- Nonhuman Moral Agency: A Practice-Focused Exploration of Moral Agency in Nonhuman Animals and Artificial Intelligence.Dorna Behdadi - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburgdetails
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Standing to Praise.Daniel Telech - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
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Moral Patiency Partially Grounds Moral Agency.Dorna Behdadi - manuscriptdetails
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A Puzzle Concerning Gratitude and Accountability.Robert H. Wallace - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (3):455–480.details
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Why and When is Pure Moral Motivation Defective.David Heering - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):665-684.details
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The Communication Argument and the Pluralist Challenge.Shawn Tinghao Wang - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):384-399.details
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The Moral Addressor Account of Moral Agency.Dorna Behdadi - manuscriptdetails
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Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):733-752.details
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Unconditional Forgiveness and Normative Condescension.David Beglin - 2021 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 7. Oxford University Press.details
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A Dilemma For Neurodiversity.Kenneth Shields & David Beversdorf - 2020 - Neuroethics 14 (2):125-141.details
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Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Second‐Personal Authority.Adam Piovarchy - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):603-627.details
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A Defense of Angry Blame.Lyn Alison Radke - 2019 - Dissertation, Vanderbilt Universitydetails
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Responsibility and the limits of good and evil.Robert H. Wallace - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2705-2727.details
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Two Strawsonian strategies for accounting for morally responsible agency.David Beglin - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2341-2364.details
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Corporate Philanthropy as a Context for Moral Agency, a MacIntyrean Enquiry.Helen Nicholson, Ron Beadle & Richard Slack - 2020 - Journal of Business Ethics 167 (3):589-603.details
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“Screw you!” & “thank you”.Coleen Macnamara - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):893-914.details
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Psychopathy, Agency, and Practical Reason.Monique Wonderly - 2020 - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 262-275.details
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Deontology defended.Nora Heinzelmann - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5197–5216.details
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Social Constraints On Moral Address.Vanessa Carbonell - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):167-189.details
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Early Relationships, Pathologies of Attachment, and the Capacity to Love.Monique Wonderly - 2018 - In Adrienne M. Martin (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy. New York: Routledge Handbooks in Philoso. pp. 23-34.details
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Blame: Strangers and the Moral Relationship.Eric Brown - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):10-20.details
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Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Is Moral Responsibility Essentially Interpersonal?Michael J. Zimmerman - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):247-263.details
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Mining the Past, Acting in the Present, and Enriching the Future.Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley - 2012 - The Pluralist 7 (3):7-24.details
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You Got What You Deserved.Larry Alexander - 2013 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (2):309-319.details
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Cognitive disability and moral status.David Wasserman - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Meta‐Ethical Realism with Good of a Kind.Reid D. Blackman - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):273-292.details
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The desired moral attitude of the physician: (III) care. [REVIEW]Petra Gelhaus - 2013 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (2):125-139.details
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Revisionism and Desert.Lene Bomann-Larsen - 2010 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):1-16.details
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Cruel Jokes and Normative Competence.David Shoemaker - 2018 - Social Philosophy and Policy 35 (1):173-195.details
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Demanding more of Strawsonian accountability theory.Daniel Telech - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):926-941.details
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Once More to the Limits of Evil.Chad Van Schoelandt - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (4):375-400.details
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Moral torch fishing: A signaling theory of blame.David Shoemaker & Manuel Vargas - 2019 - Noûs (3).details
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In Defense of Idealization in Public Reason.Kevin Vallier - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1109-1128.details
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Reactive Attitudes as Communicative Entities.Coleen Macnamara - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):546-569.details
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Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions.Zac Cogley - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):165-177.details
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Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility.David Shoemaker - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):602-632.details
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Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest.Matthew Talbert - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (1):89-109.details
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Relationships, Authority, and Reasons: A Second-Personal Account of Corporate Moral Agency.Alan D. Morrison, Rita Mota & William J. Wilhelm - 2022 - Business Ethics Quarterly 32 (2):322-347.details
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Can Kant’s Theory of Radical Evil Be Saved?Zachary J. Goldberg - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (3):395-419.details
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Justification, coercion, and the place of public reason.Chad Van Schoelandt - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1031-1050.details
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Qualities of will.David Shoemaker - 2013 - Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):95-120.details
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Living the categorical imperative: autistic perspectives on lying and truth telling–between Kant and care ethics. [REVIEW]Pier Jaarsma, Petra Gelhaus & Stellan Welin - 2012 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 15 (3):271-277.details
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Responsibility and disability.David Shoemaker - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (3-4):438-461.details
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Does Affective Empathy Require Perspective-Taking or Affective Matching?David Schwan - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (3):277-287.details
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Blame and Protest.Eugene Chislenko - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (2):163-181.details
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Inadequate Agency and Appropriate Anger.Daphne Brandenburg - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):169-185.details
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Moral Responsibility as Guiltworthiness.A. P. Duggan - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (2):291-309.details
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The “Ethical Subject/Agent” as “Rational Individual” but Also as So Much More!Jacquelyn A. K. Kegley - 2011 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 25 (1):116-129.details
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Are There Distinctively Moral Reasons?Andrew T. Forcehimes & Luke Semrau - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):699-717.details
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