Zeno’s arguments are generally regarded as ingenious but downright unsound paradoxes, worth of attention mainly to disclose why they go wrong or, alternatively, to recognise them as clever, even if crude, anticipations of modern views on the space, the infinite or the quantum view of matter. In either case, the arguments lose any connection with the scientific and philosophical problems of Zeno’s own time and environment. In the present paper, I argue that it is possible to make sense of Zeno’s (...) arguments if we recognise that Zeno was indeed a close follower of Parmenides, who wanted to show that, if the plurality of beings existed, then various absurd consequences would follow. He intended to highlight the compact and inarticulate nature of the being, and the human character of the system of world partitions producing the entities and the objects on which our knowledge is based. (shrink)

Salmon was the first to speak explicitly of paradoxes of kinematics. In this short note I introduce a new class of infinity puzzles. Following natural terminology, they should actually be called static paradoxes.

This paper discusses the relevance of supertask computation for the determinacy of arithmetic. Recent work in the philosophy of physics has made plausible the possibility of supertask computers, capable of running through infinitely many individual computations in a finite time. A natural thought is that, if supertask computers are possible, this implies that arithmetical truth is determinate. In this paper we argue, via a careful analysis of putative arguments from supertask computations to determinacy, that this natural thought is mistaken: supertasks (...) are of no help in explaining arithmetical determinacy. (shrink)

In this paper I present a novel supertask in a Newtonian universe that destroys and creates infinite masses and energies, showing thereby that we can have infinite indeterminism. Previous supertasks have managed only to destroy or create finite masses and energies, thereby giving cases of only finite indeterminism. In the Nothing from Infinity paradox we will see an infinitude of finite masses and an infinitude of energy disappear entirely, and do so despite the conservation of energy in all collisions. I (...) then show how this leads to the Infinity from Nothing paradox, in which we have the spontaneous eruption of infinite mass and energy out of nothing. I conclude by showing how our supertask models at least something of an old conundrum, the question of what happens when the immovable object meets the irresistible force. (shrink)

Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, allegedly denying motion, have been conceived to reinforce the Parmenidean vision of an immutable world. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that these famous logical paradoxes should be seen instead as paradoxes of immobility. From this new point of view, motion is therefore no longer logically problematic, while immobility is. This is convenient since it is easy to conceive that immobility can actually conceal motion, and thus the proposition “immobility is mere illusion of the (...) senses” is much more credible than the reverse thesis supported by Parmenides. Moreover, this proposition is also supported by modern depiction of material bodies: the existence of a ceaseless random motion of atoms—the ‘thermal agitation’—in the scope of contemporary atomic theory, can offer a rational explanation of this ‘illusion of immobility’. Our new approach to Zeno’s paradoxes therefore leads to presenting the novel concept of ‘impermobility’, which we think is a more adequate description of physical reality. (shrink)

Zeno’s Arrow and Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way Chapter 2 contain paradoxical, dialectic arguments thought to indicate that there is no valid explanation of motion, hence there is no physical or generic motion. There are, however, diverse interpretations of the latter text, and I argue they apply to Zeno’s Arrow as well. I also find that many of the interpretations are dependent on a mathematical analysis of material motion through space and time. However, with modern philosophy and physics (...) we find that the link from no explanation to no phenomena is invalid and that there is a valid explanation and understanding of physical motion. Hence, those arguments are both invalid and false, which banishes the MMK/2 and The Arrow under this and derivative interpretations to merely the history of philosophy. However, a view that maintains their relevance is that each is used as a koan or sequence of koans designed to assist students in spiritual meditation practice. This view is partly justified by the realization that both Nāgārjuna and Zeno were likely meditation masters in addition to being logicians. The works are, therefore, not works that should be assessed as having valid arguments and true conclusions by the standards of modern analytic philosophy—contrary to some of the literature—but rather are therapeutic and perhaps more appropriately considered as part of an experientially focused philosophy such as existentialism, phenomenology or religion. (shrink)

The inclusion of De astrologia in the Lucianic corpus has been disputed for centuries since it appears to defend astrological practices that Lucian elsewhere undercuts. This paper argues for Lucian’s authorship by illustrating its masterful subversion of a captatio benevolentiae and subtle rejection of Stoic astrological practices. The narrator begins the text by blaming phony astrologers and their erroneous predictions for inciting others to “denounce the stars and hate astrology” (ἄστρων τε κατηγοροῦσιν καὶ αὐτὴν ἀστρολογίην μισέουσιν, 2). The narrator assures (...) readers that he, the knowledgeable astrologer, will correct for the “stupidity and laziness” (ἀμαθίῃ καὶ ῥαθυμίῃ, ibid.) that bring about false predictions. The narrator’s credibility quickly decays when he attempts to recast Orpheus, Bellerophon, Icarus, Daedalus, and a host of other mythological figures as Greek astrologers. Lucian’s audience would expect such far-fetched interpretations of myth from the stereotypical Stoic philosopher, a character lampooned elsewhere in the Lucianic corpus. (shrink)

In 1909 A. Koyré (1892–1964) came to Göttingen as an exile and there became a student of Edmund Husserl and other philosophers (A. Reinach, M. Scheler): already before leaving his country Russia Koyré read Husserl'sLogical Investigations, a text which interested greatly Russian philosophers and was translated into Russian in the same year. As many other contemporary philosophers, in Göttingen they were discussing on the fundaments of mathematic, Cantor's set theory and Russell's antinomies. On this problems Koyré wrote a long paper (...) inspired to Husserl'sLogical Investigations, read it in the Philosophical Society at Göttingen and submitted it as draft for his Ph.D. dissertation to Prof. Husserl, who refused it. So unhappily the celebrated methodologist and historian of science began his academical career: Koyré came back to write on logical and mathematical paradoxes in 1922 and in 1946–47 saying he was “going back to his first love”. Among other factors this deep interest in mathematic and exact sciences unabled Koyré to analyze Galileo and Newton in his masterly way. (shrink)

I present a simple model of Grünbaum’s staccato run in classical mechanics, the staccato roller coaster. It consists of a bead sliding on a frictionless wire shaped like a roller coaster track with infinitely many hills of diminishing size, each of which is a one-dimensional variant of the so-called Norton dome. The staccato roller coaster proves beyond doubt the dynamical (and hence logical) possibility of supertasks in classical mechanics if the Norton dome is a proper system of classical mechanics with (...) metaphysical import. If not, challenges raised against the metaphysical significance of the Norton dome are shown to be challenges against various arguments for the dynamical possibility of supertasks, and the staccato roller coaster clearly shows the importance of meeting these challenges. And the staccato roller coaster can provide, as well as interesting lessons, illuminating analyses of Burke’s (Mod Schoolman 78:1–8, 2000 ) attempt to refute the dynamical possibility of the staccato run and Pérez Laraudogoitia’s (Synthese 148:433–441, 2006 ) rebuttal of it. (shrink)

I propose that an irreducible property of physical space — consistency — is the origin of logic. I propose that an inconsistent space is inconceivable and that this inconceivability can be recognized as the force behind logical propositions. The implications of this argument are briefly explored and then applied to address two paradoxes: Zeno of Elea’s paradox regarding the race between Achilles and the Tortoise, and Lewis Carroll’s paradox regarding the Tortoise’s conversation with Achilles after the race. I conclude that (...) Achilles would have won on both accounts, in the race and the argument, by invoking the consistency of space as the foundation of both movement across space and logical argument. (shrink)

This introduction to the roles infinity plays in metaphysics includes discussion of the nature of infinity itself; infinite space and time, both in extent and in divisibility; infinite regresses; and a list of some other topics in metaphysics where infinity plays a significant role.

infinite, and offer several arguments in sup port of this thesis. I believe their arguments are unsuccessful and aim to refute six of them in the six sections of the paper. One of my main criticisms concerns their supposition that an infinite series of past events must contain some events separated from the present event by an infinite number of intermediate events, and consequently that from one of these infinitely distant past events the present could never have been reached. I (...) introduce.. (shrink)

Zeno's paradoxes of motion and the semantic paradoxes of the Liar have long been thought to have metaphorical affinities. There are, in fact, isomorphisms between variations of Zeno's paradoxes and variations of the Liar paradox in infinite-valued logic. Representing these paradoxes in dynamical systems theory reveals fractal images and provides other geometric ways of visualizing and conceptualizing the paradoxes.

I argue that Descartes' Second Causal Proof of God in the Third Meditation evidences, and commits him to, the belief that time is "strongly discontinuous" -- that is, that there is actually a gap between each consecutive moment of time. Much of my article attempts to reconcile this interpretation, the "received view," with Descartes' statements about time, space, and matter in his other writings, including his correspondence with various philosophers.

One kind of structuralism holds that mathematics is about structures, conceived as a type of abstract entity. Another denies that it is about any distinctively mathematical entities at all—even abstract structures; rather it gives purely general information about what holds of any collection of entities conforming to the axioms of the theory. Of these, pure structuralism is most plausibly taken to enjoy significant advantages over platonism. But in what appears to be its most plausible—modalised—version, even restricted to elementary arithmetic, it (...) requires defence of a very strong possibility claim: that there could be a completed w-sequence of concrete objects. There are very serious epistemological difficulties in the way of providing the requisite defence. (shrink)

Events between which we have no epistemic reason to discriminate have equal epistemic probabilities. Bertrand’s chord paradox, however, appears to show this to be false, and thereby poses a general threat to probabilities for continuum sized state spaces. Articulating the nature of such spaces involves some deep mathematics and that is perhaps why the recent literature on Bertrand’s Paradox has been almost entirely from mathematicians and physicists, who have often deployed elegant mathematics of considerable sophistication. At the same time, the (...) philosophy of probability has been left out. In particular, left out entirely are the philosophical ground of the principle of indifference, the nature of the principle itself, the stringent constraint this places on the mathematical representation of the principle needed for its application to continuum sized event spaces, and what these entail for rigour in developing the paradox itself. This book puts the philosophy and its entailments back in and in so doing casts a new light on the paradox, giving original analyses of the paradox, its possible solutions, the source of the paradox, the philosophical errors we make in attempting to solve it and what the paradox proves for the philosophy of probability. The book finishes with the author’s proposed solution—a solution in the spirit of Bertrand’s, indeed—in which an epistemic principle more general than the principle of indifference offers a principled restriction of the domain of the principle of indifference. (shrink)

While Aristotle provides the crucial testimonies for the paradoxes of motion, topos, and the falling millet seed, surprisingly he shows almost no interest in the paradoxes of plurality. For Plato, by contrast, the plurality paradoxes seem to be the central paradoxes of Zeno and Simplicius is our primary source for those. This paper investigates why the plurality paradoxes are not examined by Aristotle and argues that a close look at the context in which Aristotle discusses Zeno holds the answer to (...) this question. (shrink)

In contemporary metaphysics, the Eleatic Principle (EP) is a causal criterion for reality. Articulating the EP with precision is notoriously difficult. The criterion purportedly originates in Plato’s Sophist, when the Eleatic Visitor articulates the EP at 247d-e in the famous Battle of the Gods and the Giants. There, the Visitor proposes modifying the ontologies of both the Giants (who are materialists) and the Gods (who are friends of the many forms), using a version of the EP according to which only (...) items which have the capacity to affect or to be affected are real. Recently, it has been argued that while there are some genetic connections between the EP and the views of some of the historical Eleatics (Parmenides and Zeno), the views of Melissus are generally incompatible with the EP. This raises the following question: What, exactly, is Eleatic about the Eleatic Principle? In this paper, I look to the dialectical context in which the Visitor’s appeal to the EP appears, and I propose that there are at once three relevant senses of affecting and being affected in the text: (1) tangible contact (as in the interactions between the bodies of the materialists), (2) Cambridge change (as in the form's being affected by a soul via the act of coming to know), and (3) the notion of a cause that does not itself change (as in a form’s affecting another form, a soul, or any sensible item). I argue that these have clear parallels to the metaphysics of all three main Eleatic philosophers, and that the views of Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus are therefore compatible with the EP. This has interesting consequences for narratives about the reception of the Eleatics in Plato, the inclusion of an Eleatic Visitor as an interlocutor in the Sophist, and for the metaphysics of subsequent schools (such as the Stoics) who are widely thought to have been influenced by the EP. (shrink)

Perhaps the real paradox of Zeno's Arrow is that, although entirely stationary, it has, against all odds, successfully traversed over two millennia of human thought to trouble successive generations of philosophers. The prospects were not good: few original Zenonian fragments survive, and our access to the paradoxes has been for the most part through unsympathetic commentaries. Moreover, like its sister paradoxes of motion, the Arrow has repeatedly been dismissed as specious and easily dissolved. Even those commentators who have taken it (...) seriously have propounded solutions with which they profess themselves to be perfectly satisfied. So my question is: will Zeno's Arrow survive into the millennium just begun? (shrink)

Our world is a world of change. Children are born and grow into adults. Material possessions rust and decay with age and ultimately perish. Yet scepticism about change is as old as philosophy itself. Heraclitus, for example, argued that nothing could survive the replacement of parts, so that it is impossible to step into the same river twice. Zeno argued that motion is paradoxical, so that nothing can alter its location. Parmenides and his followers went even further, arguing that the (...) very concept of qualitative change is inconsistent. Change in any respect is impossible, they argued, since change requires difference and nothing differs from itself.1 Few today would accept the Eleatic conclusion that change is impossible. But the topic of change continues to be a source of much debate, as it brings together various issues that are central to metaphysics, language and logic – including identity, persistence, time, tense, and temporal logic. As we consider various approaches to our topic, it will become clear that one’s perspective on change is often determined by one’s position in the broader philosophical landscape. (shrink)

Three of Zeno's objections to motion are answered by utilizing a version of nonstandard analysis, internal set theory, interpreted within an empirical context. Two of the objections are without force because they rely upon infinite sets, which always contain nonstandard real numbers. These numbers are devoid of numerical meaning, and thus one cannot render the judgment that an object is, in fact, located at a point in spacetime for which they would serve as coordinates. The third objection, an arrow never (...) appears to be moving, is answered by showing that it only applies to a finite number of instants of time. A theory of motion is also advanced; it consists of a finite series of contiguous infinitesimal steps. The theory is immune to Zeno's first two objections because the number of steps is finite and each lies outside the domain of observation. Present motion is hypothesized to be an unobservable process taking place within each step. The fact of motion is apparent through a summing (Riemann integration) of the steps. (shrink)

In this paper a simple model in particle dynamics of a well-known supertask is constructed (the supertask was introduced by Max Black some years ago). As a consequence, a new and simple result about creation ex nihilo of particles can be proved compatible with classical dynamics. This result cannot be avoided by imposing boundary conditions at spatial infinity, and therefore is really new in the literature. It follows that there is no reason why even a world of rigid spheres should (...) be eternal, as has been erroneously assumed, especially since the time of Newton. (shrink)

We examine the notions of negative, infinite and hotter than infinite temperatures and show how these unusual concepts gain legitimacy in quantum statistical mechanics. We ask if the existence of an infinite temperature implies the existence of an actual infinity and argue that it does not. Since one can sensibly talk about hotter than infinite temperatures, we ask if one could legitimately speak of other physical quantities, such as length and duration, in analogous terms. That is, could there be longer (...) than infinite lengths or temporal durations? We argue that the answer is surprisingly yes, and we outline the properties of a number system that could be employed to characterize such magnitudes. (shrink)

In the paper below the authors describe three super-tasks. They show that although the abstract notion of a super-task may be, as Benacerraf suggested, a conceptual mismatch, the completion of the three super-tasks involved can be defined rather naturally, without leading to inconsistency, by means of a particular kinematical interpretation combined with a principle of continuity.

This catalogue is divided into two parts. Part 1 presents basic bibliographical information on books and journal issues that consist exclusively or in large part in papers devoted to the Presocratics and the Sophists. Part 2 lists the papers on Presocratic and Sophistic topics found in the volumes, providing name of author, title, and page numbers, and in the case of reprinted papers, the year of original publication. In some cases Part 2 lists the complete contents of volumes, not only (...) the Presocratic and Sophistic-related papers. Annual updates are submitted as additional files below. (shrink)

Various arguments have been put forward to show that Zeno-like paradoxes are still with us. A particularly interesting one involves a cube composed of colored slabs that geometrically decrease in thickness. We first point out that this argument has already been nullified by Paul Benacerraf. Then we show that nevertheless a further problem remains, one that withstands Benacerraf s critique. We explain that the new problem is isomorphic to two other Zeno-like predicaments: a problem described by Alper and Bridger in (...) 1998 and a modified version of the problem that Benardete introduced in 1964. Finally, we present a solution to the three isomorphic problems. (shrink)

I claim that, if persisting objects have temporal parts, then there are non-supervenient relations between those temporal parts. These are relations which are not determined by intrinsic properties of the temporal parts. I use the Kripke-Armstrong 'rotating homogeneous disc' argument in order to establish this claim, and in doing so I defend and develop that argument. This involves a discussion of instantaneous velocity, and of the causes and effects of rotation. Finally, I compare alternative responses to the rotating disc argument, (...) and consider the implications of my arguments for the doctrines of Humean Supervenience and unrestricted mereology. (shrink)

This article addresses the question whether supertasks are possible within the context of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The supertask under consideration consists of performing an infinite number of quantum mechanical measurements in a finite amount of time. Recent arguments in the physics literature claim to show that continuous measurements, understood as N discrete measurements in the limit where N goes to infinity, are impossible. I show that there are certain kinds of measurements in quantum mechanics for which these arguments break down. (...) This suggests that there is a new context in which quantum mechanics, in principle, permits the performance of a supertask. (shrink)

We explore the better known paradoxes of Zeno including modern variants based on infinite processes, from the point of view of standard, classical analysis, from which there is still much to learn (especially concerning the paradox of division), and then from the viewpoints of non-standard and non-classical analysis (the logic of the latter being intuitionist).The standard, classical or Cantorian notion of the continuum, modeled on the real number line, is well known, as is the definition of motion as the time (...) derivative of distance (we are not concerned with position and motion in more than one dimension, since Zeno wasn't). The real number line consists of its points, the distance between distinct points being positive and finite. The standard, classical derivative relies on the classical notion of limit, which does not use infinitesimals. (shrink)

This paper explores the classical idea of complementarity in mathematics concerning the relationship of intuition and axiomatic proof. Section I illustrates the basic concepts of the paper, while Section II presents opposing accounts of intuitionist and axiomatic approaches to mathematics. Section III analyzes one of Einstein's lecture on the topic and Section IV examines an application of the issues in mathematics and science education. Section V discusses the idea of complementarity by examining one of Zeno's paradoxes. This is followed by (...) presenting a few more programmatic suggestions and a brief summary. (shrink)

Ways and words about infinity have frequently hidden a continuing paradox inspired by Zeno. The basic puzzle is the tortoise's – Mr T's – Extension Challenge, the challenge being how any extension, be it in time or space or both, moving or still, can yet be of an endless number of extensions. We identify a similarity with Mr T's Deduction Challenge, reported by Lewis Carroll, to the claim that a conclusion can be validly reached in finite steps. Rejecting common solutions (...) to both challenges, we use a Wittgensteinian approach for dissolution, noting also that other paradoxes, such as the Surprise Examination and Yablo's, trap us inconsistently into similar endlessnesses. In so doing, we encounter a hopping flea, generate a proportionality paradox and consider the knight's move in chess. (shrink)