This essay briefly evaluates the ongoing controversy between LIU Qingping and GUO Qiyong (and their followers) about the “moral heart ”of Confucianism in order to draw acomparison with Islamic ethics for mutual illumination of the two traditions.

This essay presents an in-depth interpretation of the controversial dialogue in Analects 13.18 through careful and critical investigation of its historical background and philosophical significations. With a clarification of the multifaceted connotations of the word zhi (?, upright, forthright), my study brings out the play of irony in Confucius's words in Analects 13.18. According to my interpretation, not only is Confucius's reaction not inappropriate but it also demonstrates the art of early Confucian moral discretion that was informed by the teaching (...) of quan (? moral discretion). Accordingly, Confucius's judgment of the case embodied a high and bright middle way of moral choice originating in the openness and sincerity of heart. It epitomized a singular moment of deliberation and decision that was responsible for a sinuous opening of piety and individuality within the interplay of conflicting conditions and requisitions. (shrink)

Paul Gewirtz has suggested that contemporary Chinese society lacks a shared framework. A Rortian might describe this by saying that China lacks a “final vocabulary” of “thick terms” with which to resolve ethical disagreements. I briefly examine the strengths and weaknesses of Confucianism and Legalism as potential sources of such a final vocabulary, but most of this essay focuses on Zhuangzian Daoism. Zhuangzi 莊子 provides many stories and metaphors that can inspire advocates of political pluralism. However, I suggest that Zhuangzi (...) is ultimately an “ironist” in Rorty’s sense. Many intellectuals assume there is something progressive and liberating about broadly ironic stances like relativism and skepticism. Ethically, though, irony is “the night in which all cows are black”: since it regards all positions as equally undermined, an ironic stance cannot be enlisted in support of tolerance or humanitarianism or in opposition to absolutism or cruelty. (shrink)

This paper brings a fresh, epistemic perspective to bear on prominent Confucian philosophers’ arguments for a hybrid Deweyan-Confucian democracy, or for an illiberal democracy with “Confucian characteristics.” Reconstructing principles for epistemic elitism and paternalism from the pre-Qin 秦 Confucian thought that inspires these advocates for Confucian democracy, it finds two major problems with their proposals. For those who abandon or modify this epistemic elitism and paternalism in accordance with , the result is a philosophical syncretism that is either unconvincingly Confucian (...) or unconvincingly Deweyan. For those who retain it in accordance with , the result is a democratic proposal that will lack legitimacy in increasingly pluralistic East Asian societies. In the end, there is a need for thinking that appropriately synthesizes Eastern and Western philosophies in a politically changing East Asia, but it would benefit from being less “Confucian.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACTI suggest that Kierkegaard proves a helpful interlocutor in the debate about Analects 13.18 and the meaning of yin 隱. After surveying the contemporary debate, I argue that Kierkegaard and the Confucians agree on three important points. First, they both present relational selves. Second, both believe certain relationships are integral for moral knowledge. Third, both present a differentiated account of love where our obligations are highest to those with whom we are closest. Moreover, Kierkegaard’s ‘covering’ in the deliberation ‘Love covers (...) a multitude of sins’ in Works of Love of ‘covering’ suggests innovative meanings for yin 隱 that are compatible with Confucian philosophy. Finally, I argue that sagely discretion in covering on the Confucian account is like the teleological suspension of the ethical. (shrink)

For Confucianism nowadays, the characteristics and relationship between benevolence and filial piety are crucial topics. This paper is a discussion of the relationship between benevolence and filial piety in Confucianism from a new doctrine, i.e. the doctrine of ren wei tian sheng 人为天生 (humans are born of tian). Confucianists believed that man’s existence as a human was derived from tian. This was extended to mean that, in contrast to being born into a family, part of being ‘human’ was also given (...) by tian. The two virtues are applicable to different occasions, and require different moral competencies. Based on these premises, Confucianism conceived of an ideal order. Confucianism holds that junzi (gentlemen) involved in politics must fulfil the virtues of benevolence, justice, loyalty and trustworthiness, while xiaoren (ordinary people) are only expected to do their filial duty within the family. (shrink)

LIU Qingping’s criticism of Confucian teachings of filial piety, though valuable in stimulating critical attitude toward classic Confucianism, is largely based on misinterpreting Confucians as Kantians. The article tries to show that, unlike the Kantian rule-oriented ethic that provides universal ethical principles, Confucianism focuses on the process of person-making, and the teachings of classic Confucianism are more like gongfu instructions than moral principles. Looking from the gongfu perspective, Liu’s criticism becomes misdirected, if not irrelevant.

This paper discusses relevant issues surrounding a debate between two groups of Chinese academics concerning whether Confucianism was the source of corruption. Apart from offering my own analyses of the two stories from the Mencius, the implication of which is central to this debate, I argue that it is unsuitable to rely on current conceptions and mode of argumentation adopted from Western analytic philosophy to read ancient stories, as is practised by one group of scholars. On the other hand, the (...) other group seem to have organized their interpretation at the urge of defending Confucianism as a whole. (shrink)

Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi regard the human as an emotional being and especially consider such moral feelings as humane love, filial piety and devoted loyalty to be the constituent elements of humanity. On the one hand, they try to integrate the corresponding multiple roles of the humane person, filial son and loyal subject in harmony in order to make one become a true human in the ethical sense; on the other hand, they assign a supreme position merely to filial piety (...) or loyalty in cases of conflict because they regard one's parents or ruler as the greatest root of one's life, respectively. As a result, their ideas about humanity fall into some in-depth moral paradoxes, which might be resolved by a post-Confucian transformation of the traditional Confucian framework from particularistic consanguinism to universalistic humanism. (shrink)

Two controversial cases in Confucian literature present the demands of filial piety as conflicting with those of impartial justice. Let us call them the Case of Concealment (Analects18.13) and the Case of Evasion (Mencius7A53). Adogmaticreading of the texts indicates that both Confucius and Mencius give more weight to filial piety than to justice. This essay, however, provides an alternative reading of the cases:the liberal reading. I argue that the Confucian teachers used the cases as moral dilemmas that force Confucian students (...) to learn how to use a cluster of Confucian virtues, including practical wisdom, discretion, and straight determination, under difficult circumstances. The liberal reading views these moral dilemmas as rhetorical tools; they guide Confucian students in meditative exercises and ultimately transform students’ mode of seeing and being. (shrink)