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What's so Bad about Discrimination?

Utilitas 24 (1):82-100 (2012)

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  1. Does harm or disrespect make discrimination wrong? An experimental approach.Andreas Albertsen, Bjørn G. Hallsson, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen & Viki M. L. Pedersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    While standard forms of discrimination are widely considered morally wrong, philosophers disagree about what makes them so. Two accounts have risen to prominence in this debate: One stressing how wrongful discrimination disrespects the discriminatee, the other how the harms involved make discrimination wrong. While these accounts are based on carefully constructed thought experiments, proponents of both sides see their positions as in line with and, in part, supported by the folk theory of the moral wrongness of discrimination. This article presents (...)
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  • Is discrimination wrong because it is undeserved?Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Several leading theorists embrace the Simple Desert Account of Discrimination. This account involves two claims: it claims that a mismatch between what people deserve, on the one hand, and what they get, on the other hand, is (a) integral to discrimination, and (b) wrong. I shall query (a). First, I challenge what I see as the principal, positive argument for the Simple Desert Account. Second, in some cases wrongful discrimination brings about a better match between desert and what people get. (...)
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  • No Disrespect - But That Account Does Not Explain the Badness of Discrimination.Frej Klem Thomsen - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 23 (3):420-447.
    The article explores one prominent account of what makes discrimination morally bad (when it is) – the disrespect-based account. The article first reviews and clarifies the account, arguing that it is most charitably understood as the claim that discrimination is morally bad when the discriminator gives lower weight to reasons grounded in the moral status of the discriminatee(s) in her decision-making. It then presents three challenges to the account, and reviews a recent argument in defense of it. The first challenge (...)
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  • In for a Penny, or: If You Disapprove of Investment Migration, Why Do You Approve of High-Skilled Migration?Lior Erez - 2021 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 8 (1):155-178.
    While many argue investment-based criteria for immigration are wrong or at least problematic, skill-based criteria remain relatively uncontroversial. This is normatively inconsistent. This article assesses three prominent normative objections to investment-based selection criteria for immigrants: that they wrongfully discriminate between prospective immigrants that they are unfair, and that they undermine political equality among citizens. It argues that either skill-based criteria are equally susceptible to these objections, or that investment-based criteria are equally shielded from them. Indeed, in some ways investment-based criteria (...)
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  • No Fats, Femmes, or Asians.Xiaofei Liu - 2015 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 2 (2):255-276.
    A frequent caveat in online dating profiles – “No fats, femmes, or Asians” – caused an LGBT activist to complain about the bias against Asians in the American gay community, which he called “racial looksism”. In response, he was asked that, if he himself would not date a fat person, why he should find others not dating Asians so upsetting. This response embodies a popular attitude that personal preferences or tastes are simply personal matters – they are not subject to (...)
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  • Stealing Bread and Sleeping Beneath Bridges - Indirect Discrimination as Disadvantageous Equal Treatment.Frej Klem Thomsen - 2015 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 2 (2):299-327.
    The article analyses the concept of indirect discrimination, arguing first that existing conceptualisations are unsatisfactory and second that it is best understood as equal treatment that is disadvantageous to the discriminatees because of their group-membership. I explore four ways of further refining the definition, arguing that only an added condition of moral wrongness is at once plausible and helpful, but that it entails a number of new problems that may outweigh its benefits. Finally, I suggest that the moral wrongness of (...)
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  • The Injustice of Discrimination.Carl Knight - 2013 - South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):47-59.
    Discrimination might be considered unjust on account of the comparative disadvantage it imposes, the absolute disadvantage it imposes, the disrespect it shows, or the prejudice it shows. This article argues that each of these accounts overlooks some cases of unjust discrimination. In response to this state of affairs we might combine two or more of these accounts. A promising approach combines the comparative disadvantage and absolute disadvantage accounts.
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  • Why Benefitting a Person Cannot Constitute a Form of Discrimination.Daniel Statman - 2021 - Ratio Juris 34 (4):315-330.
    The purpose of this article is to discuss whether a person can be discriminated against by means of an action intended to benefit him or her. The discussion is triggered by a recent court decision according to which women may be entitled to compensation for a policy that made them better off in some respect because of its assumed effect on the perpetuation of harmful stereotypes about women. I reject this view, arguing that such effects are neither necessary nor sufficient (...)
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  • Why It Is Wrong to Use Student Evaluations of Professors as a Measure of Teaching Effectiveness in Personnel Assessments: An Unjust Risk of Harm Account.Eamon Aloyo - 2023 - Public Affairs Quarterly 37 (2):79-100.
    I argue that university supervisors should not use student evaluations of teachers (SETs) as a measure of teaching effectiveness in personnel assessments because the evidence suggests SETs likely violate several duties university supervisors have toward their instructional employees. I focus on the duty to not knowingly impose a wrongful risk of harm on nonconsenting and innocent others. Many university employers impose a wrongful risk of harm on instructors by not using relevant, merit-based performance indicators that have adequate construct validity, by (...)
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  • What Makes Discrimination Morally Wrong? A Harm‐Based View Reconsidered.Shu Ishida - 2021 - Theoria 87 (2):483-499.
    What is the morally significant feature of discrimination? All of the following seem plausible – (i) discrimination is a kind of wrongdoing and it wrongs discriminatees, which is a matter of intrapersonal morality; (ii) in view of cases of indirect discrimination, significant normative features of discrimination are best captured in a discriminatee‐focused, or harm‐based, way; and (iii) discrimination, as an act‐type, necessarily involves interpersonal comparison. The first task of this article is to address which of intra‐ or interpersonal comparison is (...)
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  • Racial Profiling And Cumulative Injustice.Andreas Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):452-477.
    This paper tries to explain why racial profiling involves a serious injustice and to do so in a way that avoids the problems of existing philosophical accounts. An initially plausible view maintains that racial profiling is pro tanto wrong in and of itself by violating a constraint on fair treatment that is generally violated by acts of statistical discrimination based on ascribed characteristics. However, consideration of other cases involving statistical discrimination suggests that violating a constraint of this kind may not (...)
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  • Discrimination in the age of artificial intelligence.Bert Heinrichs - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (1):143-154.
    In this paper, I examine whether the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and automated decision-making (ADM) aggravates issues of discrimination as has been argued by several authors. For this purpose, I first take up the lively philosophical debate on discrimination and present my own definition of the concept. Equipped with this account, I subsequently review some of the recent literature on the use AI/ADM and discrimination. I explain how my account of discrimination helps to understand that the general claim in (...)
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  • Unacceptable Generalizations in Arguments on Legal Evidence.Christian Dahlman - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (1):83-99.
    Arguments on legal evidence rely on generalizations, that link a certain circumstance to a certain hypothesis and warrants the claim that the circumstance makes the hypothesis more probable. Some generalizations are acceptable and others are unacceptable. A generalization can be unacceptable on at least four different grounds. A false generalization is unacceptable because membership in the reference class does not increase the probability of the hypothesis. A non-robust generalization is unacceptable because it uses a reference class that is too heterogeneous. (...)
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  • Making Sense of Discrimination.Re'em Segev - 2014 - Ratio Juris 27 (1):47-78.
    Discrimination is a central moral and legal concept. However, it is also a contested one. Particularly, accounts of the wrongness of discrimination often rely on controversial and particular assumptions. In this paper, I argue that a theory of discrimination that relies on premises that are very general (rather than unique to the concept of discrimination) and widely accepted provides a plausible (exhaustive) account of the concept of wrongful discrimination. According to the combined theory, wrongful discrimination consists of allocating a benefit (...)
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  • On Respecting Animals, or Can Animals be Wronged Without Being Harmed?Angela K. Martin - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (1):83-99.
    There is broad agreement that humans can be wronged independently of their incurring any harm, that is, when their welfare is not affected. Examples include unnoticed infringements of privacy, ridiculing unaware individuals, or disregarding individuals’ autonomous decision-making in their best interest. However, it is less clear whether the same is true of animals—that is, whether moral agents can wrong animals in situations that do not involve any harm to the animals concerned. In order to answer this question, I concentrate on (...)
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  • Transgender EU Citizens and the Limited Form of Union Citizenship available to them.Serhii Lashyn - 2022 - Feminist Legal Studies 30 (2):201-218.
    This article argues that only a limited form of EU citizenship is available to transgender people. As the paper demonstrates, transgender Union citizens face numerous difficulties when they exercise their right to free movement, despite such movement being the core of Union citizenship. Rather, transgender individuals only have access to a considerably restricted form of EU citizenship which is guaranteed as part of their fundamental status conferred by EU Treaties. The article points out that the current approach of including transgender (...)
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  • Intentions, Impartiality, and the Fairness of Lotteries.Xueshi Wang - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):1795-1810.
    Why should a lottery be used in the allocation of an indivisible good to which participants in the lottery have an equally strong claim? Stone argues that when indeterminacy arises, in which it is impossible to satisfy the equality condition requiring like cases to be treated alike, the impartiality principle suggests that the agent responsible for the allocation task should not intend to favor one over another on the basis of invalid reasons. In this article, I argue that the impartiality (...)
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  • Paying minorities to leave.Mollie Gerver - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):3-22.
    In April 1962, white segregationists paid money to African Americans agreeing to leave New Orleans. In 2010, the British National Party proposed paying non-white migrants money to leave the UK. Five years later, a landlord in New York paid African American tenants to vacate their apartments. This article considers when, if ever, it is morally permissible to pay minorities to leave. I argue that paying minorities to leave is demeaning towards recipients and so wrong. Although the payments are wrong, it (...)
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