Pareto principles are at the core of ethics and decision theory. The Strong Pareto principle says that if one thing is better than another for someone and at least as good for everyone else, then the one is overall better than the other. But a host of famous figures express it differently, with ‘not worse’ in place of ‘at least as good.’ In the presence of parity (or incommensurability), this results in a strictly stronger Pareto principle, which I call Super‐Strong (...) Pareto. Super‐Strong Pareto, however, yields cyclic betterness and is therefore false. I point out a number of influential arguments—concerning population ethics, collective action problems, and decision‐making in the face of parity and uncertainty—that crucially rely on Super‐Strong Pareto and are therefore unsound. I then turn to the most influential argument against the possibility of parity—Broome's collapsing argument—and argue that it likewise relies on Super‐Strong Pareto reasoning and is therefore question‐begging. Finally, I turn to the much‐neglected question of how to justify Strong Pareto. The answer I arrive at, which emphasizes tie‐breaking, yields a striking insight, namely that Super‐Strong Pareto amounts to the denial of insensitivity to mild sweetening. That is what makes it problematic in the presence of parity. (shrink)

A provocateur does not pose a threat of harm. Hence, a forceful response to provocation is generally considered wrongful. And yet, a provocateur is often denied recourse to a self-defence justification if she defends herself against such a violent response. In recent work, Kimberly Ferzan argues that a provocateur forfeits defensive rights but this forfeiture cannot be explained in the same way as an aggressor’s rights forfeiture. Ordinarily, one forfeits the right not to be harmed and to self-defend against harm (...) by threatening to violate another person’s rights. But provocateurs forfeit their defensive rights because they bring about the situation in which defence becomes necessary. As I argue here, positing these two types of forfeiture justifications is neither desirable nor necessary. I suggest a unified rights forfeiture account that grounds rights forfeiture in moral responsibility for an unjust threat. My account offers clearer distinctions than alternative unified accounts, which I briefly discuss. Furthermore, the account can provide better explanations of intuitively plausible judgements. A provocateur will have less extensive defensive rights than an innocent victim, but will not lose all her defensive rights simply because ‘she started it.’. (shrink)

In this article, we develop and defend an account of the normative significance of nonhuman animal agency. In particular, we examine how animals’ agency interests impact upon the moral permissibility of our interactions with them. First, we defend the claim that nonhuman animals sometimes have rights to self-determination. However, unlike typical adult humans, nonhuman animals cannot exercise this right through the giving or withholding of consent. This combination of claims generates a puzzle about the permissibility of our interactions with nonhuman (...) animals. If animals sometimes have rights to self-determination, but lack the capacity to consent, then when, if ever, is it permissible for us to touch them, hold them, bathe them, or confine them? In the second half of the article, we develop a solution to this puzzle. We argue that while we cannot obtain animals’ consent, they can engage in authoritative communications of will through acts of “assent” and “dissent.”. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine how markets enable companionship to be disconnected from the concept of friendship thus enabling an illusion of companionship without the demands of friendship. As friendship is a crucial early relationship for children, this is particularly germane to the world of education. It recognizes the previous lack of philosophical attention to the idea of companionship—a key factor in friendship—and that this omission contributes to a lack of clarity on a variety of issues. Starting (...) with a brief outline of companion friendship, the article examines the idea of the ‘intimate work’ of friendship within the market domain by considering three illustrative examples: firstly, rent-a-friend; secondly paid companionship; ending with companionate robots for children. It then concludes by contending that this is an important issue for children and their development and thus for education. (shrink)

This essay explores the possible justification that liberal perfectionism may provide to an epistocratic regime. I suggest that epistocratic mechanisms and rules can maintain and improve epistemic autonomy, which itself contributes to the form of personal autonomy to which perfectionists grant a moral priority. Though not decisive, I claim that the Perfectionist Argument for Epistocracy partially justifies epistocracy. Because this argument is developed in the context of liberal social forms, this indicates the conceptual possibility of liberal epistocracy.

People condemn inequalities for many reasons. For example, many who have no concern with distribution per se criticize inequalities in health care, because these inequalities lessen the benefits provided by the resources that are devoted to health care. Others who place no intrinsic value on distribution believe that a just society must show a special concern for those who are worst off. Some people, on the other hand, do place an intrinsic value on equality of distribution, regardless of its contribution (...) to other goals. Derek Parfit and Larry Temkin call these people "egalitarians." I shall always employ quotation marks when referring to "egalitarians" in this special sense, because, as I shall argue, this terminology is misleading. One of its unhappy implications is that almost all egalitarians are not "egalitarians.". (shrink)

What do exclusionary reasons exclude? This is the main issue I address in this article. Raz appears to endorse what I label the “motivational” model of exclusionary reasons. He stresses that within the context of his theory of practical reasoning, exclusionary reasons are reasons not to be motivated by certain first-order reasons (namely, the first-order reasons which conflict with the first-order reasons that the exclusionary reasons protect). Some of his critics take him to be committed to another model of exclusionary (...) reasons which I label the “consideration” model. According to this model exclusionary reasons are reasons not to consider or think of the conflicting first-order reasons. I argue that Raz's account of the exclusionary function of decisions suggests a third model of exclusionary reasons which I label the “reconsideration” model. In the reconsideration model, exclusionary reasons are reasons not to reconsider the balance of first-order reasons. In this article I show how the reconsideration model differs from both the motivational and the consideration model and how it can account for the exclusionary function not only of decisions but also of personal rules and authoritative directives. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

What, if anything, do we owe others as a basic minimum? Sufficiency theorists claim that we must provide everyone with enough – but, to date, few well-worked-out accounts of the sufficiency threshold exist, so it is difficult to evaluate this proposition. Previous theories do not provide plausible, independent accounts of resources, capabilities, or welfare that might play the requisite role. Moreover, I believe existing accounts do not provide nearly enough guidance for policymakers. So, this article sketches a mechanism for arriving (...) at an account of the minimally good life that can help locate the sufficiency threshold. (shrink)

ABSTRACT What kind of basic minimum do we owe to others? This paper defends a new procedure for answering this question. It argues that its minimally good life account has some advantages over the main alternatives and that neither the first-, nor third-, person perspective can help us to arrive at an adequate account. Rather, it employs the second-person perspective of free, reasonable, care. There might be other conditions for distributive justice, and morality certainly requires more than helping everyone to (...) secure a basic minimum. Still, if the minimally good life account is correct, and we owe everyone a basic minimum, we must ensure that everyone lives well enough. (shrink)

On the traditional Christian doctrine: 1. People have free will (in Heaven as on Earth). 2. Those with free will can go to Hell. 3. Heaven is eternal. Many Christians also hold: 4. God is all powerful, knowing and good and 5. Free will can justify eternal suffering, evil, or hell. The paper argues that those who accept a version of Christianity that endorses 1–5 face a dilemma: Either deny that free will can justify suffering, evil, or hell or accept (...) that we can fail in heaven and so go to hell. It suggests that compassionate Christians may do best to i) give up on the idea that free will is valuable enough to justify significant suffering. This may require: ii) accepting that something has gone woefully wrong on Earth and iii) giving up the idea that people can suffer significantly in Hell, but allows Christians to maintain that iv) Heaven is eternal. (shrink)

The essay considers what respect demands and what trust demands when one person trusts another. What respect requires in responding to trust is substantial but limited, ranging from the sharply proscriptive to the mildly prescriptive. What trust requires is, in a sense, unlimited, its content depending on the extent to which the person who trusts, and more importantly the person who is trusted, seek to build a relationship characterised by trust and trustworthiness.

This paper investigates the accusation that judicial review is undemocratic. It argues that the alleged tension between judicial review and democracy fails to account for the fact that the content of rights and their scope depends on societal convictions and moral judgments of the public. Such dependence suggests that rights-based judicial review can be described as an alternative form of democratic participation.

English today seems to be emerging as a global lingua franca. And a global lingua franca would be a global public good. Characteristically, being non-excludable, public goods are susceptible to free-riding: absent targeted distributive policies, some individuals can accrue a good’s benefits without having contributed to the costs of its production. In this paper, I make two arguments. First, I argue, against Philippe Van Parijs, that Anglophones are not unfairly free-riding on the efforts of non-Anglophones of producing English as a (...) global lingua franca. I defend the view that instances of what counts as unfair free-riding should be limited to free-riding on public goods that are co-operatively produced. Second, I suggest an alternative claim that is available for Van Parijs to make. Van Parijs believes a global lingua franca is required by global justice. This is a highly controversial claim. But if he is right, then Anglophones' free-riding on the global lingua franca while not an instance of unfair free-riding, may be objectionable nonetheless. (shrink)

This article explores the consequences of interventions to secure moral enhancement that are at once compulsory and inescapable and of which the subject will be totally unaware. These are encapsulated in an arresting example used by Ingmar Perrson and Julian Savulescu concerning a “God machine” capable of achieving at least three of these four objectives. This article demonstrates that the first objective—namely, moral enhancement—is impossible to achieve by these means and that the remaining three are neither moral nor enhancements nor (...) remotely desirable. Along the way the nature of morality properly so called is further explored. (shrink)

According to the ‘integration approach’, interpretations of political concepts should explain that they stand for rights we ought to respect and be both compatible and mutually supporting. I start by clarifying what this means, and proceed to an examination of Ronald Dworkin’s latest argument for value holism. I argue that his argument fails to provide a convincing case for the integration approach. I go on to argue that we nonetheless should accept that interpretations of political concepts should be compatible, because (...) denying it would be inconsistent with, and the fact that ‘ought implies can’. I then provide reasons for thinking that we also cannot really satisfy for any particular concept without giving reasons in term of what fall under other concepts—that is, interpreting the concepts as mutually supporting. We thus have reasons to accept both parts of. Finally, I defend the integration approach from three important objections: First, that it conflates different values; secondly, that it is inconsistent with ordinary language-usage; and thirdly, that it overlooks important telic values. I conclude that none of these compels us to abandon the integration approach. (shrink)

Many philosophers now see meaning in life as a key evaluative category that stands alongside well-being and moral goodness. Our lives are assessed not only by how well they go for us and how morally good they are, but also by their meaningfulness. In this article, I raise a challenge to this view. Theories of meaning in life closely resemble theories of well-being, and there is a suspicion that the former collapse into the latter. I develop this challenge showing that (...) it is formidable. I then answer it by offering a novel account of what meaning in life is and how it differs from well-being. The account I offer is able to resist the strongest form of the challenge while also having much intuitive appeal. (shrink)

Many philosophers have argued that agents must be irrational to lose out in a or . A number of different conclusions have been drawn from this claim. The has been one of the main arguments offered for the axioms of expected utility theory; it has been used to show that options cannot be incomparable or on a par; and it has been used to show that our past choices have normative significance for our subsequent choices. In this article, I argue (...) that the fact that someone loses out in a value pump provides no reason to believe that they are irrational. The VP is impotent. (shrink)

Let me begin with what should be a reassuring thought, and one that may serve as a corrective to presumptions that sometimes characterize political philosophy. The possibility, which Aquinas and Madison are both concerned with, of wise and virtuous political deliberation resulting in beneficial and stable civil order, no more depends upon possession of aphilosophical theory of the state and of the virtues proper to it, than does the possibility of making good paintings depend upon possession of an aesthetic theory (...) of the nature and value of art. (shrink)

Truth, the pragmatist claims, is something we make, not something which corresponds to reality. If this view of truth is accepted, Rorty notes, two problems arise: the pragmatist will have little to say to those who abuse others, because he or she will not be able to point to some universal standards that the abusers are vio lating ; and the torturers may be able to quote pragmatic principles in their own defence. Rorty argues that the pragmatist can reduce cruelty (...) by splitting himself or herself into public and private parts. I examine this problem and Rorty's solution. I argue that his solution fails for two reasons: first, keeping our public and private selves apart is unlikely to reduce cruelty; and, second, he cannot maintain the public/private split. Consequently, Rorty is unable to deal with the anti-pragmatic criticism that his theory of truth could lead to an increase in cruelty. Key Words: democracy • liberalism • political theory • pragmatism • Richard Rorty. (shrink)

Is personal moral inconsistency a challenge to overcome or embrace? This paper opts for the latter and argues for the Virtue of Encompassing the Contrary (VEC). According to VEC, an individual can balance and realize opposite values or virtues through time virtuously. This paper discusses critically various explanations given for moral inconsistency: Circumstantial Relativism, Moral Opportunism, the Consequentialist Solution, Moral Ambivalence, Kant’s Imperfect Duty and Dancy’s Moral Particularism. The paper argues that VEC fares better in answering the moral challenge of (...) inconsistent behavior. (shrink)

Critical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population ethics. Yet Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism entails the Weak Sadistic Conclusion, that is, it entails that each population consisting of lives at a bad well-being level is not worse than some population consisting of lives at a good well-being level. In this paper, I defend a version of Critical-Range Utilitarianism which does not entail the Weak Sadistic Conclusion. This is made (...) possible by a fourth category of absolute value in addition to goodness, badness, and neutrality. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of (...) intrinsic goodness or it breaks down in cases where both of the relata of ‘better’ are bad. (shrink)

In order to account for non-traditional preference relations the present paper develops a new, richer framework for preference relations. This new framework provides characterizations of non-traditional preference relations, such as incommensurateness and instability, that may hold when neither preference nor indifference do. The new framework models relations with swaps, which are conceived of as transfers from one alternative state to another. The traditional framework analyses dyadic preference relations in terms of a hypothetical choice between the two compared alternatives. The swap (...) framework extends this approach by analysing dyadic preference relations in terms of two hypothetical choices: the choice between keeping the first of the compared alternatives or swapping it for the second; and the choice between keeping the second alternative or swapping it for the first. (shrink)

The freedom of expression is vital to our ability to convey opinions, convictions, and beliefs, and to meaningfully participate in democracy. The state may, however, ‘limit’ the freedom of expression on certain grounds, such as national security, public order, public health, and public morals. Examples from around the world show that the freedom of individuals to express their opinions, convictions, and beliefs is often imperilled when states are not required to meet a substantial justificatory burden when limiting such freedom. This (...) article critiques one of the common justificatory approaches employed in a number of jurisdictions to frame the state’s burden to justify limitations on the freedom of expression—the proportionality test. It presents a case for an alternative approach that builds on the merits and addresses some of the weaknesses of a typical proportionality test. This alternative may be called a ‘duty-based’ justificatory approach because it requires the state to demonstrate—through the presentation of publicly justifiable reasons—that the individual concerned owes others a duty of justice to refrain from the expressive conduct in question. The article explains how this approach is more normatively compelling than a typical proportionality test. It also illustrates how such an approach can better constrain the state’s ability to advance majoritarian interests or offload its positive obligations by limiting the freedom of expression of minorities and dissenting voices. (shrink)

Lorsque la philosophie a voulu penser la propriété et son origine, elle a fait de la nature le cadre approprié pour l’appréhender, y compris à des époques où la propriété, aussi bien privée que commune, était déjà régulée par un système de juridictions préexistant. La propriété et la question de sa légitimité ont alors été interrogées aux confins de l’articulation entre l’ordre du fait (s’incarnant notamment dans l’appropriation) et celui du droit. Néanmoins la mise au premier plan d’une nécessité naturelle (...) ainsi que l’inscription de l’appropriation dans un registre naturaliste ont pour vocation de soustraire la propriété à la problématique de la justice distributive. L’approche naturaliste de l’appropriation privative implique en outre un usage pragmatique de la norme juridique, renversant par là la « loi de Hume », alors même que cette norme pourrait être tout aussi légitimement mobilisée pour instaurer un devoir-être plutôt que pour instituer juridiquement un état de fait. Classification JEL : B12, P14. (shrink)

Medical clinicians – doctors, nurses, nurse practitioners etc. – are charged to act for the good of their patients. But not all ways of acting for a patient's good are on par: some are paternalistic; others are not. What does it mean to act paternalistically, both in general and specifically in a medical context? And when, if ever, is it permissible for a clinician to act paternalistically? -/- This paper deals with the first question, with a special focus on paternalism (...) in medicine. While it is easy to give a rough characterization of paternalism (i.e. acting for another's good against that person's will), it is surprisingly difficult to provide a unified account of the myriad of actions that seem to count as paternalistic. After surveying four accounts of paternalism, I argue that two – what I call the authority and beneficence accounts – are the strongest on offer. According to the authority account, a clinician acts paternalistically when, for her patient's good, she usurps his decision-making authority. According to the beneficence account, a clinician acts paternalistically when, for her patient's good, she acts only or overrindingly out of concern for his good. I show how the difference between these accounts matters (in part) for how we should think about the nature of surrogate decision making in medicine. I argue that there are reasons – albeit hardly decisive – to prefer the beneficence account to the authority account. I conclude by considering whether attempts by clinicians to rationally persuade their patients to pursue a particular course of action should be thought of as paternalistic. (shrink)

:Proponents of behavioural policies seek to justify them as ‘evidence-based’. Yet they typically fail to show through which mechanisms these policies operate. This paper shows – at the hand of examples from economics and psychology – that without sufficient mechanistic evidence, one often cannot determine whether a given policy in its target environment will be effective, robust, persistent or welfare-improving. Because these properties are important for justification, policies that lack sufficient support from mechanistic evidence should not be called ‘evidence-based’.

Lifelong smokers lose on average a decade of life vis-à-vis non-smokers. Globally, tobacco causes about 5–6 million deaths annually. One billion tobacco-related deaths are predicted for the 21st century, with about half occurring before the age of 70. In this paper, we consider a complete ban on the sale of cigarettes and find that such a ban, if effective, would be justified. As with many policy decisions, the argument for such a ban requires a weighing of the pros and cons (...) and how they impact on different individuals, both current and future. The weightiest factor supporting a ban, we argue, is the often substantial well-being losses many individuals suffer because of smoking. These harms, moreover, disproportionally affect the disadvantaged. The potential gains in well-being and equality, we argue, outweigh the limits a ban places on individuals’ freedom, its failure to respect some individuals’ autonomous choice and the likelihood that it may, in individual cases, reduce well-being. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that physicians have normative authority over patients. First we elaborate on the nature of normative authority. We then examine and critique Arthur Isak Applbaum’s view that physicians lack authority over patients. Our argument appeals to four cases that demonstrate physicians’ authority.

This paper focuses on a hypothetical case that represents an intervention request familiar to those who work with individuals with intellectual disability. Stacy has autism and moderate intellectual disability. Her parents have requested treatment for her hand flapping. Stacy is not competent to make her own treatment decisions; proxy consent is required. There are three primary justifications for proxy consent: the right to an open future, substituted judgment, and the best interest standard. The right to an open future justifies proxy (...) consent on the assumption of future autonomy whereas substituted judgment justifies proxy consent via reference to past autonomy. Neither applies. Stacy has not been, nor will she be, competent to make her own treatment decisions. The best interest standard justifies proxy consent on the grounds of beneficence. It is unlikely that hand flapping harms Stacy. None of the three primary means of justifying proxy consent apply to Stacy’s case. (shrink)

In all of its varieties, traditional liberalism is a universalist political theory. Its content is a set of principles which prescribe the best regime, the ideally best institutions, for all mankind. It may be acknowledged — as it is, by a proto-liberal such as Spinoza — that the best regime can be attained only rarely, and cannot be expected to endure for long; and that the forms its central institutions will assume in different historical and cultural milieux may vary significantly. (...) It will then be accepted that the liberal regime's role in political thought is as a regulative ideal, which political practice can hope only to approximate, subject to all the vagaries and exigencies of circumstance. Nonetheless, the content of traditional liberalism is a system of principles which function as universal norms for the critical appraisal of human institutions. In this regard, traditional liberalism — the liberalism of Locke and Kant, for example — represents a continuation of classical political rationalism, as it is found in Aristotle and Aquinas, where it also issues in principles having the attribute of universality, in that they apply ideally to all human beings. (shrink)

In a series of important papers, G.A. Cohen has developed a forceful argument for the claim that workers are rendered unfree by capitalist institutions. His argument poses a powerful challenge to those who think that capitalist institutions best promote freedom. Yet, formidable as it is, Cohen's argument can be shown to be flawed at several crucial points. It is not one argument, but three at least, and one of the goals of my criticism of Cohen on this question is to (...) distinguish and assess the various separate lines of reasoning that together make up his case for the unfreedom under capitalism of workers as a class. Cohen argues of workers that they are rendered unfree by the institution of private property on which the capitalist system depends, that they suffer a form of collective unfreedom under capitalism, and that they are forced to sell their labor power under capitalism. (shrink)

An increasingly popular view in the philosophy of art is that some artworks are good artworks at least partly because they are achievements. This view was introduced to explain why two works that look the same, such as an original painting and a perfect copy, can differ in artistic merit. An achievement theory can say that the original is better because it is a greater achievement. Achievement theories have since been used to answer other questions, and they are now a (...) serious alternative to traditional theories of artistic merit. This paper has three aims. The first is to articulate the achievement theory more fully and explicitly than its advocates have. The second is to show that the achievement theory should be rejected, by raising five problems for it. The third is to show that appealing solely to the excellence, aptitude, and ineptitude a work manifests yields a better theory of artistic merit. (shrink)

Transgender people have among the highest rates of suicide attempts of any group in society, driven strongly by the perception that they do not belong in the sex of their physical body. Gender reassignment surgery is a procedure that can change the transgender person’s physical body to accord with their gender identity. The procedure raises important ethical and distributive justice concerns, given the controversy of whether it is a cosmetic or medical procedure and the economic costs associated with performing the (...) procedure. This paper argues that there is a strong case for funding GRS as a matter of clinical necessity and justice. This paper will be divided in four key sections: First, the state of transgender health will be outlined, including the role of GRS and common objections to it. Second, a number of common objections to GRS will be analysed at the outset and shown to be unconvincing. Third, a constructive argument will be advanced, arguing that publicly funded GRS is clinically necessary, cost-effective, and demanded by principles of justice. Fourth, the paper will briefly discuss moralistic biases and why we demand a higher burden of justification for funding GRS compared with other analogous procedures. (shrink)

What is the nature of evil action? My thesis is that perpetrators and victims of evil inhabit an asymmetrical relation of power; the strength of the more powerful party lies in its ability to exploit the other’s fundamental vulnerability, and the weaker party is vulnerable precisely insofar as it is directly dependent on the more powerful party for the satisfaction of its fundamental needs. The fundamental vulnerabilities that are exploited correspond to features essential to our humanity (ontological), moral personhood (personal), (...) and individuality (characteristic). These kinds of vulnerabilities are both constituted by and engender fundamental needs and give rise to direct dependencies on others to satisfy or to refrain from interfering with the satisfaction of fundamental needs. The unambiguous exploitation by the more powerful agent on whom the vulnerable directly depend is characteristic of evil action. Although I do not claim that the exploitation of ontological, personal, and characteristic vulnerabilities necessarily results in evil, it does typify it. (shrink)

MacIntyre characterises liberal societies as suffering distinctive, structural forms of malaise: they are a ‘disaster’, a ‘moral calamity’, sites of ‘barbarism and darkness’. I argue that, whilst we well understand why MacIntyre thinks liberalism is false, it is unclear why this falsity should imply such moral catastrophe. I begin by motivating the question and distinguishing it from the classic liberal-communitarian debates (§§1-2). In particular, I highlight liberalism’s ability to offer ‘workarounds’, accommodating at least some of MacIntyre’s commitments and so forestalling (...) the prospect of moral disaster. I then introduce two arguments which supply the missing premises, in each case juxtaposing MacIntyre with other critics of liberalism. First, I argue that liberalism’s conception of the private sphere systematically marginalizes MacIntyre’s vision of pedagogy (§3). I compare the argument and the attendant conception of privacy with Adorno’s (§4). In §5, I introduce the second premise: I argue that liberalism espouses a conception of maturity that actively undermines MacIntyre’s model of development, subverting liberal ‘workarounds’. I contrast this claim with recent attacks on liberalism by Deneen. I close with some methodological implications: MacIntyre’s case against liberalism should be seen as a form of external, not immanent, critique. (shrink)

In this article I seek a more complete understanding of evil action. To this end, in the first half of the article I assess the conceptual strengths and weaknesses of the most compelling theories of evil action found in the contemporary philosophical literature. I conclude that the theories that fall under the category I call ‘‘Nuanced Harm Accounts’’ successfully identify the necessary and sufficient conditions of the concept. However, necessary and sufficient conditions are not coextensive with significant features, and Nuanced (...) Harm Accounts are incomplete even if they are correct. In order to supplement them, in the second half of the article I examine the normative relation that obtains between perpetrators and victims of evil and find them to be parties to a relation of asymmetrical power in which the vulnerability of the weaker party is exploited by the stronger party for its advantage, pleasure, or otherwise to achieve its aims. Moreover, the parties in the relation reciprocally enable each other’s role relative to one another. The strength of the more powerful party emerges out of the states of vulnerability of the victims, and the victims are vulnerable relative to the power(s) of the perpetrator. (shrink)

Perfectionism about well-being is, at a minimum, the view that people’s lives go well when, and because they realize their capacities. It is common to link perfectionism with an idea of human essence or nature, to yield the view that what constitutes people’s well-being is the development and exercise of characteristically human capacities. The first part of this paper considers the very serious problems associated with the idea of human nature or essence, and argues that perfectionism would be more plausible (...) if it abandons reliance on it and focuses instead on the unfolding of some valuable capacities that need not be unique to, or shared by all human beings. This revised perfectionism is evaluative all the way down, pragmatic but not unprincipled, and holistic. In its second part, the paper articulates this account in terms of the dignitarian approach—the view that we have reason to organize our personal and social life in such a way that we respond appropriately to the valuable features of individuals that give rise to their dignity. Dignity is a non-conventional, normative status based on a diverse and disjunctive set of valuable capacities. The dignitarian approach helps develop, defend, and identify the implications of the revised perfectionism suggested in the previous part of the paper while also allowing us to make sense of the role of some generalizations that animated some of the plausibility of traditional perfectionism—and this without the pitfalls of reliance on an idea of human nature. On this paper’s proposed view—Dignitarian Perfectionism—human individuals’ well-being consists, at least in part, in developing and exercising the capacities at the basis of their dignity. (shrink)

A symbolic, normative, and institutional investigation of the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution reveals that the individual is displaced and locked in the periphery as much of the socio-economic and political ecology of the state is occupied by Nations, Nationalities and Peoples. The Constitution presents and makes NNPs authors, sovereigns and constitutional adjudicators by adopting a corporate conception of group rights. As this corporate conception of group rights permeate and structure the organization of the Ethiopian state and government, the individual is relegated (...) in the constitutional order. In order to make the transition to constitutional democracy sustainable, it is argued that the Constitution should accommodate and ensure individual autonomy by adopting a collective conception of group rights. This offers both the normative basis and institutional safeguards to strike a proper equilibrium between group rights and individual rights. (shrink)

The “welcome return” to “substantive political philosophy” that Rawls'sA Theory of Justicewas said to herald has resulted in forty years of proposals seeking to show that philosophical reflection leads to the demonstrable truth of almost every and any conceivable view of the justice of property rights. Select any view—from the justice of unregulated capitalist markets to the most extreme forms of egalitarianism—and one will find that some philosophers have proclaimed that rational reflection uniquely leads to its justice. This is, I (...) believe, a sort of ideological thinking masquerading as philosophizing. In this paper, using some tools from game theory as well as experimental findings, I seek to sketch a non-ideological approach to the question of the justification of property rights. On this approach the aim of political philosophy is, first and foremost, to reflect on whether our social rules of property are within the “optimal eligible set” of rules acceptable to all. (shrink)

William Perm summarized theMagna Cartathus: “First, It assertsEnglishmento be free; that's Liberty. Secondly, they that have free-holds, that's Property.” Since at least the seventeenth century, liberals have not only understood liberty and property to be fundamental, but to be somehow intimately related or interwoven. Here, however, consensus ends; liberals present an array of competing accounts of the relation between liberty and property. Many, for instance, defend an essentially instrumental view, typically seeing private property as justified because it is necessary to (...) maintain or protect other, more basic, liberty rights. Important to our constitutional tradition has been the idea that “[t]he right to property is the guardian of every other right, and to deprive a people of this, is in fact to deprive them of their liberty.” Along similar lines, it has been argued that only an economic system based on private property disperses power and resources, ensuring that private people in civil society have the resources to oppose the state and give effect to basic liberties. Alternatively, it is sometimes claimed that only those with property develop the independent characters that are necessary to preserve a regime of liberty. But not only have liberals insisted that, property is a means of preserving liberty, they have often conceived of it as an embodiment of liberty, or as a type of liberty, or indeed as identical to liberty. This latter view is popular among contemporary libertarians or classical liberals. Jan Narveson, for instance, bluntly asserts that “Liberty is Property,” while John Gray insists that “[t]he connection between property and the basic liberties is constitutive and not just instrumental.”. (shrink)

I defend the idea that a liberal commitment to value neutrality is best honoured by maintaining a pure cardinality component in our rankings of opportunity or liberty sets. I consider two challenges to this idea. The first holds that cardinality rankings are unnecessary for neutrality, because what is valuable about a set of liberties from a liberal point of view is not its size but rather its variety. The second holds that pure cardinality metrics are insufficient for neutrality, because liberties (...) cannot be individuated into countable entities without presupposing some relevantly partisan evaluative perspective. I argue that a clear understanding of the liberal basis for valuing liberty shows the way to satisfying responses to both challenges. (shrink)

In this article I articulate two pairs of theses about the relationship between the right and the good and I sketch an account of morality that systematically vindicates all four theses, despite a nearly universal consensus that they are not all true. In the first half I elucidate and motivate the theses and explain why leading ethical theorists maintain that at least one of them is false; in the second half I present the outlines of an account of the relationship (...) between the right and the good satisfying all four theses. (shrink)

May the state try to promote the flourishing of its citizens? Some political philosophers—perfectionists—hold that the state may do so, while other political philosophers—anti-perfectionists—hold that the state may not do so. Here I examine how perfectionists might respond to a style of argument that anti-perfectionists give—what I call the legitimacy objection. This argument holds that considerations about flourishing are not themselves the right kind of considerations to justify state authority, and so if the state takes action to promote the flourishing (...) of its citizens, it is meddling in issues that are beyond the legitimate scope of its authority. I argue that this objection only shows that considerations about flourishing cannot themselves legitimate state action, but that they may still guide the state and state officials when they are deciding among policy options that are legitimate for non-perfectionist reasons. (shrink)