The values that people hold are the most important factor in deciding whether they endorse sustainable development. At the same time value orientations are likely to change over long time periods. International long-term research conducted by Ronald Inglehart in the second half of the twentieth century tried to capture the shift from material to post-material values. With respect to a sustainable lifestyle the research revealed a problem: there is a relationship between post-materialistic attitudes and the level of GDP. What can (...) be done to preserve the quality of the environment and at the same time allow countries to develop economically? Czech environmentalist Josef Vavroušek defined a framework of key values that are typical for an industrial society. He assigned alternative values to them that should be compatible with sustainable living. The values of Euro-American culture and civilization stem from the heritage of Judaism and Christianity, which find fundamental ethical importance in the Ten Commandments. Modern times, however, bring new challenges and it is not easy to distinguish between what is good and what is not; for example, genetic engineering, experiments on humans, polluting the environment and lives in excessive wealth. (shrink)

Most people agree that inflicting unnecessary suffering upon animals is wrong. Many fewer people, including among ethicists, agree that painlessly killing animals is necessarily wrong. The most commonly cited reason is that death (without pain, fear, distress) is not bad for them in a way that matters morally, or not as significantly as it does for persons, who are self-conscious, make long-term plans and have preferences about their own future. Animals, at least those that are not persons, lack a morally (...) significant interest in continuing to live. At the same time, some argue that existence itself can be good, insofar as one’s life is worth living. For animals, a good life can offset a quick, if early, death. So, it seems to follow that breeding happy animals that will be (prematurely) killed can be a good thing overall. Insofar as slaughter and sale makes it economically sustainable to raise new ones, who would otherwise not exist, raising and killing animals for food who will have lives worth living is good overall. It benefits them as well as consumers, and makes the world better by adding to the sum of happiness. The process of raising and killing animals with positive welfare produces a sequence of replacement that maintains or increases overall welfare, all else being equal (assuming in particular no overall negative impact on the welfare of other parties). Call this the Replaceability Argument (RA) and the ensuing controversy the Replaceability Problem (RP). This is a problem at the crossroads of the ethics of killing, agricultural ethics, procreation ethics, and population ethics. (shrink)

Non-human animal models of human diseases advance our knowledge of the genetic underpinnings of disease and lead to the development of novel therapies for humans. While mice are the most common model organisms, their usefulness is limited. Larger animals may provide more accurate and valuable disease models, but it has, until recently, been challenging to create large animal disease models. Genome editors, such as Clustered Randomised Interspersed Palindromic Repeat, meet some of these challenges and bring routine genome engineering of larger (...) animals and non-human primates well within reach. There is growing interest in creating NHP models of brain disorders such as autism, depression and Alzheimer’s, which are very difficult to model or study in other organisms, including humans. New treatments are desperately needed for this set of disorders. This paper is novel in asking: Insofar as NHPs are being considered for use as model organisms for brain disorders, can this be done ethically? The paper concludes that it cannot. Notwithstanding ongoing debate about NHPs’ moral status, animal welfare concerns, the availability of alternative methods of studying brain disorders and unmet expectations of benefit justify a stop on the creation of NHP model organisms to study brain disorders. The lure of using new genetic technologies combined with the promise of novel therapeutics presents a formidable challenge to those who call for slow, careful, and only necessary research involving NHPs. But researchers should not create macaques with social deficits or capuchin monkeys with memory deficits just because they can. (shrink)

El concepto “animal” no suele ser dilucidado, es decir, cómo y por qué podemos hablar de algo así como “animales”. En el camino de comprender cómo llegan los animales humanos a distinguirse de otros animales hemos examinado la propuesta de Bimbenet, Heidegger, de Rousseau y la de Lévi-Strauss, así como otras propuestas de antropología empírica, como las de Washburn y Moore y la de Lee Berger. Es necesario decidir filosóficamente si lo que se distingue es un hecho o un criterio (...) puesto por el investigador. (shrink)

Twentieth century criticism has pointed out that many of Jonathan Swift´s works are linked with Irish conditions as well as some theories, which have remained particularly obscure for many literary investigations, in spite of the fact that they might be the key to a better understanding of the Irish author. Remarkable scholars noticed three main theoretical fields: economical, scientific and philosophical/linguistic. In the following pages, we will take into account some recent works on Swift in order to point out how (...) A Modest Proposal develops its satiric energy from a hesitating biopolitics, which criticises modernity and some of its knowledge, and also casts some light on human being’s contemporary condition. La crítica del siglo XX ha hecho ver que varias de las obras de Jonathan Swift están vinculadas tanto con las condiciones sociales, políticas y culturales irlandesas como con algunas teorías, las cuales han quedado en la oscuridad para algunas investigaciones literarias, a pesar del hecho de que puedan ser la clave de un mejor entendimiento del autor irlandés. Importantes investigadores han distinguido tres campos teóricos principales a los que se refiere la obra de Swift: el económico, el científico y el filosófico/lingüístico. En las siguientes páginas, tomaremos en cuenta algunos de los trabajos recientes sobre Swift con la intención de hacer ver que Una Modesta Proposición desarrolla su fuerza satírica a partir de una biopolítica que duda y critica la modernidad y algunos de los saberes de la modernidad, arrojando luz acerca de la condición contemporánea del ser humano. (shrink)

This article examines the ideal of Bildung within the philosophy of nature and the natural sciences by investigating the methodological and scientific writings of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. It arg...

What do we owe to the lower animals, if anything? The issues raised by this question are among the most fascinating and fundamental in ethical theory. They provide a real watershed for the moral philosopher and, on perhaps the most widely professed view, a trenchant test of consistency in ethical practice. Among the virtues of these two challenging books is that they make painfully clear that there has been a paucity of clear and plausible argument in support of the nearly (...) universal tendency of humans to eat animal flesh, and to visit varying degrees of pain, discomfort, and unfreedom on the animals in question in the process.When we are asked why it is all right to do this, given our strong belief that it is not all right for us to eat other humans, we tend to give answers that won't readily wash. We may say, for example, that animals are stupid; but we don't think it all right to eat stupid people, including people less apparently competent than many of the higher animals. Or we may say things that are patently untrue, such as that the other animals don't really feel pain anyway. (shrink)

The hierarchical human-centric paradigm has been criticized by various movements of posthuman philosophy because this paradigm forgets and dismisses nonhuman beings and entities: animals, n...

Australia's Coalition Against Duck Shooting sees duck-shooting as a social problem and as an injustice with moral, legal and environmental consequences. The small animal liberationist group has succeeded in dramatically reducing the numbers of duck shooters in Victoria, which is the home of duck-shooting in Australia. The Coalition's framing work with the public via the electronic media involves three parts: a diagnosis , a prognosis and a motivational frame , all of which construct hunting as a cruel, antisocial blood sport (...) that ought to be banned. In this article, television news bulletins and feature stories from the 1993 and 1994 campaigns are analyzed to show how CADS makes and sustains its claims. In addition to 90 pages of transcripts of news commentaries and descriptive accounts of the visuals, the data include tape-recorded interviews with some of the duck liberationists involved in the campaign. (shrink)

This paper investigates the ethical implications of research at the interface between biodiversity and both human and animal health. Health and sanitary crises often lead to ethical debates, especially when it comes to disruptive interventions such as forced vaccinations, quarantine, or mass culling of domestic or wild animals. In such debates, the emergence of a “Planetary health ethics” can be highlighted. Ethics and accountability principles apply to all aspects of scientific research including its technological and engineering applications, regardless of whether (...) they are considered “hard sciences”, such as state-of-the-art technology in the fields of medicine, veterinary medicine, agronomy, or environment, or “soft”, such as local or global governance, health, socio-ecosystems, and the environment. Ethical reflection in the interdisciplinary field of biodiversity and health requires the examination of relevant scientific domains, such as biology, ecology, evolution, human medicine, animal medicine, anthropology, and law, and their epistemology and representation as well as scientific pluralism, which is crucial to establish genuine interdisciplinarity. Navigating the ethics-scape necessitates going beyond the hierarchy of science by recognising that scientific knowledge has implications for both scientific and non-scientific perspectives on the study of nature. The example of a Nipah virus outbreak is used to illustrate how the so-called “modern epidemiological” approach often focuses on risk factors associated with individual behavioural characteristics or collective practices, whereas the so-called “eco-social” approach focuses on global, socio-economic, and environmental factors that are the contextual causes of the health problem affecting the community. “Modern epidemiologists” aim to “correct” individual or practice factors using a “minimal set” of ethics, whereas “eco-social” scientists have to act systemically, which requires integrated research that acknowledges scientific pluralism, avoids the hierarchy of sciences, but accepts the pluralism of ethics and values. (shrink)

This is a critique of Timothy Hsiao’s ‘A Moral Defense of Trophy Hunting.’ I argue that Hsiao’s arguments on pain, consciousness, behavior, cruelty, and necessity all fail. More importantly, I argue against his broader conclusion that non-human animals ‘do not have any inherent moral significance.’ My conclusion is that Hsiao’s moral defense of trophy hunting fails.

Speciesist or biological accounts of moral status can be defended by showing that all members of Homo sapiens have a moral status conferring property. In this article, I argue that the most promising defense locates the moral status conferring property in the relational property of being biologically tied to other humans. This requires that biological ties ground moral obligations. I consider and reject the best defenses of that premise. Thus, we are left with compelling evidence that biological ties and membership (...) in a biological category like “species” ground neither moral obligations nor moral status. Because it is crucial to account for the moral significance of family bonds, I conclude by describing the sense in which biological ties matter morally. (shrink)

On my view, every bone, every fossil, and every putrid whiff of carrion that one smells on a hike in the country is just as good evidence for a divine intervention as it is for the suffering of an animal.

Animal ethicists have worried that hoping for the success of the animal rights movement is epistemically irrational because it contradicts our best evidence and practically irrational because it makes animal rights advocates complacent. Against these worries, this article defends the claim that animal rights advocates can rationally hope for the success of their movement despite grim prospects. To this end, the article draws on Philip Pettit's (2004) account of hope to articulate the novel notion of “careful substantial hope.” Hope in (...) this sense is a cognitive strategy of thinking as if movement success is likely because the right strategies and tactics will be employed. The article concludes with suggestions for how philosophers can encourage this kind of hope. (shrink)

Common philosophical discussions concerning the ethics of human interaction with the biosphere and universe have been significantly informed by certain presuppositions: nature is conquerable; human cultural and social progress is somewhat like a thing, beyond human control, and is inevitable and benevolent; and Homo sapiens is the superior life-form. Although arguments, such as whether humans should conquer nature, founded upon these presuppositions have sometimes been challenged, each of these three presuppositions wants direct analysis. The three have become so ingrained in (...) professional and everyday discourse that they have mythic proportions, as though beyond question. Because of the weightiness of the relevant philosophical issues, they merit overt analysis. Although they are independent and may be analyzed separately, this article treats them as whole, as they often work together in arguments. After finding substantial problems, the article suggests alternative ways of building sustainable presuppositions in similar territory. (shrink)

Presenting a series of powerful arguments, Robert Garner proposes that animal rights must be considered within the discourse on justice. The book offers an ideal theory of animal rights as well as a more achievable nonideal theory which we must use to get to the ideal, rejecting an array of alternative positions. The work contains much that is of value to animal ethicists, such as a novel consideration of the argument from marginal cases, and much that will be convincing for (...) those political thinkers and ethicists not already convinced of the moral significance of nonhuman animals. The text occasionally falls into an unfortunate "us and them" dynamic, and practical considerations are, in places, underdeveloped. These shortcomings do not detract from the value of the work, and the book comes highly recommended: It is readable, rigorous and, most importantly, highly convincing. (shrink)

The possibility of “clean milk”—dairy produced without the need for cows—has been championed by several charities, companies, and individuals. One can ask how those critical of the contemporary dairy industry, including especially vegans and others sympathetic to animal rights, should respond to this prospect. In this paper, I explore three kinds of challenges that such people may have to clean milk: first, that producing clean milk fails to respect animals; second, that humans should not consume dairy products; and third, that (...) the creation of clean milk would affirm human superiority over cows. None of these challenges, I argue, gives us reason to reject clean milk. I thus conclude that the prospect is one that animal activists should both welcome and embrace. (shrink)

A close scrutiny of a European Community directive on habitats and of the statutory instrument by which it is implemented in Britain reveals small but nevertheless significant concessions towards an ecocentric approach. Planning law now allows interference in the habitats of protected species only when human interests are demonstrably overriding. Recent decisions of the European Court of Justice have given a very restrictive interpretation of the circumstances in which such interference may be permitted. The implications for further ecocentric influence in (...) environmental law are discussed. (shrink)

A central puzzle of contemporary moral and political philosophy is that while most of us believe that all or almost all human beings enjoy the same moral status, human beings possess the capacities that supposedly ground moral status to very unequal levels. This paper aims to develop a novel strategy to vindicate the idea of moral equality against this challenge. Its central argument is that the puzzle emerges only if one accepts a usually unstated theoretical premise about value and the (...) proper response to value. The premise holds that if the presence of a valuable property warrants a certain kind of response towards its bearers, then every variation in the degree to which the property is present necessarily constitutes a reason for a corresponding variation in the response that is warranted towards its bearers. It argues that despite its intuitive appeal, the premise is not plausible as a general view about the proper way of responding to value, and as a view about responding to the value of rational beings in particular. It proposes an account of the proper manner of valuing rational beings that supports a distinctive version of the so-called threshold approach to justifying equal moral status. (shrink)

To capture genuine utilitarian tendencies, (Kahane et al., Psychological Review 125:131, 2018) developed the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS) based on two subscales, which measure the commitment to impartial beneficence and the willingness to cause harm for the greater good. In this article, I argue that the impartial beneficence subscale, which breaks ground with previous research on utilitarian moral psychology, does not distinctively measure utilitarian moral judgment. I argue that Kantian ethics captures the all-encompassing impartial concern for the well-being of all (...) human beings. The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale draws, in fact, a point of division that places Kantian and utilitarian theories on the same track. I suggest that the impartial beneficence subscale needs to be significantly revised in order to capture distinctively utilitarian judgments. Additionally, I propose that psychological research should focus on exploring multiple sources of the phenomenon of impartial beneficence without categorizing it as exclusively utilitarian. (shrink)

Apparent clashes of interest between 'deep ecologists' and 'animal liberationists' can be understood as differences in emphasis rather than conflicts of principle, although it is only too easy for campaigners to regard as rivals good causes other than their own. Moral principles are part of a larger whole, within which they can be related, rather than absolute all-purpose rules of right conduct. This is illustrated using the practical dilemma which often occurs in conservation management, of whether or not to cull (...) animals that are damaging their habitat by overgrazing. Here, and in general, when we are faced with a choice between two evils, the need for scrupulous discrimination and honesty cannot be overstated; but it is not a worthy option to retreat behind moral principles of limited application. (shrink)

Apparent clashes of interest between ‘deep ecologists’ and ‘animal liberationists’ can be understood as differences in emphasis rather than conflicts of principle, although it is only too easy for campaigners to regard as rivals good causes other than their own. Moral principles are part of a larger whole, within which they can be related, rather than absolute all-purpose rules of right conduct. This is illustrated using the practical dilemma which often occurs in conservation management, of whether or not to cull (...) animals that are damaging their habitat by overgrazing. Here, and in general, when we are faced with a choice between two evils, the need for scrupulous discrimination and honesty cannot be overstated; but it is not a worthy option to retreat behind moral principles of limited application. (shrink)

Some critics have understood environmental egalitarianism to imply that human and animal lives are generally equal in value, so that killing a human is no more objectionable than killing a dog. This charge should be troubling for anyone with egalitarian sympathies. I argue that one can distinguish two distinct versions of equality, one based on the idea of equal treatment, the other on the idea of equally valuable lives. I look at a lifeboat case where one must choose between saving (...) a human and saving a dog, and using the work of Peter Singer and Tom Regan, I show why equality understood as equal treatment does not entail that lifeboat cases are moral toss-ups. But the view that all lives are equally valuable does entail this, and so egalitarians should reject this alternative account of equality. The upshot is that egalitarians need to be more careful about distinguishing between these two versions of equality. The failure to insist on this distinction has led many to believe that egalitarianism generally has counter-intuitive implications when in fact only one version of egalitarianism has this problem. (shrink)

The global turn in media ethics has presented a tough challenge for traditional models of moral theory: How do we assert common moral standards while also showing respect for the values of those from outside the Western tradition? The danger lies in advocating for either extreme: reason-dependent absolutism or cultural relativism. In this paper, I reject Cliff Christian’s attempts to solve the problem and propose instead a moral theory of universal standards that are discovered via a mix of rationally grounded (...) methods. Such universality refutes relativism but, because it is grounded in evolutionary naturalism and life-world philosophy—as opposed to a Kantian or theological transcendentalism—it also avoids absolutism. (shrink)

Metzger’s presentation develops from his concept of ‘The Third Culture’. This is an extension of C.P. Snow’s Two Cultures - that of the artist and that of the scientist - and the divisions between them. Metzger argues that this division has been replaced by a great deal of interaction; but that there is now a Third Culture which straddles generations, classes and income groups. It is exemplified by protesters at the world summits and represents a response of people who are (...) aware that the tools and technologies which are used to control us can also be manipulated in ways that could make oppressive regimes lose their grip. If technologies of control can be subverted, however, it is also important that the ambivalent nature of technology is recognized. Metzger points to two threats to the continued existence of humanity - species extinction and destruction from asteroid impact - the former a consequence of technology, the latter requiring technological innovation. (shrink)

BackgroundCurrent policies regulating the use of animals for scientific purposes are based on balancing between potential gain of knowledge and suffering of animals used in experimentation. The balancing process is complicated, on the one hand by plurality of views on our duties towards animals, and on the other hand by more recent discussions on uncertainty in the probability of reaching the final aim of the research and problems of translational failure.MethodsThe study combines ethical analysis based on a literature review with (...) neuropsychiatry-related preclinical research as a case study.ResultsBased on the analysis and the case study we show that neuropsychiatry-related preclinical research is an especially interesting case from an ethical perspective. The 3R principles are used to minimize the negative consequences for the animals used in research. However, neuropsychiatric research is characterized by specific challenges in assessing the probability of success of reaching the final aim, due to our limited mechanistic knowledge of human neuropsychiatric illness. Consequently, the translational value of the currently used animal models may be difficult to prove, which undermines the validity of these models and complicated the ethical assessment.ConclusionsWe conclude that a combined approach that deals with both science and the ethical dimensions is necessary to address the problems of validity and translation in neuropsychiatry-related preclinical research. We suggest this approach to comprise first, improved experimental methods, e.g. by using systematic reviews, second, a more patients-based approach that leads to models that reflect interindividual variation better, and third, more interdisciplinary cooperation. (shrink)

Aquaculture is the fastest growing animal-production sector in the world. This leads to the question how we should guarantee fish welfare. Implementing welfare standards presupposes that we know how to weigh, define, and measure welfare. While at first glance these seem empirical questions, they cannot be answered without ethical reflection. Normative assumptions are made when weighing, defining, and measuring welfare. Moreover, the focus on welfare presupposes that welfare is a morally important concept. This in turn presupposes that we can define (...) the capacities of fish, which is an empirical undertaking that informs and is informed by ethical theories about the moral status of animals. In this article we want to illustrate the need for a constant interaction between empirical scientific research and ethics, in which both fields of research make their own contribution. This is not a novel claim. However, the case of fish sheds new light on this claim, because regarding fish there is still much empirical uncertainty and there is a plurality of moral views on all levels. Therefore, we do not only want to show the necessity of this interaction, but also the added value of a cooperation between ethicists and empirical scientists, such as biologists, physiologists, and ethologists. We demonstrate this by considering the different steps in the process of reflection about and implementation of fish welfare. (shrink)

This essay provides an overview of the field of environmental ethics. I sketch the major debates in the field from its inception in the 1970s to today, explaining both the central tenets of the schools of thought within the field and the arguments that have been given for and against them. I describe the main trends within the field as a whole and review some of the criticisms that have been offered of prevailing views.

Most ethicists agree that at least some nonhumans have interests that are of direct moral importance. Yet with very few exceptions, both climate ethics and climate policy have operated as though only human interests should be considered in formulating and evaluating climate policy. In this paper I argue that the anthropocentrism of current climate ethics and policy cannot be justified. I first describe the ethical claims upon which my analysis rests, arguing that they are no longer controversial within contemporary ethics. (...) Next, I review work in climate ethics and policy, demonstrating the absence of consideration of nonhuman interests in both domains. Finally, I consider five possible justifications for omitting nonhuman interests in the evaluation climate policy options, arguing that none of these arguments succeeds. (shrink)

Hunting ducks with a firearm has become increasingly contested in industrialized and urbanized contemporary societies. In southern New Zealand, an area that maintains strong connections to rural life ways, duck shooting is still a very popular activity. However, even duck shooters living in this region are increasingly finding that they must justify an activity their grandparents practiced without compunction. This paper considers ethical discourses associated with the killing of ducks, particularly the ways in which people who shoot ducks construct the (...) act of killing as an activity that can be ethically justified. As this paper will show, duck hunters assert that they have a more realistic and appropriate view of nature and animal life cycles than the average antihunter who might criticize them. New Zealand duck hunters also embed their hunting activities within a discourse of wetland conservation, arguing that they do far more to preserve and develop wetlands than do non-hunters. This paper concludes that duck hunters' understandings of nature are intrinsic to the ethical discourses that underpin duck hunting activities in New Zealand. (shrink)

For over 40 years, Mary Midgley has been celebrated for the sensibility with which she approached some of the most challenging and pressing issues in philosophy. Her expansive corpus addresses such diverse topics as human nature, morality, animals and the environment, gender, science, and religion. While there are many threads that tie together this impressive plurality of topics, the thread of relationality unites much of Midgley's thought on human nature and morality. This paper explores Midgley's pursuit of a relational notion (...) of the self and our connections to others, including animals and the natural world. (shrink)

Bovine tuberculosis is an important animal health policy issue in Britain, which impacts farmers, the public, domestic farmed cattle and the wild badger population. The Westminster government’s badger culling policy in England, which began in 2013, has caused considerable controversy. This is in part because the Independent Scientific Group advised against culling, based on the Randomised Badger Culling Trial. Those opposed to badger culling support more stringent cattle-based measures and the vaccination of badgers. This paper argues for ethical analysis of (...) public policy options which impact sentient species. It provides a summary Animal Welfare Impact Assessment of a do-nothing approach, badger culling, and badger vaccination. A utilitarian analysis is then applied to these policy options considering human wellbeing and animal welfare. The analysis compares a badger culling policy that achieves a 19% reduction in bovine TB incidence, a badger vaccination model achieving a 12.5% reduction, and a do-nothing approach. Policy options are assessed over 9 years and a longer timeframe, and uncertainty is considered. The analysis finds that non-culling approaches, particularly badger vaccination, result in greater total utility, compared to badger culling. Badger culling causes 30% reduction in the badger population in England as well as substantial harms due to the culling process. Culling is opposed by public opinion and is associated with considerable risks and uncertainty. In contrast, non-culling approaches, such as cattle-based measures and badger vaccination, are supported by public opinion and are not associated with such risks. (shrink)

Speciesism is a concept that was derived to name forms of discrimination and oppression against nonhuman animals that could be compared to racism and sexism. The concept was formulated in strong terms by Richard Ryder, Peter Singer, and Tom Regan that made it a powerful tool for social and political movements. The discourse on speciesism has been amplified and changed by a set of newer writings in the last few decades that take a more ethological, critical theory, and deconstructive bent. (...) This paper outlines some of the conditions for an antispeciesism based on posthumanism. As humanism itself is the most virulent form of speciesism, no robust antispeciesism can be developed without continued challenge to humanism. (shrink)

Ever since Kant, moral philosophers have been more or less animated by the mission of discovering inescapable law-like rules that would provide a binding justification for morality. Recently, however, many have started to question whether this is possible and what, after all, this project could achieve. An alternative vision of the task of moral philosophy starts from the pragmatist idea that philosophizing begins and ends in human experiencing. It leads to a view where morality is seen as a “social technology” (...) that aims to make living together possible, and strengthens people's capability to live a good life within a society. The role of moral philosophy is, accordingly, to develop our moral tools further. Moral philosophers become ethical engineers who use their expertise in ethical topics to criticize existing “moral technology” and construct new concepts, tools, and theories that better answer the current challenges for living a good life. (shrink)

Traditionally, in Spain bullfighting represents an ancient and well-respected tradition and a combined brand of sport, art and national identity. However, bullfighting has received considerable criticism from various segments of society, with the concomitant rise of the animal rights movement. The paper reports a survey of the Spanish citizens using a face-to-face survey during January 2016 with a total sample of 2522 citizens. The survey asked about degree of liking and approving; culture, art and national identity; socio-economic aspects; emotional perception (...) and animal welfare. The hypothesis proposed that the perception of bullfights may be affected by gender, age, occupation, origin and nationality of the persons surveyed. The hypothesis was confirmed. The majority of citizens surveyed do not like bullfights and great majorities do not attend or watch such events. Two extreme clusters were described: one representing favorable attitude towards bullfighting and other against bullfighting. The proportion of indifferent persons was important. Women and young people showed a more favorable attitude towards animal welfare issues associated with these events. Rural people were more accepting bullfights than urban people. Students were more anti-bullfight than those in other occupations. Additionally, technical economic factors made people favor more bullfights. The growth of claim against bullfights establishes an element of a far more multifaceted phenomenon that animal cruelty per se and support of a new paradigm called social change in countries as Spain. (shrink)

The ethics of bioculture deals with moral questions raised by the cultivation and farming of living things. P. W. Taylor believes that they have an inherent worth just like animals and wild plants. Therefore, judgment about how they should be treated cannot be limited to the principle of greater efficiency for the benefit of humans. Taylor developed a comprehensive theory that is founded on the symmetry between human and environmental ethics. He believes that every living thing is teleologically oriented and (...) a member of the earth's biotic community. A systemic and hologrammatic approach is the alternative to Taylor's ethics of bioculture. Each component of an ecosystem characterised by contingency, plays a role in co-evolution. Therefore, as moral agents, we must take historical responsibility for domesticating and employing other living things, and we should reconsider the emerging model of economic development and define criteria of ethical sustainability for bioculture companies. Such an ethics of bioculture can contribute to oriented decision-making to ensure that an increase in well-being for all living things is an economically and environmentally sustainable and political perspective. (shrink)

Animal size is a relevant and unappreciated consideration in moral evaluations of killing animals for food, especially for utilitarians, who must weigh the gustatory satisfaction of eating meat-the quantity of which varies greatly throughout the animal kingdom-against animal suffering in utilitarian calculations. I argue that animal size can drastically alter not only the extent but even the valence of such calculations. Then I show how the business ethics literature on vegetarianism is deficient for not taking animal size into account. Last, (...) I argue that market conditions are also relevant in moral assessments of vegetarianism. (shrink)

We are inquiring [into] what virtue is, not in order just to know it, but in order to become good.It seems, reading them [Heidegger and Wittgenstein], . . . that some moral claim upon us is levied by the act of philosophizing itself, a claim that no separate subject of ethics would serve to study. . . . [W]hat needs attention from philosophy, is our life as a whole.What I propose, therefore, is very simple: it is nothing more than to (...) think what we are doing. Whether amazed, curious, angered, or beset by gnawing doubts, philosophy finds itself with something like Emerson's query, "Where do we find ourselves?" Recoiling even as it relies upon a given, philosophy is always orienting or, rather, reorienting .. (shrink)

Many deep ecologists call for a 'new ecological ethic'. If this ethic is meant to be a moral ethic, then deep ecology fails. However if deep ecology is interpreted as an aesthetic movement, then it is both philosophically coherent and practically adequate.

Several writers on animal ethics defend the abolition of most or all animal agriculture, which they consider an unethical exploitation of sentient non-human animals. However, animal agriculture can also be seen as a co-evolution over thousands of years, that has affected biology and behavior on the one hand, and quality of life of humans and domestic animals on the other. Furthermore, animals are important in sustainable agriculture. They can increase efficiency by their ability to transform materials unsuitable for human consumption (...) and by grazing areas that would be difficult to harvest otherwise. Grazing of natural pastures is essential for the pastoral landscape, an important habitat for wild flora and fauna and much valued by humans for its aesthetic value. Thus it seems that the environment gains substantially when animals are included in sustainable agricultural systems. But what about the animals themselves? Objections against animal agriculture often refer to the disrespect for animals’ lives, integrity, and welfare in present intensive animal production systems. Of the three issues at stake, neither integrity nor animal welfare need in principle be violated in carefully designed animal husbandry systems. The main ethical conflict seems to lie in the killing of animals, which is inevitable if the system is to deliver animal products. In this paper, we present the benefits and costs to humans and animals of including animals in sustainable agriculture, and discuss how to address some of the ethical issues involved. (shrink)

Changes in social framework conditions, accelerated by globalization or political inventions, have created new societal demands and requirements on companies. The concept of corporate social responsibility is often considered a potential tool for meeting societal demands and criticism as a company voluntarily takes responsibility for society. The spotlight of public attention has only recently come to focus on agribusiness-related aspects of CSR. It is therefore the objective of this paper to provide an overview and a critical examination of the current (...) state of research into CSR in agribusiness from different perspectives. Upon that this paper goals to define CSR special cases in agribusiness and derive implications for further research. CSR in agribusiness is a multi-dimensional and complex concept, which is sensitive to ongoing exchange processes between companies and stakeholders. We conclude with the special position of CSR in agribusiness and that future research should focus on adding value to industry-specific CSR aspects in the general CSR framework borrowed from management literature. Explorative fieldwork such as expert interviews with different stakeholders might be suitable for gaining insights into agribusiness-specific aspects of CSR in firms. (shrink)

: Kathryn Paxton George's recent publication, Animal, Vegetable, or Woman? (2000), is the culmination of more than a decade's work and encompasses standard and original arguments against the feminist-vegetarian connection. This paper demonstrates that George's key arguments are deeply flawed, antithetical to basic feminist commitments, and beg the question against fundamental aspects of the debate. Those who do not accept the feminist-vegetarian connection should rethink their position or offer a non-question-begging defense of it.

Kathryn Paxton George's recent publication, Animal, Vegetable, or Woman?, is the culmination of more than a decade's work and encompasses standard and original arguments against the feminist-vegetarian connection. This paper demonstrates that George's key arguments are deeply flawed, antithetical to basic feminist commitments, and beg the question against fundamental aspects of the debate. Those who do not accept the feminist-vegetarian connection should rethink their position or offer a non-question-begging defense of it.