This paper explores the intersection of time and relational economic sociology. Building on Viviana Zelizer’s relational framework, I argue that analyzing the temporal dimensions of exchange provides insight into how social ties gain meaning through economic practices. The paper shows time’s dual role as both an organizing structure bounding action, and a dynamic element that actors leverage to shape transactional contexts. As structure, time offers culturally-available templates like schedules and rhythms that facilitate coordination and signify predictable social meanings befitting particular (...) relational categories. Yet time also constitutes relational work itself; strategic timing, duration, pacing, and sequencing of interactions signal context, manage expectations, and sustain bonds amidst entanglements. Synchronization through temporal agency prevents mismatches between transactions and social contexts that could strain ties. This agency in time ranges from passive adherence to dominant structures to active assertions of power resistance, enabling both domination and defiance across economic contexts. Analyzing shared temporal infrastructure within circuits of commerce further illuminates how actors distinguish those spheres of exchange at various scale from the impersonal market. Ultimately, incorporating temporality strengthens relational economic sociology by identifying a key mechanism through which practices of exchange become relationally meaningful. (shrink)

This article introduces the idea of ‘dependence subtexts’ to explain how the stories that we encounter in property theory and public rhetoric function to make some actors appear ‘independent’, and thus capable of acquiring property in their own right, while making other actors appear ‘dependent’ and thus incapable of acquiring property. The argument develops the idea of ‘dependence subtexts’ out of the work of legal scholar Carol Rose and political theorist Carole Pateman, before using it as a tool for contrasting (...) the canonical property stories of John Locke and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. We argue that the link between property and dependence provides a useful starting point for understanding issues of economic justice that share a common political problem: how do we choose to govern the relation between dependence and independence through the institution of property? (shrink)

This article explores Axel Honneth’s attempts to reconnect the struggles of workers with the normative content of modernity through Hegel’s intersubjective account of recognition. The importance of Honneth’s writings lies in his attempt to extend Habermas’ account of normative self-constitution to labor via the morally motivated struggles of workers to correct the modern maldistribution of social worth. To this extent, the expansion of ethical life is predicated on the struggles of excluded participants to gain inclusion within the normative content of (...) modernity. From this perspective Habermas’ attempt to legitimate the exclusion of labor (by the system) from the normative content of modernity appears unjust and unjustified. Unfortunately, Honneth shares with Habermas a tendency to locate the economic system beyond the (culturally defined) limits of ethical life. He thereby fails to acknowledge the extent to which workers play a major role in re-moralizing the former via the de-reification of the latter. (shrink)

After the initial formulation of the concept of reification in Georg Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness (HCC, 1923), a series of confusing uses of it within critical theory have contributed to blurring its contours. In his pre-Marxist work, while analyzing the social rationalization process, Lukács located the modern form of mediation between subject and object and connected it with certain effects on the level of human consciousness and behavior. This very scheme is repeated and refined in HCC. In the Reification (...) essay, Lukács uses the neo-Kantian concept of the “form of objectivity” to grasp the central constitutive form of all kinds of objects in bourgeois society. He interprets Marx’s commodity form as the “archetype” of all capitalist objectivity, which consists in converting qualitative contents into quantitative categories. Thus, the formal/calculative rationality of exchange penetrates all kinds of objectification in modern society. In Lukács’s view, only in its modern, universalized form does rational objectification bring about the phenomenon of reification, i.e. the de-historicization and political neutralization of the social relations that constitute the social system and the dominant forms of consciousness. This systemic, cultural, and political understanding of reification can prove to be fruitful in the context of contemporary discussions on democratic transformative praxis. (shrink)

I argue in this text that the economic mind is a culturally hegemonic, naturalistic interpretation of the behavior produced by the revolutionary nature of the economic and technical developments of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Despite persistent criticism, people fulfilled the predictions of the economic model of a human being for so long that they committed an attribution error and took it to be the adequate vision of human nature. Neoclassical economic theory played a significant, even if involuntary, role (...) in the spread of this illusion. I also claim that the concept of economic mind—as the dominant interpretation of human nature—currently functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy, reproducing behaviors that would have a chance to change (refuting the theory developed on their basis), were it not for the popularity of this concept as commonsensical definition of human nature. (shrink)

In this review article, I survey books by three authors, each of which address the issues of debt and personal indebtedness. The authors are: Greta Krippner; David Graeber; and Maurizio Lazzarato. They argue, and I agree, that whilst money is broadly beneficial, its use in a capitalist context increases personal indebtedness, subjugates the individual, and reduces freedom. I briefly outline their positions, each of which make important contributions. However – contrary to Krippner’s lack of normative commitment, Graeber’s suggestion that we (...) need to forgive the debt and start again, or Lazzarato’s suggestion that we should to stop paying back debt and refuse to work – I suggest that we need to return to socialist principles, based on the premise that capitalism is no alternative. (shrink)

German sociologist Alfred Vierkandt is hardly remembered today. This may seem surprising. Several prominent sociologists from the German-speaking countries contributed to the Handwörterbuch der Soziologie (1931), which Vierkandt edited and published. However, Vierkandt did not interact with any of them significantly, and this publication brought no recognition of the importance of his sociological oeuvre in Germany, the United States, or elsewhere. His key notion of the social group found no acknowledgment among other contemporary or later sociologists, even though several of (...) them used this notion and discussed social groups in their own writings. Moreover, those who paid close attention to his writings, like Abel and Hochstim, evaluated them quite critically. Both before and after World War II, Vierkandt remained a solitary and relatively unknown author. (shrink)

Why has comedy become one of our most abiding ethical preoccupations as well as a dominant mode of political critique? It is suggested that comedy appeals to contemporary persons because it provides an apt social-aesthetic form through which to face up to living with others at a time when it is hard to bear others or otherness. The article outlines an ethics of modern individuality by developing a theory of comedy as more about building social bonds and finding out what (...) could be shared knowledge and experience than the toppling of dominant modes of thought or repudiating our mutuality with others. Drawing on Georg Simmel’s ‘The Law of the Individual’, the article develops a Simmelian reading of Freud’s Jokes to argue that comedy is one solution to resolving our mutual un-alikeness by way of forging knotted paths toward recognising how we could be alike. (shrink)

I investigate ethical questions concerning a novel cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, using a Fichtean account of the ethics of currency. Fichte holds that currencies should fulfill an ethical purpose: providing access, in perpetuity, to the material welfare that underwrites citizens' basic rights. In his nineteenth‐century context, Fichte argues that currencies fulfill this purpose better when nations control them (i.e., when they are “national currencies”) than when foreigners freely trade them (as “world currencies”). After exploring conditions in which national currencies fail to secure (...) material stability over time, e.g., in corrupt regimes, I develop a Fichtean model for ethically evaluating currencies and evaluate the extent to which Bitcoin meets its standards for ethical currency. I argue that Bitcoin undermines the (monetary) power of nations and, as such, threatens their ability to provide access to necessary material goods. While offering citizens a means of defending themselves against corrupt regimes, Bitcoin forsakes the general welfare and is, as such, unethical by Fichtean lights. (shrink)

In a global economic landscape of hyper-commodification and financialisation, efforts to assimilate digital art into the high-stakes commercial art market have so far been rather unsuccessful, presumably because digital artworks cannot easily assume the status of precious object worthy of collection. This essay explores the use of blockchain technologies in attempts to create proprietary digital art markets in which uncommodifiable digital artworks are financialised as artificially scarce commodities. Using the decentralisation techniques and distributed database protocols underlying current cryptocurrency technologies, such (...) efforts, exemplified here by the platform Monegraph, tend to be presented as concerns with the interest of digital artists and with shifting ontologies of the contemporary work of art. I challenge this characterisation, and argue, in a discussion that combines aesthetic theory, legal and philosophical theories of intellectual property, rhetorical analysis and research in the political economy of new media, that the formation of proprietary digital art markets by emerging commercial platforms such as Monegraph constitutes a worrisome amplification of long-established, on-going efforts to fence in creative expression as private property. As I argue, the combination of blockchain-based protocols with established ambitions of intellectual property policy yields hybrid conceptual-computational financial technologies (such as self-enforcing smart contracts attached to digital artefacts) that are unlikely to empower artists but which serve to financialise digital creative practices as a whole, curtailing the critical potential of the digital as an inherently dynamic and potentially uncommodifiable mode of production and artistic expression. (shrink)

In this paper I first aim to identify, from a perspective mindful of both analytic and Continental traditions, the central normative issues at stake in the various debates concerning commodification in law. Although there now exists a wealth of thoughtful literature in this area, I often find myself disoriented within the webs of moral criteria used to analyze the increasingly ubiquitous practice of converting legal goods into monetary values. I therefore attempt to distinguish and organize these often conflated conceptual distinctions (...) across several registers of moral analysis. Second, I formulate what I consider the most illuminating questions regarding the criteria used to evaluate commodification in law. Critiques of commodification in law face what I call problems of ideology, intractability, and hyperbole, and identifying these issues helps to explain the momentum of the law and economics movement. (shrink)

Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of cultural, social, and symbolic capital have not only enriched sociological theory; they have also clearly established themselves in interdisciplinary and transdiscipli...

This article seeks to understand a puzzling aspect of Georg Simmel’s The Philosophy of Money, namely, the many religious analogies Simmel uses to characterize money. We argue that with these analogies Simmel indicates how what he would later term ‘the transcendent character of life’ permeates mundane monetary interactions. Specifically, we articulate how key religious forms of experience – faith, unity, and individuality – exist in monetary exchange and point toward a distinctively Simmelian way to understand the interplay between religion and (...) economics. (shrink)

Why do so many people remain so passive in the face of today’s massive, looming economic, political, and ecological crises, such as climate change? Despite some notable rhetorical and regulatory examples, attempts to stem climate change have, as a rule, not come to frame the activities of most citizens. The inability to confront the imperative of social transformation today is a complex, manifold problem. At root, it has to do with fundamental systemic features of a global social system that we (...) all contribute to reproducing in our everyday lives. While these features do not preclude political engagement, innovation, and action, they do undermine the bases of movements towards truly systemic transformation. This article focuses on one such feature, reification, as a social-structural foundation of passivity that impedes the social innovations required to tackle the climate crisis. (shrink)

We investigate the fundamental relationship between philosophical aesthetics and the philosophy of nature, arguing for a position in which the latter encompasses the former. Two traditions are set against each other, one is natural aesthetics, whose covering philosophy is Idealism, and the other is the aesthetics of nature, the position defended in this article, with the general program of a comprehensive philosophy of nature as its covering theory. Our approach is philosophical, operating within the framework of the ontology of the (...) process of the production of art, inspired especially by the views of Antonin Artaud, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Bakhtin, Deleuze, and Guattari. We interrogate Dilthey and Worringer while outlining an ontology of art based on the production of nonhuman images and a nonpersonal experiential field of nature. (shrink)

This article explores parallels between Marx's and Schumpeter's theories of capitalist development, and discusses the relationship of these classical approaches to later constructivist theories of technological and organizational changes. It is suggested that Marxian and Schumpeterian ideas could be combined in a way which remedies the weaknesses of both sides, and provides a better understanding of the innovative dynamics of capitalism; such a synthesis could then be linked to a constructivist model of the rise and fall of economic `myths'.

In noise we hear the possibility of a signal, indeed different signals, and in the multiplicity of signals we hear noise. With variation and selection comes dynamic evolution, a contingent state, one that could be otherwise. The term ‘polemogenous’ (from the French, polémogène) means that which generates polemics. And polemics are creative. If everyone, every system, were to reason in the same way, there would be silence. Every remark would be redundant, having no informational value. Thus noise is not bad. (...) The essence of finance economics, like all that is social in nature, is a forming of meaning. Whatever cannot be formed meaningfully is not available to the system. This unavailability, as ‘noise’, is the dynamic difference (noise/information) that scintillates the system. Information, like morality, is polemogenous – it stirs contention. Without noise and the possibility of its conversion to information there would be no opportunities to exploit. This paper applies a systems theoretical understanding of observation to conceive of finance economics as the economy’s means of observing its noise and capitalizing on that polemic. Niklas Luhmann’s method is utilized to explicate some ideas on noise by financial economist Fischer Black, who suggests the incomprehensible is computable. This is finance. The fact that logical grounds, absolute deductions, and clear calculations are claimed to be rare in finance is no barrier to understanding it. Rather, this polyphonic and polemogenous information-selection is the ‘ground’ of finance, not as totalizing logic, but as different difference-production for the sake of deriving economic opportunity. (shrink)

Max Weber’s last in his life publications give grounds to correct the traditional notions of the ethics of responsibility as purely calculative and one that subordinates the ethical goal to the right means of achieving it and the strictness of its observance. For Weber devotion to certain values is ultimately the basis of any possible ethics: in the ethics of conviction, this devotion is contrasted with taking into account all the results of the ethical act, and in the ethics of (...) responsibility these results seek to take into account what should make certain values more reliable. Passionate commitment to political goals that express the interests of the community, rather than the selfish and vain intentions of the politician is a solid basis for the responsibility of the politician. The passionate pursuit of truth directs the scientist’s well-thought-out research pro- gram. In economics, the pursuit of personal gain, which is inherent for the “economic man”, requires consideration of the common economic good both for those with whom the man makes his business and for the community, which is his lifeworld and creates the necessary conditions for any possible economic activity. In any social sphere, each social system has its own logic of calculating success, but each time this calculation involves respecting and protecting the basic values for this system. In everyday life we observe numerous deviations from this clear and transparent logic of the ethics of responsibility, which create the illusion of its dysfunction. Similarly, insincere and inconsistent adherence to declared beliefs can give the wrong impression of the whole ethics of conviction. It is these deviations from the intrinsic integrity of the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of persuasion that create the false impression of them as mutu- ally exclusive behavioral strategies. In their conscientious pursuit, the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility complement each other. The formalism of the ethics of responsibility makes sense only for a stricter and more impartial protection of the values that are important to the adherents of this ethic. This formalism is a denial only of all other, irrelevant values, and not a designation of responsibility for a particular ethical commitment as a value-empty, indifferent form. Weber points to the prospect of recognition as a path to a collective ethic of responsibility in its positive sense — as a conscious commitment by a community of like-minded people to commit to values that are significant to them. (shrink)