- Brain disorders? Not really: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research.Denny Borsboom, Angélique O. J. Cramer & Annemarie Kalis - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42:e2.details
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Optimality as a mathematical rhetoric for zeroes.Fred L. Bookstein - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):216-217.details
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Descartes' fundamental mistake: Introspective singularity.Joseph E. Bogen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):175-176.details
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New elements of a theory of mind in wild chimpanzees.Christophe Boesch - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):149-150.details
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Using Neural Networks to Generate Inferential Roles for Natural Language.Peter Blouw & Chris Eliasmith - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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The Implications of the Cognitive Sciences for the Relation Between Religion and Science Education: The Case of Evolutionary Theory.Stefaan Blancke, Johan De Smedt, Helen De Cruz, Maarten Boudry & Johan Braeckman - 2012 - Science & Education 21 (8):1167-1184.details
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From Ends to Causes (and Back Again) by Metaphor: The Paradox of Natural Selection.Stefaan Blancke, Tammy Schellens, Ronald Soetaert, Hilde Van Keer & Johan Braeckman - 2014 - Science & Education 23 (4):793-808.details
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Life and death.Ken Binmore - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (1):75-97.details
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The Recognition of Emotions in Music and Landscapes: Extending Contour Theory.Marta Benenti & Cristina Meini - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):647-664.details
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Comments on Dennett from a cautious ally.Jonathan Bennett - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):381-385.details
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Evil and roboethics in management studies.Enrico Beltramini - 2019 - AI and Society 34 (4):921-929.details
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The animal's point of view, animal welfare and some other related matters.Marc Bekoff - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):753-755.details
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Why we assume it’s all good: The role of theory of mind in early inherent feature inferences.Karen Bartsch & David Estes - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (5):482-482.details
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Understanding self and other.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):142-154.details
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The concept of intentionality: Invented or innate?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-30.details
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Optimality as an evaluative standard in the study of decision-making.Jonathan Baron - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):216-216.details
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How monkeys do things with “words”.Simon Baron-Cohen - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):148-149.details
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How do Somatic Markers Feature in Decision Making?Jordan Bartol & Stefan Linquist - 2015 - Emotion Review 7 (1):81-89.details
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Can children with autism integrate first and third person representations?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):123-124.details
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Are false beliefs representative mental states?Karen Bartsch & David Estes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):30-31.details
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Ethology and physiology: A happy marriage.Gerard P. Baerends - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):369-370.details
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Monkeys and consciousness.D. M. Armstrong - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):147-148.details
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Causes are perceived and introspected.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-29.details
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Why ‘believes’ is not a vague predicate.Sophie Archer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3029-3048.details
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Advantages of experimentation in neuroscience.Michael A. Arbib - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):368-369.details
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The causal relevance of the mental.Louise Antony - 1991 - Mind and Language 6 (4):295-327.details
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Toward an ontological interpretation of Dennett's theory.Michael V. Antony - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):343-369.details
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Optimality and human memory.John R. Anderson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):215-216.details
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Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach, by Dan Sperber. [REVIEW]Mahesh Ananth - 2001 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (4):563-571.details
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Monkeys mind.Colin Allen - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):147-147.details
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Mental content and evolutionary explanation.Colin Allen - 1992 - Biology and Philosophy 7 (1):1-12.details
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Kinds behaving badly: intentional action and interactive kinds.Sophie R. Allen - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 12):2927-2956.details
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Knowledge and adaptation.Barry Allen - 1997 - Biology and Philosophy 12 (2):233-241.details
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Comparative cognitive studies, not folk phylogeny, please.Colin Allen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):122-123.details
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Rethinking the problem of cognition.Mikio Akagi - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3547-3570.details
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Defending Non-Derived Content.Ken Aizawa & Fred Adams - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.details
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The tragedy of a priori selectionism: Dennett and Gould on adaptationism. [REVIEW]Jeremy C. Ahouse - 1998 - Biology and Philosophy 13 (3):359-391.details
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Mechanistic explanation for enactive sociality.Ekaterina Abramova & Marc Slors - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (2):401-424.details
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Exploring the Folk Understanding of Belief: Identifying Key Dimensions Endorsed in the General Population.Rachel Pechey & Peter W. Halligan - 2012 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 12 (1-2):81-99.details
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Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):233-248.details
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Cuteness and Disgust: The Humanizing and Dehumanizing Effects of Emotion.Gary D. Sherman & Jonathan Haidt - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):245-251.details
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Redundant Group Agency.Lars J. K. Moen - 2019 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49 (5):364-384.details
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Belief integration in action: A defense of extended beliefs.Miriam Kyselo & Sven Walter - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):245-260.details
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The evolution of misbelief.Ryan McKay & Daniel Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493–510; discussion 510–61.details
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Patterns and descriptions.D. E. Bradshaw - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 27 (3):181-202.details
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Les conditions de l'interprétation.Martin Montminy - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (3):505-528.details
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How Can a Symbol System Come into Being?David Lumsden - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (1):87-96.details
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Rhesus monkeys are radical behaviorists.Gordon G. Gallup - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-129.details
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Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods.Matthias Siemer - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):256-263.details
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Emotional Experience in the Computational Belief–Desire Theory of Emotion.Rainer Reisenzein - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):214-222.details
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