This paper describes the development of theories of scientific explanation since Hempel's earliest models in the 1940ies. It focuses on deductive and probabilistic whyexplanations and their main problems: lawlikeness, explanation-prediction asymmetries, causality, deductive and probabilistic relevance, maximal specifity and homogenity, the height of the probability value. For all of these topic the paper explains the most important approaches as well as their criticism, including the author's own accounts. Three main theses of this paper are: (1) Both deductive and probabilistic explanations (...) are important in science, not reducible to each other. (2) One must distinguish between (cause giving) explanations and (reason giving) justifications and predictions. (3) The adequacy of deductive as well as probabilistic explanations is relative to a pragmatically given background knowledge-which does not exclude, however, the possibility of purely semantic models. (shrink)

This article describes abductions as special patterns of inference to the best explanation whose structure determines a particularly promising abductive conjecture and thus serves as an abductive search strategy. A classification of different patterns of abduction is provided which intends to be as complete as possible. An important distinction is that between selective abductions, which choose an optimal candidate from given multitude of possible explanations, and creative abductions, which introduce new theoretical models or concepts. While selective abduction has dominated the (...) literature, creative abductions are rarely discussed, although they are essential in science. The article introduces several kinds of creative abductions, such as theoretical model abduction, common cause abduction and statistical factor analysis, and illustrates them by various real case examples. It is suggested to demarcate scientifically fruitful abductions from purely speculative abductions by the criterion of causal unification. (shrink)

When two rocks shatter the window at once, what causes the window to shatter? Is the throwing of each individual rock a cause of the window shattering, or are the throwings only causes collectively? This question bears on the analysis of causation, and the metaphysics of macro-causation. I argue that the throwing of each individual rock is a cause of the window shattering, and generally that individual overdeterminers are causes.

This article suggests a revision of the theory of causal nets. In section 1 we introduce an axiomatization of TCN based on a realistic understanding. It is shown that the causal Markov condition entails three independent principles. In section 2 we analyze indeterministic decay as the major counterexample to one of these principles: screening off by common causes. We call SCC-violating common causes interactive causes. In section 3 we develop a revised version of TCN, called TCN*, which accounts for interactive (...) causes. It is shown that there are interactive causal models that admit of no faithful noninteractive reconstruction. (shrink)

This paper has three goals. The first goal is to work out the difference between literal ceteris paribus laws in the sense of “all others being equal” and ceteris rectis “laws” in the sense of “all others being right”. While cp laws involve a universal quantification, cr generalizations involve an existential quantification over the values of the remainder variables Z. As a result, the two differ crucially in their confirmability and lawlikeness. The second goal is to provide a classification of (...) different kinds of cr generalizations, including certain transition cases between cr generalizations and cp laws. The third goal is to work out what cp laws and all kinds of cr assertions have in common: they figure as an information source for assertions of causal influence between variables. (shrink)

This article introduces confirmatory composite analysis (CCA) as a structural equation modeling technique that aims at testing composite models. In doing so, it overcomes a current weakness of structural equation modeling, i.e., the operationalization and assessment of design concepts, so-called artifacts. CCA entails the same steps as confirmatory factor analysis: model specification, model identification, model estimation, and model assessment. Composite models are specified such that they consist of a set of interrelated composites, all of which emerge as linear combinations of (...) observable variables. Researchers must ensure theoretical identification of their specified model. For the estimation of the model, several estimators are available; in particular Kettenring's extensions of canonical correlation analysis provide consistent estimates. Model assessment mainly relies on the Bollen-Stine bootstrap to assess the discrepancy between the empirical and the estimated model-implied indicator covariance matrix. A Monte Carlo simulation examines the efficacy of CCA, and demonstrates that CCA is able to detect various forms of model misspecification. (shrink)

Two key ideas of scientific explanation−explanation as causal information and explanation as unification-have frequently been set into mutual opposition. This paper proposes a “dialectical solution” to this conflict, by arguing that causal explanations are preferable to non-causal ones, because they lead to a higherdegree of unification at the level of explaining statistical regularities. The core axioms of the theory of causal nets (TC) are justified because they offer the best if not the only unifying explanation of two statistical phenomena: screening (...) off and linking up. Alternative explanations of the two phenomena are discussed and it isshown why they don’t work. It is demonstrated that although the core axioms of TC are empirically vacuous, extended versions of TC have empirical content by means of which they can generate independently testable predictions.Con frecuencia se han planteado como contrapuestas dos ideas clave en la explicacion cientifica (explicacion como informacion causal y explicacion como unificacion). El presente articulo propone una “solucion dialectica” argumentando que las explicaciones causales son preferibles a las no-causales porque aquellas comportan un mayor grado de unificacion en la explicacion de regularidades estadisticas. Los axiomas centrales de la teoria de redes causales (TC) estan justificados porque ofrecen la mejor, si no la unica, explicacion unificada de dos fenomenos estadisticos: neutralizacion (screening off) y vinculacion (linking up). Se discuten las explicaciones alternativas de estos dos fenomenos y se razona por que no funcionan. Se demuestra ademas que aunque los axiomas centrales de TC son empiricamente vacuos, las versiones extendidas de TC tienen un contenido empirico gracias al cual pueden generar predicciones independientemente contrastables. (shrink)

We start this paper by arguing that causality should, in analogy with force in Newtonian physics, be understood as a theoretical concept that is not explicated by a single definition, but by the axioms of a theory. Such an understanding of causality implicitly underlies the well-known theory of causal nets and has been explicitly promoted by Glymour. In this paper we investigate the explanatory warrant and empirical content of TCN. We sketch how the assumption of directed cause–effect relations can be (...) philosophically justified by an inference to the best explanation. We then ask whether the explanations provided by TCN are merely post-facto or have independently testable empirical content. To answer this question we develop a fine-grained axiomatization of TCN, including a distinction of different kinds of faithfulness. A number of theorems show that although the core axioms of TCN are empirically empty, extended versions of TCN have successively increasing empirical content. (shrink)

In this paper I assess the adequacy of no-conspiracy conditions employed in the usual derivations of the Bell inequality in the context of EPR correlations. First, I look at the EPR correlations from a purely phenomenological point of view and claim that common cause explanations of these cannot be ruled out. I argue that an appropriate common cause explanation requires that no-conspiracy conditions are re-interpreted as mere common cause-measurement independence conditions. In the right circumstances then, violations of measurement independence need (...) not entail any kind of conspiracy (nor backwards in time causation). To the contrary, if measurement operations in the EPR context are taken to be causally relevant in a specific way to the experiment outcomes, their explicit causal role provides the grounds for a common cause explanation of the corresponding correlations. (shrink)

A model for measurement in collapse-free nonrelativistic fermionic quantum field theory is presented. In addition to local propagation and effectively-local interactions, the model incorporates explicit representations of localized observers, thus extending an earlier model of entanglement generation in Everett quantum field theory (Rubin in Found. Phys. 32:1495–1523, 2002). Transformations of the field operators from the Heisenberg picture to the Deutsch-Hayden picture, involving fictitious auxiliary fields, establish the locality of the model. The model is applied to manifestly-local calculations of the results (...) of measurements, using a type of sudden approximation and in the limit of massive systems in narrow-wavepacket states. Detection of the presence of a spin-1/2 system in a given spin state by a freely-moving two-state observer illustrates the features of the model and the nonperturbative computational methodology. With the help of perturbation theory the model is applied to a calculation of the quintessential “nonlocal” quantum phenomenon, spin correlations in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm experiment. (shrink)

This paper examines tracer techniques in neuroscience, which are used to identify neural connections in the brain and nervous system. These connections capture a type of “structural connectivity” that is expected to inform our understanding of the functional nature of these tissues. This is due to the fact that neural connectivity constrains the flow of signal propagation, which is a type of causal process in neurons. This work explores how tracers are used to identify causal information, what standards they are (...) expected to meet, the forms of causal information they provide, and how an analysis of these techniques contributes to the philosophical literature, in particular, the literature on mark transmission and mechanistic accounts of causation. (shrink)

Many philosophers maintain that causation is to be explicated in terms of a kind of dependence between cause and effect. These “dependence” theories are opposed by “production” accounts which hold that there is some more fundamental causal “oomph”. A wide range of experimental research on everyday causal judgments seems to indicate that ordinary people operate primarily with a dependence-based notion of causation. For example, people tend to say that absences and double preventers are causes. We argue that the impression that (...) commonsense causal discourse is largely dependence-based is the result of focusing on a very narrow class of causal verbs. Almost all of the vignette-based experimental work on causal judgment has been prosecuted using the word “cause”. But much ordinary causal discourse involves special causal verbs, such as “burn” and “crack”. We find that these verbs display a quite different pattern from the verb “cause”. For instance, for absences and double preventers (Studies 1-3), we find that while people are inclined to say that X caused Y to burn, turn, crack or start, they are less inclined to think that X burned, turned, cracked or started Y. In Study 4, we find that for chains involving a distal and proximal event, people are inclined to say that the distal event is not a special cause of the outcome, though it is a “cause” of the outcome. Together, we find a surprising double dissociation between “cause” and a stock of special causal verbs. We conclude by suggesting that much commonsense causal judgment, which heavily trades in special causal verbs, might be better captured by production-based accounts of causation. (shrink)

This article argues that time-asymmetric processes in spacetime are enantiomorphs. Subsequently, the Kantian puzzle concerning enantiomorphs in space is reviewed to introduce a number of positions concerning enantiomorphy, and to arrive at a dilemma: one must either reject that orientations of enantiomorphs are determinate, or furnish space or objects with orientation. The discussion on space is then used to derive two problems in the debate on the direction of time. First, it is shown that certain kinds of reductionism about the (...) direction of time are at variance with the claim that orientation of enantiomorphic objects is intrinsic. Second, it is argued that reductive explanations of time-asymmetric processes presuppose that enantiomorphic processes do not have determinate orientation. (shrink)

This article argues that time‐asymmetric processes in spacetime are enantiomorphs. Subsequently, the Kantian puzzle concerning enantiomorphs in space is reviewed to introduce a number of positions concerning enantiomorphy, and to arrive at a dilemma: one must either reject that orientations of enantiomorphs are determinate, or furnish space or objects with orientation. The discussion on space is then used to derive two problems in the debate on the direction of time. First, it is shown that certain kinds of reductionism about the (...) direction of time are at variance with the claim that orientation of enantiomorphic objects is intrinsic. Second, it is argued that reductive explanations of time‐asymmetric processes presuppose that enantiomorphic processes do not have determinate orientation. (shrink)

It is claimed that the `problem of the arrow of time in classical dynamics' has been solved. Since all classical particles have a self-field (gravitational and in some cases also electromagnetic), their dynamics must include self-interaction. This fact and the observation that the domain of validity of classical physics is restricted to distances not less than of the order of a Compton wavelength (thus excluding point particles), leads to the conclusion that the fundamental classical equations of motion are not invariant (...) under time reversal: retarded self-interactions lead to different equations than advanced ones. Since causality (the time order of cause and effect) requires retarded rather than advanced self-interaction, it is causality which is ultimately responsible for the arrow of time. Classical motions described by equations with advanced self-interactions differ from retarded ones and do not occur in nature. (shrink)

Probabilistic support is not transitive. There are cases in which x probabilistically supports y , i.e., Pr( y | x ) > Pr( y ), y , in turn, probabilistically supports z , and yet it is not the case that x probabilistically supports z . Tomoji Shogenji, though, establishes a condition for transitivity in probabilistic support, that is, a condition such that, for any x , y , and z , if Pr( y | x ) > Pr( y (...) ), Pr( z | y ) > Pr( z ), and the condition in question is satisfied, then Pr( z | x ) > Pr( z ). I argue for a second and weaker condition for transitivity in probabilistic support. This condition, or the principle involving it, makes it easier (than does the condition Shogenji provides) to establish claims of probabilistic support, and has the potential to play an important role in at least some areas of philosophy. (shrink)

While the fundamental laws of physics are time-reversal invariant, most macroscopic processes are irreversible. Given that the fundamental laws are taken to underpin all other processes, how can the fundamental time-symmetry be reconciled with the asymmetry manifest elsewhere? In statistical mechanics, progress can be made with this question. What I dub the ‘Zwanzig–Zeh–Wallace framework’ can be used to construct the irreversible equations of SM from the underlying microdynamics. Yet this framework uses coarse-graining, a procedure that has faced much criticism. I (...) focus on two objections in the literature: claims that coarse-graining makes time-asymmetry ‘illusory’ and ‘anthropocentric’. I argue that these objections arise from an unsatisfactory justification of coarse-graining prevalent in the literature, rather than from coarse-graining itself. This justification relies on the idea of measurement imprecision. By considering the role that abstraction and autonomy play, I provide an alternative justification and offer replies to the illusory and anthropocentric objections. Finally, I consider the broader consequences of this alternative justification: the connection to debates about inter-theoretic reduction and the implication that the time-asymmetry in SM is weakly emergent. 1Introduction 1.1Prospectus2The Zwanzig–Zeh–Wallace Framework3Why Does This Method Work? 3.1The special conditions account3.2When is a density forwards-compatible?4Anthropocentrism and Illusion: Two Objections 4.1The two objections in more detail4.2Against the justification by measurement imprecision5An Alternative Justification 5.1Abstraction and autonomy5.2An illustration: the Game of Life6Reply to Illusory7Reply to Anthropocentric8The Wider Landscape: Concluding Remarks 8.1Inter-theoretic relations8.2The nature of irreversibility. (shrink)

The Lorentz transformation of space and time between two reference frames is one of the pillars of the special relativity theory. As a result of the Lorentz transformation, space and time are only relative and are entangled, while the Minkowski metric is Lorentz invariant. For this reason, the Lorentz transformation is one of the major obstructions in the development of physical theories with quantized space and time. Here is described the Lorentz transformation of a physical system with a discrete dynamical (...) time and a continuous space that fulfills Lorentz invariance while approximating the Lorentz transformation at the time continuous limit and the Galilei transformation at the classical limit. Furthermore, the discreteness of time is not mixed with the continuous nature of space, making time distinct from space. (shrink)

Psychological constructs such as personality dimensions or cognitive traits are typically unobserved and are therefore measured by observing so-called indicators of the latent construct. The Common Factor Model models the relations between the observed indicators and the latent variable. In this article we argue in favor of interpreting the CFM as a causal model rather than merely a statistical model, in which common factors are only descriptions of the indicators. When there is sufficient reason to hypothesize that the underlying causal (...) structure of the data is a common cause structure, a causal interpretation of the CFM has several benefits over a merely statistical interpretation of the model. We argue that a causal interpretation conforms with most research questions in which the goal is to explain the correlations between indicators rather than merely summarizing them; a causal interpretation of the factor model legitimizes the focus on shared, rather than unique variance of the indicators; and a causal interpretation of the factor model legitimizes the assumption of local independence. (shrink)

Cartwright (Synthese 121(1/2):3–27, 1999a; The dappled world, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999b) attacked the view that causal relations conform to the Markov condition by providing a counterexample in which a common cause does not screen off its effects: the prominent chemical factory. In this paper we suggest a new way to handle counterexamples to Markov causation such as the chemical factory. We argue that Cartwright’s as well as similar scenarios feature a certain kind of non-causal dependence that kicks in once (...) the common cause occurs. We then develop a representation of this specific kind of non-causal dependence that allows for modeling the problematic scenarios in such a way that the Markov condition is not violated anymore. (shrink)

A theory of categorization is presented in which knowledge of causal relationships between category features is represented in terms of asymmetric and probabilistic causal mechanisms. According to causal‐model theory, objects are classified as category members to the extent they are likely to have been generated or produced by those mechanisms. The empirical results confirmed that participants rated exemplars good category members to the extent their features manifested the expectations that causal knowledge induces, such as correlations between feature pairs that are (...) directly connected by causal relationships. These expectations also included sensitivity to higher‐order feature interactions that emerge from the asymmetries inherent in causal relationships. Quantitative fits of causal‐model theory were superior to those obtained with extensions to traditional similarity‐based models that represent causal knowledge either as higher‐order relational features or “prior exemplars” stored in memory. (shrink)

If $\mathcal{A}$ (V) is a net of local von Neumann algebras satisfying standard axioms of algebraic relativistic quantum field theory and V 1 and V 2 are spacelike separated spacetime regions, then the system ( $\mathcal{A}$ (V 1 ), $\mathcal{A}$ (V 2 ), φ) is said to satisfy the Weak Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle iff for every pair of projections A∈ $\mathcal{A}$ (V 1 ), B∈ $\mathcal{A}$ (V 2 ) correlated in the normal state φ there exists a projection C (...) belonging to a von Neumann algebra associated with a spacetime region V contained in the union of the backward light cones of V 1 and V 2 and disjoint from both V 1 and V 2 , a projection having the properties of a Reichenbachian common cause of the correlation between A and B. It is shown that if the net has the local primitive causality property then every local system ( $\mathcal{A}$ (V 1 ), $\mathcal{A}$ (V 2 ), φ) with a locally normal and locally faithful state φ and suitable bounded V 1 and V 2 satisfies the Weak Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle. (shrink)

It is shown that by realizing the isomorphism features of the frequency and geometric interpretations of probability, Reichenbach comes very close to the idea of identifying mathematical probability theory with measure theory in his 1949 work on foundations of probability. Some general features of Reichenbach’s axiomatization of probability theory are pointed out as likely obstacles that prevented him making this conceptual move. The role of isomorphisms of Kolmogorovian probability measure spaces is specified in what we call the “Maxim of Probabilism”, (...) which states that a necessary condition for a concept to be probabilistic is its invariance with respect to measure-theoretic isomorphisms. The functioning of the Maxim of Probabilism is illustrated by the example of conditioning via conditional expectations. (shrink)

Reichenbach's principles of a probabilistic common cause of probabilistic correlations is formulated in terms of relativistic quantum field theory, and the problem is raised whether correlations in relativistic quantum field theory between events represented by projections in local observable algebrasA(V1) andA(V2) pertaining to spacelike separated spacetime regions V1 and V2 can be explained by finding a probabilistic common cause of the correlation in Reichenbach's sense. While this problem remains open, it is shown that if all superluminal correlations predicted by the (...) vacuum state between events inA(V1) andA(V2) have a genuinely probabilistic common cause, then the local algebrasA(V1) andA(V2) must be statistically independent in the sense of C*-independence. (shrink)

The explanatory role of natural selection is one of the long-term debates in evolutionary biology. Nevertheless, the consensus has been slippery because conceptual confusions and the absence of a unified, formal causal model that integrates different explanatory scopes of natural selection. In this study we attempt to examine two questions: (i) What can the theory of natural selection explain? and (ii) Is there a causal or explanatory model that integrates all natural selection explananda? For the first question, we argue that (...) five explananda have been assigned to the theory of natural selection and that four of them may be actually considered explananda of natural selection. For the second question, we claim that a probabilistic conception of causality and the statistical relevance concept of explanation are both good models for understanding the explanatory role of natural selection. We review the biological and philosophical disputes about the explanatory role of natural selection and formalize some explananda in probabilistic terms using classical results from population genetics. Most of these explananda have been discussed in philosophical terms but some of them have been mixed up and confused. We analyze and set the limits of these problems. (shrink)

Cortical reverberations may induce synaptic changes that underlie developmental plasticity as well as long-term memory. They may be especially important for the consolidation of synaptic changes. Reverberations in cortical networks should have particular significance during development, when large numbers of new representations are formed. This includes the formation of representations across different sensory modalities.

A distinction should be made between the formation of stimulus-driven associations and cognitive concepts. To test the learning mode of a neural network, we propose a simple and classic input-output test: the discrimination shift task. Feed-forward PDP models appear to form stimulus-driven associations. A Hopfield network should be extended to apply the test.

En esta ponencia nos proponemos mostrar que ciertas tesis o consensos recibidos sobre pseudoprocesos causales , procesos cuya característica prominente parece ser superar la velocidad de la luz, deben ser cuestionados o seriamente modificados. Dos de dichos consensos son, primero, que los PSP deberían ser tratados simplemente como "basura espacio-temporal" y, segundo, que ellos no cumplen, aparte de permitir aislar procesos causales genuinos, ninguna función epistémica o metodológica en la descripción de cualquier estado físico, en particular, al interior de la (...) relatividad especial . Para ello, apelaremos a procedimientos de medición física bien conocidos tanto en física clásica como en RE. Como consecuencia de lo anterior, argumentamos que, una vez que los PSP son integrados en toda la escena física, se revela que ellos juegan un rol fundamental y más complejo en la física experimental de lo que hasta ahora se ha pensado. In this paper we show that some received contentions about causal pseudo processes , processes of which the most salient aspect seems to be travelling faster than the speed of light, must be rejected o seriously modified. Two of such contentions are, first, that PSPs should be considered just "spatiotemporal junk" and, second, that they do not meet, besides allowing us to isolate proper genuine causal processes, any other epistemic or methodological role in the description of a physical state of affair, in particular, in a special relativity setting. In order to do that, we are going to appeal to physical measure procedures, well known both in classic and relativistic physics. As a consequence of that, we contend that, once PSPs are integrated into the whole physical scenario, a fundamental and more complex role for them in experimental physics is revealed. (shrink)

Amit defines cell assemblies aslocal cortical neuron populationswith strong internal connections. However, Hebb himself proposed that cell assemblies are distributed over different cortical areas (nonlocal ortranscortical assemblies). We review evidence from cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology supporting the assumption that cell assemblies are transcortical.

Background: Evidence suggesting adverse drug reactions often emerges unsystematically and unpredictably in form of anecdotal reports, case series and survey data. Safety trials and observational studies also provide crucial information regarding the (un-)safety of drugs. Hence, integrating multiple types of pharmacovigilance evidence is key to minimising the risks of harm. Methods: In previous work, we began the development of a Bayesian framework for aggregating multiple types of evidence to assess the probability of a putative causal link between drugs and side (...) effects. This framework arose out of a philosophical analysis of the Bradford Hill Guidelines. In this article, we expand the Bayesian framework and add “evidential modulators,” which bear on the assessment of the reliability of incoming study results. The overall framework for evidence synthesis, “E-Synthesis”, is then applied to a case study. Results: Theoretically and computationally, E-Synthesis exploits coherence of partly or fully independent evidence converging towards the hypothesis of interest (or of conflicting evidence with respect to it), in order to update its posterior probability. With respect to other frameworks for evidence synthesis, our Bayesian model has the unique feature of grounding its inferential machinery on a consolidated theory of hypothesis confirmation (Bayesian epistemology), and in allowing any data from heterogeneous sources (cell-data, clinical trials, epidemiological studies), and methods (e.g., frequentist hypothesis testing, Bayesian adaptive trials, etc.) to be quantitatively integrated into the same inferential framework. Conclusions: E-Synthesis is highly flexible concerning the allowed input, while at the same time relying on a consistent computational system, that is philosophically and statistically grounded. Furthermore, by introducing evidential modulators, and thereby breaking up the different dimensions of evidence (strength, relevance, reliability), E-Synthesis allows them to be explicitly tracked in updating causal hypotheses. (shrink)

Amalgamating evidence from heterogeneous sources and across levels of inquiry is becoming increasingly important in many pure and applied sciences. This special issue provides a forum for researchers from diverse scientific and philosophical perspectives to discuss evidence amalgamation, its methodologies, its history, its pitfalls, and its potential. We situate the contributions therein within six themes from the broad literature on this subject: the variety-of-evidence thesis, the philosophy of meta-analysis, the role of robustness/sensitivity analysis for evidence amalgamation, its bearing on questions (...) of extrapolation and external validity of experiments, its connection with theory development, and its interface with causal inference, especially regarding causal theories of cancer. (shrink)

The paper extends the framework of outcomes in branching space-time (Kowalski and Placek [1999]) by assigning probabilities to outcomes of events, where these probabilities are interpreted either epistemically or as weighted possibilities. In resulting models I define the notion of common cause of correlated outcomes of a single event, and investigate which setups allow for the introduction of common causes. It turns out that a deterministic common cause can always be introduced, but (surprisingly) only special setups permit the introduction of (...) truly stochastic common causes. I analyse next the Bell-Aspect experiment and derive the Bell-CH inequalities. I observe that we postulate there not a common cause for outcomes of a single event but rather a common common cause that accounts for outcomes of many events, where 'events' mean 'measurements with (different) directions of polarization'. Since the inequalities are violated, I claim that no causal story can be told about the Bell correlations, where causality is subliminal and restricted by screening-off condition. Similarly, given certain intuitive principles, no deterministic story can be told about these correlations. (shrink)

Introduction to a special issue of Erkenntnis.

Analogical reasoning addresses the question how evidence from various phenomena can be combined and made relevant for theory development and prediction. In the first part of my contribution, I review some influential accounts of analogical reasoning, both historical and contemporary, focusing in particular on Keynes, Carnap, Hesse, and more recently Bartha. In the second part, I sketch a general framework. To this purpose, a distinction between a predictive and a conceptual type of analogical reasoning is introduced. I then take up (...) a common intuition according to which analogical inferences hold if the differences between source and target concern only irrelevant circumstances. I attempt to make this idea more precise by addressing possible objections and in particular by specifying a notion of causal irrelevance based on difference making in homogeneous contexts. (shrink)

Amit's “Attractor Neural Network” perspective on cognition raises difficult technical problems already met by prior dynamical models. This commentary sketches briefly some of them concerning the internal topological structure of attractors, the constituency problem, the possibility of activating simultaneously several attractors, and the different kinds of dynamical structures one can use to model brain activity: point attractors, strange attractors, synchronized arrays of oscillators, synfire chains, and so forth.

Philosophers of science have often favoured reductive approaches to how-possibly explanation. This article identifies three alternative conceptions making how-possibly explanation an interesting phenomenon in its own right. The first variety approaches “how possibly X?” by showing that X is not epistemically impossible. This can sometimes be achieved by removing misunderstandings concerning the implications of one’s current belief system but involves characteristically a modification of this belief system so that acceptance of X does not result in contradiction. The second variety offers (...) a potential how-explanation of X. It is usually followed by a range of further potential how-explanations of the same phenomenon. In recent literature the factual claims implied by the second variety have been downplayed whereas the heuristic role of mapping the space of conceptual possibilities has been emphasized. I will focus especially on this truth-bracketing sense of potentiality when looking closer at the second variety in the paper. The third variety has attracted less interest. It presents a partial how-explanation of X. Typically it aims to establish the existence of a mechanism by which X could be and was generated. The third conception stands out as the natural alternative for the advocate of ontic how-possibly explanations. This article transfers Salmon’s view that explanation-concepts can be broadly divided into epistemic, modal, and ontic to the context of how-possibly explanations. Moreover, it is argued that each of the three above-mentioned varieties of how-possibly explanation occurs in science. To recognize this may be especially relevant for philosophers. We are often misled by the promises of various why-explanation accounts, and seem to have forgotten nearly everything about the diversity of how-possibly explanations. (shrink)

Michael Strevens develops kairetic account of causal explanations as a brand of explanatory reductionism. He argues that explanations in higher-level sciences are complete only because they can be potentially deepened—that is, added kernels of causal processes all the way down to the level of micro-physical relations. Thus, they are, in essence, the result of abstraction from deeper causal explanatory levels. I argue that Strevens’s discussion of the notion of depth in science is limited to a very narrow domain, the boundaries (...) of which are determined by a simplistic amalgam of science textbook and everyday cases analyzed by means of rational metaphysics. In contrast to his view, history of scientific practice shows that scientific explanations are typically bounded within a level and do not draw their viability from their potential for lower-level explanatory deepening. Moreover, a result of such deepening of higher-level explanations produces changes and refinements much more complex than Strevens’s account assumes. (shrink)

We consider the problem of therelationship between the quantum and theclassical domains from the point of view that itis possible to speak of a direct physicaldescription of quantum systems havingphysical properties. We put emphasis, inevidencing it, on the specific quantum conceptof indistinguishability of identical in aconceptual way (and not in a logical way in thevein of ``da Costa's school''). In essence, thesubsequent argumentation deals with therelationship between the classical and thequantum, with the problem of the quantum theoryof measurement. Even in (...) the absence of adefinitive response to this problem, the bestattitude for the time being, as we cannot reducethe classical and the quantum one to the other,seems to be to accept their pacific coexistence,and this is possible with the toleranceprinciple of the ``pragmatic truth'' developedfrom a logical point of view by Newton daCosta.RESUMO. As áreas quântica eclássica enquanto provisórioscoexistentes parallelos. Abordamos oproblema da relação entre as áreasdo quântico e do clássico considerandoque é possível falar de umadescrição física direta de sistemas quânticos tendo propriedades.Insistimos, para isto, sobre o conceitoespecificamente quântico daindicernabilidade dos idênticos de um ponto devista conceptual (não de um ponto de vistalógico à maneira da ``escola da Costa'')como evidenciando isto. O essencial daargumentação a seguir tem como enfoquea relação clássico-quântico, como problema da teoria quântica damedição. Mesmo não tendo umaresposta definitiva para este, a melhor atitudepor enquanto, já que não se podemreduzir um ao outro o clássico e oquântico, nos parece ser esta de aceitar suacoexistência pacífica, o que épossível com o princípio detolerância da ``verdade pragmática''desenvolvida logicamente por Newton da Costa. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that the statistical mechanical reversibility objection implies that our putative records of the past are more likely to have arisen as spontaneous fluctuations from equilibrium states than through causal processes that correctly indicate past states of affairs. Hence, so the story goes, without some further assumption that solves the reversibility objection, such as the past hypothesis, all our beliefs about the past would almost surely be false. This claim is disputed and it is argued that at (...) least some of our records of the past can and should be thought to be veridical because the intentional contents of records are not included as part of their statistical mechanical description. The fact that the present state of the world around us coheres so well with the way we would expect it to be if our records were veridical provides good evidence for the claim that they are produced via a common causal structure. (shrink)

In recent years, Reichenbach's 1920 conception of the principles of coordination has attracted increased attention after Michael Friedman's attempt to revive Reichenbach's idea of a "relativized a priori". This paper follows the origin and development of this idea in the framework of Reichenbach's distinction between the axioms of coordination and the axioms of connection. It suggests a further differentiation among the coordinating axioms and accordingly proposes a different account of Reichenbach's "relativized a priori".

If well-designed, the results of a Randomised Clinical Trial can justify a causal claim between treatment and effect in the study population; however, additional information might be needed to carry over this result to another population. RCTs have been criticized exactly on grounds of failing to provide this sort of information Evidence, inference and enquiry. Oxford University Press, New York, 2011), as well as to black-box important details regarding the mechanisms underpinning the causal law instantiated by the RCT result. On (...) the other side, so-called In Silico Clinical Trials face the same criticisms addressed against standard modelling and simulation techniques, and cannot be equated to experiments Philosophy of molecular medicine: foundational issues in research and practice, Routledge, New York, 2017; Parker in Synthese 169:483–496, 2009; Parke in Philos Sci 81:516–536, 2014; Diez Roux in Am J Epidemiol 181:100–102, 2015 and related discussions in Frigg and Reiss in Synthese 169:593–613, 2009; Winsberg in Synthese 169:575–592, 2009; Beisbart and Norton in Int Stud Philos Sci 26:403–422, 2012). We undertake a formal analysis of both methods in order to identify their distinct contribution to causal inference in the clinical setting. Britton et al.’s study :E2098–E2105, 2013) on the impact of ion current variability on cardiac electrophysiology is used for illustrative purposes. We deduce that, by predicting variability through interpolation, ISCTs aid with problems regarding extrapolation of RCTs results, and therefore in assessing their external validity. Furthermore, ISCTs can be said to encode “thick” causal knowledge —as opposed to “thin” difference-making information inferred from RCTs. Hence, ISCTs and RCTs cannot replace one another but rather, they are complementary in that the former provide information about the determinants of variability of causal effects, while the latter can, under certain conditions, establish causality in the first place. (shrink)