O artigo tem o objetivo de investigar as características centrais do modelo ético coerentista utilizado por Rawls nos textos A Theory of Justice , Political Liberalism , “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” , “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy” , Lectures on History of Moral Philosophy , “Reply to Habermas” , The Law of Peoples , Justice as Fairness: A Restatement , Collected Papers . Especificamente, quero ver como seu construtivismo político oferece uma alternativa ao problema debatido entre realistas e antirrealistas, (...) a saber, se existem fatos morais independente das crenças ou se estes dependem da estrutura mental do agente, sendo uma alternativa tanto ao construtivismo moral kantiano como ao intuicionismo racional. Quero defender que o construtivismo político é um modelo contratualista coerentista holístico e que faz uso de uma ontologia social, conduzindo a um modelo pragmático de justificação em um âmbito público que supera este impasse em ontologia moral. Para tal, inicio com a controvérsia entre realistas e antirrealistas e, após, analiso a teoria rawlseana à luz deste debate. Por fim, procuro estabelecer algumas considerações conclusivas sobre este problema.This paper aims to investigate the core characteristics of the ethical coherentist model used by Rawls,in texts such as A Theory of Justice , Political Liberalism , “KantianConstructivism in Moral Theory” , “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy” , Lectureson History of Moral Philosophy , “Reply to Habermas” , The Law ofPeoples , Justice as Fairness: A Restatement , Collected Papers . Morespecifically, I wish to see how his political constructivism provides an alternative to the problem thatrealists and anti-realists discuss, i.e., whether moral facts exist regardless of beliefs or if it there areonly in the structure of the agent’s mind, an alternative both for Kant’s moral constructivism and forrational intuitionism. I wish to point out that the political constructivism is a coherentist holisticcontractarian model and use a social ontology leading to a pragmatic justification model in the publicdomain that go beyond of this moral ontology impasse. Therefore, I will start with the controversybetween realists and anti-realists and after I will analyze the rawlsean theory in light of this debate. Inthe end, I try to show some concluding remarks about this problem. (shrink)

A edição especial da Revista Dissertatio pretende refletir sobre a importância da filosofia moral e política de John Rawls no cenário filosófico atual no ano em que sua obra mais conhecida, A Theory of Justice, completa quarenta anos. Esta data comemorativa é apenas um pretexto para uma avaliação integral do projeto de Rawls, o que inclui obras posteriores, como, por exemplo, Political Liberalism e The Law of Peoples. Os artigos aqui reunidos procuram tematizar tanto a estrutura quanto o conteúdo da (...) teoria da justiça como equidade, avaliando atentamente as suas virtudes e, também, as suas fraquezas. (shrink)

Blockchain is an open digital ledger technology that has the capability of significantly altering the way that people operations operate in organizations. This research takes a first step in proposing several ways in which the blockchain technology can be used to improve current organizational practices, while also considering the ethical implications. Specifically, the paper examines the role that blockchain technology plays in three primary areas of people operations: entry to the organization, intraorganizational processes, and exit. In each section, the paper (...) reviews the ethical implications from the lenses of virtue ethics, utilitarianism, deontology and contractarianism. The paper concludes that in whole the implementation of blockchain technology in people operations processes can create a more ethical work environment. However, careful implementation is necessary and requires extensive examination of ethical implications in advance. (shrink)

Artikkel käsitleb kriitiliselt üht viimaste kümnendite vastandust poliitilises filosoofias — ‘poliitilise liberalismi’ (Rawls) ja ‘radikaalse demokraatia’ (Laclau ja Mouffe) vahel. Artikkel püüab käivitada potentsiaalset dialoogi nende kahe näiliselt lahkneva lähenemise vahel. Kokkuvõttes näitab artikkel, et vastandus on möödarääkimine vähemalt ühes fundamentaalses mõttes: mõlemad lähenemised jagavad ühiskonnastmõtlemisel sama aluseetost. Artiklis nimetatakse seda ‘sattumuslikkuse eetoseks’ ning väidetakse, et see on kõige fundamentaalsem alusveendumus nii Laclau ja Mouffe’i ‘radikaalse demokraatia’ kui ka Rawlsi ‘õigluse kui ausameelsuse’ idee jaoks. Artikkel osutab ka ühele kesksele kitsaskohale (...) Laclau ja Mouffe’i lähenemises: nende suutmatusele kontseptualiseerida institutsioonilisi korraldusi tulenevalt nende ülemäärasest rõhuasetust demokraatia dekonstruktiivsele potentsiaalile. Selles suhtes osutatakse ka Rawlsi käsitluse ilmselgetele eelistele, kuna see pakub juhiseid organiseerimaks demokraatlikke institutsioone. The paper concentrates on a controversy in recent decades’ political thought between ‘political liberalism’ of Rawls and ‘radical democracy’ (represented in this paper by Laclau and Mouffe). The article tries to initiate a potential dialogue between these seemingly divisive approaches. In conclusion the paper maintains that the whole controversy is misguided in one fundamental respect: both approaches share the same underlying ethos in envisioning society—‘the ethos of contingency’. It is argued that it is the most fundamental tenet informing both Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony with its complementary idea of ‘radical democracy’, and justice as fairness conceived in terms of reciprocity with its accompanying idea of public justification and reflective equilibrium. _e article points to a central impasse in Laclau and Mouffe’s approach: its incapability to conceptualize institutional arrangements due to their overemphasis on the deconstructive potential of democracy. In this respect the obvious merits of Rawls’ conception are highlighted in view of his proposals for organizing democratic institutions. (shrink)

Universal Declaration of Human Rights 70th anniversary is been celebrated in 2018. On the other hand, people are still arguing about the political, juridical, social and civilizational gains it has provided. Such discussions, however, focus on peripheral aspects of Human Rights, losing sight of what could be understood as its highest normative gain. Whenever arguments are not completely rectified, they dissociate from the social demands that actually gave them meaning and relevance. From this scope, the article intends to reconstruct the (...) conceptual and argumentative aspects of Human Rights from the critical theory of relations of justification by Rainer Forst, in which Human Rights are interpreted as arising from a fundamental right to justification. This fundamental right, in Forst’s theory, is interpreted as being part of the “deep grammar” of social conflicts. According to the Forstian theory, we argue for an interpretation of Human Rights capable of encompassing the multiple aspects of these rights, avoiding reductionism and unilateral interpretations of it. This presentation has been divided into three parts. First, it presented some traditional “pictures”, current forms of referring to Human Rights and its characteristics, against which another picture will be proposed, in order to place social conflicts and rejections of injustice as a starting point for the Human Rights. Next, the Forst’s principle of justification and the recursive argument that led toit was discussed. Finally, a critical interpretation of the Forstian proposal, which dealtwith the purposes that his theory is allegedly seeking, was carried out. (shrink)

Does the ‘Zeitenwende’ herald the beginning of a new and as yet undefined open society realism? The present essay argues this question requires critical discussion of nature and value of realist political theory, particularly at a time where international society is accelerating to somewhere which is itself as yet unclear. Adding to revisionist research on political realism in International Relations (IR) theory I sketch how a political vision I call open society realism may be developed out of Classical realism, in (...) sharp distinction to academic IR neorealism for methodological and political reasons. To strip foreign policy realism from Continental philosophy, law, and history risks that we become what political liberalism ought to avoid: a closed society with a good conscience retreating from world politics, hiding behind the ‘national’ interest as if strategic great power management is a methodic function of structure rather than the politics of an ethically conscious diplomacy. (shrink)

Research has suggested a fundamental connection between fairness and well-being at the individual, relational, and societal levels. Mattering is a multidimensional construct consisting of feeling valued by, and adding value to, self and others. Prior studies have attempted to connect mattering to both fairness and a variety of well-being outcomes. Based on these findings, we hypothesize that mattering acts as a mediator between fairness and well-being. This hypothesis was tested through Covariance-Based Structural Equation Modeling using multidimensional measures of fairness, mattering, (...) and well-being. Results from a Latent Path Analysis conducted on a representative sample of 1,051U.S. adults provide support to our hypothesis by revealing a strong direct predictive effect of mattering onto well-being and a strong indirect effect of fairness onto well-being through mattering. Results also show that mattering is likely to fully mediate the relationship between fairness and multiple domains of well-being, except in one case, namely, economic well-being. These findings illustrate the value of a focus on mattering to understand the relationship between fairness and well-being and to provide future directions for theory, research, and practice. Theoretical implications for the experience of citizenship and participation, along with cross-cultural considerations, are also discussed. (shrink)

The paper is an attempt to revisit Rawls’ idea of a self, which elicits the concept of justice in the liberal tradition. Justice, as understood in the social and political context, is the basic feature of a well-ordered and rationally developed society and it is considered to be a virtue of the social institution. The liberal theory believes in the basic principle that right is prior to the good, and what is most fundamental to our personhood are not the ends (...) we choose but our capacity to choose them. Hence, in Rawls’ account of the self, absoluteness of the metaphysical priority has an edge over the absoluteness of the moral priority. The idea of an unencumbered self, in the social and historical sense, is at the core of the Kantian-Rawlsian theory of justice, which is under attack by the communitarians. Communitarians like Sandel, however, questions Rawls’ claim for the priority of right over good and maintains that liberals fail to recognize the self is ‘embedded,’ in and partly constituted by communal commitments and values which are objects of choice. In this paper, I examine communitarian critiques of Rawls’ liberal self. Further, I also refer to Rawls’ turn to the ‘political,’ which works as a ‘module’ that fits into and can be supported by a variety of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. (shrink)

The field of Latin American philosophy has established itself as a relevant subfield of philosophical inquiry. However, there might be good reasons to consider that our focus on the subfield could have distracted us from considering another subfield that, although it might share some geographical proximity, does not share the same historical basic elements. In this paper, I argue for a possible and meaningful conceptual difference between Latin American Philosophy and Indigenous philosophy produced in Latin America. First, I raise what (...) I call Mariátegui’s Solidarity Challenge to show that there might be some neglectful treatment of the philosophical views of different Indigenous groups. I then depart from Mariátegui and engage in a critical exercise to show that even he would be guilty of failing in his own solidarity demands. I follow that by drawing out some implications of the argument. I first sketch how this differentiation would play out against the political project of “Mestizaje,” a project that seems to inform some of the Latin American philosophical tradition. I then speculate about the kinds of duties that the field of Latin American philosophy might have towards the field of Indigenous Philosophy produced in Latin America. (shrink)

Es corriente invocar el lenguaje de los derechos para demandar justicia. Sin embargo, el uso irreflexivo de este lenguaje puede ser perjudicial. En este trabajo, presento dos argumentos en favor de una más atenta reflexión sobre el concepto de derecho subjetivo. Primero, uso la distinción entre el concepto y la concepción de una noción normativa para precisar cuál es la clase de investigación que la reflexión sobre el concepto de derecho implica y los problemas que trae ignorarla para las prácticas (...) de reivindicación de justicia. Segundo, propongo que el que un individuo o colectivo tenga derecho a la satisfacción de un contenido dado significa que existen razones suficientes, pero no absolutas, para que alguien esté obligado a actuar de forma que contribuya razonablemente y de una manera especificada a la satisfacción de tal contenido. Esta propuesta del concepto de derecho subjetivo es “independiente”, en tanto permite la discusión de diferentes concepciones de derechos en una sociedad democrática. Además, articula la idea de que conceder un derecho implica siempre considerar la manera en que se distribuyen las cargas y responsabilidades al interior de una sociedad, así como la forma en que sus instituciones deben funcionar en conjunto. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es proponer un concepto de agente crítico que dialogue con una práctica democrática deliberativa, considerando qué significa el acto de dar razones. Para tal efecto, en este trabajo se discute, primero, qué significaría ser crítico o tender hacia la criticidad tanto autorreferente como hacia terceros. Esta sección está apoyada principalmente con ideas provenientes de la teoría de la argumentación y de la lógica informal. En segundo término, se aborda el concepto de democracia deliberativa a la (...) luz de la sinergia conceptual que habría entre la participación -potencial- de un agente crítico en tal contexto sociopolítico. En esta sección se pasa revista a algunas de las ideas centrales de la teoría de la democracia deliberativa. Y en la tercera y última parte, se aborda el problema de dar y recibir razones discutiendo la propuesta semántica inferencialista de Brandom (2002, 2005) para observar de qué manera este acercamiento puede aportar a una teoría de la deliberación y a un concepto -y educación- de agente crítico. En las conclusiones se sintetizan las ideas principales y, además, se hace un contrapunto entre la noción de agencia, concepto que es importante en mi propuesta, y la noción de persona, concepto de especial valor en la teoría de la democracia deliberativa. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the ways in which “Public Reason” (or public reasons, in plural) can be said to resonate with some types of reasons as presented and defended in contemporary legal theory. I begin by identifying the concept of Public Reason within the context of a discussion sparked by the between “internal” and “external” reasons, which was made famous by Bernard Williams. I will then compare this interpretation of Public Reason with Joseph Raz’s celebrated concept of exclusionary reasons. (...) Next, I refer to two concepts of moral “neutrality” and how such concepts affect our understanding of Public Reason. I also reflect upon whether it is tenable to draw a distinction between the good reasons for actions that we conduct in our own lives and good reasons to be adopted in public life. Finally, I raise the question of a distinction between the reasons which we press in general societal discourse and those that we press in the advocacy-related law-making process. (shrink)

Many scholars in the area of citizenship education take deliberative approaches to democracy, especially as put forward by John Rawls, as their point of departure. From there, they explore how students’ capacity for political and/or moral reasoning can be fostered. Recent work by political theorist Chantal Mouffe, however, questions some of the central tenets of deliberative conceptions of democracy. In the paper I first explain the central differences between Mouffe’s and Rawls’s conceptions of democracy and politics. To this end I (...) take Eamonn Callan’s Creating Citizens as an example of Rawlsian political education and focus on the role of conflict and disagreement in his account. I then address three areas in which political education would need to change if it were to accept Mouffe’s critiques of deliberative approaches to democracy and her proposal for an agonistic public sphere. The first area is the education of political emotions; the second is fostering an understanding of the difference between the moral and the political; the third is developing an awareness of the historical and contemporary political projects of the “left” and “right.” I propose that a radical democratic citizenship education would be an education of political adversaries. (shrink)

For the traditional legalistic discourse on the International Criminal Court, “politics” is a bête noire that compromises the independence of the Court and thus needs to be avoided and overcome. In response to this legalistic approach, a burgeoning body of literature insists that the Court does not exist and operate “beyond politics”, arguing that the ICC is an institution where law and politics are intimately connected. The present article seeks to contribute to this “non-traditional” literature by addressing two of its (...) fundamental weaknesses: First, writers of the “non-traditional camp” often present a rather limited view of “politics”; in particular, they have shied away from taking the radical step of portraying and analysing the ICC as a “political actor”. This undermines both its critical and constructive potential. Secondly, these commentators offer a simplistic explanation as to why “traditionalists” treat politics as the ICC’s bête noire: Traditionalists, they claim, are “legalists” with scant interest in and understanding of politics. By focusing on the ICC’s nature as a political actor, this article does not only paint a more nuanced picture of the ICC but also demonstrates the constructive potential of this understanding of the ICC to shed light on the so-called “peace versus justice dilemma”. And secondly, it demonstrates that precisely because the ICC is and ought to be a prudent political actor, it must officially disavow politics. The “noble lie” of disavowing politics, therefore, is a prudential strategy to avoid dangerous moral and political consequences and, ultimately, to secure the continued existence of the ICC itself. (shrink)

The present article discusses the “peace versus justice” dilemma in international criminal justice through the lenses of the respective legal theories of Judith Shklar and Hannah Arendt—two thinkers who have recently been described as theorists of international criminal law. The article claims that in interventions carried out by the International Criminal Court, there is an ever-present potentiality for the “peace versus justice” dilemma to occur. Unfortunately, there is no abstract solution to this problem, insofar as ICC interventions will in some (...) cases be conducive while in others, they will be deleterious to peace. If a tension between peace and justice arises in a particular case, the article asserts, the former must be prioritised over the latter. Such a prioritisation, however, requires a vision of the ICC as a flexible actor of world politics which is situated at the intersection of law, ethics and politics, rather than a strictly legalistic view of the court. Ultimately, then, the present article seeks to probe whether the legal and political theories of Shklar and Arendt—in isolation, but ultimately also in combination—support such a flexible vision of the ICC. (shrink)

O presente texto apresenta a seguinte estrutura. Na primeira parte, resumirei algumas das críticas à concepção de sujeito em John Rawls; na segunda parte, examinarei um texto de Rawls de 1963, intitulado “O senso de justiça”, e procuro mostrar, com base nesse texto, que não se pode afirmar que o ser moral rawlsiano é destituído de carne, sangue ou vida, como sugeriram alguns críticos, na esteira das críticas de Hegel a Kant; em terceiro lugar, examinarei trechos de TJ que lidam, (...) direta ou indiretamente, com o conceito de sujeito; finalmente, examinarei textos de Rawls publicados após TJ que possam ser relevantes para o presente tópico. (shrink)

Political liberals argue that the classical conception of autonomy must be discarded because it is sectarian and metaphysical. This article rejects that a commitment to autonomy necessarily leads to sectarianism and questions the notion that respect for persons is separable from the commitment to autonomy. It defends a Kantian approach to autonomy, as belonging to the standpoint of practical reason, and argues that in this approach autonomy is a norm regulating how we should treat each other as opposed to a (...) good to be promoted. This approach also avoids the metaphysical idea of autonomy as self-origination of binding principles. (shrink)

John Rawls's ?veil of ignorance? approach to ethical decision making is a staple in mass media ethics literature, but Rawls's overarching theory of distributive justice receives less consideration in public relations ethics than in other communication disciplines. Public relations ethicists who describe the veil often divorce it from Rawls's original intention. This paper describes Rawls's theory; its uses and misuses in contemporary discussions of public relations ethics; six reasons why the veil seems to be a difficult fit for public relations (...) practitioners; and Rawlsian considerations in the context of three commonly accepted public relations models. (shrink)

El principio de tolerancia recibe un giro novedoso en la obra de John Rawls con su propuesta de aplicarlo a la filosofía misma.

In this paper three models of teaching and learning medical ethics are discussed critically, the traditional and revised vocational models, and the patient-centred model. The autonomy-oriented patient-centred ethics of Beauchamp and Childress is rejected in favour of a hermeneutic practical ethics. A performative conception of ethics teaching is recommended as the most appropriate model for use in the theory and practice of ethics pedagogy.

This review essay on three recent books on John Rawls’s theory of justice, by Catherine Audard, Samuel Freeman, and Thomas Pogge, describes the great boon they offer serious students of Rawls. They form a united front in firmly and definitively rebuffing Robert Nozick’s libertarian critique, Michael Sandel’s communitarian critique, and more generally critiques of “neutralist liberalism,” as well as in affirming the basic unity of Rawls’s position. At a deeper level, however, they diverge, and in ways that, this essay suggests, (...) go astray on subtle questions of interpretation: Freeman overemphasizes reciprocity, Pogge miscasts Rawls as a consequentialist, and Audard exaggerates the Kantian aspect of Rawls’s core, continuing commitment to “doctrinal autonomy.”. (shrink)

In our philosophical tradition and our wider culture, we tend to think of persons as agents. This agential conception is flattering, but in this paper I will argue that it conceals a more complex truth about what persons are. In 1. I set the issues in context. In 2. I critically explore four features commonly presented as fundamental to personhood in versions of the agential conception: action, capability, choice and independence. In 3. I argue that each of these agential features (...) presupposes a non-agential feature: agency presupposes patiency, capability presupposes incapability, choice presupposes necessity and independence presupposes dependency. In 4. I argue that such non-agential features, as well as being implicit within the agential conception, are as apt to be constitutive of personhood as agential features, and in 5. I conclude. (shrink)

This article focuses on the problem of political legitimacy: first, by finding it to be the driving force in the Rawlsian paradigm moving from a focus on the moral to one on the political; second, with the help of a consideration of multiple-modernities theory, by arguing for a version of political liberalism freed of its western framework; and third, by applying that framework to current debates over the meaning of democracy in a Confucian context.

Conceptions of desert and responsibility have had a powerful influence in justifying economic inequality. Currently, they are being reaffirmed in policies advocated by the centre left in Britain. In contrast, luck egalitarianism, one of the dominant theoretical positions in contemporary political philosophy, puts equality at the top of the agenda and notoriously undermines traditional notions of desert and rejects the conception of personal responsibility on which traditional ideas rely. Although luck egalitarians are sceptical about desert and redefine responsibility to reduce (...) its role in arguments for just distribution, they nevertheless retain a commitment to holding people responsible for the distributive consequences of what they freely choose to do. They attempt to demonstrate that equality can be reconciled with responsibility. I will argue that luck egalitarians have not gone far enough in eliminating desert and responsibility from the armoury of social justice, and that their own arguments should have led them to do so. My aim in this article is to push the ideas implicit in luck egalitarian's arguments to their logical conclusion. I argue that for practical and conceptual reasons, they should have formulated their theories as though hard determinism is true, or nearly true, even if it is not. Denying the pertinence of judgements of desert and responsibility to questions of distributive justice removes an obstacle to egalitarian aims by suggesting a more egalitarian distribution than one that is hostage to voluntary choice. It could be accepted that luck egalitarianism cannot accommodate the concept of personal responsibility without accepting the conclusion that considerations of responsibility should be abandoned. However, any plausible account of responsibility would demonstrate that existing inequalities are undeserved, and that these inequalities make a mockery of politicans current emphasis on personal responsibility. (shrink)

Social and political concepts are indispensable yet historically and culturally variable in a way that poses a challenge: how can we reconcile confident commitment to them with awareness of their contingency? In this article, we argue that available responses to this problem—Foundationalism, Ironism, and Right Wittgensteinianism—are unsatisfactory. Instead, we draw on the work of Bernard Williams to tease out and develop a Left Wittgensteinian response. In present-day pluralistic and historically self-conscious societies, mere confidence in our concepts is not enough. For (...) modern individuals who are ineluctably aware of conceptual change, engaged concept-use requires reasonable confidence, and in the absence of rational foundations, the possibility of reasonable confidence is tied to the possibility of critically discriminating between conceptual practices worth endorsing and those worth rejecting. We show that Left Wittgensteinianism offers such a basis for critical discrimination through point-based explanations of conceptual practices which relate them to the needs of concept-users. We end by considering how Left Wittgensteinianism guides our understanding of how conceptual practices can be revised in the face of new needs. (shrink)

This paper explores the problem of universalism and particularism in contemporary ethics, and its relationship to Christian bioethics in particular. An ethic of human dignity is outlined, which, it is argued, constrains moral discourse in the broad sense – thus meeting the demands of universalism – but which is at the same time amenable to a variety of particularist interpretations – thus acknowledging the current shift toward historicism, traditionalism, and culture. The particularist interpretations that are of central concern here are (...) those provided by historic Christianity. The eventual goal is to indicate how a Christian conception of human dignity can have universal normative relevance both as a standard against which to assess competing particularist conceptions, and as a practical guide for everyday living. A Christian conception of dignity will in turn have significant implications when addressing contemporary issues in bioethics. These are ambitious goals, and a full explication of the ideas presented will not be possible in this context. Nevertheless, there is value in getting a bird's-eye view of the landscape before one goes about scaling the mountains and exploring the valleys. The present essay is intended as a general geography of the moral terrain in which an ethic of dignity in general, and a Christian perspective on dignity in particular, can provide normative guidance. (shrink)

Resumen Trabajos recientes demuestran un interés renovado en el análisis de la igualdad como principio fundador del Estado democrático de derecho. Se trata de estudios que evidencian un esfuerzo conceptual por abordar el problema desde el punto de vista de la aplicación y el reconocimiento efectivo del principio de igualdad, pero que dan por supuesta o dejan de lado su fundamentación. Ante estos planteamientos, este trabajo explora una propuesta de justificación filosófica del principio de igualdad en el marco teórico de (...) la ética del discurso de Karl-Otto Apel. La idea es tomar en cuenta el método reconstructivo de esta teoría para identificar un principio de igualdad siempre presupuesto en los discursos prácticos y conferirle así una fundamentación última.Recent works show a renewed interest in the analysis of equality as a founding principle of the democratic rule of law. These studies reveal a conceptual effort to examine the problem from the point of view of the implementation and effective recognition of the principle of equality, but without considering its foundation. Given these approaches, this paper explores a philosophical justification of the principle of equality based on the theoretical framework of Karl-Otto Apel’s discourse ethics. The idea is to consider the reconstructive method of this theory by which it is possible to identify a principle of equality which is always presupposed in the context of practical discourses, and thus give it an ultimate foundation. (shrink)

(2002). Rich Egalitarianism, Ordinary Politics, and the Demands of Justice. Inquiry: Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 97-117.

This paper identifies why hypocrites lack the standing to blame others for certain wrongs. I first examine previous analyses of 'standing', and note these attempts all centre around the idea of entitlement. I then argue that thinking of standing to blame as a purely moral entitlement faces numerous problems. By examining how the concept of standing is used in other contexts, I argue that we should think of standing to blame in partly metaphysical terms. That is, we should think of (...) it as a status which grants agents the ability to do certain things. Using Darwall's (2006) account of second-personal obligations, I argue that we should think of blame as expressing demands. For these demands to impose obligations on others, however, we must first have the authority to make these demands. I argue that agents who lack standing to blame lack the authority to blame, and thus lack the ability to impose second-personal obligations on others by making these demands. They lack this authority because they fail to accept other people's second-personal authority to make similar demands on them. (shrink)

I was thinking about my philosophical work and saying to myself: ‘I destroy, I destroy, I destroy…’Context: The ‘linguistic turn’ of Western philosophy ; and correlatively, the decline of universalist discourses. The weariness with regard to ‘theory’, and the miserable slackening that goes along with it. The time has come to philosophize.…there is no danger of philosophy's ‘coming to an end’. Religion did not come to an end in the Enlightenment, nor painting in Impressionism. Even if the period from Plato (...) to Nietzsche is encapsulated and ‘distanced’ in the way Heidegger suggests, and even if twentieth‐century philosophy comes to seem a stage of awkward transitional backing and filling, there will be something called ‘philosophy’ on the other side of the transition. (shrink)

Critics and defenders of Rawls' idea of public reason have tended to neglect the relationship between this idea and his conception of democratic legitimacy. I shall argue that Rawls' idea of public reason can be interpreted in two different ways, and that the two interpretations support two different conceptions of legitimacy. What I call the substantive interpretation of Rawls' idea of public reason demands that it applies not just to the process of democratic decision-making, but that it extends to the (...) substantive justification of democratic decisions. I shall argue against this interpretation and suggest a procedural interpretation instead. On this view, public reason is invoked when it comes to the political justification of the principles that should govern the process of democratic decision-making, but not – at least not directly – in relation to the content of public deliberation. (shrink)

In this short response to Kerstein and Bognar, we clarify three aspects of the complete lives system, which we propose as a system of allocating scarce medical interventions. We argue that the complete lives system provides meaningful guidance even though it does not provide an algorithm. We also defend the investment modification to the complete lives system, which prioritizes adolescents and older children over younger children; argue that sickest-first allocation remains flawed when scarcity is absolute and ongoing; and argue that (...) Kerstein and Bognar are mistaken to base their allocation principles on differences in personhood. (shrink)

En este artículo se trata de situar el régimen de derechos humanos –aunque sólo el de los llamados derechos civiles y políticos- dentro del universo mental de los imaginarios sociales modernos que conforman nuestra forma de leer el mundo En estas páginas se sostiene que: los derechos humanos no tienen fundamento filosófico posible ; uno de los ejes de estos imaginarios sociales modernos es el que se extiende desde la humanidad una hasta el estado soberano moderno; el otro eje se (...) despliega entre la civilización y la condición de salvaje, en un relato teleológico. Con estas premisas los derechos humanos, que sólo se entienden hasta el fondo, en una determinada tradición lingüística, pueden y deben ser usados, no como fundamentos universales de la acción, sino como armas de lucha. (shrink)

All social phenomena, all social interaction, anything that exists in society, is temporal. Anticipation of futures is a necessary part of all social actions, and particularly so in the world of modern organisations. If social sciences are to be relevant they should also be able to say something about possible and likely futures. My paper articulates an ontology for futures studies and then, on that ontological basis, specifies the methodology of futures studies. Critical realist ontology explains why there are multiple (...) possible futures. The actual is only a part of the real world, which also consists of non-actualised possibilities and unexercised powers of the already existing structures and mechanisms that are transfactually efficacious in open systems. Social sciences are also involved in envisaging better possible futures in terms of concrete utopias. However, building concrete utopias is not the only task of a futurologist. We are also interested in other possible and likely futures, and in determining the ways in which our actions and the actions of others contribute—sometimes via unintended effects and consequences—to making some of them real. Empirico-analytical models have a role to play, as do systematic modelling of geo-historical realities: embodied agency and actors; modes of action; rules and principles; resources, as competencies and facilities; practices; relational structures ; and self-organising social systems. However, scenario-construction should also be seen as self-reflective exercise in cultural studies, moral philosophy and creative ability. (shrink)

Resumen Tanto el concepto típicamente utilitarista de protección social como el concepto típicamente kantiano de consentimiento ocupan un lugar central en la estrategia que ensaya C. S. Nino para justificar la institución del castigo. Sin embargo, en este trabajo intentaré demostrar que ambos conceptos son irreconciliables. La encrucijada, en cualquier caso, es la siguiente: mientras el primer concepto, interpretado a la luz de la teoría ética del autor, parece tornar innecesaria la apelación al segundo concepto, una interpretación alternativa del primer (...) concepto tampoco nos situaría ante un mejor panorama filosófico.In the present article I aim to show that the meaning of the first concept, as well as the Kantian concept becomes truly intelligible only when we manage to read Nino’s penal theory in the light of his own ethical theory. Thus, on the hypothesis that this is indeed the best possible reading, the strategy tried out by Nino will have to face a difficult crossroads: either adopt a concept of social protection that will definitely displace the notion of consent from the justifying plane where the theory operates; or embrace a broader idea of protection where the notion of consent finds a less uncomfortable place. As will be argued, none of the alternatives is without its problems. (shrink)

Rawls''s recent modification of his theory of justice claims that political liberalism is free-standing and falls under the category of the political. It works entirely within that domain and does not rely on anything outside it In this article I pursue the metatheoretical goal of obtaining insight into the anthropological assumptions that have remained so far unacknowledged by Rawls and critics alike. My argument is that political liberalism has a dependence on comprehensive liberalism and its conception of a self-serving subjectivity (...) that is far more binding as well as undesirable than it has been so far acknowledged. I proceed with a heuristic approach that introduces us to the possibility that political liberalism presupposes tacitly the Occidental metanarrative of reason harnessing rampant self-interest and subordinating it to a higher-order interest. As the presuppositions of political liberalism emerge, I draw from the debate between Rawls and Habermas in order to illustrate my argument for the existence of a dependence on these presuppositions. I outline some implications of the anthropological basis of political liberalism and conclude by exemplifying them with reference to Rawls''s comments on the division of a cake. (shrink)

ExcerptIntroduction Much of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy proclaimed the end the metaphysics and the death of God. The German, French, and English strands of the Enlightenment were united in their suspicion of metaphysical theism. Figures as diverse as Comte, Marx, Spencer, Nietzsche, and Russell defended the absolute autonomy of atheist reason against religious faith. Following the rise of partisan ideologies that terrorized the West from 1789 to 1989, the downfall of the Soviet empire appeared to herald the “end of history” (...) and a global convergence toward liberal market democracy. Ideas of freedom and justice would henceforth…. (shrink)

Intuitionism—in some form or another—is the most widely recognized and thoroughly discussed method of justification for moral theories. It rests on the claim that a moral theory must not deviate too much from our pre-theoretical moral convictions. In some form or another, this methodology goes back at least as far as Aristotle, and has been discussed, refined, and defended by such contemporary philosophers as John Rawls and Norman Daniels.There is, however, another methodology for constructing and defending moral theories. It draws (...) on premises about human nature or the nature of persons to support conclusions about the nature and structure of morality. This method—which I will call thenature to morality methodology—evaluates a moral claim or moral theory on the basis of its relation to some facts about the kind of beings we are. For brevity, I will use the term ‘nature-claims’ to refer to claims about human nature or the nature of persons, and the term ‘nature-facts’ to refer to true nature-claims. The nature-claims that have been used to support or criticize various moral theories include claims about human motivation, personal identity, the human soul, and the conceptual features of personhood or rational agency. (shrink)