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Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic

Oxford: Oxford University Press UK (2016)

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  1. Anti-exceptionalism about logic as tradition rejection.Ben Martin & Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-33.
    While anti-exceptionalism about logic is now a popular topic within the philosophy of logic, there’s still a lack of clarity over what the proposal amounts to. currently, it is most common to conceive of AEL as the proposal that logic is continuous with the sciences. Yet, as we show here, this conception of AEL is unhelpful due to both its lack of precision, and its distortion of the current debates. Rather, AEL is better understood as the rejection of certain traditional (...)
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  • Kant on the Possibilities of Mathematics and the Scope and Limits of Logic.Frode Kjosavik - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (6):683-706.
    ABSTRACT I suggest how a broadly Kantian critique of classical logic might spring from reflections on constructibility conditions. According to Kant, mathematics is concerned with objects that are given through ‘arbitrary synthesis,’ in the form of ‘constructions of concepts’ in the medium of ‘pure intuition.’ Logic, by contrast, is narrowly constrained – it has no objects of its own and is fixed by the very forms of thought. That is why there is not much room for developments within logic, as (...)
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  • Husserl on Kant and the Critical View of Logic.Mirja Hartimo - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (6):707-724.
    ABSTRACT This paper seeks to clarify Husserl’s critical remarks about Kant’s view of logic by comparing their respective views of logic. In his Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl criticizes Kant for not asking transcendental questions about formal logic, but rather ascribing an ‘extraordinary apriority’ to it. He thinks the reason for Kant’s uncritical attitude to logic lies in Kant’s view of logic as directed toward the subjective, instead of being concerned with a ‘“world” of ideal Objects’. Whereas for Kant, general (...)
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  • Invariance and Necessity.Gila Sher - 2019 - In Bernhard Ritter, Paul Weingartner & Gabriele M. Mras (eds.), Philosophy of logic and Mathematics. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 55-70.
    Properties and relations in general have a certain degree of invariance, and some types of properties/relations have a stronger degree of invariance than others. In this paper I will show how the degrees of invariance of different types of properties are associated with, and explain, the modal force of the laws governing them. This explains differences in the modal force of laws/principles of different disciplines, starting with logic and mathematics and proceeding to physics and biology.
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  • The Cost of Closure: Logical Realism, Anti-Exceptionalism, and Theoretical Equivalence.Michaela M. McSweeney - 2021 - Synthese 199:12795–12817.
    Philosophers of science often assume that logically equivalent theories are theoretically equivalent. I argue that two theses, anti-exceptionalism about logic (which says, roughly, that logic is not a priori, that it is revisable, and that it is not special or set apart from other human inquiry) and logical realism (which says, roughly, that differences in logic reflect genuine metaphysical differences in the world), make trouble for both this commitment and the closely related commitment to theories being closed under logical consequence. (...)
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  • The Bounds of Logic: A Generalized Viewpoint.Gila Sher - 1991 - MIT Press.
    The Bounds of Logic presents a new philosophical theory of the scope and nature of logic based on critical analysis of the principles underlying modern Tarskian logic and inspired by mathematical and linguistic development. Extracting central philosophical ideas from Tarski’s early work in semantics, Sher questions whether these are fully realized by the standard first-order system. The answer lays the foundation for a new, broader conception of logic. By generally characterizing logical terms, Sher establishes a fundamental result in semantics. Her (...)
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  • Human Thought, Mathematics, and Physical Discovery.Gila Sher - forthcoming - In Yemima Ben Menahem & Carl Posy (eds.), Mathematical Knowledge, Objects and Applications: Essays in Memory of Mark Steiner. Berlin: Springer Nature.
    In this paper I discuss Mark Steiner's view of the contribution of mathematics to physics and take up some of the questions it raises. In particular, I take up the question of discovery and explore two aspects of this question ‒ a metaphysical aspect and a related epistemic aspect. The metaphysical aspect concerns the formal structure of the physical world. Does the physical world have mathematical or formal features or constituents, and what is the nature of these constituents? The related (...)
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  • Pluralism and Normativity in Truth and Logic.Gila Sher - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57:337-350.
    In this paper I investigate how differences in approach to truth and logic (in particular, a deflationist vs. a substantivist approach to these fields) affect philosophers’ views concerning pluralism and normativity in these fields. My perspective on truth and logic is largely epistemic, focusing on the role of truth in knowledge (rather than on the use of the words “true” and “truth” in natural language), and my reference group includes Carnap (1934), Harman (1986), Horwich (1990), Wright (1992), Beall and Restall (...)
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  • Logic as a Methodological Discipline.Gil Sagi - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9725-9749.
    This essay offers a conception of logic by which logic may be considered to be exceptional among the sciences on the backdrop of a naturalistic outlook. The conception of logic focused on emphasises the traditional role of logic as a methodology for the sciences, which distinguishes it from other sciences that are not methodological. On the proposed conception, the methodological aims of logic drive its definitions and principles, rather than the description of scientific phenomena. The notion of a methodological discipline (...)
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  • On the Explanatory Power of Truth in Logic.Gila Sher - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):348-373.
    Philosophers are divided on whether the proof- or truth-theoretic approach to logic is more fruitful. The paper demonstrates the considerable explanatory power of a truth-based approach to logic by showing that and how it can provide (i) an explanatory characterization —both semantic and proof-theoretical—of logical inference, (ii) an explanatory criterion for logical constants and operators, (iii) an explanatory account of logic’s role (function) in knowledge, as well as explanations of (iv) the characteristic features of logic —formality, strong modal force, generality, (...)
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  • Lessons on Truth From Kant.Gila Sher - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):171-201.
    Kant is known for having said relatively little about truth in Critique of Pure Reason. Nevertheless, there are important lessons to be learned from this work about truth, lessons that apply to the contemporary debate on the nature and structure of truth and its theory. In this paper I suggest two such lessons. The first lesson concerns the structure of a substantive theory of truth as contrasted with a deflationist theory; the second concerns the structure of a correspondence theory of (...)
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  • Substantivism About Truth.Gila Sher - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):818-828.
    Substantivism is a general philosophical methodology advocating a substantive approach to philosophical theorizing. In this article, I present an overview of this methodology with a special emphasis on the field of truth. I begin with a framework for understanding what is at stake in the substantivist–deflationist debate and describe the substantivist critique of deflationism. I then proceed to discuss contemporary substantivism as a positive methodology, present examples of recent substantivist theories of truth, delineate several principles of philosophical substantivism, and connect (...)
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  • Invariance as a Basis for Necessity and Laws.Gila Sher - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):3945-3974.
    Many philosophers are baffled by necessity. Humeans, in particular, are deeply disturbed by the idea of necessary laws of nature. In this paper I offer a systematic yet down to earth explanation of necessity and laws in terms of invariance. The type of invariance I employ for this purpose generalizes an invariance used in meta-logic. The main idea is that properties and relations in general have certain degrees of invariance, and some properties/relations have a stronger degree of invariance than others. (...)
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  • Truth and Scientific Change.Gila Sher - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (3):371-394.
    The paper seeks to answer two new questions about truth and scientific change: What lessons does the phenomenon of scientific change teach us about the nature of truth? What light do recent developments in the theory of truth, incorporating these lessons, throw on problems arising from the prevalence of scientific change, specifically, the problem of pessimistic meta-induction?
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  • Logical Realism: A Tale of Two Theories.Gila Sher - forthcoming - In Sophia Arbeiter & Juliette Kennedy (eds.), The Philosophy of Penelope Maddy. Springer.
    The paper compares two theories of the nature of logic: Penelope Maddy's and my own. The two theories share a significant element: they both view logic as grounded not just in the mind (language, concepts, conventions, etc.), but also, and crucially, in the world. But the two theories differ in significant ways as well. Most distinctly, one is an anti-holist, "austere naturalist" theory while the other is a non-naturalist "foundational-holistic" theory. This methodological difference affects their questions, goals, orientations, the scope (...)
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  • Quine Vs. Quine: Abstract Knowledge and Ontology.Gila Sher - 2020 - In Frederique Janssen-Lauret (ed.), Quine, Structure, and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford. pp. 230-252.
    How does Quine fare in the first decades of the twenty-first century? In this paper I examine a cluster of Quinean theses that, I believe, are especially fruitful in meeting some of the current challenges of epistemology and ontology. These theses offer an alternative to the traditional bifurcations of truth and knowledge into factual and conceptual-pragmatic-conventional, the traditional conception of a foundation for knowledge, and traditional realism. To make the most of Quine’s ideas, however, we have to take an active (...)
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  • Where Are You Going, Metaphysics, and How Are You Getting There? - Grounding Theory as a Case Study.Gila Sher - 2019 - In Miroslav Szatkowski (ed.), Quo Vadis, Metaphysics? Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter Studium. pp. 37-57.
    The viability of metaphysics as a field of knowledge has been challenged time and again. But in spite of the continuing tendency to dismiss metaphysics, there has been considerable progress in this field in the 20th- and 21st- centuries. One of the newest − though, in a sense, also oldest − frontiers of metaphysics is the grounding project. In this paper I raise a methodological challenge to the new grounding project and propose a constructive solution. Both the challenge and its (...)
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  • The Logical Inconsistency in Making Sense of an Ineffable God of Islam.Abbas Ahsan - 2020 - Philotheos 20 (1):68-116.
    With the advent of classical logic we are continuing to observe an adherence to the laws of logic. Moreover, the system of classical logic exhibits a prominent role within analytic philosophy. Given that the laws of logic have persistently endured in actively defining classical logic and its preceding system of logic, it begs the question as to whether it actually proves to be consistent with Islam. To consider this inquiry in a broader manner; it would be an investigation into the (...)
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  • The Paradox of an Absolute Ineffable God of Islam.Abbas Ahsan - 2019 - Philotheos 19 (2):227-259.
    The laws of logic and two of the broader theories of truth are fundamental components that are responsible for espousing an ontology and meaningfulness in matters of analytic philosophy. In this respect they have persisted as conventional attitudes or modes of thought which most, if not all, of analytic philosophy uses to philosophize. However, despite the conceptual productivity of these components they are unable to account for matters that are beyond them. These matters would include certain theological beliefs, for instance, (...)
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  • Pragmatism and Correspondence.Andrew Howat - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):685-704.
    It is commonplace to describe the pragmatist conception of truth as incompatible with correspondence theory. This popular description relies on a deflationary reading of Peirce and James’s many apparent endorsements of correspondence. This reading says they regarded it as a mere platitude or truism, not as a substantive piece of philosophical theorizing. There are two main reasons typically offered in support of this platitude narrative – its consonance with Peirce’s original formulation of PT from 1878, and the objections that pragmatists (...)
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  • Editorial Introduction to ‘Truth: Concept Meets Property’.Jeremy Wyatt - 2020 - Synthese 198 (2):591-603.
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  • Invariance and Logicality in Perspective.Gila Sher - 2021 - In Gil Sagi & Jack Woods (eds.), The Semantic Conception of Logic: Essays on Consequence, Invariance, and Meaning. Cambridge, Britain: Cambridge University Press. pp. 13-34.
    Although the invariance criterion of logicality first emerged as a criterion of a purely mathematical interest, it has developed into a criterion of considerable linguistic and philosophical interest. In this paper I compare two different perspectives on this criterion. The first is the perspective of natural language. Here, the invariance criterion is measured by its success in capturing our linguistic intuitions about logicality and explaining our logical behavior in natural-linguistic settings. The second perspective is more theoretical. Here, the invariance criterion (...)
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  • Pluralist Theories of Truth.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Theorizing About Truth Outside of One’s Own Language.Graham Seth Moore - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):883-903.
    A theory of truth is language-transcendent if it ascribes truth conditions to truth-bearers that are not expressible in our natural language; a theory is language-immanent if it is not language-transcendent. In this paper, I argue for the following theses. Whether the correct theory of truth is language-transcendent or language-immanent will have significant consequences for general philosophy. Prima facie, a language-transcendent theory is preferable. However, language-transcendent theories tend to require substantive metaphysical commitments concerning truth. Deflationist theories are particularly interesting in this (...)
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  • A Survey of Logical Realism.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4775-4790.
    Logical realism is a view about the metaphysical status of logic. Common to most if not all the views captured by the label ‘logical realism’ is that logical facts are mind- and language-independent. But that does not tell us anything about the nature of logical facts or about our epistemic access to them. The goal of this paper is to outline and systematize the different ways that logical realism could be entertained and to examine some of the challenges that these (...)
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