In this chapter, Daniel Layman argues that there is not one Lockean conception of IR but rather (at least) two mutually incompatible conceptions: one a Ciceronian moral cosmopolitanism and the other a colonialism centered on British interests. Opposing Locke’s philosophical writings with his economic works, Layman’s reading acknowledges the contradictions and incoherence present in Locke’s IR theory.

In this article, the relationship between philosophy and history of education is delved into. First, it is noted that both disciplines have diverged from each other over the last few decades to become relatively autonomous subsectors within the pedagogical sciences, each with its own discourses, its own expositional characteristics, its own channels of communication, and its own networks. From the perspective of the history of education, it seems as though more affiliation has been sought with the science of history. The (...) history of education, in any event, has in the past few years become more historicizing and less ‘educationalizing’. According to the author, (who is not a philosopher of education) there are signs that indicate that such an analogous line of reasoning, mutatis mutandis, also applies for the philosophy of education. Does this mean that there are no longer any bridges from the one area to the other or that none are possible? Probably not. In the second portion, it is shown that the modern or even postmodern ‘new cultural history of education’, with its often ironical and demythologizing traits uses or can use a considerable amount of ‘grand theory’ (à la Foucault). Indeed, the development of an adequate conceptual apparatus that also has to cope with the problem of ‘presentism’ assumes a constant dialogue with the past and for this a philosophical‐interpretative (casu quo, hermeneutic) approach is still the best situated. Inversely, the Foucauldian perspective shows that philosophy in general and philosophy of education in particular equally hardly do without history. Within the reflection on pedagogical praxis, the historical and the philosophical thus probably will continue to rely on each other—if only as allies against the dominance of short‐winded empirical‐quantitative research. Still, it would be naive to think that, from this possible alliance, the fragmentation of historically developed knowledge systems with their own sociological and institutional foundation of scientific activities can be rectified in a trice. (shrink)

In the history of ideas some researchers have recently coined the term psycho-utopianism, denoting the notion that the ideal society presupposes a “new man,” that is, the psychological nature of man must change before society can change. Cultural studies have noted this line of thinking also within the so-called New Age movement. However, the notion of a New Age is not really new; it occurred already at the beginning of the Modern Epoch; in seventeenth-century Europe. At that time, the educational (...) philosopher J. A. Comenius was writing his canonical work _Didactica Magna_ and other texts on education, science, and philosophy, with the ultimate aim of contributing to a new world order. Comenius was one of the first modern educators to argue for a general education of both boys and girls irrespective of social class. Three hundred years later, B. F. Skinner suggested psychological methods of education and upbringing, also with the ultimate aim to transform society. In this article I will look closer at the similarities and differences between these two thinkers regarding their psycho-utopian notions. I will conclude with similar reflections on psycho-utopian tendencies in present discourses on information and communication technology (ICT) and education. (shrink)

We propose a new method for the history of ideas that has none of the shortcomings so often ascribed to this approach. We call this method the model approach to the history of ideas. We argue that any adequately developed and implementable method to trace continuities in the history of human thought, or concept drift, will require that historians use explicit interpretive conceptual frameworks. We call these frameworks models. We argue that models enhance the comprehensibility of historical texts, and provide (...) historians of ideas with a method that, unlike existing approaches, is susceptible neither to common holistic criticisms nor to Skinner's objections that the history of ideas yields arbitrary and biased reconstructions. To illustrate our proposal, we discuss the so-called Classical Model of Science and draw upon work in computer science and cognitive psychology. (shrink)

As circunstâncias se apresentam como definitivas quando se pretende executar qualquer tipo ação humana, especialmente aquelas que dizem respeito à conquista e à manutenção do poder. Admitindo-se que quanto maior a força da fortuna menor a liberdade para efetivar ações capazes de conduzir o ator político ao êxito no mundo da contingência, torna-se imprescindível saber até que ponto ela exerce poder sobre as ações dos homens. Mas será possível precisálo? Partimos do contexto histórico em que as obras de Maquiavel foram (...) escritas para compreender a relação que o autor estabelece com a tradição, ora assumindo-a, ora a ela se opondo. Recuperamos os textos de Maquiavel e estabelecemos, então, diálogo com alguns comentadores da obra do autor para investigar a questão da fortuna propriamente dita. (shrink)

Starting with Popper, social theorists across the board have acknowledged that traditions serve socially valuable functions. However, while traditions are usually understood as ‘living’ entities that come in overlapping varieties and evolve over time, the socially valuable functions attributed to tradition tend to presuppose invariability in ways of thinking and acting. Addressing this tension, this article provides a detailed analysis of the concept of tradition, and directs special attention to conceivable criteria for the authentic continuation of a tradition. It is (...) argued that the ways of thinking and acting that constitute the material of a tradition must – among faithful members of that tradition – stand in a relation of equivalence – not identity or similarity. The implications of this account concern our ability to decide (normatively) conflicts over authenticity among rival tradition branches as well as the role that traditions play in policy-making. (shrink)

An emerging branch of political theory, ‘the politics of dissensus’, starts out from the premise that in order to understand the politics of constitutional democracies, one needs to focus on parliamentary politics, which compromises both institutional settings and debates. Politics takes place among adversaries, and dissensus and argumentation pro et contra is the rule. The focus on the conditions for consensus in contemporary democratic theory accordingly misses the essence of politics. The politics of dissensus tends to think that the political (...) philosophy inaugurated by John Rawls, political liberalism in particular, is too idealistic and utopian to capture real parliamentary politics. I argue that this basic objection against political liberalism is misconceived. To the contrary, the politics of dissensus and political liberalism supplement each other. The impact of my argument is that research in these disparate fields of political studies ought to enlighten each of them. (shrink)

El propósito de este texto es ofrecer una visión general de la relación entre nación e historia en los debates que se generaron por parte de los historiadores y otros intelectuales de las ciencias sociales a finales del siglo XIX y durante gran parte del siglo XX. La reflexión central que se plantea consiste entonces en estudiar y mostrar cómo al mismo tiempo que las naciones modernas eran objeto de un proceso de redefinición política, en el escenario intelectual de las (...) ciencias sociales, y en particular de los historiadores, fueron apareciendo también un conjunto de debates y obras que intentaban problematizar y someter a consideración las relaciones que pretendían establecerse entre la nación y la historia como un elemento que las justificaba. (shrink)

En la historiografía nacional poco se ha estudiado el problema de la lectura y la confrontación del sentido del pasado en la historia de la revolución durante la tercera década del siglo xix. El objetivo de este artículo es reconstruir las prácticas lectoras a partir de las cuales se asumió una posición crítica y se construyó cierta opinión pública frente a la narración de los hechos del pasado republicano vinculado con los procesos de independencia en la Nueva Granada. Para ello, (...) se examina la defensa de José Fernández Madrid frente a los testimonios, narrativas y lo que llamaba la “desnaturalización de los hechos” en la naciente historia de Colombia, que se empezó a inventar después de los sucesos de Boyacá en 1819 y luego de sancionada la Constitución Política de 1821. Se quiere llamar la atención, por un lado, sobre los criterios de veracidad a los que eran sometidos los testimonios de los protagonistas de la Independencia al momento de ser confrontados con la interpretación, los documentos y las pruebas del lector; y, por otro, sobre los usos que hacían del pasado los republicanos ilustrados para justificar su “conducta política” y mantener el “buen nombre”, justo cuando se estaban inventando y legitimando los fundamentos políticos de la nueva República. En este sentido, se trata, desde el punto de vista metodológico, de avanzar en el campo de la historia de la lectura a partir de un análisis de las discusiones, defensas, comentarios y contestaciones del público lector, para legitimar su actitud crítica frente a las formas de desconocimiento suscitadas por la escritura de la historia. (shrink)

In this article I argue that Jürgen Habermas’ notion of morality (moral norms) has more in common with Hegel’s notion of ‘ethical life’ as a ‘ sittlich ’ relation – understood as a socially integrative force – rather than Kant’s supreme principle of personal morality. I show that Habermas and Hegel, each in his own way, make a distinction between morality and ethics. However, I make the case that Habermas’ conception of ‘morality’ incorporates aspects of Hegel’s notion of ‘ethical life’, (...) while Habermas’ conception of ‘ethical’ – referring to individual and group conceptions of the good life – is a remedy to the shortcomings in Hegel’s overly unified ethical life. I offer an alternative reading of Habermas’ principle of morality, which I suggest should be read as his attempt to provide a binding process to set up the norms that ought to condition a modern political community understood as a civil association. (shrink)

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. We use evaluative terms and concepts every day. We call actions right and wrong, teachers wise and ignorant, and pictures elegant and grotesque. Philosophers place evaluative concepts into two camps. Thin concepts, such as goodness and badness, and rightness and wrongness (...) have evaluative content, but they supposedly have no or hardly any nonevaluative, descriptive content: they supposedly give little or no specific idea about the character of the person or thing described. In contrast, thick concepts such as kindness, elegance and wisdom supposedly give a more specific idea of people or things. Yet, given typical linguistic conventions, thick concepts also convey evaluation. Kind people are often viewed positively whilst ignorance has negative connotations. The distinction between thin and thick concepts is frequently drawn in philosophy and is central to everyday life. However, very few articles or books discuss the distinction. In this full-length study, Simon Kirchin discusses thin and thick concepts, highlighting key assumptions, questions and arguments, many of which have gone unnoticed. Kirchin focuses in on the debate between 'separationists' and 'nonseparationists'. Thick Evaluation argues for a version of nonseparationism, and in doing so argues both that many concepts are evaluative and also that evaluation is not exhausted by thin positive and negative stances. (shrink)

Contemporary political theory (CPT) has approached questions of plurality and diversity by drawing rather implicitly on anthropological accounts of difference. This was the case with the ‘cultural turn’, which significantly shaped theories of multiculturalism. Similarly, the current ‘ontological turn’ is gaining influence and leaving a marked impact on CPT. I examine the recent turn and assess both the possibilities it offers and the challenges it poses for decentering CPT and opening radical, decolonial avenues for thinking difference otherwise. I take Paul (...) Nadasdy's critique of the ontological turn as an invitation to reflect on the methodological precepts that inform how the field frames the scope and limits of comparison. In pursuit of this, I examine the Zapatistas’ notion of a ‘world of many worlds’, which provides a way of approaching difference that captures the generative aspects of the ontological turn while avoiding the pitfalls of relativism and political inertia. I argue that the Zapatistas’ insights offer ethical guidance towards social and ecological thriving. Ultimately, my goal is to move CPT towards a more capacious form of making sense of what is out there in the world, and thus make room for better ways of inhabiting the Earth. (shrink)

El objeto de este trabajo es abordar la idea de nación cívica, un concepto político clave en la producción discursiva de la Generación de 1837, cuyo poder de interpelación ha persistido en momentos más recientes de la historia Argentina. Para ello, se analizarán con las herramientas heurísticas de la historia conceptual los usos de ‘civilidad', ‘civismo', ‘civilización', ‘patria' y ‘nación' en un corpus específico de la producción de Juan Bautista Alberdi y Domingo Faustino Sarmiento. Nuestra hipótesis de lectura es que, (...) para comprender las diferencias entre estos dos planteos y las tensiones internas de cada uno de ellos, hay que problematizar sus representaciones discursivas, a partir del carácter polisémico y polémico de la nación cívica, donde conviven formas de la politicidad muchas veces contrapuestas, como el republicanismo cívico y la dominación civilizatoria. En ese marco, adquiere mayor relevancia una pregunta filosófico-política cuyo sentido se reafirma en el contexto del Bicentenario: ¿cuáles son las implicancias contemporáneas de un discurso político-generacional que pretendió crear una nación para el desierto Argentina? The main object of this paper is analyze to the notion of civic nation, a concept and a politic representation which is fundamental in the production of the Generation of 1837 in Argentina The interpellation power of this concept still persists in recent moments of argentine history. To this end, we shall study, with the heuristic tools of Conceptual and Intellectual History, the uses of ‘civility', civism', ‘civilization', ‘patria' and ‘nation' in an specific corpus of Juan Bautista Alberdi and Domingo Faustino Sarmiento's production. Our reading hypothesis is that for understanding the differences between these two interpretations of the civic nation and the internal tensions that each proposition has is necessary to question their discursive representations. Because it is inside these representations of civic nation we can identify oppositional conceptions of politics such as the civic republicanism and the domination of the civilization. (shrink)

In historiography Calvinism has suffered from several interpreters who have sought to recruit it for this or that contemporary school of thought. In this article I will discuss some of these approaches developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On the basis of recent research it is argued that it historically and theologically incorrect to force Calvinism into an overall system which is controlled by theological or socio-political ‘unit ideas’ or even a ‘central dogma.’ Instead the historian of theology should (...) attempt to develop a historical approach to the Reformed tradition after Calvin that is not influenced by nineteenth or twentieth century agenda's that impose categories of modern theology onto early modern theologians. Such an approach takes account of the complexity and wide variety of post-Reformation Reformed tradition. (shrink)

Fleck’s “comparative epistemology” approached its main object, thought, as human action. Using English and Swedish translations as test cases, this article ascribes significance to Fleck’s preference for the verb denken in forming his core terminology. Fleck referred to “thinking” as Tätigkeit. This is juxtaposed with an anglophone tradition in intellectual history harking back to Collingwood and speech-act philosophy. Still, Fleck’s stress on the profoundly social nature of denken is his distinctive characteristic as a theorist of thought as things done. Furthermore (...) Fleck’s approach was formed to deal with any kind of thought, and this was important to his dealing with the special cases of science. The term Denkverkehr is also examined within an argument stressing the deliberateness of Fleck’s linguistic choices and his flair for pursuing deeply serious intents by means of playfulness and humor. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza el debate entre John Boswell y David Halperin en torno a los orígenes históricos de la homosexualidad masculina. Si para el primero es posible afirmar que existieron personas gays en la Antigüedad y el Medioevo, para el segundo la homosexualidad, tal como la conocemos, es un invento moderno. El artículo argumenta que entender este debate como un choque entre esencialistas y construccionistas sociales –tal como fue leído por sus comentadores– es problemático y sugiere una lectura alternativa a (...) partir de las ideas de figuralismo e irrealismo. Como consecuencia, propone que además del esencialismo sexual, los estudios de género y sexualidad deberían desconfiar del esencialismo histórico y comprometerse con un pluralismo historiográfico. (shrink)

This article articulates a neo-pragmatist theory of human rights by drawing and expanding upon the American classical pragmatism of G.H. Mead. It characterizes this neo-pragmatist theory of rights by its anti-foundationalist, relational, fictive, and constitutive nature, and begins by providing a reconstruction of Mead’s social pragmatist approach to rights, a contribution systematically ignored by contemporary sociologists of rights. Next, it details the cost of this disciplinary oblivion by examining how much neo-pragmatism, critical theory, and legal consciousness studies have meanwhile gained (...) by engaging with Mead’s work on rights. Finally, it discusses the contributions of this historical-theoretical exercise to the rapidly growing sociology of rights, and shows that by supplementing the neo-Meadian approach with a recent interpretation of Hobbes’s fictional theory of politics, there appear to be substantive gains in the empirical study of the origins, consequences, meaning, and denial of rights. (shrink)

Amplifying Bernard Williams’ critique of the Nietzschean project of a revaluation of values, this paper mounts a critique of the idea that whether values will help us to live can serve as a criterion for choosing which values to live by. I explore why it might not serve as a criterion and highlight a number of further difficulties faced by the Nietzschean project. I then come to Nietzsche's defence, arguing that if we distinguish valuations from values, there is at least (...) one form of the project which overcomes those difficulties. Finally, however, I show that even on this reading, the project must either fall prey to ‘Saint-Just's illusion’ or fall back into the problems it was supposed to escape. This highlights important difficulties faced by the Nietzschean project and its descendants while also explaining why Williams, who was so Nietzschean in other respects, remained wary of the revaluation of values as a project. (shrink)

ArgumentThis article focuses on a problematic character of communication in science. Two solutions are compared: paradigm-based science and the semiotic solution developed in the arts and social sciences. There are several parallels between the latter approach and Marxist dialectics. A third, original, approach to solving communication problems is proposed; it can be labeled “transactional.” It represents a version of the semiotic solution with particular emphasis on interactions, both face-to-face and depersonalized, and the imperative of negotiating and finding compromises. Communication problems (...) existing at two registers of interactions, face-to-face and depersonalized, are differentiated; freedom is interpreted as the capacity to change the registers at will. An in-depth case study of the Coase theorem in economic sciences and legal studies illustrates key points in the proposed analysis. (shrink)

Much of the debate concerning political obligation deals with the question of which, if any, moral principles could make obedience to the directives of the government a matter of obligation. What makes political obligation political has not received attention in the literature on the topic. In this article I argue that the lack of systematic reflection on what makes political obligation political is responsible for the failure of a number of influential theories of political obligation. I demonstrate this failure using (...) the consent theory of political obligation as my major example. I conclude my analysis by formulating some positive conditions that a successful principle of political obligation should satisfy. (shrink)

The associative argument for political obligation has taken an important place in the debate on political obligation. Proponents of this view argue that an obligation to obey the government arises out of ties of affiliation among individuals who share the same citizenship. According to them, relationships between compatriots constitute basic reasons for action in the same way in which relationships between family members or friends do. As critics point out, this account of the normative force of relationships has counterintuitive implications: (...) if relationships between people sharing the same citizenship make up basic reasons for action, then relationships between people sharing other attributes, for example, relationships between racists or sexists form basic reasons for action too. In this essay, I pursue a modified version of the associative approach that is not vulnerable to this objection. (shrink)

Was there an Enlightenment in Ireland? Was there even a distinctively Irish Enlightenment? Few scholars have bothered even to pose this question. Historians of Ireland during the era of Protestant Ascendancy have tended to be all-rounders rather than specialists; their traditional preoccupations are constitutional clashes between London and Dublin, religious conflict, agrarian unrest and popular politicization. With few exceptions there has been no tradition of intellectual history, and little interest in the methodological debates associated with the rise of the “Cambridge (...) school”. Most advances in our understanding of Irish philosophical writing have consequently originated outside Ireland's history departments. One by-product of recent work on the Scottish Enlightenment has been the rediscovery of the “Molesworth Circle” by two scholars engaged in a painstaking reconstruction of Francis Hutcheson's early career in Dublin. At the other end of the century, meanwhile, some of the most exciting and ambitious attempts to conceptualize the republicanism of the United Irishmen have come from a leading historian of revolutionary France, James Livesey. His previous research on the “commercial republicanism” of Montesquieu, Adam Ferguson and Brissot has suggested a new framework for understanding Irish radicals such as Wolfe Tone, Thomas Addis Emmet and, in particular, Arthur O'Connor. (shrink)

The question of dissolution and maintenance of the state is an aspect of Hobbes’s political philosophy that has not yet received a survey to the same extent and importance usually attributed to other issues pertaining to his political writings. I emphasize in this study the English philosopher’s concern to show that the science of conserving States has the same value and scientific philosophical caliber than the science of building States. The tripartite division of this study aims to investigate first the (...) causes and the characters associated with the dissolution of the state, then the precepts and processes related to the maintenance of the State and, finally, the acts of hostilities (treason and espionage, for example) that need be known and combated by the sovereign representative because someone else affronts and contradicts the security imperative salus populi suprema lex (safety of the people is the supreme law) and the principles of reason that sustain in totum the Hobbesian public architectonic. (shrink)

Peter Winch, in his political philosophy, wanted to rethink the concepts of political authority, legitimacy and political culture, with a starting point in Wittgensteinian ideas. This essay brings together Winch's thoughts on political authority. Developing insights from Wittgenstein's work on certainty, Winch emphasised the unstated background behind any normative stand concerning authority. Ideas of legitimacy and civil society are formed within historically specific political cultures. In the 1990s, Winch was increasingly inclined to emphasise disagreement, which was related to his developing (...) views on understanding, logic and reasoning. This development is traced, in part, on the basis of unpublished lecture notes. (shrink)

O presente artigo, tem como objetivo apresentar a maneira pela qual Hobbes e Espinosa entendem a multidão, elucidando, a partir disso o papel que conferem a ela na instituição do Estado. Parte-se do pressuposto de que tanto num pensador quanto no outro, a multidão tem um papel central no que diz respeito à instituição do estado civil, de maneira que, por vias distintas, tal instituição somente pode ser pensada a partir dela. Como se observa, os dois pensadores têm maneiras totalmente (...) díspares de conceber a multidão – enquanto em um ela necessariamente precisa ser unificada por meio da representação, no outro o sujeito político instituinte é justamente a multidão tomada em sua pluralidade –, do que se segue que somos colocados diante de duas concepções distintas de Estado. (shrink)

Commentators have found Hobbes's translation of Thucydides? history puzzling. It was Hobbes's first publication and it preceded his earliest political treatise by more than a decade. Although towards the end of his life Hobbes himself claimed that he published it in order to warn his compatriots of the dangers of democracy and demagoguery, some commentators have dismissed his explanation as an attempt to tie it to his own political theory, in hindsight. Through an examination of Hobbes's preface and essay on (...) the life and history of Thucydides, published alongside his translation, this paper shows that Hobbes's view of Thucydides and his usefulness remained consistent throughout. Siding with Plutarch, Hobbes valued Thucydides for his ability to turn the auditor into a spectator, thereby protecting him, as far as possible, from the dangers of demagoguery. (shrink)

I happened to be reading Andrew Peterson’s Civic Republicanism and Civic Education: The Education of Citizens in England on the weekend that the Queen’s Diamond.

ABSTRACTIs Confucian democracy philosophically justifiable? In recent decades, prominent Confucian theorists have answered this question in the negative, arguing that the political system that is c...

The importance of Pyrrhonism to Hobbes's political philosophy is much greater than has been recognized. He seems to have used Pyrrhonist arguments to support a doctrine of moral relativity, but he was not a sceptic in the Pyrrhonist sense. These arguments helped him to develop his teaching that there is no absolute good or evil; to minimise the purchase of natural law in the state of nature and its restrictions on the right of nature; virtually to collapse natural law into (...) civil law; and to make the sovereign the political, moral and theological epicenter of his political system. (shrink)

This article shows how the public inscriptions of Hellenistic poleis, especially decrees in honor of leading citizens, illuminate Greek ethical thinking, including wider debates about questions of central importance for Greek ethical philosophers. It does so by comparing decrees' rhetoric with the ethical language and doctrines of different ancient philosophical schools. Whereas some scholars identify ethical views comparable to Stoic ideas in Hellenistic decrees, this article argues that there are more significant overlaps, especially in decrees from Asia Minor dating to (...) after 150 BC, with fourth-century BC ethical philosophy, especially Aristotle's, and its Hellenistic continuators. The overlaps between decrees and philosophers' approaches had complex, diverse causes, probably sometimes including philosophical education and influence. Comparison of philosophy and epigraphy shows that, in the same way as the polis continued to flourish after Chaironeia, critical reflection about the ethical foundations of civic life also remained vibrant, among both philosophers and citizens. (shrink)

Innovation has become a very popular concept over the twentieth century. However, few have stopped to study the origins of the category and to critically examine the studies produced on innovation. This paper conducts such an analysis on one type of innovation, namely technological innovation. The study of technological innovation is over one hundred years old. From the early 1900s onward, anthropologists, sociologists, historians, and economists began theorizing about technological innovation, each from his own respective disciplinary framework. However, in the (...) last forty years an economic and “dominant” understanding of technological innovation has developed: technological innovation defined as commercialized invention. This paper documents the origins of this representation and the tradition of research to which it gave rise: “innovation studies.” More specifically, it analyzes what distinguishes this tradition from that concerned with technological change as the use of inventions in industrial production, and looks at why such a tradition originated in Europe. (shrink)

Machiavelli is the first modern political thinker who pays great attention to the magistracy of dictatorship. “Dictatorial authority,” as he puts it, is fundamental to the survival and prosperity of republics: It is the magistracy, the “ordinary mode,” to which they turn to deal with “extraordinary accidents,” political and military emergencies. Machiavelli's gaze is cast both on the Ancient and the Modern world: Although he concentrates on the Roman magistracy, he also pays attention to magistracies of the modern world that (...) were in some way similar, such as the Council of the Ten in the Republic of Venice. In my paper, I will attempt to reconstruct the essential points of Machiavelli's discussion on dictatorship; in the concluding remarks, I will briefly tackle the more general question of the relationship between politics and law in his work as a whole. (shrink)

Towards the end of the 19th century there was a revival of the struggle for democracy throughout the world. The formation of Australia as a federation embodied this commitment, a commitment subsequently abandoned. The impetus for public education in Australia came from its commitment to democracy, inspired by the British Idealists. If the people of a country are to be its governors, these philosophers argued, they must be educated to be governors. Taking this injunction seriously, I will argue that the (...) history of the struggle for democracy should be central to education, taught in such a way that students are able to appreciate what this commitment to democracy means. Taking Australia as a model, I will argue that this implies that the young be educated so that they define themselves in relation to the vision of a democratic society and see themselves as historical actors responsible for the future of their country and the future of humanity. (shrink)

When J. L. Austin introduced two “shining new tools to crack the crib of reality”—the theory of performative utterances and the doctrine of infelicities—he could not have imagined that he was also about to inaugurate a shining new industry in the philosophy of the social sciences. But with its evident concern for the features to which “all acts are heir which have the general character of ritual or ceremonial,” Austin’s theory soon became indispensable in the analysis of ritual, linguistic and (...) every kind of social action. While Indianists such as Frits Staal, Bimal Matilal and David Seyfort Ruegg have made good use of the work of Austin and his “ordinary language” school, it is Quentin Skinner who has attempted to turn Austin’s insights into a general “theory and method” for the study of intellectual cultures. The question I want to address in this paper has to do with the applicability of Skinnerian techniques to the study of literary and intellectual Sanskrit culture in premodern India. If not all of Skinner’s methods transfer to the new context, identification of the points at which they breakdown helps to clarify the distinctive contours of Indian intellectual history, and suggests appropriate methodological innovation. (shrink)

Quentin Skinner has enduringly insisted that a past text cannot be ‘understood’ without the reader knowing something about its historical and linguistic context. But since the 1970s he has been attacked on this central point of all his work by authors maintaining that the text itself is the fundamental guide to the author’s intention, and that a separate study of the context cannot tell the historian anything that the text itself could not. Mark Bevir has spent much of the last (...) 20 years repeating a similar counter-argument. Although ‘study the linguistic context’ might be a useful heuristic maxim, Bevir says, it does not express a necessary or sufficient condition for understanding. But Skinner is right, and one of the figures he has consistently identified as a formative inspiration, R. G. Collingwood, has already (in his work of the 1930s) shown why. What Collingwood calls his ‘logic of question and answer’ explains why the historian cannot answer his characteristic ‘intention’ question about past texts without knowing the context of problems to which authors think they are offering solutions. The study of context is neither ‘prior’ (as Bevir incorrectly supposes) nor ‘separate’ (as Skinner inaccurately says), but it is, as Skinner maintains, nevertheless impossible to grasp an author’s intention without it. This ‘logic of question and answer’ also explains why, in history, dismissing the study of context is in fact a pre-judgement of evidence yet unseen. (shrink)

Historians of philosophy are increasingly likely to emphasize the extent to which their work offers a pay‐off for philosophers of un‐historical or anti‐historical inclinations; but this defence is less familiar, and often seems less than self‐evident, to intellectual historians. This article examines this tendency, arguing that such arguments for the instrumental value of historical scholarship in philosophy are often more problematic than they at first appear. Using the relatively familiar case study of René Descartes' reading of his scholastic and Aristotelian (...) contemporaries, the article attempts to problematize this notion of pay‐off from an historian's perspective. (shrink)

The principle of limited liability is one of the defining characteristics of modern corporate capitalism. It is also, we argue in this article, a powerful structural source of moral hazard. Engaging in a double conceptual genealogy, we investigate how the concepts of moral hazard and limited liability have evolved and diffused over time. We highlight two parallel but unconnected paths of construction, diffusion, moral contestation, and eventual institutionalization. We bring to the fore clear elective affinities between both concepts and their (...) respective evolution. Going one step further, we suggest that both concepts have come to be connected through time. In the context of contemporary capitalism, limited liability has to be understood, we argue, as a powerful structural source of moral hazard. In conclusion, we propose that this structural link between limited liability and moral hazard is an important explanatory factor of the systemic instability of contemporary capitalism and, as a consequence, of a pattern of recurrent crises that are regularly disrupting our economies and societies. (shrink)

The chapter begins with an initial survey of ups and downs of contextualist history of philosophy during the twentieth century in Britain and America, which finds that historically serious history of philosophy has been on the rise. It then considers ways in which the study of past philosophy has been used and is used in philosophy, and makes a case for the philosophical value and necessity of a contextually oriented approach. It examines some uses of past texts and of history (...) that reveal limits to noncontextual history, including Strawson's Kant, Rorty's grand diagnosis of the Western tradition, and Friedman on Kant's philosophy of mathematics. It then considers ways in which the history of philosophy may become philosophically deeper by becoming more historical, and instances in which history of philosophy of various stripes has or may deliver a philosophical payoff. Along the way, it urges historians of philosophy to attend not only to individual philosophers and their problems and projects, but also to the larger shape of the history of philosophy and its narrative themes. (shrink)

Plato’s theory of virtue in the Laws could be striking for someone who is more familiar with Aristotle’s ethics for conceptual complementarity between the two positions (contrary emotions, the ordering element of reason, virtue as a mean which lies between two forms of vice, typically linked to excessive actions, etc.). Plato’s theory, however, still differs from that of Aristotle in two crutial points. First, the source of emotional dynamism is, according to Plato, supraindividual as far as the psyche is a (...) cosmological principle. Only if it comes to be formed and ordered, it separates from the universal cosmic context and make up the emotional nature of an individual soul. But the soul is not, and this is the second point of difference, ordered by some external element (training or education, organized by a rational agent). Plato counts on a pre-arranged order of emotions at a particular ontological topos of the individual soul into which reason eventually descends. Emotions, on their part, seem to include a nexus between formable and forming that is chronologically and methodocally prior to that between the biological substratum and its rational organization, as assumed by Aristotle. (shrink)

En los últimos años, la relación entre la filosofía de la Ilustración y el cinismo ha logrado atraer la atención de los especialistas. En ese marco, los críticos suelen identificar las filosofías de Diógenes y Diderot. El objetivo del presente trabajo es revisar el vínculo que existe entre ambos con el fin de demostrar que el mismo es problemático y que, por esa razón, desborda las interpretaciones que se han presentado hasta el momento. Esto, por otra parte, arrojará luces sobre (...) la relación entre el materialismo de Diderot y su teoría ético-política. In recent years the relationship between the philosophy of the Enlightenment and cynicism has managed to attract the attention of scholars. In this framework, critics often identify Diogenes and Diderot's philosophy. The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between Diderot and Diogenes in order to demonstrate that it is a problematic relationship that goes beyond the interpretations that have been presented so far. This, on the other hand, will shed light on the relationship between Diderot's materialism and his ethical and political theory. (shrink)

O presente artigo busca definir o movimento literário cyberpunk a partir da sua influência teórica vinda do campo da matemática. Utilizando a teorização interna ao movimento, centrada em Rudy Rucker, o objetivo aqui é entender como os campos da análise e dos fundamentos da matemática criam uma importante distinção entre os cyberpunks e as demais distopias literárias. Com isso, há a pressuposição de um movimento de uma crítica sociomatemática feita pelos cyberpunks cujos conceitos matemáticos tornam possível criticar o tempo presente, (...) bem como servir de divulgação científica. (shrink)

This article examines the philosophical position of Plutarch on death through the way that he faces the deaths of prominent and non-prominent Lacedaemonians. Then, an analysis of Plutarch's positions by Georgius Trapezuntius in the Renaissance period is attempted, so as to illustrate the degree and the method of using the classical philosophical thought in the Renaissance.