría del cerebro triuno de MacLean, la TET propone tres sistemas morales distintivos, o motivaciones éticas fundamentales: la ética de seguridad, enfocada en la auto-preservación, y a menudo en la dominación personal o del endogrupo; la ética de conexión, enfocada en los lazos sociales o relaciones afectivas con otros; y la ética de imaginación, enfocada en formas creativas de pensar y actuar socialmente. Además de ofrecer una visión introductoria de las premisas básicas de la TET y de sus tres éticas, el artículo distingue varios tipos y subtipos de personalidad moral, y discute las implicaciones de este enfoque para la comprensión de diversos fenómenos sociales y políticos, o en términos más generales, para nuestra comprensión de un desarrollo moral óptimo. (shrink)

Artículo centrado en el significado, medida y promoción de las competencias o capacidades democráticas. Tal como lo demuestran muchas Constituciones, declaraciones internacionales y encuestas, la mayoría de la población mundial valora los ideales morales democráticos. Sin embargo, en la vida cotidiana, rara vez nos comportamos a la altura de esos ideales. Para superar esa brecha, necesitamos cultivar las competencias democráticas a través de la educación, enseñando a los estudiantes a expresarse y escuchar a otros ―sobre todo a aquellos con puntos (...) de vista opuestos―. Pero en la mayoría de las escuelas, la educación para la democracia se limita a transmitir el conocimiento declarativo de los libros de texto, en vez de promover el conocimiento tácito o procedimental necesario para resolver conflictos sociales a través de la deliberación no-violenta. Así, el artículo: a) presenta un modelo conceptual del comportamiento democrático; b) explica brevemente las características metodológicas de un instrumento para la medición de una competencia democrática fundamental, el Test del Juicio Moral; y c) discute los principios pedagógicos del Método Konstanz de Discusión de Dilemas, un método que según se ha comprobado representa una mejora respecto al método pionero de Blatt y Kohlberg. (shrink)

Este artículo explora tanto los puntos de vista compartidos como los contrastantes entre el enfoque oriental, de Chikuro Hiroike, y el occidental de Lawrence Kohlberg, en cuanto a la vida moral. Expande nuestra comprensión del principal aporte de Kohlberg, la teoría de etapas evolutivas del razonamiento moral, sugiriendo que su enfoque de la vida moral puede vislumbrarse mediante un examen de sus ideas sobre la Etapa 6, tal como se relacionan con su concepción de una metafórica Etapa 7. Concluyo que (...) si bien tanto Hiroike como Kohlberg caracterizaron el vivir una vida moral como expresiones de la indivisibilidad de la justicia y la benevolencia, subsisten diferencias importantes en cuanto a cómo concebían la relación del sí mismo con la moralidad; relación que para Hiroike requería de autorrenunciación, mientras que para Kohlberg requería la aceptación del lugar del sí mismo en la vastedad del universo. (shrink)

Dirigido a docentes, el texto aborda las implicaciones educativas de un enfoque actualizado e integrador del desarrollo moral, que recomienda diferenciar entre los dominios personal, convencional y moral. Desde esa perspectiva, examina dos temas relacionados, según los diferentes niveles educativos o de edad: Primero, la importancia del clima social y emocional predominante en las aulas y escuelas, ya que los climas caracterizados por la calidez, la equidad y la confianza promueven la conducta prosocial y una “orientación de buena voluntad”. Especial (...) atención se le presta a los riesgos de las camarillas y la exclusión entre pares durante la adolescencia, así como a la necesidad de subdividir las escuelas grandes en comunidades educativas más pequeñas ―o a escala humana―. Segundo, la importancia práctica y ética de complementar una atmósfera moral positiva con una disciplina constructivista o evolutiva. Una disciplina que además de las metas comunes de control y eficiencia, también se propone elevar la competencia social y moral de los estudiantes enfatizando la motivación intrínseca, las habilidades de solución de problemas sociales, y un uso moderado de las consecuencias lógicas del mal comportamiento; en lugar del énfasis usual en modelar la conducta mediante recompensas y castigos extrínsecos. (shrink)

This paper considers the practical question of why people do not behave in the way they ought to behave. This question is a practical one, reaching both into the normative and descriptive domains of morality. That is, it concerns moral norms as well as empirical facts. We argue that two main problems usually keep us form acting and judging in a morally decent way: firstly, we make mistakes in moral reasoning. Secondly, even when we know how to act and judge, (...) we still fail to meet the requirements due to personal weaknesses. This discussion naturally leads us to another question: can we narrow the gap between what people are morally required to do and what they actually do? We discuss findings from neuroscience, economics, and psychology, considering how we might bring our moral behavior better in line with moral theory. Potentially fruitful means include nudging, training, pharmacological enhancement, and brain stimulation. We conclude by raising the question of whether such methods could and should be implemented. (shrink)

Studies have shown that videoconferences are an effective medium for facilitating communication between parties who are separated by distance. Furthermore, studies reveal that videoconferences are effective when used for distance learning, particularly due to their ability to facilitate complex collaborative learning tasks. However, as in face-to-face communication, learners benefit when they receive additional support for such learning tasks. This article provides an overview of two empirical studies to illustrate more general insights regarding some effective and less effective ways to support (...) collaborative learning with videoconferencing. The focus is on content schemes as content-specific support and task-specific support as collaboration scripts. Based on the results of the two studies, conclusions can be drawn about support measures that promote learning. Conclusions can also be reached about the need for employing both content schemes and collaboration scripts to provide learners with the most benefit. (shrink)

The current debates in social sciences show that the paradox of observing—the embeddedness of observer in the process of observing—is at the heart of the controversy about their cognitive status and future. Although the problem of observing has been addressed in numerous theoretical perspectives—some of which (Habermas, Leydesdorff, Maturana, and Luhmann) are examined in this article—the prospects for resolving this paradox remain problematic. Locating a point that allows reflection on the process of autopoiesis in general, not just the operation of (...) a particular autopoietic system, may be one condition for resolving this paradox. Such point will offer reflection on all autopoietic systems, including the observer. The dynamic balance between equilibrium and disequilibrium is the mechanism which regulates the process of autopoiesis. Since the function of regulation is essentially a reflective function, this equilibrium between equilibrium and disequilibrium, which can be identified with the concept of homeorhesis introduced by Conrad Waddington, may offer a possibility to reflect on the process of observing. (shrink)

The concept of acting intentionally is an important nexus where ‘theory of mind’ and moral judgment meet. Preschool children’s judgments of intentional action show a valence-driven asymmetry. Children say that a foreseen but disavowed side-effect is brought about 'on purpose' when the side-effect itself is morally bad but not when it is morally good. This is the first demonstration in preschoolers that moral judgment influences judgments of ‘on-purpose’ (as opposed to purpose influencing moral judgment). Judgments of intentional action are usually (...) assumed to be purely factual. That these judgments are sometimes partly normative — even in preschoolers — challenges current understanding. Young children’s judgments regarding foreseen side-effects depend upon whether the children process the idea that the character does not care about the side-effect. As soon as preschoolers effectively process the ‘theory of mind’ concept, NOT CARE THAT P, children show the side-effect effect.idea.. (shrink)