- Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.details
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Counterlegals and necessary laws.By Toby Handfield - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):402–419.details
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Dispositions and habituals.Michael Fara - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):43–82.details
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Strong necessitarianism: The nomological identity of possible worlds.Alexander Bird - 2004 - Ratio 17 (3):256–276.details
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Physicalism and sparse ontology.Kelly Trogdon - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):147-165.details
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Dispositional essentialism and the possibility of a law-abiding miracle.Toby Handfield - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):484-494.details
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Ontology and realism about modality.Crawford L. Elder - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):292 – 302.details
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Laws and essences.Alexander Bird - 2005 - Ratio 18 (4):437–461.details
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Functionalism, computationalism, and mental contents.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):375-410.details
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The co-instantiation thesis.Ann Whittle - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):61 – 79.details
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Mental Causation and the Metaphysics of Causation.Michael Esfeld - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):207 - 220.details
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Mental causation and mental properties.Michael Esfeld - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):5-18.details
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Mental Causation.Karen Bennett - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337.details
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Causally relevant properties.David Braun - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9 (AI, Connectionism and Philosophi):447-75.details
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Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist.Derk Pereboom - 1991 - Synthese 88 (September):341-58.details
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Against the argument from functional explanation.Thomas W. Polger - 2001details
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Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted.Irwin Goldstein - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.details
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Red and 'red'.Galen Strawson - 1989 - Synthese 78 (February):193-232.details
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Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience.Evan Thompson - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):407-427.details
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The normativity of the mental.Nick Zangwill - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.details
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The Language of Thought: No Syntax Without Semantics.Tim Crane - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (3):187-213.details
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Cool red.Joseph Levine - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):27-40.details
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Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.details
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The particulate instantiation of homogeneous pink.Austen Clark - 1989 - Synthese 80 (August):277-304.details
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Bermudez on self-consciousness.Brian J. Garrett - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):96-101.details
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Colour inversion problems for representationalism.Fiona Macpherson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.details
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Against functionalist theories of consciousness.Michael V. Antony - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):105-23.details
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Precis of "Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory".Peter Carruthers - 2001 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 2 (1).details
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Consciousness.Tony Cheng - 2019 - In Heather Salazar (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind. Rebus Foundation Publishing. pp. 41-48.details
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Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.details
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The problem of self in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy: a contemporary perspective.Rajakishore Nath - 2018 - AI and Society 33 (4):537-543.details
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Selfless experience.Geoffrey Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):207-243.details
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Should Explanations Omit the Details?Darren Bradley - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3):827-853.details
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Dispositional and categorical properties, and Russellian Monism.Eric Hiddleston - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):65-92.details
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Metaphysics of the principle of least action.Vladislav Terekhovich - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 62:189-201.details
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Against Extrinsic Dispositions.Seungbae Park - 2017 - Review of Contemporary Philosophy 16:92-103.details
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Must strong emergence collapse?Umut Baysan & Jessica Wilson - 2017 - Philosophica 91 (1):49--104.details
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Fundamental ontological structure: an argument against pluralism.Michael Bertrand - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1277-1297.details
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Cartesianism and Intersubjectivity in Paranormal Activity and the Philosophy of Mind.Steve Jones - 2017 - Film-Philosophy 21 (1):1-19.details
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A Puzzle About Persistence.John W. Carroll & Lee Wentz - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):323-342.details
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The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):269-311.details
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The Conditional Analysis of Dispositions and the Intrinsic Dispositions Thesis.Sungho Choi - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):568-590.details
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The computable universe: from prespace metaphysics to discrete quantum mechanics.Martin Leckey - 1997 - Dissertation, Monash Universitydetails
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The Feeling of Personal Ownership of One’s Mental States: A Conceptual Argument and Empirical Evidence for an Essential, but Underappreciated, Mechanism of Mind.Stan Klein - 2015 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 2 (4):355-376.details
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Placing Qualia in the Head Review of Locating Consciousness by Valerie Gray Hardcastle. [REVIEW]Derek Browne - 1997 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 3.details
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Concrete consciousness: A Sartrean critique of functionalist accounts of mind.Joel W. Krueger - 2006 - Sartre Studies International 12 (2):44-60.details
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Which Are the Genuine Properties?Bradley Rives - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (1):104-126.details
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Structuralism with and without causation.Juha Saatsi - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2255-2271.details
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A Defense of Experiential Realism: The Need to take Phenomenological Reality on its own Terms in the Study of the Mind.Stan Klein - 2015 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 2 (1):41-56.details
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What is a Negative Property?Sam Baron, Richard Copley-Coltheart, Raamy Majeed & Kristie Miller - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (1):33-54.details
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