- Philosophical thought experiments, intuitions, and cognitive equilibrium.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 68-89.details
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Motion events in language and cognition.S. Gennari - 2002 - Cognition 83 (1):49-79.details
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Using Insights from Applied Moral Psychology to Promote Ethical Behavior Among Engineering Students and Professional Engineers.Scott D. Gelfand - 2016 - Science and Engineering Ethics 22 (5):1513-1534.details
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The 7E Model of the Human Mind: Articulating a Plastic Self for the Cognitive Science of Religion.Flavio A. Geisshuesler - 2019 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 19 (5):450-476.details
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Are "implicit" attitudes unconscious?Bertram Gawronski, Wilhelm Hofmann & Christopher J. Wilbur - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):485-499.details
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Choice models and realistic ontologies: three challenges to neuro-psychological modellers.Roberto Fumagalli - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (1):145-164.details
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Implicit Bias and Qualiefs.Martina Fürst - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-34.details
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Formal Ontologies and Semantic Technologies: A “Dual Process” Proposal for Concept Representation.Marcello Frixione & Lieto - 2014 - Philosophia Scientiae 18:139-152.details
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Formal Ontologies and Semantic Technologies: A “Dual Process” Proposal for Concept Representation.Marcello Frixione & Antonio Lieto - 2014 - Philosophia Scientiae 18:139-152.details
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Reasoning in the monty hall problem: Examining choice behaviour and probability judgements.Ana Franco-Watkins, Peter Derks & Michael Dougherty - 2003 - Thinking and Reasoning 9 (1):67 – 90.details
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How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts.Keith Frankish - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):145-146.details
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Dynamic reasoning and time pressure: Transition from analytical operations to experiential responses.Peter A. F. Fraser-Mackenzie & Itiel E. Dror - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (2):211-225.details
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Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning.Keith Frankish - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):914-926.details
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Conscious thinking, acceptance, and self-deception.Keith Frankish - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):20-21.details
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Philosophical intuitions , heuristics , and metaphors.Eugen Fischer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):569-606.details
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Adaptive domains of deontic reasoning.Laurence Fiddick - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):105 – 116.details
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Inductive reasoning and semantic cognition: More than just different names for the same thing?Aidan Feeney, Aimee K. Crisp & Catherine J. Wilburn - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):715-716.details
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Whole mind theory: Massive modularity meets dual processes.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):200 – 208.details
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Spot the difference: distinguishing between two kinds of processing.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):121-131.details
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Reasoning to and from belief: Deduction and induction are still distinct.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):267-283.details
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Reflections on reflection: the nature and function of type 2 processes in dual-process theories of reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2019 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (4):383-415.details
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Rapid responding increases belief bias: Evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Jodie Curtis-Holmes - 2005 - Thinking and Reasoning 11 (4):382 – 389.details
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Questions and challenges for the new psychology of reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (1):5 - 31.details
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Frequency versus probability formats in statistical word problems.Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Simon J. Handley, Nick Perham, David E. Over & Valerie A. Thompson - 2000 - Cognition 77 (3):197-213.details
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Frequency versus probability formats in statistical word problems.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Simon J. Handley, Nick Perham, David E. Over & Valerie A. Thompson - 2000 - Cognition 77 (3):197-213.details
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Dual processes, evolution and rationality.Jonathan Evans - 2004 - Thinking and Reasoning 10 (4):405 – 410.details
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Dual-processing explains base-rate neglect, but which dual-process theory and how?Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Shira Elqayam - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):261-262.details
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Miserliness in human cognition: the interaction of detection, override and mindware.Keith E. Stanovich - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 24 (4):423-444.details
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Individual Differences in Framing and Conjunction Effects.Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (4):289-317.details
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Who detects and why: how do individual differences in cognitive characteristics underpin different types of responses to reasoning tasks?Nikola Erceg, Zvonimir Galić, Andreja Bubić & Dino Jelić - 2023 - Thinking and Reasoning 29 (4):594-642.details
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Dual process theories versus massive modularity hypotheses.Angeles Eraña - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):855-872.details
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Probabilities, beliefs, and dual processing: the paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning.Shira Elqayam & David Over - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):27-40.details
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Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):251-252.details
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Two social minds in one brain? error-related negativity provides evidence for parallel processing pathways during social evaluation.Nassim Elimari & Gilles Lafargue - 2024 - Cognition and Emotion 38 (1):90-102.details
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The mechanics of implicit learning of contingencies: A commentary on Custers & Aarts' paper.Baruch Eitam - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):379-381.details
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Varieties of Risk.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):432-455.details
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The biological function of consciousness.Brian Earl - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.details
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Suppose We Know Things.Matt Duncan - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):308-323.details
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Moral agency among the ruins.David Dunning - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.details
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Knowledge of things.Matt Duncan - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3559-3592.details
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Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings.Richard Dub - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):27-60.details
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How to confuse organisms with mousetraps: Machine metaphors and intelligent design.Doren Recker - 2010 - Zygon 45 (3):647-664.details
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A theory of implicit and explicit knowledge.Zoltan Dienes & Josef Perner - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):735-808.details
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Contributii la psihologia morala: evaluari ale rezultatelor si noi cercetari empirice.Bogdan Olaru & Andrei Holman (eds.) - 2015 - Bucuresti, Romania: Pro Universitaria.details
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Metacognitive control in single- vs. dual-process theory.Aliya R. Dewey - 2023 - Thinking and Reasoning 29 (2):177-212.details
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Intention Reconsideration in Artificial Agents: a Structured Account.Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - Special Issue of Phil Studies.details
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Cross-talk in economics and neuroscience.Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & Carl Schoonover - unknowndetails
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Agency.Markus Schlosser - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Associationist Theories of Thought.Eric Mandelbaum - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: Is it time for a tri-process theory.Keith E. Stanovich - 2009 - In Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press. pp. 55--88.details
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