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  1. Molecularity in the Theory of Meaning and the Topic Neutrality of Logic.Bernhard Weiss & Nils Kürbis - 2024 - In Antonio Piccolomini D'Aragona (ed.), Perspectives on Deduction: Contemporary Studies in the Philosophy, History and Formal Theories of Deduction. Springer Verlag. pp. 187-209.
    Without directly addressing the Demarcation Problem for logic—the problem of distinguishing logical vocabulary from others—we focus on distinctive aspects of logical vocabulary in pursuit of a second goal in the philosophy of logic, namely, proposing criteria for the justification of logical rules. Our preferred approach has three components. Two of these are effectively Belnap’s, but with a twist. We agree with Belnap’s response to Prior’s challenge to inferentialist characterisations of the meanings of logical constants. Belnap argued that for a logical (...)
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  • Natural Language and Logical Consequence: An Inferentialist Account.Simon Vonlanthen - manuscript
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  • .Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
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  • The Formalization of Arguments.Robert Michels - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (2).
    The purpose of this introduction is to give a rough overview of the discussion of the formalization of arguments, focusing on deductive arguments. The discussion is structured around four important junctions: i) the notion of support, which captures the relation between the conclusion and premises of an argument, ii) the choice of a formal language into which the argument is translated in order to make it amenable to evaluation via formal methods, iii) the question of quality criteria for such formalizations, (...)
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  • A forgotten logical expressivist: Strawson’s philosophy of logic and its challenges.Sybren Heyndels - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-23.
    P.F. Strawson contributed to many philosophical domains, including the philosophy of language, the history of philosophy, metaphysics, moral philosophy and philosophical methodology. Most of his contributions in these areas have influenced contemporary debates, either because his views are still defended or because they are still considered worthy of detailed responses. His views on the philosophy of logic have been only rarely discussed, however. My aim in this paper is threefold. First, I provide a systematic account of Strawson’s philosophy of logic. (...)
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  • Logical Form and the Limits of Thought.Manish Oza - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    What is the relation of logic to thinking? My dissertation offers a new argument for the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking in the following sense: representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In short, thinking has to be minimally logical. An account of thinking has to allow for our freedom to question or revise our commitments – even seemingly obvious conceptual connections – without loss of understanding. This freedom, I argue, requires that (...)
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  • Against the Unrestricted Applicability of Disjunction Elimination.Marcel Jahn - 2017 - Rerum Causae 9 (2):92-111.
    In this paper, I argue that the disjunction elimination rule presupposes the principle that a true disjunction contains at least one true disjunct. However, in some contexts such as supervaluationism or quantum logic, we have good reasons to reject this principle. Hence, disjunction elimination is restricted in at least one respect: it is not applicable to disjunctions for which this principle does not hold. The insight that disjunction elimination presupposes the principle that a true disjunction contains at least one true (...)
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  • Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought: The Epistemology of Basic Deductive Rules.Joshua Schechter - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press.
    We are justified in employing the rule of inference Modus Ponens (or one much like it) as basic in our reasoning. By contrast, we are not justified in employing a rule of inference that permits inferring to some difficult mathematical theorem from the relevant axioms in a single step. Such an inferential step is intuitively “too large” to count as justified. What accounts for this difference? In this paper, I canvass several possible explanations. I argue that the most promising approach (...)
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  • (1 other version)Inferentialism.Florian Steinberger & Julien Murzi - 2017 - In Steinberger Florian & Murzi Julien (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Language. pp. 197-224.
    This article offers an overview of inferential role semantics. We aim to provide a map of the terrain as well as challenging some of the inferentialist’s standard commitments. We begin by introducing inferentialism and placing it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. §2 focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case for and the most natural application of inferential role semantics: the case of the logical constants. We discuss some of the (alleged) benefits (...)
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  • Sentence connectives in formal logic.Lloyd Humberstone - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Failures of Categoricity and Compositionality for Intuitionistic Disjunction.Jack Woods - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):281-291.
    I show that the model-theoretic meaning that can be read off the natural deduction rules for disjunction fails to have certain desirable properties. I use this result to argue against a modest form of inferentialism which uses natural deduction rules to fix model-theoretic truth-conditions for logical connectives.
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  • Double-line Harmony in a Sequent Setting.Gratzl Norbert & Orlandelli Eugenio - 2017 - In Arazim Pavel & Lávička Tomáš (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2016. College Publications.
    This paper concentrates on how to capture harmony in sequent calculi. It starts by considering a proposal made by Tennant and some objections to it which have been presented by Steinberger. Then it proposes a different analysis which makes use of a double-line presentation of sequent calculi in the style of Dosen and it shows that this proposal is able to dismiss disharmonious operators without thereby adopting any global criterion.
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  • (1 other version)Against Harmony.Ian Rumfitt - 1995 - In B. Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.), Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell.
    Many prominent writers on the philosophy of logic, including Michael Dummett, Dag Prawitz, Neil Tennant, have held that the introduction and elimination rules of a logical connective must be ‘in harmony ’ if the connective is to possess a sense. This Harmony Thesis has been used to justify the choice of logic: in particular, supposed violations of it by the classical rules for negation have been the basis for arguments for switching from classical to intuitionistic logic. The Thesis has also (...)
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  • Harmonic inferentialism and the logic of identity.Stephen Read - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):408-420.
    Inferentialism claims that the rules for the use of an expression express its meaning without any need to invoke meanings or denotations for them. Logical inferentialism endorses inferentialism specically for the logical constants. Harmonic inferentialism, as the term is introduced here, usually but not necessarily a subbranch of logical inferentialism, follows Gentzen in proposing that it is the introduction-rules whch give expressions their meaning and the elimination-rules should accord harmoniously with the meaning so given. It is proposed here that the (...)
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  • Cut for classical core logic.Neil Tennant - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (2):236-256.
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  • Proofs and Models in Naive Property Theory: A Response to Hartry Field's ‘Properties, Propositions and Conditionals’.Greg Restall, Rohan French & Shawn Standefer - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (2):162-177.
    ABSTRACT In our response Field's ‘Properties, Propositions and Conditionals’, we explore the methodology of Field's program. We begin by contrasting it with a proof-theoretic approach and then commenting on some of the particular choices made in the development of Field's theory. Then, we look at issues of property identity in connection with different notions of equivalence. We close with some comments relating our discussion to Field's response to Restall’s [2010] ‘What Are We to Accept, and What Are We to Reject, (...)
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  • Proof-theoretic pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Eugenio Orlandelli - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4879-4903.
    Starting from a proof-theoretic perspective, where meaning is determined by the inference rules governing logical operators, in this paper we primarily aim at developing a proof-theoretic alternative to the model-theoretic meaning-invariant logical pluralism discussed in Beall and Restall. We will also outline how this framework can be easily extended to include a form of meaning-variant logical pluralism. In this respect, the framework developed in this paper—which we label two-level proof-theoretic pluralism—is much broader in scope than the one discussed in Beall (...)
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  • Classical Harmony and Separability.Julien Murzi - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):391-415.
    According to logical inferentialists, the meanings of logical expressions are fully determined by the rules for their correct use. Two key proof-theoretic requirements on admissible logical rules, harmony and separability, directly stem from this thesis—requirements, however, that standard single-conclusion and assertion-based formalizations of classical logic provably fail to satisfy :1035–1051, 2011). On the plausible assumption that our logical practice is both single-conclusion and assertion-based, it seemingly follows that classical logic, unlike intuitionistic logic, can’t be accounted for in inferentialist terms. In (...)
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  • An Expressivist Bilateral Meaning-is-Use Analysis of Classical Propositional Logic.John Cantwell - 2015 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 24 (1):27-51.
    The connectives of classical propositional logic are given an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions of acceptance and rejection, i.e. the connectives are analyzed within an expressivist bilateral meaning-is-use framework. It is explained how such a framework differs from standard inferentialist frameworks and it is argued that it is better suited to address the particular issues raised by the expressivist thesis that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the mental state that it is conventionally used to (...)
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  • Harmonious rules for identity.Owen Griffiths - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):499-510.
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  • Peano's Counterexample to Harmony.Leonardo Ceragioli - 2019 - Theoria 85 (6):459-484.
    Harmony and conservative extension are two criteria proposed to discern between acceptable and unacceptable rules. Despite some interesting works in this field, the exact relation between them is still not clear. In this article, some standard counterexamples to the equivalence between them are summarized, and a recent formulation of the notion of stability is used to express a more refined conjecture about their relation. Then Prawitz's proposal of a counterexample based on the truth predicate to this refined conjecture is shown (...)
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  • Burali-Forti as a Purely Logical Paradox.Graham Leach-Krouse - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (5):885-908.
    Russell’s paradox is purely logical in the following sense: a contradiction can be formally deduced from the proposition that there is a set of all non-self-membered sets, in pure first-order logic—the first-order logical form of this proposition is inconsistent. This explains why Russell’s paradox is portable—why versions of the paradox arise in contexts unrelated to set theory, from propositions with the same logical form as the claim that there is a set of all non-self-membered sets. Burali-Forti’s paradox, like Russell’s paradox, (...)
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  • Introducing Identity.Owen Griffiths & Arif Ahmed - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (6):1449-1469.
    The best-known syntactic account of the logical constants is inferentialism. Following Wittgenstein’s thought that meaning is use, inferentialists argue that meanings of expressions are given by introduction and elimination rules. This is especially plausible for the logical constants, where standard presentations divide inference rules in just this way. But not just any rules will do, as we’ve learnt from Prior’s famous example of tonk, and the usual extra constraint is harmony. Where does this leave identity? It’s usually taken as a (...)
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  • On a Generality Condition in Proof‐Theoretic Semantics.Bogdan Dicher - 2017 - Theoria 83 (4):394-418.
    In the recent literature on proof-theoretic semantics, there is mention of a generality condition on defining rules. According to this condition, the schematic formulation of the defining rules must be maximally general, in the sense that no restrictions should be placed on the contexts of these rules. In particular, context variables must always be present in the schematic rules and they should range over arbitrary collections of formulae. I argue against imposing such a condition, by showing that it has undesirable (...)
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  • Weak disharmony: Some lessons for proof-theoretic semantics.Bogdan Dicher - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic (3):1-20.
    A logical constant is weakly disharmonious if its elimination rules are weaker than its introduction rules. Substructural weak disharmony is the weak disharmony generated by structural restrictions on the eliminations. I argue that substructural weak disharmony is not a defect of the constants which exhibit it. To the extent that it is problematic, it calls into question the structural properties of the derivability relation. This prompts us to rethink the issue of controlling the structural properties of a logic by means (...)
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  • On the Equivalence Conjecture for Proof-Theoretic Harmony.Florian Steinberger - 2013 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 54 (1):79-86.
    The requirement of proof-theoretic harmony has played a pivotal role in a number of debates in the philosophy of logic. Different authors have attempted to precisify the notion in different ways. Among these, three proposals have been prominent in the literature: harmony–as–conservative extension, harmony–as–leveling procedure, and Tennant’s harmony–as–deductive equilibrium. In this paper I propose to clarify the logical relationships between these accounts. In particular, I demonstrate that what I call the equivalence conjecture —that these three notions essentially come to the (...)
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