The traditional sciences have always had trouble with ambiguity. Through the imposition of “enabling constraints” -- making a set of assumptions and then declaring ceteris paribus -- science can bracket away ambiguity. These enabling constraints take the form of uncritically examined presuppositions or “uceps.” Second order science examines variations in values assumed for these uceps and looks at the resulting impacts on related scientific claims. After rendering explicit the role of uceps in scientific claims, the scientific method is used to (...) question rarely challenged assertions. This article lays out initial foundations for second order science, its ontology, methodology, and implications. (shrink)

Working from within the Lakatosian framework of scientific change, this paper seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the Jesuits’ role in the scientific revolution during the years of Galileo’s trials and the subsequent century. Their received research program was Aristotelian cosmology. Their efforts to construct protective belts to shield the core principles were fueled not only by the basic instinct to conserve but also by the impact of official prohibitions from the side of Church authorities. The paper illustrates how (...) these Church restrictions were not as paralyzing for Jesuit intellectuals as has often been thought. They left considerable space for maneuvering. The paper shows how, within this space, Jesuits were engaged mainly in the indispensable task of exhausting all the potential of Aristotelian cosmology. They did this primarily by trying to build intellectual bridges to ensure coherence between three realms of the cosmological imagination of the time: the received Aristotelian view, the new empirical data, and the realm of everyday experience. (shrink)

If the term "relativism" is understood as relativists take it, everyone is a relativist. If, on the other hand, one understands "relativism" as absolutists do, no one really could consistently be a relativist, despite what they might think. As I hope to show, however, much of this positioning of persons and philosophies is foolish. It misses much that is important in philosophical discussion and focuses attention in directions that lead to dead ends.

The aim of the paper is to give an outline of the development of Feyerabend´s thought through four basic periods: the realist-empiricistic, intermediate, relativist and, finally, process-realistic periods. The ideas Feyerabend presents in his papers are often misunderstood and misinterpreted. The author attempts at revaluation of his work within the philosophy of science and to show the applicability of his ideas in problem solving in contemporary philosophy, epistemology and methodology of science as well as in other areas of sciences – (...) e. g. anthropology or cognitive sciences. In his view Feyerabend´s ideas are still valid especially in analyses concerning different approaches to the problems of scientific realism, connections between perception and cognition, and comparability of radically different scientific conceptions. (shrink)

Through the analysis of the interpretations of quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, the paper aims to demonstrate the following thesis: the Duhem-Quine thesis on empirical underdetermination can be extended to the claim that not only the empirical data, but also the empirical data together with the mathematical formalism of a physical theory do not suffice to determine completely our theories of physical reality. As a consequence, beyond observational data and mathematical physics, cultural and social factors as well as (...) the value-preferences of physicists also play role as constitutive elements of physical theories. For example, the indeterminist interpretations of quantum mechanics are not neutral but value-laden, and deterministic interpretations, which insist on classical determinism as a value, are also possible. On the other hand, the thesis of the underdetermination of physical reality by mathematical physics confirms neither radical relativism, nor extreme versions of sociology of science. On the contrary, the mathematical formalism to be interpreted is autonomous – and in this sense “objective” – to a great extent with respect to cultural, social and other non-scientific factors and, therefore, there is a firm consensus regarding it in science. (shrink)

Elliott Sober has suggested his criterion of contrastive testability as an improvement over previous criteria of empirical significance like falsifiability. I argue that his criterion renders almost any theory empirically significant because its restrictions on auxiliary assumptions are to weak. Even when the criterion is modified to avoid this trivialization, it fails to meet other conditions of adequacy for a criterion of empirical significance that follow from Sober's position. I suggest to define empirical significance as empirical non-equivalence to a tautology, (...) because this definition does meet the conditions of adequacy. Specifically, it is equivalent to the standard Bayesian criterion of empirical significance whenever all probabilities are defined and contains falsifiability as a special case. This latter feature is important because those conditions of adequacy that apply to criteria of deductive empirical significance single out falsifiability. (shrink)

One of the main goals of scientific research is to provide a description of the empirical data which is as accurate and comprehensive as possible, while relying on as few and simple assumptions as possible. In this paper, I propose a definition of the notion of few and simple assumptions that is not affected by known problems. This leads to the introduction of a simple model of scientific progress that is based only on empirical accuracy and conciseness. An essential point (...) in this task is the understanding of the role played by measurability in the formulation of a scientific theory. This is the key to prevent artificially concise formulations. The model is confronted here with many possible objections and with challenging cases of real progress. Although I cannot exclude that the model might have some limitations, it includes all the cases of genuine progress examined here, and no spurious one. In this model, I stress the role of the state of the art, which is the collection of all the theories that are the only legitimate source of scientific predictions. Progress is a global upgrade of the state of the art. (shrink)

Since the publication of Kitcher’s influential paper The Division of Cognitive Labor, some philosophers wondered about these two related issues: (1) which is the optimal distribution of cognitive efforts among rival methods within a scientific community?, and (2) whether and how can a community achieve such an optimal distribution? Though not committing to any specific answer to question (1), I claim that issue (2) does not depend exclusively on an invisible hand like mechanism, since both intra-scientific and extra-scientific institutions may (...) play a major role. Finally, I examine some practical difficulties of reallocating scientists from a method to another, which leads to stress the importance of well-planned training and recruitment. (shrink)

Determinism has long been a core assumption in many forms of behaviorism, including radical behaviorism. However, this assumption has been a stumbling block for many—both within and outside the field of radical behaviorism—resulting in misunderstanding and misrepresentation. The following paper provides a descriptive taxonomy of four kinds of determinism assumed or asserted in the radical behavioral literature. This taxonomy is intended to organize these deterministic positions, provide working definitions, and explore their implications. Through this work, it is hoped that behaviorists (...) and nonbehaviorists alike will possess a clearer understanding of determinism in behavioral analysis. (shrink)

This dissertation consists of three parts. Part I is a defense of an artificial language methodology in philosophy and a historical and systematic defense of the logical empiricists' application of an artificial language methodology to scientific theories. These defenses provide a justification for the presumptions of a host of criteria of empirical significance, which I analyze, compare, and develop in part II. On the basis of this analysis, in part III I use a variety of criteria to evaluate the scientific (...) status of intelligent design, and further discuss confirmation, reduction, and concept formation. (shrink)

A number of areas of biology raise questions about what is of value in the natural environment and how we ought to behave towards it: conservation biology, environmental science, and ecology, to name a few. Based on my experience teaching students from these and similar majors, I argue that the field of environmental ethics has much to teach these students. They come to me with pent-up questions and a feeling that more is needed to fully engage in their subjects, and (...) I believe some exposure to environmental ethics can help focus their interests and goals. I identify three primary areas in which environmental ethics can con- tribute to their education. The first is an examination of who (or what) should be considered to be part of our moral community (i.e., the community to whom we owe direct duties). Is it humans only? Or does it include all sentient life? Or all life? Or ecosystems considered holistically? Often, readings implicitly assume one or more of these answers; the goal is to make the student more sensitive to these implicit claims and to get them to think about the different reasons that support them. The second area, related to the first, is the application of the different answers concerning the extent of the ethical community to real environmental issues and problems. Students need to be aware of how the different answers concerning the moral community can imply conflicting answers for how we should act in certain cases and to think about ways to move toward conflict resolution. The third area in which environmental ethics can contribute is a more conceptual one, focusing on central concepts such as biodiversity, sustainability, species, and ecosystems. Exploring and evaluating various meanings of these terms will make students more reflective and thoughtful citizens and biologists, sensitive to the implications that different conceptual choices make. (shrink)

La falsifiabilité de Popper a été critiquée à la fois pour avoir exclu la science légitime et pour avoir accordé un statut scientifique aux pseudo-sciences. Selon Larry Laudan, « cela a la conséquence fâcheuse de considérer comme « scientifique » toute demande faisant de fausses allégations de manière concluante ». Certains reprochent à Popper en disant que sa théorie ne constitue pas une alternative légitime aux propositions inductives qu’il critique. Jeffrey soutient que le bayésianisme, qui insiste sur le point de (...) savoir dans quelle mesure les preuves empiriques appuient une hypothèse, est beaucoup plus proche de la pratique scientifique que la falsifiabilité de Popper. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.21235.27680. (shrink)

Neste trabalho, é apresentada uma investigação do que poderia ser chamado de formalização lógica do processo de mudança de teorias devido a anomalias. Por anomalia entende-se um fato observado que faz parte do escopo explanatório de uma teoria, mas que vai de encontro à previsão da mesma. Uma abordagem clássica para restaurar o poder explicativo de uma teoria ameaçada por uma anomalia é a postulação de hipóteses novas e provisórias que, em conjunto com as demais hipóteses auxiliares originais, sejam capazes (...) de resolver a anomalia. Após chegar à algumas conclusões sobre a estrutura de tal processo, propomos um framework lógico multimodal e não-monotônico capaz de representar alguns aspectos-chave dessa faceta importante da dinâmica de teorias científicas. Devido à necessidade de acomodar hipóteses provisórias incompatíveis, esse framework incorpora uma forma fraca de paraconsistência. Como um estudo de caso, analisamos o comportamento anômalo do planeta Urano que ameaçou a mecânica celeste Newtoniana por mais de meio século e ensejou a descoberta do planeta Netuno. -/- In this work, an investigation of what could be called the logical formalization of the theory change process due to anomalies is presented. An anomaly is understood as an observed fact that is part of the explanatory scope of a theory, but that goes against its prediction. A classic approach to restoring the explanatory power of a theory threatened by an anomaly is to postulate new and provisional hypotheses that, together with the other original auxiliary hypotheses, are capable of resolving the anomaly. After reaching some conclusions about the structure of such a process, we propose a multimodal and non-monotonic logical framework capable of representing some key aspects of this important facet of the dynamics of scientific theories. Due to the need to accommodate incompatible provisional hypotheses, this framework incorporates a weak form of paraconsistency. As a case study, we analyze the anomalous behavior of the planet Uranus that threatened Newtonian celestial mechanics for more than half a century and prompted the discovery of the planet Neptune. (shrink)

Keywords: climate change, integrated assessment, knowledge integration, transdisciplinary research, vulnerability, vulnerability assessment. This thesis explores how transdisciplinary knowledge integration can be facilitated in the context of integrated assessments and vulnerability assessments of climate change. Even though knowledge integration is fundamental in such transdisciplinary assessments, the actual process of integrating knowledge is rarely addressed explicitly and methodically. Here, knowledge integration is conceptualised into the subsequent phases of the elaboration of a shared language and the design of a methodology. Three devices for (...) facilitating knowledge integration are put forward: 1. semantic ascent or the shift from speaking in a language to speaking in a meta-language about the former, 2. formalisation or the translation of statements made in ordinary or technical language into a formal language, and 3. knowledge integration methods, which are methods that provide a meta-language for speaking about the knowledge to be integrated and organise the process of integration. Four cases of knowledge integration are presented. First, the general problem of methodology design is addressed and a graphical framework for representing methodologies is presented. Second, the problem of developing a shared language for speaking about vulnerability to climate change is addressed. A formal mathematical framework of vulnerability and related concepts is presented. Third, a special case of methodology design, the integration of computer models in the context of modular integrated assessment modelling is addressed. A modular approach developed in the PIAM project is presented. Fourth, the integration of computer models, this time in the context of a global assessment of coastal vulnerability to sea-level rise, is addressed. A knowledge integration method, which was developed and applied in the DINAS-COAST project, is presented. These cases show that semantic ascent is a useful device in those cases in which it is difficult to directly elaborate a shared language at the beginning of the assessment. Formalisation can contribute to the elaboration of a shared language in those cases in which concepts overlap non trivially in their meanings. More emphasis should be placed on the development and application of iterative knowledge integration methods as iteration is crucial in order to benefit from the mutual learning during the course of the assessment. (shrink)

The idea that a serious threat to scientific realism comes from unconceived alternatives has been proposed by van Fraassen, Sklar, Stanford and Wray among others. Peter Lipton's critique of this threat from underconsideration is examined briefly in terms of its logic and its applicability to the case of space-time and particle physics. The example of space-time and particle physics indicates a generic heuristic for quantitative sciences for constructing potentially serious cases of underdetermination, involving one-parameter family of rivals T_m that work (...) as a team rather than as a single rival against default theory T_0. In important examples this new parameter has a physical meaning and makes a crucial _conceptual_ difference, shrinking the symmetry group and in some case putting gauge freedom, formal indeterminism vs. determinism, the presence of the hole argument, etc., at risk. Methodologies akin to eliminative induction or tempered subjective Bayesianism are more demonstrably reliable than the custom of attending only to "our best theory": they can lead either to a serious rivalry or to improved arguments for the favorite theory. The example of General Relativity vs. massive spin 2 gravity, a recent topic in the physics literature, is discussed. Arguably the General Relativity and philosophy literatures have ignored the most serious rival to General Relativity. (shrink)

In the first half of this dissertation, I develop a heuristic methodology for analyzing scientific solutions to the problem of underdetermination. Heuristics are rough-and-ready procedures used by scientists to construct models, design experiments, interpret evidence, etc. But as powerful as they are, heuristics are also error-prone. Therefore, I argue that they key to prudently using a heuristic is the articulation of meta-heuristics---guidelines to the kinds of problems for which a heuristic is well- or ill-suited. Given that heuristics will introduce certain (...) errors into our scientific investigations, I emphasize the importance of a particular category of meta-heuristics involving the search for robust evidence. Robustness is understood to be the epistemic virtue bestowed by agreement amongst multiple modes of determination. The more modes we have at our disposal, and the more these confirm the same result, the more confident can we be that a result is not a mere artifact of some heuristic simplification. Through an analysis of case-studies in the philosophy of biology and clinical trials, I develop a principled method for modeling and evaluating heuristics and robustness claims in a qualitative problem space. The second half of the dissertation deploys the heuristic methodology to address ethical and epistemological issues in the science of clinical trials. To that end, I develop a network model for the problem space of clinical research, capable of representing the various kinds of experiments, epistemic relationships, and ethical justifications intrinsic to the domain. I then apply this model to ongoing research with the antibacterial agent, moxifloxacin, for the treatment of tuberculosis, tracking its development from initially successful and promising in vitro and animal studies to its disappointing and discordant performance across five human efficacy trials. Given this failure to find a robust result with moxifloxacin across animal and human studies, what should researchers now do? While my final analysis of this case does not definitively answer that question, I demonstrate how my methodology, unlike a statistical meta-analysis, helps to clarify the directions for further research. (shrink)

We reflect on the nature, role and limits of non-empirical theory assessment in fundamental physics, focusing in particular on quantum gravity. We argue for the usefulness and, to some extent, necessity of non-empirical theory assessment, but also examine critically its dangers. We conclude that the principle of proliferation of theories is not only at the very root of theory assessment but all the more necessary when experimental tests are scarce, and also that, in the same situation, it represents the only (...) medicine against the degeneration of scientific research programmes. (shrink)

La memética es una disciplina joven que se inscribe en el campo de las teorías de la evolución cultural y que busca extrapolar hipótesis darwinianas de selección natural al campo de las ideas, proponiendo la existencia de replicadores culturales llamados memes. En el presente artículo se hace una revisión histórica de dicha disciplina, se examina la contribución que puede ofrecer a las teorías del cambio científico de Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos y Edgar Morin y se hace una evaluación de la (...) memética desde una perspectiva epistemológica basada en categorías ofrecidas por Karl Popper, Mario Bunge e Imre Lakatos, presentándola de esta manera, en un proceso recursivo, como elemento explicativo e interpretativo a la vez que como objeto de estudio y análisis. -/- 'Science in light of memes. Memes in light of science.' -/- Memetics is a young discipline that is inserted in the field of theories of cultural evolution and seeks to extrapolate Darwinian hypotheses of natural selection to the field of ideas by proposing the existence of cultural replicators called memes. In this article, we present a historical overview of the discipline, examining the contribution it can offer to theories of scientific change by Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and Edgar Morin. Lastly, we provide an assessment of memetics from an epistemological perspective based on categories suggested by Karl Popper, Mario Bunge and Imre Lakatos, thereby presenting that discipline in a recursive process as an explanatory and interpretative element, while at the same time as an object of study and analysis. (shrink)

This article has two main objectives: 1) to account for the relation between definitions, boundaries and comparison in the study of “esotericism” in a systematic manner; 2) to argue for an expansion of comparative research methods in this field. The argument proceeds in three steps. First it is argued that a process of academic boundary-work has been instrumental in delimiting esotericism as a historical category. Second, a Lakatosian “rational reconstruction” of competing “research programmes” is provided to clarify the relationship between (...) views on definition, boundaries and comparison. Third, a typology of different comparative methods is constructed along two axes: a homological-analogical axis distinguishes between comparison based on shared genealogy versus purely structural or functional comparisons, while a synchronic-diachronic axis picks out a temporal dimension. Historical research programmes have typically endorsed homological comparison, while analogical comparison has remained suspect. This limitation is shown to be entirely arbitrary from a methodological point of view. It is argued that a reconsideration of analogical comparison has the promise of shedding new light on fundamental problems and must be a part of the ongoing theoretical reorientations in the field. (shrink)

In October 1924, The Physical Review, a relatively minor journal at the time, published a remarkable two-part paper by John H. Van Vleck, working in virtual isolation at the University of Minnesota. Van Vleck used Bohr's correspondence principle and Einstein's quantum theory of radiation to find quantum formulae for the emission, absorption, and dispersion of radiation. The paper is similar but in many ways superior to the well-known paper by Kramers and Heisenberg published the following year that is widely credited (...) to have led directly to Heisenberg's Umdeutung paper. As such, it clearly shows how strongly the discovery of matrix mechanics depended on earlier work on the application of the correspondence principle to the interaction of matter and radiation. (shrink)

This thesis intends to address one type of approach to evolutionary theory that seeks to criticise the neo-Darwinist account of evolution and individuation, that of symbiosis. This thesis will begin by examining current evolutionary theory through Darwin to neo-Darwinism, with a view to discerning which types of mechanisms neo- Darwinism rules out, and which it allows. This will be achieved by using a methodology which treats groups of related scientific theories or practices as research programmes. This methodological approach will allow (...) comparison between competing research programmes, and it will be possible to determine whether or not a competing research programme is really a challenge to neo-Darwinism, or simply a sub- programme which shares some of the same metaphysical commitments and mechanisms as neo-Darwinism. The second half of the thesis will assess the ‘symbiosis’ challenge to neo-Darwinism on these terms. This section will conclude that symbiosis as it is usually formulated by its proponents is not a separate research programme that rejects neo-Darwinism in any significant way, but rather it is a sub-programme of neo- Darwinism. But I will also argue that there are aspects of this programme, if they were to be made more prominent, would in fact constitute an alternative research programme which could not only be treated as a separate research programme, but a research programme that is incompatible with neo-Darwinism. Bacteria in particular are organisms which function through symbiosis and their functioning problematises neo-Darwinism’s account of individuation on a fundamental level. It will be concluded that neo-Darwinism is either a theory of very limited scope, or one which can be made into a general theory, but this can only be achieved through fundamental changes to neo-Darwinism itself. (shrink)

Ova filozofska analiza psihoterapijskih pristupa temelji se na tezi o znanstvenolikosti životne filozofije. Filozofija života je koncept koji je prisutan u svakoj važnijoj psihoterapiji, bilo na jasan bilo na implicitan način. Rabili smo nekoliko načina istraživanja filozofske pozadine psihoterapija: povijesnu i konceptualnu analizu, dvofaktorski model ontološko-epistemološkog prostora, socijalne mreže i filozofske škole i njihov utjecaj na povijest psihologije, te neke specifične probleme iz područja filozofije znanosti. U završnom odjeljku smo analizirali pokret filozofskog savjetovanja. Istražili smo njegove značajke, te poveznice s (...) psihoterapijom.This philosophical analysis of psychotherapeutic approaches is based upon thesis of scientific character of one’s philosophy of life. Notion of philosophy of life is present in each major psychotherapeutic approach, in either explicit or implicit matter.Modes of philosophical inquiry include historical and concept analysis, two factor model of ontological-epistemological space, social networks in the philosophical schools and their impact on the history of psychology, and some specific issues in the philosophy of science.Finally, philosophical counseling movement is examined. What is typical for this movement and what sort of connections does it have with psychotherapy is covered. (shrink)

Lane, K. A., Banaji, M. R., Nosek, B. A., & Greenwald, A. G. (2007). Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: IV. What we know (so far) (Pp. 59–102). In B. Wittenbrink & N. S. Schwarz (Eds.). Implicit measures of attitudes: Procedures and controversies . New York: Guilford Press. PDF - 652KB ].

The mind-brain problem is a persistent challenge in philosophy and science, having marked implications for psychiatry. In this paper, we claim that physicalism, a kind of theoretical monism, is usually taken by many psychiatrists as the only possible solution to the MBP, and argue that this may have negative consequences for the field. Not only does it restrict the psychiatric training, thereby preventing professionals from considering and reflecting upon different perspectives on the MBP, but it also leads clinical psychiatrists to (...) ignore alternatives in their research agendas and clinical care. We suggest, therefore, that, as long as the MBP remains open and disputed by divergent views, theoretical monism should give place to theoretical pluralism in psychiatry. (shrink)