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Counterfactual Decision Theory Is Causal Decision Theory.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (1):115-156.details
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Bayesian merging of opinions and algorithmic randomness.Francesca Zaffora Blando - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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The punctuated equilibrium of scientific change: a Bayesian network model.Patrick Grim, Frank Seidl, Calum McNamara, Isabell N. Astor & Caroline Diaso - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-25.details
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Rational monism and rational pluralism.Jack Spencer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1769-1800.details
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Skepticism and the principle of sufficient reason.Robert C. Koons & Alexander R. Pruss - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1079-1099.details
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The influence of financial practice in developing mathematical probability: Submitted for a special edition of Synthese, “Enabling mathematical cultures”.Timothy Johnson - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 26):6291-6331.details
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Causal Decision Theory is Safe from Psychopaths.Timothy Luke Williamson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):665-685.details
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Bayesian Confirmation or Ordinary Confirmation?Yongfeng Yuan - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (3):425-449.details
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Learning from Conditionals.Benjamin Eva, Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):461-508.details
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Why Take Both Boxes?Jack Spencer & Ian Wells - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48.details
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No Interpretation of Probability.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1195-1212.details
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Philosophy as conceptual engineering: Inductive logic in Rudolf Carnap's scientific philosophy.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Dissertation, University of British Columbiadetails
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Causal Decision Theory and EPR correlations.Arif Ahmed & Adam Caulton - 2014 - Synthese 191 (18):4315-4352.details
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The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.details
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The Case for Quantum State Realism.Morgan C. Tait - 2012 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontariodetails
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Vagueness, Uncertainty and Degrees of Belief: Two Kinds of Indeterminacy—One Kind of Credence.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1027-44.details
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Scotching Dutch Books?Alan Hájek - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):139-151.details
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Projecting Chances: A Humean Vindication and Justification of the Principal Principle.Barry Ward - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (1):241-261.details
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Causal reasoning and backtracking.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):139 - 154.details
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Stakes and beliefs.Brad Armendt - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):71 - 87.details
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Causal laws are objectifications of inductive schemes.Wolfgang Spohn - 1955 - In Anthony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability. Routledge. pp. 223-252.details
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Everett and evidence.Hilary Greaves & Wayne Myrvold - 2010 - In Simon Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent & David Wallace (eds.), Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, & Reality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Countable additivity and the de finetti lottery.Paul Bartha - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):301-321.details
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Representation theorems and realism about degrees of belief.Lyle Zynda - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.details
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Logic, probability, and coherence.John M. Vickers - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (1):95-110.details
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Subjunctive conditionals and revealed preference.Brian Skyrms - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):545-574.details
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Darwin meets the logic of decision: Correlation in evolutionary game theory.Brian Skyrms - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (4):503-528.details
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Bayesianism without the Black box.Mark Kaplan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (1):48-69.details
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A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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