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  1. Peirce's Account of Assertion.Jaime Alfaro Iglesias - 2016 - Dissertation, University of São Paulo
    One usually makes assertions by means of uttering indicative sentences like “It is raining”. However, not every utterance of an indicative sentence is an assertion. For example, in uttering “I will be back tomorrow”, one might be making a promise. What is to make an assertion? C.S. Peirce held the view that “to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth” (CP 5.543). In this thesis, I interpret Peirce’s view of assertion and I evaluate Peirce’s reasons for (...)
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  • Is Conscious Will an Illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):59 - 70.
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  • Pereboom’s Defense of Deliberation-Compatibilism: A Problem Remains.David Widerker - 2019 - Journal of Ethics 23 (3):333-345.
    Pereboom’s defense of deliberation-compatibilism is the most elaborate and most sophisticated current attempt to defend this position. In this paper, I have provided a careful, and open-minded assessment of that defense. The conclusion that emerged is that it is subject to an important objection that leaves him with no explanation of the relevant difference between a scenario in which it would irrational for an agent to deliberate what to do, and a scenario the deliberation-compatibilist would consider appropriate for rational deliberation. (...)
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  • Making Sense of Akrasia.Matthew Burch - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):939-971.
    There are two extreme poles in the literature on akrasia. Internalists hold that it's impossible to act intentionally against your better judgment, because there's a necessary internal relation between judgment and intentional action. To the contrary, externalists maintain that we can act intentionally against our better judgment, because the will operates independently of judgment. Critics of internalism argue that it fails a realism test—most people seem to think that we can and do act intentionally against our better judgment. And critics (...)
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  • John Searle’s Naturalism as a Hybrid Version of Naturalistic Psychophysical Dualism.Dmytro Sepetyi - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (52):23-44.
    The article discusses the relationship between John Searle’s doctrine of naturalism and various forms of materialism and dualism. It is argued that despite Searle’s protestations, his doctrine is not substantially differ- ent from the epiphenomenalistic property dualism, except for the admis- sion, in his later works, of the existence of an irreducible non-Humean self. In particular, his recognition that consciousness is unique in having an irreducible first-person ontology makes his disavowal of property du- alism purely verbalistic. As for epiphenomenalism, Searle’s (...)
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  • Quaderns de filosofia V, 1.Quad Fia - 2018 - Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (1).
    Quaderns de filosofia V, 1 Número complet / Número completo / Full Issue.
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  • Sobre la Respuesta de Carlos Moya Al Argumento de la Suerte.Mirja Pérez de Calleja - 2018 - Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (1).
    On Carlos Moya's Reply to the Argument from Luck Resumen: Esta nota crítica se centra en el argumento de Carlos Moya a favor de la conclusión de que el Argumento de la Suerte representa en realidad un problema mayor para los compatibilistas que para los libertaristas. La Sección 1 introduce brevemente el Argumento de la Suerte. La Sección 2 discute la distinción de Moya entre dos concepciones de deliberación práctica, y propone una manera alternativa a la de Moya de entender (...)
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  • You Ought to Φ Only If You May Believe That You Ought to Φ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.
    In this paper I present an argument for the claim that you ought to do something only if you may believe that you ought to do it. More exactly, I defend the following principle about normative reasons: An agent A has decisive reason to φ only if she also has sufficient reason to believe that she has decisive reason to φ. I argue that this principle follows from the plausible assumption that it must be possible for an agent to respond (...)
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  • Two Arguments for Evidentialism.Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):805-818.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that all reasons to believe p are evidence for p. Pragmatists hold that pragmatic considerations – incentives for believing – can also be reasons to believe. Nishi Shah, Thomas Kelly and others have argued for evidentialism on the grounds that incentives for belief fail a ‘reasoning constraint’ on reasons: roughly, reasons must be considerations we can reason from, but we cannot reason from incentives to belief. In the first half of the paper, I show that this (...)
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  • Consciousness, Free Will, Moral Responsibility.Caruso Gregg - forthcoming - In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Routledge.
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. To properly assess what, if anything, these empirical advances can tell us about free will and moral responsibility, we first need to get clear on the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free will? If so, what role or (...)
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  • The Ontology of Intentional Agency in Light of Neurobiological Determinism: Philosophy Meets Folk Psychology.Dhar Sharmistha - 2017 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (1):129-149.
    The moot point of the Western philosophical rhetoric about free will consists in examining whether the claim of authorship to intentional, deliberative actions fits into or is undermined by a one-way causal framework of determinism. Philosophers who think that reconciliation between the two is possible are known as metaphysical compatibilists. However, there are philosophers populating the other end of the spectrum, known as the metaphysical libertarians, who maintain that claim to intentional agency cannot be sustained unless it is assumed that (...)
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  • Wohin Führt Die Kausale Handlungstheorie?Georg Gasser - 2008 - In Bruno Niederbacher & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Was sind menschliche Personen? Ein akttheoretischer Zugang. Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag. pp. 181-208.
    Wer der Frage nachgeht, was jemand tut, der geht – wenigstens implizit – auch der Frage nach, wer da etwas tut. Handlungen schreiben wir normalerweise Personen zu. Handeln zu können ist eine derjenigen Eigenschaften, die Personen auszeichnet. Die Analyse menschlichen Handelns geht mit der Frage einher, was menschliche Personen sind. Folgender Beitrag befasst sich mit dem Verhältnis von Handlung und Person innerhalb der kausalen Theorie des Handelns. Durch eine eingehende Analyse dieses weitverbreiteten Ansatzes zur Erklärung und Deutung menschlichen Handelns sollen (...)
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  • The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
    The phenomenology of agency has, until recently, been rather neglected, overlooked by both philosophers of action and philosophers of consciousness alike. Thankfully, all that has changed, and of late there has been an explosion of interest in what it is like to be an agent. 1 This burgeoning field crosses the traditional boundaries between disciplines: philosophers of psychopathology are speculating about the role that unusual experiences of agency might play in accounting for disorders of thought and action; cognitive scientists are (...)
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  • Philosophy and Economics.D. Wade Hands - 2008 - In S. N. Durlauf & L. E. Blume (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition. Palgrave. pp. 410-420.
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  • The Mystery of Capital and the Construction of Social Reality.Barry Smith, David M. Mark & Isaac Ehrlich (eds.) - 2008 - Open Court.
    John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality and Hernando de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital shifted the focus of current thought on capital and economic development to the cultural and conceptual ideas that underpin market economies and that are taken for granted in developed nations. This collection of essays assembles 21 philosophers, economists, and political scientists to help readers understand these exciting new theories.
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  • Rule Following: A Pedestrian Approach.Masahiro Yamada - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):283-311.
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  • Can Reasons Be Propositions? Against Dancy's Attack on Propositionalism.Attila Tanyi & Morganti Matteo - 2017 - Theoria 83 (3):185-205.
    The topic of this article is the ontology of practical reasons. We draw a critical comparison between two views. According to the first, practical reasons are states of affairs; according to the second, they are propositions. We first isolate and spell out in detail certain objections to the second view that can be found only in embryonic form in the literature – in particular, in the work of Jonathan Dancy. Next, we sketch possible ways in which one might respond to (...)
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  • The Role of Vulnerability in Kantian Ethics.Paul Formosa - 2014 - In Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers & Susan Dodds (eds.), Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 88-109.
    Does the fact that humans are vulnerable, needy and dependent beings play an important role in Kantian ethics? It is sometimes claimed that it cannot and does not. I argue that it can and does. I distinguish between broad (all persons are vulnerable) and narrow (only some persons are vulnerable) senses of vulnerability, and explain the role of vulnerability in both senses in Kantian ethics. The basis of this argument is to show that the core normative focus of Kantian ethics (...)
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  • Free Will, Narrative, and Retroactive Self-Constitution.Roman Altshuler - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):867-883.
    John Fischer has recently argued that the value of acting freely is the value of self-expression. Drawing on David Velleman’s earlier work, Fischer holds that the value of a life is a narrative value and free will is valuable insofar as it allows us to shape the narrative structure of our lives. This account rests on Fischer’s distinction between regulative control and guidance control. While we lack the former kind of control, on Fischer’s view, the latter is all that is (...)
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  • How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.
    Recently, much attention has been paid to ‘rational requirements’ and, especially, to what I call ‘rational requirements of formal coherence as such’. These requirements are satisfied just when our attitudes are formally coherent: for example, when our beliefs do not contradict each other. Nevertheless, these requirements are puzzling. In particular, it is unclear why we should satisfy them. In light of this, I explore the conjecture that there are no requirements of formal coherence. I do so by trying to construct (...)
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  • The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.
    Niko Kolodny It is often said that there is a special class of norms, ‘rational requirements’, that demand that our attitudes be related one another in certain ways, whatever else may be the case.1 In recent work, a special class of these rational requirements has attracted particular attention: what I will call ‘requirements of formal coherence as such’, which require just that our attitudes be formally coherent.2 For example, we are rationally required, if we believe something, to believe what it (...)
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  • Intentional Cognitive Models with Volition.Ammar Qusaibaty & Newton Howard - manuscript
    Man’s intellectual capacity remains an enigma, as it is both the subject and the means of analysis. If one is to assume quantum-wave dualism in physics then the state of the world depends on the instruments we use for observation. The “paradoxical” nature of investigating human cognition may thus bear inherent limitations. However, studying cognitive models may be less of a seemingly inconsistent endeavor, if “contradictions” may be classified. In this brief exposition, a variety of aspects related to cognitive models (...)
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  • “Strategically Wrong”: Bias and Argumentation.Santibanez Yanez Cristian - unknown
    The brain is composed of mutually inconsistent modules that contain contradictory beliefs. What consequences could this view have on argumentation? In order to sketch an answer, first the family of concepts of what is called generalized deception is discussed; then, this discussion is applied to the problem of the social influence bias to observe both how the mind works strategically wrong and what kind of arguments are used within this mental design in a social argumentative context.
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  • Meta-Argumentation in Deliberative Discourse: Rhetoric 1360b05-1365b21.Olmos Paula - unknown
    In Rhetoric 1360b05-1365b21, Aristotle naturally assumes the debatable, exceptionable and multidimensional character of the kind of allegations, adduced as reasons for the proposals which act as conclusions of the practical arguments typical of political debate. This is a problem which has been currently addressed in terms of the prima facie incommensurability caused by the multi-dimensionality of value-based argumentation, an approach that seems to lead us to an evaluative and dialectical dead-end. But in the Aristotelian text, we find a different tactic. (...)
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  • Where is the Reasonable? Objectivity and Bias of Practical Argument.Lewinski Marcin - unknown
    The paper offers a theoretical investigation regarding the sources of normativity in practical argument from the following perspective: Do we need objectively-minded, unbiased arguers or can we count on “good” argumentative processes in which individual biases cancel each other out? I will address this problem by analysing a detailed structure of practical argument and its varieties. I will argue that given the structure proposed, biased advocacy upholds reasonableness whenever the argumentative activity is adequately designed.
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  • Computational Representation of Practical Argument.Katie Atkinson, Trevor Bench-Capon & Peter McBurney - 2006 - Synthese 152 (2):157-206.
    In this paper we consider persuasion in the context of practical reasoning, and discuss the problems associated with construing reasoning about actions in a manner similar to reasoning about beliefs. We propose a perspective on practical reasoning as presumptive justification of a course of action, along with critical questions of this justification, building on the account of Walton. From this perspective, we articulate an interaction protocol, which we call PARMA, for dialogues over proposed actions based on this theory. We outline (...)
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  • Nonhuman Animals: Not Necessarily Saints or Sinners.Cheryl E. Abbate - 2014 - Between the Species 17 (1):1-30.
    Higher-order thought theories maintain that consciousness involves the having of higher-order thoughts about mental states. In response to these theories of consciousness, an attempt is often made to illustrate that nonhuman animals possess said consciousness, overlooking an alarming consequence: attributing higher-order thought to nonhuman animals might entail that they should be held morally accountable for their actions. I argue that moral responsibility requires more than higher-order thought: moral agency requires a specific higher-order thought which concerns a belief about the rightness (...)
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  • Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity: A Critique of Darwinian Analogical Reasoning From Nature to Culture.Maria Kronfeldner - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Regensburg
    The dissertation criticizes two analogical applications of Darwinism to the spheres of mind and culture: the Darwinian approach to creativity and memetics. These theories rely on three basic analogies: the ontological analogy states that the basic ontological units of culture are so-called memes, which are replicators like genes; the origination analogy states that novelty in human creativity emerges in a "blind" Darwinian manner; and the explanatory units of selection analogy states that memes are "egoistic" and that they can spread independently (...)
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  • A Unified Framework for Addiction: Vulnerabilities in the Decision Process.A. David Redish, Steve Jensen & Adam Johnson - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):415-437.
    The understanding of decision-making systems has come together in recent years to form a unified theory of decision-making in the mammalian brain as arising from multiple, interacting systems (a planning system, a habit system, and a situation-recognition system). This unified decision-making system has multiple potential access points through which it can be driven to make maladaptive choices, particularly choices that entail seeking of certain drugs or behaviors. We identify 10 key vulnerabilities in the system: (1) moving away from homeostasis, (2) (...)
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  • How Verbal Reports of Desire May Mislead.Alex Gregory - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):241-249.
    In this paper I highlight two noteworthy features of assertions about our desires, and then highlight two ways in which they can mislead us into drawing unwarranted conclusions about desire. Some of our assertions may indicate that we are sometimes motivated independently of desire, and other assertions may suggest that there are vast divergences between our normative judgements and our desires. But I suggest that some such assertions are, in this respect, potentially misleading, and have in fact misled authors such (...)
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  • Controverse sur la causalité mentale dans l’action.Candida Jaci De Sousa Melo - 2008 - Philosophiques 35 (2):345-367.
    Le problème métaphysique central en philosophie de l’esprit concerne la relation entre l’esprit et le corps des agents. Quand on tente d’expliquer, par exemple, le rapport entre les pensées et les actions humaines, on est alors immédiatement confronté avec la difficulté, apparemment insurmontable, d’expliquer la causalité mentale. On doit répondre à la question : nos états de pensée causent-ils effectivement ce que l’on fait? Bien sûr, nos croyances, nos intentions et nos désirs sont à la base de notre comportement, dira (...)
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  • Understanding the Background Conditions of Skilled Movement in Sport: A Study of Searle's 'Background Capacities'.Vegard Fusche Moe - 2007 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 1 (3):299 – 324.
    In this paper I take up John Searle's account of ?Background capacities? to render intelligible the presupposed and hidden aspects of the background conditions that enable the performance of skilled movement. The paper begins with a review of Searle's initial account of Background capacities and how this picture can be applied to account for skilled movement in sport. Then an objection to this picture is addressed, claiming that Searle's initial picture might ?overrepresentationalise? background conditions. Moreover, this objection prompts how Searle (...)
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  • Voices and Noises in the Theory of Speech Acts.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2004 - Pragmatics and Cognition 12 (1):105-151.
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  • Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control.John Dilworth - 2008 - Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
    The naturalistic voluntary control (VC) theory explains free will and consciousness in terms of each other. It is central to free voluntary control of action that one can control both what one is conscious of, and also what one is not conscious of. Furthermore, the specific cognitive ability or skill involved in voluntarily controlling whether information is processed consciously or unconsciously can itself be used to explain consciousness. In functional terms, it is whatever kind of cognitive processing occurs when a (...)
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  • Improving Practical Reasoning and Argumentation.Michael D. Baumtrog - 2015 - Dissertation, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
    This thesis justifies the need for and develops a new integrated model of practical reasoning and argumentation. After framing the work in terms of what is reasonable rather than what is rational (chapter 1), I apply the model for practical argumentation analysis and evaluation provided by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) to a paradigm case of unreasonable individual practical argumentation provided by mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik (chapter 2). The application shows that by following the model, Breivik is relatively easily able (...)
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  • Metacognitive Control of Categorial Neurobehavioral Decision Systems.Gordon R. Foxall - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Is Conscious Will an Illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):58-70.
    In this essay I critically examine Daniel Wegner’s account of conscious will as an illusion developed in his book The Illusion of Conscious Will. I show that there are unwarranted leaps in his argument, which considerably decrease the empirical plausibility and theoretical adequacy of his account. Moreover, some features essential to our experience of willing, which are related to our general understanding of free will, moral responsibility and human agency, are largely left out in Wegner’s account of conscious will. This (...)
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  • Hjumovska teorija motivacije: u obranu dogme.Matej Sušnik - 2012 - Prolegomena 11 (1):83-105.
    Prema hjumovskoj teoriji motivacije, motivacijski se proces sastoji od dva međusobno nezavisna mentalna stanja , što znači da subjekt ne može biti u potpunosti motiviran na djelovanje ako mu jedno od tih stanja nedostaje. U prvom dijelu članka prikazujem središnja obilježja ove teorije, a potom pokazujem da prihvaćanje Humeove distinkcije između divljih i tihih strasti može biti vrlo koristan alat za obranu ovog modela od nekih standardnih prigovora.
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  • Basic Deviance Reconsidered.Markus E. Schlosser - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):186–194.
    Most contemporary philosophers of action agree on the following claims. Firstly, the possibility of deviant or wayward causal chains poses a serious problem for the standard-causal theory of action. Secondly, we can distinguish between different kinds of deviant causal chains in the theory of action. In particular, we can distinguish between cases of basic and cases of consequential deviance. Thirdly, the problem of consequential deviance admits of a fairly straightforward solution, whereas the possibility of basic deviance constitutes a separate and (...)
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  • Argumentation Theory and the Conception of Epistemic Justification.Lilian Bermejo-Luque - 2009 - In Marcin Koszowy (ed.), Informal Logic and Argumentation Theory. University of Białystok. pp. 285--303.
    I characterize the deductivist ideal of justification and, following to a great extent Toulmin’s work The Uses of Argument, I try to explain why this ideal is erroneous. Then I offer an alternative model of justification capable of making our claims to knowledge about substantial matters sound and reasonable. This model of justification will be based on a conception of justification as the result of good argumentation, and on a model of argumentation which is a pragmatic linguistic reconstruction of Toulmin’s (...)
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  • Analyzing Creativity in the Light of Social Practice Theory.Giuseppe Città, Manuel Gentile, Agnese Augello, Simona Ottaviano, Mario Allegra & Frank Dignum - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Nietzsche's Constructive Philosophy: Self-Understanding and the Sovereign Individual.Walter Duhaime - unknown
    There is an apparent disagreement between recent commentators who find in Nietzsche both a constructive philosophy and a compatibilist account of freedom, and Brian Leiter’s reading that rejects both. The reason for this disagreement, I argue, is that Leiter’s “illiberal” view is limited in scope to Nietzsche’s critical philosophy, while Nietzsche also has a constructive philosophy aimed at select readers. I read Nietzsche’s critical philosophy as targeting the metaphysical entities that underpin asceticism and herd values, not the mental states and (...)
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  • The Limits of Emergence: Reply to Tony Lawson.John R. Searle - 2016 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 46 (4):400-412.
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  • Role of Affective Associations in the Planning and Habit Systems of Decision-Making Related to Addiction.Marc T. Kiviniemi & Rick A. Bevins - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):450-451.
    The model proposed by Redish et al. considers vulnerabilities within decision systems based on expectancy-value assumptions. Further understanding of processes leading to addiction can be gained by considering other inputs to decision-making, particularly affective associations with behaviors. This consideration suggests additional decision-making vulnerabilities that might explain addictive behaviors.
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  • What We May Say to Hare in The Light of Kantian Ethics?Seyed Mohammad Hossein Mir-Mohammadi - 2012 - Sententiae 27 (2):60-66.
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  • Towards a Theory of Intention Revision.Wiebe van der Hoek, Wojciech Jamroga & Michael Wooldridge - 2007 - Synthese 155 (2):265-290.
    Although the change of beliefs in the face of new information has been widely studied with some success, the revision of other mental states has received little attention from the theoretical perspective. In particular, intentions are widely recognised as being a key attitude for rational agents, and while several formal theories of intention have been proposed in the literature, the logic of intention revision has been hardly considered. There are several reasons for this: perhaps most importantly, intentions are very closely (...)
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  • Intentional Systems Theory, Mental Causation and Empathic Resonance.Marc Slors - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):321-336.
    In the first section of this paper I argue that the main reason why Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory (IST) has been perceived as behaviourist or antirealist is its inability to account for the causal efficacy of the mental. The rest of the paper is devoted to the claim that by emending the theory with a phenomenon called ‘empathic resonance’ (ER), it can account for the various explananda in the mental causation debate. Thus, IST + ER is a much more (...)
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  • Self-in-a-Vat: On John Searle's Ontology of Reasons for Acting.Laurence Kaufmann - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (4):447-479.
    John Searle has recently developed a theory of reasons for acting that intends to rescue the freedom of the will, endangered by causal determinism, whether physical or psychological. To achieve this purpose, Searle postulates a series of "gaps" that are supposed toendowthe self with free will. Reviewing key steps in Searle's argument, this article shows that such an undertaking cannot be successfully completed because of its solipsist premises. The author argues that reasons for acting do not have a subjective, I-ontology (...)
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  • Do Androids Dream of Normative Endorsement? On the Fallibility of Artificial Moral Agents.Frodo Podschwadek - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3):325-339.
    The more autonomous future artificial agents will become, the more important it seems to equip them with a capacity for moral reasoning and to make them autonomous moral agents. Some authors have even claimed that one of the aims of AI development should be to build morally praiseworthy agents. From the perspective of moral philosophy, praiseworthy moral agents, in any meaningful sense of the term, must be fully autonomous moral agents who endorse moral rules as action-guiding. They need to do (...)
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  • Shusterman’s Thinking Through the Body and Everyday Aesthetics.Thomas Leddy - 2015 - Contemporary Pragmatism 12 (1):79-99.
    How does Richard Shusterman’s Thinking Through the Bodyapply to the issues of everyday aesthetics? As it turns out, many chapters contribute significantly to everyday aesthetics, in particular the work on architecture, self-styling, the body as background, lovemaking, and the process of making a photographic portrait. Shusterman’s concentration on the art of living has special importance to everyday aesthetics. Current debates within the field of everyday aesthetics also raise problems for somaesthetics. I also question the limits of somaesthetics and Shusterman’s rejection (...)
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