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Two concepts of rules

Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32 (1955)

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  1. Consequentialism, Collective Action, and Blame.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2024 - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-33.
    Several important questions in applied ethics – like whether to switch to a plant-based diet, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, or vote in elections – seem to share the following structure: if enough people ‘cooperate’ and become vegan for example, we bring about a better outcome; but what you do as an individual seems to make no difference whatsoever. Such collective action problems are often thought to pose a serious challenge to consequentialism. In response, I defend the Reactive Attitude Approach: rather (...)
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  • Rawls, Libertarianism, and the Employment Problem: On the unwritten chapter in A Theory of Justice.Larry Udell - 2018 - Social Philosophy Today 34:133-152.
    Barbara Fried described John Rawls’s response to libertarianism as “the unwritten theory of justice.” This paper argues that while there is no need for a new theory of justice to address the libertarian challenge, there is a need for an additional chapter. Taking up Fried’s suggestion that the Rawlsian response would benefit from a revised list of primary goods, I propose to add employment to the list, thus leading to adoption of a full employment principle in the original position that (...)
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  • The Standard of Correctness and the Ontology of Depiction.Enrico Terrone - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (4):399-412.
    This paper develops Richard Wollheim’s claim that the proper appreciation of a picture involves not only enjoying a seeing-in experience but also abiding by a standard of correctness. While scholars have so far focused on what fixes the standard, thereby discussing the alternative between intentions and causal mechanisms, the paper focuses on what the standard does, that is, establishing which kinds, individuals, features and standpoints are relevant to the understanding of pictures. It is argued that, while standards concerning kinds, individuals (...)
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  • Sustaining rules: a model and application.John Turri - 2017 - In Knowledge first: approaches in epistemology and mind.
    I introduce an account of when a rule normatively sustains a practice. My basic proposal is that a rule normatively sustains a practice when the value achieved by following the rule explains why agents continue following that rule, thus establishing and sustaining a pattern of activity. I apply this model to practices of belief management and identifies a substantive normative connection between knowledge and belief. More specifically, I proposes one special way that knowledge might set the normative standard for belief: (...)
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  • The law of duty and the virtue of justice.Ekow Nyansa Yankah - 2008 - Criminal Justice Ethics 27 (1):67-77.
    In his new book, The Grammar of Criminal Law: American, Comparative, and International, celebrated criminal law theorist George Fletcher excavates criminal law doctrine across a number of countries and cultures to reveal a small number of basic shared structures. Among these structures Fletcher argues that it is a criminal law justified by Kantian legal morality, in contrast to perfectionist or communitarian theories, that is legitimate. Thus, Fletcher proposes, along with legal positivists, that the validity of legal norms does not turn (...)
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  • The Incompatibility of Rawls's Justice as Fairness and His Just War Approach.Medina Vicente - 2024 - Ratio Juris 37 (1):67-82.
    A fundamental tension exists between Rawls's ideal Kantian conception of justice as fairness (JAF), which requires respecting people as ends, and his realistic non-Kantian consequentialist conception of a supreme emergency in a just war. By justifying the targeting of objectively innocent noncombatants during a supreme emergency exception, Rawls allows for treating them as means only. Hence, his appeal to a supreme emergency is insufficient to avoid this tension. First, since for him JAF is ideal but also practical, one might argue (...)
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  • Minds, Brains, and Desert: On the relevance of neuroscience for retributive punishment.Alva Stråge - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    It is a common idea, and an element in many legal systems, that people can deserve punishment when they commit criminal (or immoral) actions. A standard philosophical objection to this retributivist idea about punishment is that if human choices and actions are determined by previous events and the laws of nature, then we are not free in the sense required to be morally responsible for our actions, and therefore cannot deserve blame or punishment. It has recently been suggested that this (...)
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  • Parental Compromise.Marcus William Hunt - 2022 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 25 (2):260-280.
    I examine how co-parents should handle differing commitments about how to raise their child. Via thought experiment and the examination of our practices and affective reactions, I argue for a thesis about the locus of parental authority: that parental authority is invested in full in each individual parent, meaning that that the command of one parent is sufficient to bind the child to act in obedience. If this full-authority thesis is true, then for co-parents to command different things would be (...)
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  • Rationality, Reasons, Rules.Brad Hooker - 2022 - In Christoph C. Pfisterer, Nicole Rathgeb & Eva Schmidt (eds.), Wittgenstein and Beyond: Essays in Honour of Hans-Johann Glock. New York: Routledge. pp. 275-290.
    H.-J. Glock has made important contributions to discussions of rationality, reasons, and rules. This chapter addresses four conceptions of rationality that Glock identifies. One of these conceptions of rationality is that rationality consists in responsiveness to reasons. This chapter goes on to consider the idea that reasons became prominent in normative ethics because of their usefulness in articulating moral pluralism. The final section of the chapter connects reasons and rules and contends that both are ineliminable.
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  • Capital Punishment.Benjamin S. Yost - 2023 - In Mortimer Sellars & Stephan Kirste (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 1-9.
    Capital punishment—the legally authorized killing of a criminal offender by an agent of the state for the commission of a crime—stands in special need of moral justification. This is because execution is a particularly severe punishment. Execution is different in kind from monetary and custodial penalties in an obvious way: execution causes the death of an offender. While fines and incarceration set back some of one’s interests, death eliminates the possibility of setting and pursuing ends. While fines and incarceration narrow (...)
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  • Second‐Personal Approaches to Moral Obligation.Janis David Schaab - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (3):1 - 11.
    According to second‐personal approaches to moral obligation, the distinctive normative features of moral obligation can only be explained in terms of second‐personal relations, i.e. the distinctive way persons relate to each other as persons. But there are important disagreements between different groups of second‐personal approaches. Most notably, they disagree about the nature of second‐personal relations, which has consequences for the nature of the obligations that they purport to explain. This article aims to distinguish these groups from each other, highlight their (...)
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  • John Searle’s ontology of money, and its critics.Louis Larue - 2024 - In Joseph Tinguely (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Money. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    John Searle has proposed one of the most influential contemporary accounts of social ontology. According to Searle, institutional facts are created by the collective assignment of a specific kind of function —status-function— to pre-existing objects. Thus, a piece of paper counts as money in a certain context because people collectively recognize it as money, and impose a status upon it, which in turn enables that piece of paper to deliver certain functions (means of payment, etc.). The first part of this (...)
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  • Against legal probabilism.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Jon Robson & Zachary Hoskins (eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge.
    Is it right to convict a person of a crime on the basis of purely statistical evidence? Many who have considered this question agree that it is not, posing a direct challenge to legal probabilism – the claim that the criminal standard of proof should be understood in terms of a high probability threshold. Some defenders of legal probabilism have, however, held their ground: Schoeman (1987) argues that there are no clear epistemic or moral problems with convictions based on purely (...)
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  • The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.
    It is plausible that there are epistemic reasons bearing on a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there are a range of practical reasons bearing on what to believe. These theses are often thought to be in tension with each other. Most significantly for our purposes, it is obscure how epistemic reasons and practical reasons might interact in the explanation of what one ought to believe. We draw an analogy with a similar distinction between (...)
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  • Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements.Sally Haslanger - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):1-22.
    Racism, sexism, and other forms of injustice are more than just bad attitudes; after all, such injustice involves unfair distributions of goods and resources. But attitudes play a role. How central is that role? Tommie Shelby, among others, argues that racism is an ideology and takes a cognitivist approach suggesting that ideologies consist in false beliefs that arise out of and serve pernicious social conditions. In this paper I argue that racism is better understood as a set of practices, attitudes, (...)
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  • Life and Other Basic Rights in Anscombe.Katharina Nieswandt - 2022 - In Roger Teichmann (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Elizabeth Anscombe. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 308–323.
    Following Elizabeth Anscombe, rights exist within practices. A right consists in a bundle of possible and impossible moves within the relevant social 'game', e.g. the practice of private property. What becomes of basic rights on such a social-constructivist conception? Metaphysically, basic rights do not differ from other rights. The right not to be murdered, however, enjoys a transcendental status within Anscombe's moral philosophy, and this construction might extend to other basic rights: Since practical reasoning is directed at the good life, (...)
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  • Cognición Moral.Santiago Amaya - forthcoming - In Introducción a la filosofía de las ciencias cognitiva.
    Este artículo está escrito para una colección de ensayos introductorios sobre filosofía de las ciencias cognitivas. Es una revisión (selectiva) de la literatura sobre la psicología del juicio moral.
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  • Do the Virtues Make You Happy?Katharina Nieswandt & Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Philosophical Inquiries 7 (2):181-202.
    We answer the title question with a qualified “No.” We arrive at this answer by spelling out what the proper place of the concept 'happiness' is in a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: (1) Happiness in the sense of personal well-being has only a loose relation to virtue; it doesn't deserve any prominent place in virtue ethics. (2) Happiness in the sense of flourishing is impossible without virtue, but that doesn't imply that individual actions should aim at flourishing. (3) Instead, flourishing sets (...)
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  • Review: No Morality, No Self, by James Doyle. [REVIEW]Katharina Nieswandt - 2019 - Ethics 130 (1):102-106.
    James Doyle’s book is provocative and timely. It is an important contribution to the current wave of Anscombe scholarship, and it offers valuable insights into general metaethical ques­tions, such as: In what senses might morality be “unintelligible”? Or: To what extent does a divine law ethics rest on practical reason? Here, I do not want to summarize the many ad­mirable features of Doyle’s book. I will instead focus on his two main theses, of which I re­main unconvinced.
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  • John Rawls Refutou o Intuicionismo?Andréa Luisa Bucchile Faggion - 2024 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 69 (1):e45448.
    Em Uma Teoria da Justiça, John Rawls explicou o intuicionismo como a doutrina que professa o pluralismo irredutível de princípios morais, princípios estes cujos conflitos não poderiam ser resolvidos de maneira principiológica. Segundo Rawls, não se pode oferecer um argumento abstrato que prove que o pluralismo moral é falso. Mas seria possível mostrarmos aquilo que o intuicionista nega existir: o princípio moral mais fundamental, que sistematiza nossas obrigações morais. Este princípio, de acordo com Rawls, seria o princípio da equidade. Neste (...)
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  • Bibliography.[author unknown] - 2015 - In Gertrude Ezorsky (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment, Second Edition. State University of New York Press. pp. 425-435.
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  • What is it to wrong someone? A puzzle about justice.Michael Thompson - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and value: themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 333-384.
    This will be the best way of explaining ‘Paris is the lover of Helen’, that is, ‘Paris loves, and by that very fact [et eo ipso] Helen is loved’. Here, therefore, two propositions have been brought together and abbreviated as one. Or, ‘Paris is a lover, and by that very fact Helen is a loved one’.
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  • Genetics, justice, and respect for human life.Daniel R. DeNicola - 1976 - Zygon 11 (2):115-137.
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  • The indispensability of the manifest image.Mario De Caro - 2020 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 46 (2):162-172.
    It is very contentious whether the features of the manifest image have a place in the world as it is described by natural science. For the advocates of strict naturalism, this is a serious problem, which has been labelled ‘placement problem’. In this light, some of them try to show that those features are reducible to scientifically acceptable ones. Others, instead, argue that the features of the manifest image are mere illusions and, consequently, have to be eliminated from our ontology. (...)
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  • The Cooperation Argument for Fairness in International Trade.Helena de Bres - 2011 - Journal of Social Philosophy 42 (2):192-218.
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  • Punishment Theory’s Golden Half Century: A Survey of Developments from 1957 to 2007. [REVIEW]Michael Davis - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):73 - 100.
    This paper describes developments in punishment theory since the middle of the twentieth century. After the mid–1960s, what Stanley I. Benn called “preventive theories of punishment”—whether strictly utilitarian or more loosely consequentialist like his—entered a long and steep decline, beginning with the virtual disappearance of reform theory in the 1970s. Crowding out preventive theories were various alternatives generally (but, as I shall argue, misleadingly) categorized as “retributive”. These alternatives include both old theories (such as the education theory) resurrected after many (...)
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  • Knowing and learning: from Hirst to Ofsted.Andrew John Davis - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 57 (1):214-226.
    Hirst always highlighted knowledge when reflecting on the school curriculum. He replaced his early focus on liberal education, the development of mind and theoretical knowledge by emphasizing the practical and practices as a curriculum starting point and for the framing of educational aims. In this paper I explore links between Hirst’s philosophical treatment of knowledge and some currently contested aspects of UK government education policies. I also note some ways in which his work relates to selected present-day debates in philosophy (...)
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  • It worked there. Will it work here? Researching teaching methods.Andrew Davis - 2017 - Ethics and Education 12 (3):289-303.
    ‘It worked there. Will it work here?’ We have to be able to identify the ‘it’ in that aphoristic question. Classifications of teaching methods belong in the social realm, where human intentions play a fundamental role in how phenomena are categorized. The social realm is characterized with the help of John Searle. Social phenomena are often open to interpretation, rather than definitive verdicts. The nature of the social limits the possibility of consistency in how teaching should be classified, which in (...)
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  • Robust Role-Obligation: How Do Roles Make a Moral Difference?Tim Dare - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (4):703-719.
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  • Precauciones para una crítica a la teoría de la justicia de J. Rawls.William Roberto Darós - 2010 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 42:123-148.
    Se presenta aquí brevemente la teoría de la justicia elaborada por Rawls, primeramente sobre una base moral, y luego (en el llamado segundo Rawls) la teoría de justicia desde una perspectiva política, con la que Rawls intenta justificar también la existencia del Estado, mediante un contrato social. Se analizan después las primeras críticas realizadas a su teoría. Se sostiene la tesis de que la conveniencia se convierte, sin desearlo, en utilidad, en Rawls, y ésta se convierte en sinónimo de justicia. (...)
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  • Constraints on conventions: Resolving two puzzles of conventionality.Audun Dahl & Talia Waltzer - 2020 - Cognition 196 (C):104152.
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  • The Ethos of Games.Fred D'Agostino - 1981 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 8 (1):7-18.
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  • Czedaw Znamierowski's Conception of Constitutive Rules.Stanislaw Czepita - 1990 - Ratio Juris 3 (3):399-406.
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  • Solidarity and Social Moral Rules.Adam Cureton - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):691-706.
    The value of solidarity, which is exemplified in noble groups like the Civil Rights Movement along with more mundane teams, families and marriages, is distinctive in part because people are in solidarity over, for or with regard to something, such as common sympathies, interests, values, etc. I use this special feature of solidarity to resolve a longstanding puzzle about enacted social moral rules, which is, aren’t these things just heuristics, rules of thumb or means of coordination that we ‘fetishize’ or (...)
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  • Making room for rules.Adam Cureton - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):737-759.
    Kantian moral theories must explain how their most basic moral values of dignity and autonomy should be interpreted and applied to human conditions. One place Kantians should look for inspiration is, surprisingly, the utilitarian tradition and its emphasis on generally accepted, informally enforced, publicly known moral rules of the sort that help us give assurances, coordinate our behavior, and overcome weak wills. Kantians have tended to ignore utilitarian discussions of such rules mostly because they regard basic moral principles as a (...)
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  • Marković's concept ofPraxisas norm1.David A. Crocker - 1977 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 20 (1-4):1-43.
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  • Constitutions, rule following, and the crisis of constraint.Thomas P. Crocker & Michael P. Hodges - 2018 - Legal Theory 24 (1):3-39.
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  • Reasoning about constitutive norms in BDI agents.N. Criado, E. Argente, P. Noriega & V. Botti - 2014 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 22 (1):66-93.
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  • Rawls e a justificação da punição.Denis Coitinho - 2017 - Trans/Form/Ação 40 (3):67-92.
    Resumo: O objetivo central deste artigo é procurar compreender a concepção normativa híbrida usada por John Rawls para justificar moralmente a punição legal, fazendo uso de um recurso consequencialista, a fim de justificar a instituição da punição, isto é, a eficácia social e um recurso retributivista para justificar os atos punitivos particulares, ou seja, a culpa do agente. Analisaremos, especialmente, o artigo "Two Concepts of Rules" e o livro A Theory of Justice. Defenderemos que Rawls faz uso de uma visão (...)
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  • The Implicit Morality of the Market and Joseph Heath’s Market Failures Approach to Business Ethics.Marc A. Cohen & Dean Peterson - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 159 (1):75-88.
    Joseph Heath defends competitive markets and conceptualizes business ethics with reference to Pareto efficiency, which he takes to be the “implicit morality of the market.” His justification for markets is that they generate Pareto efficient outcomes, meaning that markets optimally satisfy consumer preferences. And, for Heath, business ethics is the set of normative constraints—regulation and beyond-compliance norms—needed to preserve that outcome. The present paper accepts Heath’s claim that the economic justification for markets is ethical, in that satisfying consumer preferences is (...)
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  • Hume’s practice theory of promises and its dissimilar descendants.Rachel Cohon - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):617-635.
    Why do we have a moral duty to fulfill promises? Hume offers what today is called a practice theory of the obligation of promises: he explains it by appeal to a social convention. His view has inspired more recent practice theories. All practice theories, including Hume’s, are assumed by contemporary philosophers to have a certain normative structure, in which the obligation to fulfill a promise is warranted or justified by a more fundamental moral purpose that is served by the social (...)
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  • On the value of political legitimacy.Mathew Coakley - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (4):345-369.
    Theories of political legitimacy normally stipulate certain conditions of legitimacy: the features a state must possess in order to be legitimate. Yet there is obviously a second question as to the value of legitimacy: the normative features a state has by virtue of it being legitimate (such as it being owed obedience, having a right to use coercion, or enjoying a general justification in the use of force). I argue that it is difficult to demonstrate that affording these to legitimate (...)
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  • Ticking Bombs and Interrogations.Claudia Card - 2008 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (1):1-15.
    Torture is like slavery (and unlike murder and genocide) in that it is not inconceivable that torture might be justifiable. But the circumstances that would make it tolerable are unrealistic in philosophically interesting ways. It is unrealistic to think we can predict when torture will be effective and containable; unwarranted to suppose that humane alternatives are impossible; disastrous to remove motivations to create alternatives; unacceptable to be satisfied with available evidence regarding suspects’ identity, knowledge of critical detail, ability to recall (...)
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  • The Concept of Rights in Contemporary Human Rights Discourse.Christine Chwaszcza - 2010 - Ratio Juris 23 (3):333-364.
    In a variety of disciplines, there exists a consensus that human rights are individual claim rights that all human beings possess simply as a consequence of being human. That consensus seems to me to obscure the real character of the concept and hinder the progress of discussion. I contend that rather than thinking of human rights in the first instance as “claim rights” possessed by individuals, we should regard human rights as higher order norms that articulate standards of legitimacy for (...)
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  • Entrepreneurs, Profits, and Deserving Market Shares.John Christman - 1988 - Social Philosophy and Policy 6 (1):1.
    The question I wish to take up in this paper is whether competitive markets, as mechanisms that initiate the distribution of scarce goods, allocate those goods in accordance with what participants in those markets deserve. I want to argue that in general people do not in fact deserve what they get from market interactions, when “what they get” is determined by the competitive forces coming to bear on the market. This more general claim is meant to apply to all participants (...)
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  • Ambidextrous Lockeanism.Billy Christmas - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (2):193-215.
    Lockean approaches to property take it that persons can unilaterally acquire private ownership over hitherto unowned resources. Such natural law accounts of property rights are often thought to be of limited use when dealing with the complexities of natural resource use outside of the paradigm of private ownership of land for agricultural or residential development. The tragedy of the commons has been shown to be anything but an inevitability, and yet Lockeanism seems to demand that even the most robust common (...)
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  • Many Meanings of ‘Heuristic’.Sheldon J. Chow - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):977-1016.
    A survey of contemporary philosophical and scientific literatures reveals that different authors employ the term ‘heuristic’ in ways that deviate from, and are sometimes inconsistent with, one another. Given its widespread use in philosophy and cognitive science generally, it is striking that there appears to be little concern for a clear account of what phenomena heuristics pick out or refer to. In response, I consider several accounts of ‘heuristic’, and I draw a number of distinctions between different sorts of heuristics (...)
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  • Equality, Self-Government, and Disenfranchising Kids: A Reply to Yaffe.Michael Cholbi - 2020 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 2020 (2):281-297.
    Gideon Yaffe has recently argued that children should be subject to lower standards of criminal liability because, unlike adults, they ought to be disenfranchised. Because of their disenfranchisement, they lack the legal reasons enfranchised adults have to comply with the law. Here I critically consider Yaffe’s argument for such disenfranchisement, which holds that disenfranchisement balances children’s interest in self-government with adults’ interest in having an equal say over lawmaking. I argue that Yaffe does not succeed in showing that these two (...)
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  • Democracy unbound? Non-linear politics and the politicization of everyday life.David Chandler - 2014 - European Journal of Social Theory 17 (1):42-59.
    In liberal modernity, the democratic collective will of society was understood to emerge through the public and deliberative freedoms of associational life. Today, however, democratic discourse is much more focused on the formation of plural and diverse publics in the private and social sphere. In these ‘non-linear’ approaches, democracy is no longer seen to operate to constitute a collective will standing above society but as a mechanism to distribute power more evenly through the social empowerment of individuals and communities as (...)
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  • Do We Have Normative Powers?Ruth Chang - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):275-300.
    ‘Normative powers’ are capacities to create normative reasons by our willing or say-so. They are significant, because if we have them and exercise them, then sometimes the reasons we have are ‘up to us’. But such powers seem mysterious. How can we, by willing, create reasons? In this paper, I examine whether normative powers can be adequately explained normatively, by appeal to norms of a practice, normative principles, human interests, or values. Can normative explanations of normative powers explain how an (...)
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