- Dogmatism and Ampliative Inference.Berit Brogaard - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 66 (1):e42186.details
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Why Reid was no dogmatist.Mark Boespflug - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4511-4525.details
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The Legacy of Reid's Common Sense in Analytic Epistemology.Mark Boespflug - 2019 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 17 (1):23-37.details
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Solving the Moorean Puzzle.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):493-514.details
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Solving the problem of easy knowledge.Tim Black - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617.details
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Towards a phenomenological conception of experiential justification.Philipp Berghofer - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):155-183.details
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How to Supplement Mentalist Evidentialism: What Are the Fundamental Epistemological Principles?Philipp Berghofer - 2022 - Theoria 88 (3):679-700.details
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Husserl’s Conception of Experiential Justification: What It Is and Why It Matters.Philipp Berghofer - 2018 - Husserl Studies 34 (2):145-170.details
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The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.details
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A Priori Skepticism and the KK Thesis.James R. Beebe - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):315-326.details
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Intuitions, Meaning, and Normativity: Why Intuition Theory Supports a Non‐Descriptivist Metaethic.Matthew S. Bedke - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):144-177.details
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Was Moore a Moorean? On Moore and Scepticism.Peter Baumann - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):181-200.details
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Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.David James Barnett - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):184-212.details
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Against the perceptual model of utterance comprehension.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):387-405.details
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Normalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problem.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2877-2895.details
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Epistemic Justification: Probability, Normalcy, and the Functional Theory.Marvin Backes - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):65-81.details
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Epistemology and the law: why there is no epistemic mileage in legal cases.Marvin Backes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2759-2778.details
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Moore against the sceptics.Jody Azzouni - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 66 (1):e41521.details
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Pascal's birds: Signs and significance in nature.Yuval Avnur - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):3-20.details
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An old problem for the new rationalism.Yuval Avnur - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):175-185.details
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Justification As A Loaded Notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.details
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Justification as a loaded notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.details
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Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia, Falibilidad y normatividad: un análisis filosófico de la suerte. [REVIEW]Alfonso Anaya - 2020 - Critica 52 (155):73-82.details
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Wright Back to Dretske, or Why You Might as Well Deny Knowledge Closure.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):570-611.details
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Unjustified Defeaters.David Alexander - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):891-912.details
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In Defense of Epistemic Circularity.David Alexander - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):223-241.details
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Fallible reasons on behalf of fallibilism.David Alexander - 2017 - Synthese 198 (5):3979-3998.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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When Things Fail to Fit Together.Daniel Fogal - forthcoming - Analysis.details
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When warrant transmits.James Pryor - 2012 - In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Seemings and Justification: An Introduction.Chris Tucker - 2013 - In Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 1-29.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples.Matthew McGrath - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 225–247.details
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Common Sense and Ordinary Language: Wittgenstein and Austin.Krista Lawlor - 2020 - In Rik Peels & René van Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.details
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Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.details
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Dogmatism, Seemings, and Non-Deductive Inferential Justification.Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. Chapter 8.details
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Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.details
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Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.details
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Intuitions for inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.details
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Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism and the distinctiveness problem.Harmen Ghijsen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1549-1566.details
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The Agony of Defeat?Nicholas Silins - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):505-532.details
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Is phenomenal force sufficient for immediate perceptual justification?Lu Teng - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):637-656.details
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Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A Metacognitive Account of Phenomenal Force.Lu Teng - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (4):1081-1101.details
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The Epistemic Insignificance of Phenomenal Force.Lu Teng - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Undercutting Defeat: When it Happens and Some Implications for Epistemology.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 201-222.details
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Philosophical Individualism.John A. Keller - 2017 - In Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes From the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen. New York: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Using and Abusing Moorean Arguments.M. Scarfone - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):52-71.details
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Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Epistemologia e Filosofia da Ciência.Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid & Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
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The epistemic import of phenomenal consciousness.Paweł Jakub Zięba - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-37.details
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