- Intuitions in Experimental Philosophy.Joachim Horvath - 2023 - In Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.), The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 71-100.details
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How Infallibilists Can Have It All.Nevin Climenhaga - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):363-380.details
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Avner Baz's Ordinary Language Challenge to the Philosophical Method of Cases.Paul Oghenovo Irikefe - 2022 - Dialectica 999 (1).details
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Thomas Reid, the Internalist.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 4 (1):10.details
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Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):121-134.details
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Epistemic Luck and Knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):1-6.details
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A Cumulative Case Argument for Infallibilism.Nevin Climenhaga - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Epistemologia e Filosofia da Ciência.Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid & Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge judgments in “Gettier” cases.John Turri - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 337-348.details
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Internalism and the Nature of Justification.Jonathan Egeland Harouny - 2020 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Knowledge from Knowledge.Rodrigo Borges - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (3):283 - 297.details
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Knowledge as a Thick Concept: New Light on the Gettier and Value Problems.Brent G. Kyle - 2011 - Dissertation, Cornell Universitydetails
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Knowledge before Gettier.Pierre Le Morvan - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (6):1216-1238.details
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(1 other version)Definite Descriptions and the Gettier Example.Christoph Schmidt-Petri & London School of Economics and Political Science - 2002 - CPNSS Discussion Papers.details
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The Primacy of Knowledge: A Critical Survey of Timothy Williamson's Views on Knowledge, Assertion and Scepticism.Heine A. Holmen - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Oslodetails
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Ethics and the Nature of Action.Heine A. Holmen - 2011 - Dissertation, University of Oslodetails
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Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy.Nevin Climenhaga - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):69-104.details
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Models of Philosophical Thought Experimentation.Jonathan Andy Tapsell - 2014 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails
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Don't Believe the Hype: Why Should Philosophical Theories Yield to Intuitions?Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):141-158.details
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Constructivism in science and science education: a philosophical critique.Robert Nola - 1997 - Science & Education 6 (1-2):55-83.details
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Philosophical Thought Experiments as Excercises in Conceptual Analysis.Christian Nimtz - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):189-214.details
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Memories of the Fourth Condition and Lessons to be Learned from Suspicious Externalism.Murat Baç - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (2):127-145.details
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Fallibilism, epistemic possibility, and epistemic agency.Baron Reed - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):40-69.details
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On the Limits of Virtue Epistemology.Joshue Orozco - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):103-120.details
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Authentic Gettier Cases: a reply to Starmans and Friedman.Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond Mar - 2013 - Cognition 129 (3):666-669.details
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Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs.Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond A. Mar - 2013 - Cognition 129 (3):652-661.details
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Intentional action first.Yair Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.details
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Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.details
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Knowledge as a thick concept: explaining why the Gettier problem arises.Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.details
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Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved.John Turri - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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Saving epistemology from the epistemologists: recent work in the theory of knowledge.Adam Morton - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):685-704.details
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Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
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(2 other versions)Normativity and epistemic intuitions.Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2001 - Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.details
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Powers, causation, and modality.Robert K. Shope - 1988 - Erkenntnis 28 (3):321 - 362.details
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Accidentally true belief and warrant.Andrew Chignell - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):445 - 458.details
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Scepticism and the nature of knowledge.James E. Taylor - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (1-2):3-27.details
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On the logical unsolvability of the Gettier problem.L. Floridi - 2004 - Synthese 142 (1):61 - 79.details
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The Psychology of Epistemic Judgment.Jennifer Nagel & Jessica Wright - forthcoming - In Sarah K. Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, 2nd Edition.details
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(1 other version)Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):345-361.details
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Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder.Claudio de Almeida & J. R. Fett - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):152-169.details
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Futures for philosophy of education.Michael A. Peters - 2008 - Analysis and Metaphysics 7:14-26.details
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The Function of Epistemic Justification.Frederick Adams - 1986 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):465 - 492.details
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Evidence and Knowledge.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (2):241-262.details
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The Gettier Problem and the Parable of the Ten Coins.Don S. Levi - 1995 - Philosophy 70 (271):5 - 25.details
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What makes reasons sufficient?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):159-170.details
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How to think about fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):143-157.details
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A minimal expression of non–reductionism in the epistemology of testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):706–723.details
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Beyond verisimilitude: A linguistically invariant basis for scientific progress.Eric Barnes - 1991 - Synthese 88 (3):309 - 339.details
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Die differenz Von meinung und wissen.S. O. Welding - 2004 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (1):147-155.details
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The Receptive Theory: A New Theory of Emotions.Christine Tappolet - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (6):117.details
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