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The Prospects for Sufficientarianism

Utilitas 24 (1):101-117 (2012)

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  1. Compensation for Geoengineering Harms and No-Fault Climate Change Compensation.Pak-Hang Wong, Tom Douglas & Julian Savulescu - 2014 - The Climate Geoengineering Governance Working Papers.
    While geoengineering may counteract negative effects of anthropogenic climate change, it is clear that most geoengineering options could also have some harmful effects. Moreover, it is predicted that the benefits and harms of geoengineering will be distributed unevenly in different parts of the world and to future generations, which raises serious questions of justice. It has been suggested that a compensation scheme to redress geoengineering harms is needed for geoengineering to be ethically and politically acceptable. Discussions of compensation for geoengineering (...)
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  • The Naturalistic Fallacy in Ethical Discourse on the Social Determinants of Health.Daniel Goldberg - 2015 - American Journal of Bioethics 15 (3):58-60.
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  • Genug ist genug? Zur Kritik non-egalitaristischer Konzeptionen der Bildungsgerechtigkeit.Johannes Drerup - 2015 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 2 (1):89-128.
    Vertreter non-egalitaristischer Konzeptionen der Bildungsgerechtigkeit ersetzen das klassische egalitaristische Votum für Gleichheit als intrinsischen Wert durch die Begründung von Schwellenkonzeptionen, die über Adäquatheits- und Suffizienzbedingungen angeben sollen, was als Kriterium für die Identifikation illegitimer Bildungsungleichheiten zu gelten hat und was nicht. Alle Ungleichheiten oberhalb einer fixierten Schwelle sind aus non-egalitaristischer Sicht normativ nicht von Belang. Dieser Fokus auf Mindestbedingungen, die gegeben sein müssen, damit Akteure in liberal-demokratischen Gesellschaften politisch partizipieren und ein gedeihliches Leben führen können, steht nicht nur in einem (...)
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  • Intergenerational justice.Lukas Meyer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Is it fair to leave the next generation a public debt? Is it defensible to impose legal rules on them through constitutional constraints? From combating climate change to ensuring proper funding for future pensions, concerns about ethics between generations are everywhere. In this volume sixteen philosophers explore intergenerational justice. Part One examines the ways in which various theories of justice look at the matter. These include libertarian, Rawlsian, sufficientarian, contractarian, communitarian, Marxian and reciprocity-based approaches. In Part Two, the authors look (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Limitarianism, Upper Limits, and Minimal Thresholds.Dick Timmer - forthcoming - Res Publica:1-19.
    Limitarianism holds that there is an upper limit to how many resources, such as wealth and income, people can permissibly have. In this article, I examine the conceptual structure of limitarianism. I focus on the upper limit and the idea that resources above the limit are ‘excess resources’. I distinguish two possible limitarian views about such resources: (i) that excess resources have zero moral value for the holder; and (ii) that excess resources do have moral value for the holder but (...)
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  • Limitarismo. ¿Patrón, principio o presunción?Dick Timmer - 2024 - In Ingrid Robeyns (ed.), Tener Demasiado: Ensayos Filosóficos sobre el Limitarismo. Open Book Publishers. pp. 147–170.
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  • The Utilitarian's Guide to Dreams.Adam Piovarchy - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (1):75-97.
    Unpleasant dreams occur much more frequently than many people realise. If one is a hedonistic utilitarian – or, at least, one thinks that dreams have positive or negative moral value in virtue of their experiential quality – then one has considerable reason to try to make such dreams more positive. Given it is possible to improve the quality of our dreams, we ought to be promoting and implementing currently available interventions that improve our dream experiences, and conducting research to find (...)
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  • Warum wir eine Erbschaftssteuer brauchen: Eine philosophische Verteidigung.Marcel Twele - 2023 - De Gruyter.
    In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird eine normative Analyse und Verteidigung der Erbschaftssteuer unternommen. Zunächst wird eine egalitaristische Argumentation für die Steuer entfaltet. Aufgrund ihrer progressiven Struktur ist die Erbschaftssteuer ein geeignetes Instrument, um der wachsenden ökonomischen Ungleichheit entgegenzuwirken und letztlich verschiedene egalitäre Ideale (politische Gleichheit, Chancengleicheit etc.) zu befördern. Anschließend wird untersucht, wie aus normativer Perspektive zu beurteilen ist, dass der Erblasser bei Erhebung der Steuer nicht mehr lebt. Die restliche Arbeit besteht in einer Auseinandersetzung mit den wichtigsten Einwänden gegen (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Limitarianism: Pattern, Principle, or Presumption?Dick Timmer - 2023 - In Ingrid Robeyns (ed.), Having Too Much: Philosophical Essays on Limitarianism. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers. pp. 129-150.
    In this article, I assess the prospects for the limitarian thesis that someone has too much wealth if they exceed a specific wealth threshold. Limitarianism claims that there are good political and/or ethical reasons to prevent people from having such ‘surplus wealth’, for example, because it has no moral value for the holder or because allowing people to have surplus wealth has less moral value than redistributing it. Drawing on recent literature on distributive justice, I defend two types of limitarian (...)
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  • There Is No Such Thing as a Political Conservative.Nicholas Smyth - forthcoming - European Journal of Political Theory.
    In this paper, I try to pin down the essence of conservative political theory. I then show that no-one really believes this theory, because all of us embrace progressive values and principles under the right circumstances. This doesn't mean that there aren't such things as conservative political reasons, and I offer an account of such reasons here. But in my view no-one really thinks that such reasons are the sole or even the primary political reasons.
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  • Relational Justice: Egalitarian and Sufficientarian.Andreas Bengtson & Lasse Nielsen - 2023 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 40 (5):900-918.
    Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which people must relate as equals. In this article, we develop relational sufficientarianism – a view of justice according to which people must relate as sufficients. We distinguish between three versions of this ideal, one that is incompatible with relational egalitarianism and two that are not. Building on this, we argue that relational theorists have good reason to support a pluralist view that is both egalitarian and sufficientarian.
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  • Weighted sufficientarianisms: Carl Knight on the excessiveness objection.Dick Timmer - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):494-506.
    Carl Knight argues that lexical sufficientarianism, which holds that sufficientarian concerns should have lexical priority over other distributive goals, is ‘excessive’ in many distinct ways and that sufficientarians should either defend weighted sufficientarianism or become prioritarians. In this article, I distinguish three types of weighted sufficientarianism and propose a weighted sufficientarian view that meets the excessiveness objection and is preferable to both Knight’s proposal and prioritarianism. More specifically, I defend a multi-threshold view which gives weighted priority to benefits directly above (...)
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  • Good Enough? The Minimally Good Life Account of the Basic Minimum.Nicole Hassoun - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):330-341.
    ABSTRACT What kind of basic minimum do we owe to others? This paper defends a new procedure for answering this question. It argues that its minimally good life account has some advantages over the main alternatives and that neither the first-, nor third-, person perspective can help us to arrive at an adequate account. Rather, it employs the second-person perspective of free, reasonable, care. There might be other conditions for distributive justice, and morality certainly requires more than helping everyone to (...)
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  • Enough is too much: the excessiveness objection to sufficientarianism.Carl Knight - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (2):275-299.
    The standard version of sufficientarianism maintains that providing people with enough, or as close to enough as is possible, is lexically prior to other distributive goals. This article argues that this is excessive – more than distributive justice allows – in four distinct ways. These concern the magnitude of advantage, the number of beneficiaries, responsibility and desert, and above-threshold distribution. Sufficientarians can respond by accepting that providing enough unconditionally is more than distributive justice allows, instead balancing sufficiency against other considerations.
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  • Egalitarianism across Generations.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2024 - Utilitas 36 (3):242-264.
    Egalitarian theories assess when and why distributive inequalities are objectionable. How should egalitarians assess inequalities between generations? One egalitarian theory is (telic) distributive egalitarianism: other things being equal, equal distributions of some good are intrinsically better than unequal distributions. I first argue that distributive egalitarianism produces counterintuitive judgements when applied across generations and that attempts to discount or exclude intergenerational inequalities do not work. This being so, intergenerational comparisons also undercut the intragenerational judgements that made distributive egalitarianism intuitive in the (...)
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  • Utility, Priorities, and Quiescent Sufficiency.Fausto Corvino - 2019 - Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics 21 (3):525-552.
    In this article, I firstly discuss why a prioritarian clause can rescue the utilitarian doctrine from the risk of exacerbating inequality in the distribution of resources in those cases in which utility of income does not decline at the margin. Nonetheless, when in the presence of adaptive preferences, classic prioritarianism is more likely than utilitarianism to increase the inequality of resources under all circumstances, independently of the diminishing trend of utility. Hence, I propose to shift the informational focus of prioritarianism (...)
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  • Health(care) and the temporal subject.Ben Davies - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (3):38-64.
    Many assume that theories of distributive justice must obviously take people’s lifetimes, and only their lifetimes, as the relevant period across which we distribute. Although the question of the temporal subject has risen in prominence, it is still relatively underdeveloped, particularly in the sphere of health and healthcare. This paper defends a particular view, “momentary sufficientarianism,” as being an important element of healthcare justice. At the heart of the argument is a commitment to pluralism about justice, where theorizing about just (...)
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  • Justice and Public Health.Govind Persad - 2019 - In Anna C. Mastroianni, Jeffrey P. Kahn & Nancy E. Kass (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Public Health Ethics. Oup Usa. pp. ch. 4.
    This chapter discusses how justice applies to public health. It begins by outlining three different metrics employed in discussions of justice: resources, capabilities, and welfare. It then discusses different accounts of justice in distribution, reviewing utilitarianism, egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism, as well as desert-based theories, and applies these distributive approaches to public health examples. Next, it examines the interplay between distributive justice and individual rights, such as religious rights, property rights, and rights against discrimination, by discussing examples such as mandatory (...)
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  • Why Sufficientarianism is not Indifferent to Taxation.Philipp Kanschik - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):81-102.
    The indifference objection is one of the most powerful objections to sufficientarianism. Critics argue that sufficientarianism is objectionably indifferent to the distribution of benefits and burdens. This article focuses on the criticism of the latter, particularly the claim that sufficientarianism is indifferent to taxation. Contrary to this allegation, it is argued that sufficientarianism warrants progressive taxation, the reason being that even those who are sufficiently well off face the risk of being pushed below sufficiency. This risk decreases the better off (...)
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  • Intergenerational Justice Today.Andre Santos Campos - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (3):e12477.
    A theory of intergenerational justice consists in the study of the moral and political status of the relations between present and past or future people, more specifically, of the obligations and entitlements they can potentially generate. The challenges that justify talking about responsibilities between generations are myriad. And the disputes they prompt can focus on the past just as much as on the present, even though the fact that the human species has reached a state of technological progress that enables (...)
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  • Democracy and the Common Good: A Study of the Weighted Majority Rule.Katharina Berndt Rasmussen - 2013 - Dissertation, Stockholm University
    In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being. The main result of my (...)
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  • Paternalism and evaluative shift.Ben Davies - 2017 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 4 (2):325-346.
    Many people feel that respecting a person’s autonomy is not sufficiently important to obligate us to stay out of their affairs in all cases; but the ground for interference may often turn out to be a hunch that the agent cannot really be competent, or cannot really know what her decision implies; for if she were both of these things, surely she would not make such a foolish decision. This paper suggests a justification of paternalism that does not rely on (...)
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  • Egalitarians, sufficientarians, and mathematicians: a critical notice of Harry Frankfurt’s On Inequality.David Rondel - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):145-162.
    This critical notice provides an overview of Harry Frankfurt’s On Inequality and assesses whether Frankfurt is right to argue that equality is merely formal and empty. I counter-argue that egalitarianism, properly tweaked and circumscribed, can be defended against Frankfurt’s repudiation. After surveying the main arguments in Frankfurt’s book, I argue that whatever plausibility the ‘doctrine of sufficiency’ defended by Frankfurt may have, it does not strike a fatal blow against egalitarianism. There is nothing in egalitarianism that forbids acceptance of the (...)
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  • What is the Point of Sufficiency?Shlomi Segall - 2014 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):36-52.
    Telic sufficientarians hold that there is something special about a certain threshold level such that benefiting people below it, or raising them above it, makes an outcome better in at least one respect. The article investigates what fundamental value might ground that view. The aim is to demonstrate that sufficientarianism, at least on this telic version, is groundless and as such indefensible. The argument is advanced in three steps: first, it is shown that sufficientarianism cannot be grounded in a personal (...)
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  • Is Moderate Essentialism Truly Moderate?A. Inoue - 2013 - Public Health Ethics 6 (1):21-27.
    In this article, I argue that Powers and Faden’s non-ideal, comprehensive theory of justice cannot keep in line with the proposed moderateness of their essentialist approach. My argument is as follows: Powers and Faden’s comprehensive theory of justice contravenes the thrust of moderate essentialism, in claiming that their theory values health for its own sake. Why do they define their conception of justice as valuing health for its own sake when it is likely to be incongruous with their essentialist approach? (...)
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  • Intergenerational Justice and Freedom from Deprivation.Dick Timmer - 2024 - Utilitas 36 (2):168-183.
    Almost everyone believes that freedom from deprivation should have significant weight in specifying what justice between generations requires. Some theorists hold that it should always trump other distributive concerns. Other theorists hold that it should have some but not lexical priority. I argue instead that freedom from deprivation should have lexical priority in some cases, yet weighted priority in others. More specifically, I defend semi-strong sufficientarianism. This view posits a deprivation threshold at which people are free from deprivation, and an (...)
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  • Justice, Thresholds, and the Three Claims of Sufficientarianism.Dick Timmer - 2022 - Journal of Political Philosophy 30 (3):298-323.
    In this article, I propose a novel characterization of sufficientarianism. I argue that sufficientarianism combines three claims: a priority claim that we have non-instrumental reasons to prioritize benefits in certain ranges over benefits in other ranges; a continuum claim that at least two of those ranges are on one continuum; and a deficiency claim that the lower a range on a continuum, the more priority benefits in that range have. This characterization of sufficientarianism sheds new light on two long-standing philosophical (...)
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  • Reparatory Justice Reconsidered. On its Lack of Substance and its Epistemic Function.Adelin Dumitru - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (1):59-86.
    Unlike other kinds of theories of justice, reparatory justice can only be negatively defined, in non-ideal contexts in which initial wrongs had already been committed. For one, what counts and what does not count as wrongdoing or as an unjust state of affairs resulted from that wrongdoing depends on the normative framework upon which a theorist relies. Furthermore, the measures undertaken for alleviating historical injustices can be assessed only from the vantage point of other, independent normative considerations. In the present (...)
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  • ¿Cuánta desigualdad es compatible con el federalismo? Sobre los límites de la justicia distributiva federal.Cristian Fatauros - 2018 - Isegoría 59:493-509.
    The traditional doctrine on federalism claims that economic inequalities are morally justified as long as they result from the legitimate exercise of federal subunit self-government. This paper discusses that claim and examines the philosophical grounds of federal economic decentralization in order to lay the basis for a federal theory of distributive justice. I explore the analogy between federal organizations and the international order claiming that moral conditions of political legitimacy generate some requirements for distribution. But also, I criticize the idea (...)
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  • Assessing Non-intrinsic Limitarianism.Alexandru Volacu & Adelin Costin Dumitru - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):249-264.
    In this paper we aim to examine a novel view on distributive justice, i.e. limitarianism, which claims that it is morally impermissible to be rich. Our main goal is to assess the two arguments provided by Ingrid Robeyns in favour of limitarianism, namely the democratic argument and the argument from unmet urgent needs and the two distinct limitarian views which these arguments give rise to. We claim that strong limitarianism, which is supported by the democratic argument, should be rejected as (...)
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  • Can liberal perfectionism generate distinctive distributive principles?Chris Mills - 2012 - Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 2 (1).
    In his book Liberalism Without Perfection, Jonathan Quong challenges liberal perfectionists to show whether their favoured doctrine is capable of generating distinctive distributive principles whilst retaining a valid conception of personal responsibility. In this article I develop this challenge into a dilemma and show that liberal perfectionists can escape by illustrating how arguments for the value of personal autonomy may entail a specific and distinct treatment of choice and responsibility. I develop this claim into a sufficientarian approach to the promotion (...)
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  • The Sufficientarian Alternative: A Commentary on Setting Health-Care Priorities.Jay Zameska - 2020 - Diametros 18 (68):46-59.
    In this commentary on Torbjörn Tännsjö’s Setting Health-Care Priorities, I argue that sufficientarianism provides a valuable perspective in considering how to set health care priorities. I claim that pace Tännsjö, sufficientarianism does offer a distinct alternative to prioritarianism. To demonstrate this, I introduce sufficientarianism and distinguish two forms: Tännsjö’s “weak sufficientarianism” and an alternative strong form of sufficientarianism that I call “revised lexical sufficientarianism.” I raise a problem for Tännsjö’s sufficientarianism, and advocate for the revised view on this basis. I (...)
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  • Income-based equity weights in healthcare planning and policy.Anders Herlitz - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (8):510-514.
    Recent research indicates that there is a gap in life expectancy between the rich and the poor. This raises the question: should we on egalitarian grounds use income-based equity weights when we assess benefits of alternative benevolent interventions, so that health benefits to the poor count for more? This article provides three egalitarian arguments for using income-based equity weights under certain circumstances. If income inequality correlates with inequality in health, we have reason to use income-based equity weights on the ground (...)
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  • From Rawlsian autonomy to sufficient opportunity in education.Liam Shields - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (1):53-66.
    Equality of Opportunity is widely thought of as the normative ideal most relevant to the design of educational institutions. One widely discussed interpretation of this ideal is Rawls' principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity. In this paper I argue that theories, like Rawls, that give priority to the achievement of individual autonomy, are committed to giving that same priority to a principle of sufficient opportunity. Thus, the Rawlsian's primary focus when designing educational institutions should be on sufficiency and not equality. (...)
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  • Why Limitarianism?Ingrid Robeyns - 2022 - Journal of Political Philosophy 30 (2):249-270.
    Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 249-270, June 2022.
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  • Lives, Limbs, and Liver Spots: The Threshold Approach to Limited Aggregation.S. Matthew Liao & James Edgar Lim - 2024 - Utilitas 36 (2):148-167.
    Limited Aggregation is the view that when there are competing moral claims that demand our attention, we should sometimes satisfy the largest aggregate of claims, depending on the strength of the claims in question. In recent years, philosophers such as Patrick Tomlin and Alastair Norcross have argued that Limited Aggregation violates a number of rational choice principles such as Transitivity, Separability, and Contraction Consistency. Current versions of Limited Aggregation are what may be called Comparative Approaches because they involve assessing the (...)
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  • Sufficientarianism and incommensurability.Susumu Cato - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    This paper proposes a sufficientarian theory with an interval of sufficiency levels. I assume that there are upper and lower bounds of sufficiency and that all well-being levels in between can be considered sufficiency levels. This interval reflects the vagueness of the concept of sufficiency. According to the proposed principle, a distribution is morally better than another if and only if, for each threshold within the interval, the headcount of those below the threshold under the former distribution is smaller than (...)
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  • What is Wrong with Sufficiency?Lasse Nielsen - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (1):21-38.
    In this paper, I ask what is wrong with sufficiency. I formulate a generic sufficiency principle in relation to which I discuss possible problems for sufficientarianism. I argue against the arbitrariness–concern, that sufficiency theory need only to identify a possible space for determining a plausible threshold, and I argue against the high–low threshold dilemma concern, that multiple-threshold views can solve this dilemma. I then distinguish between currency-pluralist and currency-monist multiple-threshold views and test them against two different versions of the widely (...)
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  • The Difficulties of Sufficientarianism.Yingying Tang - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (2):161-174.
    Although the sufficientarian approach to distributive justice is increasingly popular in contemporary political philosophy, it is not easy to give an appropriate formulation of sufficientarianism. In this article, I aim to show that a proper formulation of sufficientarianism should satisfy three conditions: the Distinctiveness condition, the Intermediacy condition, and the Universality condition. However, I argue that it is very difficult to propose a substantial account of sufficiency that can satisfy the three conditions altogether. After examining several influential sufficientarian accounts, I (...)
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  • The Claims of Future Persons.Kirsten Meyer - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (1):43-59.
    This paper defends a deontological egalitarianism in the ethics of future generations. Concerns about the non-identity problem have been taken as a reason to develop sufficientarian approaches to intergenerational justice. This paper argues for a solution to the non-identity problem that refers to the claims of future persons. In principle, the content of these claims could be spelled out with a sufficientarian and an egalitarian approach. What speaks against sufficientarianism, however, is that the sufficiency threshold, unless it is set very (...)
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  • A fair division of the surplus?Pietro Maffettone - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.
    The paper examines a specific approach to the idea of the just price. The approach takes its cue from a basic insight about the nature of exchange, namely, that the latter occurs when both parties to the exchange stand to gain something from it. The distributive question that arises from this observation is how, or according to which principle, we ought to divide such gains. The paper rejects two intuitive answers. The first is that the just price is that at (...)
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  • Critical‐level Sufficientarianism.Walter Bossert, Susumu Cato & Kohei Kamaga - 2021 - Journal of Political Philosophy 30 (4):434-461.
    Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  • Moral Uncertainty and Distributive Sufficiency.Michael Bukoski - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (4):949-963.
    According to the sufficiency principle, distributive justice requires that everyone have some sufficient level of resources or well-being, but inequalities above this threshold have no moral significance. This paper defends a version of the sufficiency principle as the appropriate response to moral uncertainty about distributive justice. Assuming that the appropriate response to moral uncertainty is to maximize expected choiceworthiness, and given a reasonable distribution of credence in some familiar views about distributive justice, a version of the sufficiency principle strikes the (...)
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  • Re-evaluating Sufficientarianism in Light of Evidence of Inequality’s Harms.Monique Deveaux - 2018 - Ethics and Social Welfare 12 (2):97-116.
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  • Justice and bad luck.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Thresholds and Limits in Theories of Distributive Justice.Dick Timmer - 2021 - Dissertation, Utrecht University
    Despite the prominence of thresholds and limits in theories of distributive justice, there is no general account of their role within such theories. This has allowed an ongoing lack of clarity and misunderstanding around threshold views in distributive justice. In this thesis, I develop an account of the conceptual structure of such views. Such an account helps understand and characterize threshold views, can subsume what may seem to be different debates about such views under one conceptual header, and can be (...)
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  • Distributive sufficiency, inequality-blindness and disrespectful treatment.Vincent Harting - 2024 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 27 (4):429-440.
    Sufficientarian theories of distributive justice are often considered to be vulnerable to the ‘blindness to inequality and other values objection’. This objection targets their commitment to holding the moral irrelevance of requirements of justice above absolute thresholds of advantage, making them insufficiently sensitive to egalitarian moral concerns that do have relevance for justice. This paper explores how sufficientarians could reply to this objection. Particularly, I claim that, if we accept that the force of the aforementioned objection comes from relational, and (...)
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  • Sufficiency and the Threshold Question.Robert Huseby - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (2):207-223.
    In this paper I address the objection to sufficientarianism posed by Paula Casal and Richard Arneson, that it is hard to conceive of a sufficiency threshold such that distribution is highly important just below it, and not required at all just above it. In order to address this objection, I elaborate on the idea that sufficientarianism structurally can be seen to require two separate thresholds, which may or may not overlap. I then argue that a version of such a view (...)
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  • (1 other version)Social justice and the distribution of republican freedom.Jonathan Peterson - 2016 - European Journal of Political Theory (1):147488511668475.
    A republican theory of social justice specifies how republican freedom should be distributed. The goal of this paper is to assess the plausibility of two recently proposed principles of republican social justice: an aggregative maximizing principle defended by Philip Pettit in Republicanism and a sufficiency principle of republican social justice offered by Pettit in On the People’s Terms. The maximizing principle must be rejected because it permits under-protecting vulnerable members of society in favor of increasing the freedom of the powerful. (...)
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  • The Discontent of Social and Economic Rights.Leticia Morales - 2018 - Res Publica 24 (2):257-272.
    One major objection to social rights is a failure of determining which precise social and economic claims should be granted rights status. The social rights debate has grappled with this ‘indeterminacy problem’ for quite some time, and a number of proposals have emerged aimed at fixing the content of these rights. In what follows I examine three distinct approaches to fleshing out the idea of a minimum threshold: social rights as the fulfilment of basic needs, social rights as the securing (...)
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