Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Comparative Nonarbitrariness Norm of Blame.Daniel Telech & Hannah Tierney - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (1).
    Much has been written about the fittingness, epistemic, and standing norms that govern blame. In this paper, we argue that there exists a norm of blame that has yet to receive philosophical discussion and without which an account of the ethics of blame will be incomplete: a norm proscribing comparatively arbitrary blame. By reflecting on the objectionableness of comparatively arbitrary blame, we stand to elucidate a substantive, and thus far overlooked, norm governing our attributions of responsibility. Accordingly, our aim in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Shame, Embarrassment, and the Subjectivity Requirement.Erick J. Ramirez - 2018 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 14 (1):97-114.
    Reactive theories of responsibility see moral accountability as grounded on the capacity for feeling reactive-attitudes. I respond to a recent argument gaining ground in this tradition that excludes psychopaths from accountability. The argument relies on what Paul Russell has called the 'subjectivity requirement'. On this view, the capacity to feel and direct reactive-attitudes at oneself is a necessary condition for responsibility. I argue that even if moral attitudes like guilt are impossible for psychopaths to deploy, that psychopaths, especially the "successful" (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Conversation, Responsibility, and Autism Spectrum Disorder.Nathan Stout - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (7):1-14.
    In this paper, I present a challenge for Michael McKenna’s conversational theory of moral responsibility. On his view, to be a responsible agent is to be able to engage in a type of moral conversation. I argue that individuals with autism spectrum disorder present a considerable problem for the conversational theory because empirical evidence on the disorder seems to suggest that there are individuals in the world who meet all of the conditions for responsible agency that the theory lays out (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Emotional Awareness and Responsible Agency.Nathan Stout - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):337-362.
    This paper aims to further examine the relationship between self-awareness and agency by focusing on the role that emotional awareness plays in prominent conceptions of responsibility. One promising way of approaching this task is by focusing on individuals who display impairments in emotional awareness and then examining the effects that these impairments have on their apparent responsibility for the actions that they perform. Individuals with autism spectrum disorder as well as other clinical groups who evince high degrees of the personality (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Philosophy Comes to Dinner: Arguments About the Ethics of Eating. [REVIEW]Bob Fischer - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (2):295-300.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • “Psychopathy, Moral Reasons, and Responsibility”.Erick Ramirez - 2013 - In Alexandra Perry C. D. Herrera (ed.), Ethics and Neurodiversity.
    In popular culture psychopaths are inaccurately portrayed as serial killers or homicidal maniacs. Most real-world psychopaths are neither killers nor maniacs. Psychologists currently understand psychopathy as an affective disorder that leads to repeated criminal and antisocial behavior. Counter to this prevailing view, I claim that psychopathy is not necessarily linked with criminal behavior. Successful psychopaths, an intriguing new category of psychopathic agent, support this conception of psychopathy. I then consider reactive attitude theories of moral responsibility. Within this tradition, psychopaths are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility.Steefan Cuypers - 2019 - Ideas Y Valores 68 (171):231-249.
    This paper returns to the very concept of moral responsibility. Its focus is not on the conditions but on the nature of moral responsibility. First, it introduces the Strawsonian and ledger conceptions of moral responsibility. Next, it contrasts and compares these conceptions. Finally, it evaluates both conceptions and asks which is the right one. Though this article works toward further clarifying the concept of moral responsibility, its conclusion is open-ended.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Conversation and Responsibility. [REVIEW]Paul Russell - 2017 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 126 (2):285-295.
    A review of Conversation & Responsibility by Michael McKenna Oxford UP 2012.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Responsibility Unincorporated: Corporate Agency and Moral Responsibility.Luis Cheng-Guajardo - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):294-314.
    Those who argue that corporations can be morally responsible for what they do help us to understand how autonomous corporate agency is possible, and those who argue that they cannot be help us maintain distinctive value in human life. Each offers something valuable, but without securing the other's important contribution. I offer an account that secures both. I explain how corporations can be autonomous agents that we can continue to be justified in blaming as responsible agents, but without it also (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Responsibility and the Limits of Good and Evil.Robert Wallace - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2705-2727.
    P.F. Strawson’s compatibilism has had considerable influence. However, as Watson has argued in “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil”, his view appears to have a disturbing consequence: extreme evil exempts an agent from moral responsibility. This is a reductio of the view. Moreover, in some cases our emotional reaction to an evildoer’s history clashes with our emotional expressions of blame. Anyone’s actions can be explained by his or her history, however, and thereby can conflict with our present blame. Additionally, we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents.Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.
    Recently, a number of people have argued that certain entities embodied by groups of agents themselves qualify as agents, with their own beliefs, desires, and intentions; even, some claim, as moral agents. However, others have independently argued that fully-fledged moral agency involves a capacity for reactive attitudes such as guilt and indignation, and these capacities might seem beyond the ken of “collective” or “ corporate ” agents. Individuals embodying such agents can of course be ashamed, proud, or indignant about what (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Defending Conversation and Responsibility: Reply to Dana Nelkin and Holly Smith.Michael McKenna - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (1):73-84.
    In this paper, I defend the central arguments of my book Conversation and Responsibility in response to two critics, Dana Nelkin and Holly Smith.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Does the Machine Need a Ghost? Corporate Agents as Nonconscious Kantian Moral Agents.Kendy M. Hess - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (1):67-86.
    Does Kantian moral agency require phenomenal consciousness? More to the point, can firms be Kantian moral agents—bound by Kantian obligations—in the absence of consciousness? After sketching the mechanics of my account of corporate agents, I consider three increasingly demanding accounts of Kantian moral agency, concluding that corporate agents can meet each successively higher threshold. They can act on universalizable principles and treat humanity as an end in itself; give such principlesto themselves,treattheir own‘humanity’ as an end itself, and act out of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Very General Facts of Human Nature.Audun Benjamin Bengtson - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (3):281-304.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.
    Skepticism about moral responsibility, or what is more commonly referred to as moral responsibility skepticism, refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings are never morally responsible for their actions in a particular but pervasive sense. This sense is typically set apart by the notion of basic desert and is defined in terms of the control in action needed for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise. Some moral responsibility skeptics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Cruel Jokes and Normative Competence.David Shoemaker - 2018 - Social Philosophy and Policy 35 (1):173-195.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
    In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Responsibility and Disability.David Shoemaker - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (3-4):438-461.
    This essay explores the boundaries of the moral community—the collection of agents eligible for moral responsibility—by focusing on those just inside it and those just outside it. In particular, it contrasts mild mental retardation with psychopathy, specifically among adults. For those who work with and know them, adults with mild mental retardation are thought to be obvious members of the moral community (albeit not full-fledged members). For those who work with and theorize about adult psychopaths, by contrast, they are not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Moral Responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    When a person performs or fails to perform a morally significant action, we sometimes think that a particular kind of response is warranted. Praise and blame are perhaps the most obvious forms this reaction might take. For example, one who encounters a car accident may be regarded as worthy of praise for having saved a child from inside the burning car, or alternatively, one may be regarded as worthy of blame for not having used one's mobile phone to call for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations