Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Agente crítico, democracia deliberativa y el acto de dar razones.Cristián Santibáñez - 2020 - Co-herencia 17 (32):37-65.
    El objetivo de este trabajo es proponer un concepto de agente crítico que dialogue con una práctica democrática deliberativa, considerando qué significa el acto de dar razones. Para tal efecto, en este trabajo se discute, primero, qué significaría ser crítico o tender hacia la criticidad tanto autorreferente como hacia terceros. Esta sección está apoyada principalmente con ideas provenientes de la teoría de la argumentación y de la lógica informal. En segundo término, se aborda el concepto de democracia deliberativa a la (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Causal Powers and Social Ontology.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1357-1377.
    Over the last few decades, philosophers and social scientists have applied the so-called powers ontology to the social domain. I argue that this application is highly problematic: many of the alleged powers in the social realm violate the intrinsicality condition, and those that can be coherently taken to be intrinsic to their bearers are arguably causally redundant. I end the paper by offering a diagnosis of why philosophers and social scientists have been tempted to think that there are powers in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Close Calls and the Confident Agent: Free Will, Deliberation, and Alternative Possibilities.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):627-667.
    Two intuitions lie at the heart of our conception of free will. One intuition locates free will in our ability to deliberate effectively and control our actions accordingly: the ‘Deliberation and Control’ (DC) condition. The other intuition is that free will requires the existence of alternative possibilities for choice: the AP condition. These intuitions seem to conflict when, for instance, we deliberate well to decide what to do, and we do not want it to be possible to act in some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Game Theory, Cheap Talk and Post‐Truth Politics: David Lewis Vs. John Searle on Reasons for Truth‐Telling.S. M. Amadae - 2018 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 48 (3):306-329.
    I offer two potential diagnoses of the behavioral norms governing post‐truth politics by comparing the view of language, communication, and truth‐telling put forward by David Lewis (extended by game theorists), and John Searle. My first goal is to specify the different ways in which Lewis, and game theorists more generally, in contrast to Searle (in the company of Paul Grice and Jurgen Habermas), go about explaining the normativity of truthfulness within a linguistic community. The main difference is that for Lewis (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles About Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):62-104.
    This paper champions the view (REG) that the concept of a normative reason for an agent S to perform an action A is that of an explanation why it would be good (in some way, to some degree) for S to do A. REG has numerous virtues, but faces some significant challenges which prompt many philosophers to be skeptical that it can correctly account for all our reasons. I demonstrate how five different puzzles about normative reasons can be solved by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Creation of Institutional Reality, Special Theory of Relativity, and Mere Cambridge Change.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Saying so can make it so, J. L. Austin taught us long ago. Famously, John Searle has developed this Austinian insight in an account of the construction of institutional reality. Searle maintains that so-called Status Function Declarations, allegedly having a “double direction of fit”, synchronically create worldly institutional facts, corresponding to the propositional content of the declarations. I argue that Searle’s account of the making of institutional reality is in tension with the special theory of relativity – irrespective of whether (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Explanation of Action in History.Constantine Sandis - 2006 - Essays in Philosophy 7 (2):12.
    This paper focuses on two conflations which frequently appear within the philosophy of history and other fields concerned with action explanation. The first of these, which I call the Conflating View of Reasons, states that the reasons for which we perform actions are reasons why (those events which are) our actions occur. The second, more general conflation, which I call the Conflating View of Action Explanation, states that whatever explains why an agent performed a certain action explains why (that event (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Intentionality, Normativity, and a Problem for Searle.Michael Gorman - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (4):703-713.
    Au cœur de la philosophic de John Searle se trouve une compréhension biologique de l'esprit. Mais il y a une tension dans saposition. D'un côté, la biologiemoderne, telle quit la comprend, requiert une certaine conception de la normativité. D'un autre côte, la façon dont Searle lui-même comprend I'intentionnalité requiert une conception très différente de la normativité. Pour résoudre la difficulté, Searle devrait à la fois modifier sa compréhension de la biologie et nuancer son idée que l'esprit est un phénomène biologique (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Defence of a Rationalist Conception of Practical Reason.Gal Yehezkel - 2017 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 13 (1):39-57.
    In this paper I attempt to refute the instrumental conception of practical reason, and thus defend a rationalist conception of practical reason. I argue that, far from merely playing an instrumental role, reason can be used by an agent to evaluate, that is, to approve or reject, final ends, which might be suggested by desires, and further to determine final ends independently of any desires, whether actual or potential, that the agent might have. My argument relies on an analysis of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Is Conscious Will an Illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):58-70.
    In this essay I critically examine Daniel Wegner’s account of conscious will as an illusion developed in his book The Illusion of Conscious Will. I show that there are unwarranted leaps in his argument, which considerably decrease the empirical plausibility and theoretical adequacy of his account. Moreover, some features essential to our experience of willing, which are related to our general understanding of free will, moral responsibility and human agency, are largely left out in Wegner’s account of conscious will. This (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • John Searle’s Naturalism as a Hybrid (Property-Substance) Version of Naturalistic Psychophysical Dualism.Dmytro Sepetyi - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (52):23-44.
    The article discusses the relationship between John Searle’s doctrine of naturalism and various forms of materialism and dualism. It is argued that despite Searle’s protestations, his doctrine is not substantially differ- ent from the epiphenomenalistic property dualism, except for the admis- sion, in his later works, of the existence of an irreducible non-Humean self. In particular, his recognition that consciousness is unique in having an irreducible first-person ontology makes his disavowal of property du- alism purely verbalistic. As for epiphenomenalism, Searle’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Is Conscious Will an Illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):59 - 70.
    In this essay I critically examine Daniel Wegner’s account of conscious will as an illusion developed in his book The Illusion of Conscious Will. I show that there are unwarranted leaps in his argument, which considerably decrease the empirical plausibility and theoretical adequacy of his account. Moreover, some features essential to our experience of willing, which are related to our general understanding of free will, moral responsibility and human agency, are largely left out in Wegner’s account of conscious will. This (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • A Unified Framework for Addiction: Vulnerabilities in the Decision Process.A. David Redish, Steve Jensen & Adam Johnson - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):415-437.
    The understanding of decision-making systems has come together in recent years to form a unified theory of decision-making in the mammalian brain as arising from multiple, interacting systems (a planning system, a habit system, and a situation-recognition system). This unified decision-making system has multiple potential access points through which it can be driven to make maladaptive choices, particularly choices that entail seeking of certain drugs or behaviors. We identify 10 key vulnerabilities in the system: (1) moving away from homeostasis, (2) (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Philosophy in Poland: Varieties of Anti-Irrationalism. A Commitment to Reason without the Worship of Reason.Konrad Werner - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (1):1-32.
    I shall elaborate more on the idea of anti-irrationalism proposed by the Polish analytic philosopher Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, a prominent member of the Lvov-Warsaw School of philosophy and logic. In my reading, anti-irrationalism stands in opposition not only to overt irrationalism, which is made clear by the term itself, but also to all forms of rationalism that tip toward something like worship of reason. Having characterized anti-irrationalism as it originally appeared in Ajdukiewicz’s works, I shall propose a certain reformulation of it, (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation.Derk Pereboom - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):287 - 306.
    A traditional concern for determinists is that the epistemic conditions an agent must satisfy to deliberate about which of a number of distinct actions to perform threaten to conflict with a belief in determinism and its evident consequences. I develop an account of the sort that specifies two epistemic requirements, an epistemic openness condition and a belief in the efficacy of deliberation, whose upshot is that someone who believes in determinism and its evident consequences can deliberate without inconsistent beliefs. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Decisions, Intentions, and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):146-162.
    I will argue that close attention to deciding casts doubt on the simple view and the single phenomena view of intentional action. That is my thesis. My aim is much broader—to improve our understanding of deciding and of the bearing of the phenomenon of deciding on free will and moral responsibility.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Luck and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):543-557.
    This essay sketches a problem about luck for typical incompatibilist views of free will posed in Alfred Mele, Free Will and Luck , and examines recent reactions to that problem. Reactions featuring appeals to agent causation receive special attention. Because the problem is focused on decision making, the control that agents have over what they decide is a central topic. Other topics discussed include the nature of lucky action and differences between directly and indirectly free actions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Deliberation and Metaphysical Freedom.E. J. Coffman & Ted A. Warfield - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):25-44.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Nonhuman Animals: Not Necessarily Saints or Sinners.C. E. Abbate - 2014 - Between the Species 17 (1):1-30.
    Higher-order thought theories maintain that consciousness involves the having of higher-order thoughts about mental states. In response to these theories of consciousness, an attempt is often made to illustrate that nonhuman animals possess said consciousness, overlooking an alarming consequence: attributing higher-order thought to nonhuman animals might entail that they should be held morally accountable for their actions. I argue that moral responsibility requires more than higher-order thought: moral agency requires a specific higher-order thought which concerns a belief about the rightness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Rumos da Epistemologia V. 11.Luiz Dutra & Alexandre Meyer Luz (eds.) - 2011 - Núcleo de Epistemologia e Lógica.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • You Ought to Φ Only If You May Believe That You Ought to Φ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.
    In this paper I present an argument for the claim that you ought to do something only if you may believe that you ought to do it. More exactly, I defend the following principle about normative reasons: An agent A has decisive reason to φ only if she also has sufficient reason to believe that she has decisive reason to φ. I argue that this principle follows from the plausible assumption that it must be possible for an agent to respond (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Quaderns de filosofia V, 1.Quad Fia - 2018 - Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (1).
    Quaderns de filosofia V, 1 Número complet / Número completo / Full Issue.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Sobre la Respuesta de Carlos Moya Al Argumento de la Suerte.Mirja Pérez de Calleja - 2018 - Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (1).
    On Carlos Moya's Reply to the Argument from Luck Resumen: Esta nota crítica se centra en el argumento de Carlos Moya a favor de la conclusión de que el Argumento de la Suerte representa en realidad un problema mayor para los compatibilistas que para los libertaristas. La Sección 1 introduce brevemente el Argumento de la Suerte. La Sección 2 discute la distinción de Moya entre dos concepciones de deliberación práctica, y propone una manera alternativa a la de Moya de entender (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Philosophy and Economics.D. Wade Hands - 2008 - In S. N. Durlauf & L. E. Blume (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition. Palgrave. pp. 410-420.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Mystery of Capital and the Construction of Social Reality.Barry Smith, David M. Mark & Isaac Ehrlich (eds.) - 2008 - Open Court.
    John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality and Hernando de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital shifted the focus of current thought on capital and economic development to the cultural and conceptual ideas that underpin market economies and that are taken for granted in developed nations. This collection of essays assembles 21 philosophers, economists, and political scientists to help readers understand these exciting new theories.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Rule Following: A Pedestrian Approach.Masahiro Yamada - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):283-311.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Improving Practical Reasoning and Argumentation.Michael D. Baumtrog - 2015 - Dissertation, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
    This thesis justifies the need for and develops a new integrated model of practical reasoning and argumentation. After framing the work in terms of what is reasonable rather than what is rational (chapter 1), I apply the model for practical argumentation analysis and evaluation provided by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) to a paradigm case of unreasonable individual practical argumentation provided by mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik (chapter 2). The application shows that by following the model, Breivik is relatively easily able (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Unconscious Decisions and Free Will.Alfred Mele - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):777-789.
    It is sometimes claimed that certain experiments show that free will is an illusion by showing that all decisions are made unconsciously. I have argued elsewhere that these experiments do not show that any decisions are made unconsciously. But suppose I am wrong about that. Even then, I argue, these experiments do not pose a serious threat to free will. First, one is not warranted in generalizing from findings about the decisions allegedly made in these experiments to the claim that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Social Ontology, Practical Reasonableness, and Collective Reasons for Action.Polycarp Ikuenobe - 2019 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 49 (3):264-281.
    Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, EarlyView.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hjumovska teorija motivacije: u obranu dogme.Matej Sušnik - 2012 - Prolegomena 11 (1):83-105.
    Prema hjumovskoj teoriji motivacije, motivacijski se proces sastoji od dva međusobno nezavisna mentalna stanja , što znači da subjekt ne može biti u potpunosti motiviran na djelovanje ako mu jedno od tih stanja nedostaje. U prvom dijelu članka prikazujem središnja obilježja ove teorije, a potom pokazujem da prihvaćanje Humeove distinkcije između divljih i tihih strasti može biti vrlo koristan alat za obranu ovog modela od nekih standardnih prigovora.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Basic Deviance Reconsidered.Markus E. Schlosser - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):186–194.
    Most contemporary philosophers of action agree on the following claims. Firstly, the possibility of deviant or wayward causal chains poses a serious problem for the standard-causal theory of action. Secondly, we can distinguish between different kinds of deviant causal chains in the theory of action. In particular, we can distinguish between cases of basic and cases of consequential deviance. Thirdly, the problem of consequential deviance admits of a fairly straightforward solution, whereas the possibility of basic deviance constitutes a separate and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Argumentation Theory and the Conception of Epistemic Justification.Lilian Bermejo-Luque - 2009 - In Marcin Koszowy (ed.), Informal Logic and Argumentation Theory. University of Białystok. pp. 285--303.
    I characterize the deductivist ideal of justification and, following to a great extent Toulmin’s work The Uses of Argument, I try to explain why this ideal is erroneous. Then I offer an alternative model of justification capable of making our claims to knowledge about substantial matters sound and reasonable. This model of justification will be based on a conception of justification as the result of good argumentation, and on a model of argumentation which is a pragmatic linguistic reconstruction of Toulmin’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Analyzing Creativity in the Light of Social Practice Theory.Giuseppe Città, Manuel Gentile, Agnese Augello, Simona Ottaviano, Mario Allegra & Frank Dignum - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Nietzsche's Constructive Philosophy: Self-Understanding and the Sovereign Individual.Walter Duhaime - unknown
    There is an apparent disagreement between recent commentators who find in Nietzsche both a constructive philosophy and a compatibilist account of freedom, and Brian Leiter’s reading that rejects both. The reason for this disagreement, I argue, is that Leiter’s “illiberal” view is limited in scope to Nietzsche’s critical philosophy, while Nietzsche also has a constructive philosophy aimed at select readers. I read Nietzsche’s critical philosophy as targeting the metaphysical entities that underpin asceticism and herd values, not the mental states and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Role of Affective Associations in the Planning and Habit Systems of Decision-Making Related to Addiction.Marc T. Kiviniemi & Rick A. Bevins - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):450-451.
    The model proposed by Redish et al. considers vulnerabilities within decision systems based on expectancy-value assumptions. Further understanding of processes leading to addiction can be gained by considering other inputs to decision-making, particularly affective associations with behaviors. This consideration suggests additional decision-making vulnerabilities that might explain addictive behaviors.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Self-in-a-Vat: On John Searle's Ontology of Reasons for Acting.Laurence Kaufmann - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (4):447-479.
    John Searle has recently developed a theory of reasons for acting that intends to rescue the freedom of the will, endangered by causal determinism, whether physical or psychological. To achieve this purpose, Searle postulates a series of "gaps" that are supposed toendowthe self with free will. Reviewing key steps in Searle's argument, this article shows that such an undertaking cannot be successfully completed because of its solipsist premises. The author argues that reasons for acting do not have a subjective, I-ontology (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Do Androids Dream of Normative Endorsement? On the Fallibility of Artificial Moral Agents.Frodo Podschwadek - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3):325-339.
    The more autonomous future artificial agents will become, the more important it seems to equip them with a capacity for moral reasoning and to make them autonomous moral agents. Some authors have even claimed that one of the aims of AI development should be to build morally praiseworthy agents. From the perspective of moral philosophy, praiseworthy moral agents, in any meaningful sense of the term, must be fully autonomous moral agents who endorse moral rules as action-guiding. They need to do (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Shusterman’s Thinking Through the Body and Everyday Aesthetics.Thomas Leddy - 2015 - Contemporary Pragmatism 12 (1):79-99.
    How does Richard Shusterman’sThinking Through the Bodyapply to the issues of everyday aesthetics? As it turns out, many chapters contribute significantly to everyday aesthetics, in particular the work on architecture, self-styling, the body as background, lovemaking, and the process of making a photographic portrait. Shusterman’s concentration on the art of living has special importance to everyday aesthetics. Current debates within the field of everyday aesthetics also raise problems for somaesthetics. I also question the limits of somaesthetics and Shusterman’s rejection of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Deliberation Incompatibilism.Edmund Henden - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (3):313-333.
    Deliberation incompatibilism is the view that an agent being rational and deliberating about which of (mutually excluding) actions to perform, is incompatible with her believing that there exist prior conditions that render impossible the performance of either one of these actions. However, the main argument for this view, associated most prominently with Peter van Inwagen, appears to have been widely rejected by contemporary authors on free will. In this paper I argue first that a closer examination of van Inwagen's argument (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Friends, Robots, Citizens?Stephen Rainey - 2015 - Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 45 (3):225-233.
    The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Computational Representation of Practical Argument.Katie Atkinson, Trevor Bench-Capon & Peter McBurney - 2006 - Synthese 152 (2):157-206.
    In this paper we consider persuasion in the context of practical reasoning, and discuss the problems associated with construing reasoning about actions in a manner similar to reasoning about beliefs. We propose a perspective on practical reasoning as presumptive justification of a course of action, along with critical questions of this justification, building on the account of Walton. From this perspective, we articulate an interaction protocol, which we call PARMA, for dialogues over proposed actions based on this theory. We outline (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Voices and Noises in the Theory of Speech Acts.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2004 - Pragmatics and Cognition 12 (1):105-151.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Consciousness, Free Will, Moral Responsibility.Caruso Gregg - forthcoming - In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Routledge.
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. To properly assess what, if anything, these empirical advances can tell us about free will and moral responsibility, we first need to get clear on the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free will? If so, what role or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Pereboom’s Defense of Deliberation-Compatibilism: A Problem Remains.David Widerker - 2019 - Journal of Ethics 23 (3):333-345.
    Pereboom’s defense of deliberation-compatibilism is the most elaborate and most sophisticated current attempt to defend this position. In this paper, I have provided a careful, and open-minded assessment of that defense. The conclusion that emerged is that it is subject to an important objection that leaves him with no explanation of the relevant difference between a scenario in which it would irrational for an agent to deliberate what to do, and a scenario the deliberation-compatibilist would consider appropriate for rational deliberation. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Controverse sur la causalité mentale dans l’action.Candida Jaci De Sousa Melo - 2008 - Philosophiques 35 (2):345-367.
    Le problème métaphysique central en philosophie de l’esprit concerne la relation entre l’esprit et le corps des agents. Quand on tente d’expliquer, par exemple, le rapport entre les pensées et les actions humaines, on est alors immédiatement confronté avec la difficulté, apparemment insurmontable, d’expliquer la causalité mentale. On doit répondre à la question : nos états de pensée causent-ils effectivement ce que l’on fait? Bien sûr, nos croyances, nos intentions et nos désirs sont à la base de notre comportement, dira (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Role of Vulnerability in Kantian Ethics.Paul Formosa - 2014 - In Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers & Susan Dodds (eds.), Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 88-109.
    Does the fact that humans are vulnerable, needy and dependent beings play an important role in Kantian ethics? It is sometimes claimed that it cannot and does not. I argue that it can and does. I distinguish between broad (all persons are vulnerable) and narrow (only some persons are vulnerable) senses of vulnerability, and explain the role of vulnerability in both senses in Kantian ethics. The basis of this argument is to show that the core normative focus of Kantian ethics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Decision-Making: A Neuroeconomic Perspective.Benoit Hardy-Vallée - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):939–953.
    This article introduces and discusses from a philosophical point of view the nascent field of neuroeconomics, which is the study of neural mechanisms involved in decision-making and their economic significance. Following a survey of the ways in which decision-making is usually construed in philosophy, economics and psychology, I review many important findings in neuroeconomics to show that they suggest a revised picture of decision-making and ourselves as choosing agents. Finally, I outline a neuroeconomic account of irrationality.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Causal and Logical Necessity in Malebranche’s Occasionalism.A. R. J. Fisher - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):523-548.
    The famous Cartesian Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) espoused the occasionalist doctrine that ‘there is only one true cause because there is only one true God; that the nature or power of each thing is nothing but the will of God; that all natural causes are not true causes but only occasional causes’ (LO, 448, original italics). One of Malebranche’s well-known arguments for occasionalism, known as, the ‘no necessary connection’ argument (or, NNC ) stems from the principle that ‘a true cause… is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation