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  1. The Brittleness of Expertise and Why It Matters.Daniel Kilov - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3431-3455.
    Expertise has become a topic of increased interest to philosophers. Fascinating in its own right, expertise also plays a crucial role in several philosophical debates. My aim in this paper is to draw attention to an important, and hitherto unappreciated feature of expertise: its brittleness. Experts are often unable to transfer their proficiency in one domain to other, even intuitively similar domains. Experts are often unable to flexibly respond to changes within their domains. And, even more surprisingly, experts will occasionally (...)
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  • Simulationism and the Function(s) of Episodic Memory.Arieh Schwartz - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):487-505.
    According to simulationism, the function of episodic memory is not to remember the past, but to help construct representations of possible future episodes, by drawing together features from different experiential sources. This article suggests that the relationship between the traditional storehouse view, on which the function of memory is remembering, and the simulationist approach is more complicated than has been typically acknowledged. This is attributed, in part, to incorrect interpretations of what remembering on the storehouse view requires. Further, by appeal (...)
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  • Anti-Intellectualist Motor Knowledge.Gabriele Ferretti - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10733-10763.
    Intellectualists suggest that practical knowledge, or ‘knowing- how’, can be reduced to propositional knowledge, or ‘knowing-that’. Anti-intellectualists, on the contrary, suggest, following the original insights by Ryle, that such a reduction is not possible. Rejection of intellectualism can be proposed either by offering purely philosophical analytical arguments, or by recruiting empirical evidence from cognitive science about the nature of the mental representations involved in these two forms of knowledge. In this paper, I couple these two strategies in order to analyze (...)
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  • Knowledge How.Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • A Cognitive Perspective on Knowledge How: Why Intellectualism Is Neuro-Psychologically Implausible.Andreas Stephens & Cathrine V. Felix - 2020 - Philosophies 5 (21):21-0.
    We defend two theses: Knowledge how and knowledge that are two distinct forms of knowledge, and; Stanley-style intellectualism is neuro-psychologically implausible. Our naturalistic argument for the distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that is based on a consideration of the nature of slips and basic activities. We further argue that Stanley’s brand of intellectualism has certain ontological consequences that go against modern cognitive neuroscience and psychology. We tie up our line of thought by showing that input from cognitive neuroscience and (...)
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