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  1. The Mark of the Cognitive and the Coupling-Constitution Fallacy: A Defense of the Extended Mind Hypothesis.Giulia Piredda - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • A proposed taxonomy of eliminativism.Bernardo Pino - 2017 - Co-herencia 14 (27):181-213.
    In this paper, I propose a general taxonomy of different forms of eliminativism. In order to do so, I begin by exploring eliminativism from a broad perspective, providing a comparative picture of eliminativist projects in different domains. This exploration shows that eliminativism is a label used for a family of related types of eliminativist arguments and claims. The proposed taxonomy is an attempt to systematise those arguments and claims.
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  • Limitations on first-person experience: Implications of the “extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.
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  • Thoughts and Belief Ascriptions.Pierre Jacob - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (4):301-325.
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  • First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.
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  • The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):269-311.
    Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goal here is not to evaluate their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which type of evidence is relevant to them. I aim to dispel some sources of confusion that surround functionalism and computationalism, recruit recent philosophical work on mechanisms and computation to shed light on them, and (...)
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  • Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition.Gualtiero Piccinini & Sonya Bahar - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (3):453-488.
    We begin by distinguishing computationalism from a number of other theses that are sometimes conflated with it. We also distinguish between several important kinds of computation: computation in a generic sense, digital computation, and analog computation. Then, we defend a weak version of computationalism—neural processes are computations in the generic sense. After that, we reject on empirical grounds the common assimilation of neural computation to either analog or digital computation, concluding that neural computation is sui generis. Analog computation requires continuous (...)
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  • Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches.Gualtiero Piccinini & Carl Craver - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):283-311.
    We sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms , in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explanation. By this process, functional analyses are seamlessly integrated (...)
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  • Functionalism, computationalism, and mental contents.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):375-410.
    Some philosophers have conflated functionalism and computationalism. I reconstruct how this came about and uncover two assumptions that made the conflation possible. They are the assumptions that (i) psychological functional analyses are computational descriptions and (ii) everything may be described as performing computations. I argue that, if we want to improve our understanding of both the metaphysics of mental states and the functional relations between them, we should reject these assumptions. # 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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  • Computation vs. information processing: why their difference matters to cognitive science.Gualtiero Piccinini & Andrea Scarantino - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):237-246.
    Since the cognitive revolution, it has become commonplace that cognition involves both computation and information processing. Is this one claim or two? Is computation the same as information processing? The two terms are often used interchangeably, but this usage masks important differences. In this paper, we distinguish information processing from computation and examine some of their mutual relations, shedding light on the role each can play in a theory of cognition. We recommend that theorists of cognition be explicit and careful (...)
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  • Computation without representation.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.
    The received view is that computational states are individuated at least in part by their semantic properties. I offer an alternative, according to which computational states are individuated by their functional properties. Functional properties are specified by a mechanistic explanation without appealing to any semantic properties. The primary purpose of this paper is to formulate the alternative view of computational individuation, point out that it supports a robust notion of computational explanation, and defend it on the grounds of how computational (...)
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  • Computational explanation in neuroscience.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):343-353.
    According to some philosophers, computational explanation is proprietary
    to psychology—it does not belong in neuroscience. But neuroscientists routinely offer computational explanations of cognitive phenomena. In fact, computational explanation was initially imported from computability theory into the science of mind by neuroscientists, who justified this move on neurophysiological grounds. Establishing the legitimacy and importance of computational explanation in neuroscience is one thing; shedding light on it is another. I raise some philosophical questions pertaining to computational explanation and outline some promising answers that (...)
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  • Mentalese syntax: Between a rock and two hard places. [REVIEW]Andrew Pessin - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 78 (1):33-53.
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  • There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese 195 (10):4637-4666.
    The Nagel inspired “something-it-is-like” conception of conscious experience remains a dominant approach in philosophy. In this paper I criticize a prevalent philosophical construal of SIL consciousness, one that understands SIL as a property of mental states rather than entities as a whole. I argue against thinking of SIL as a property of states, showing how such a view is in fact prevalent, under-warranted, and philosophically pernicious in that it often leads to an implausible reduction of conscious experience to qualia. I (...)
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  • The Five Marks of the Mental.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    The mental realm seems different to the physical realm; the mental is thought to be dependent on, yet distinct from the physical. But how, exactly, are the two realms supposed to be different, and what, exactly, creates the seemingly insurmountable juxtaposition between the mental and the physical? This review identifies and discusses five marks of the mental, features that set characteristically mental phenomena apart from the characteristically physical phenomena. These five marks (intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity) are not (...)
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  • A plea for the second functionalist model and the insufficiency of simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.
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  • Content, Computation and Externalism.Christopher Peacocke - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:227-264.
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  • The semantic view of computation and the argument from the cognitive science practice.Alfredo Paternoster & Fabrizio Calzavarini - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-24.
    According to the semantic view of computation, computations cannot be individuated without invoking semantic properties. A traditional argument for the semantic view is what we shall refer to as the argument from the cognitive science practice. In its general form, this argument rests on the idea that, since cognitive scientists describe computations (in explanations and theories) in semantic terms, computations are individuated semantically. Although commonly invoked in the computational literature, the argument from the cognitive science practice has never been discussed (...)
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  • Holisme, anatomicité et hiérarchie.Fabrice Pataut - 2008 - Archives de Philosophie 71 (4):599-607.
    Selon le holisme sémantique, les propriétés sémantiques sont par nature anatomiques, c’est-à-dire intrinsèquement collectives. Selon le holisme de l’interprétation, la signification ou le contenu sont attribués collectivement. La thèse de constitution holistique de la signification peut être raisonnablement défendue à l’aide d’une contrainte de molécularité, qui introduit une hiérarchie dans la complexité logique des phrases, et un ordre ou une articulation dans le langage, en faisant droit à une condition finitaire d’anatomicité.According to semantic holism, semantic properties are anatomic by nature, (...)
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  • In the Mental Fiction, Mental Fictionalism is Fictitious.T. Parent - 2013 - The Monist 96 (4):605-621.
    Here I explore the prospects for fictionalism about the mental, modeled after fictionalism about possible worlds. Mental fictionalism holds that the mental states posited by folk psychology do not exist, yet that some sentences of folk psychological discourse are true. This is accomplished by construing truths of folk psychology as “truths according to the mentalistic fiction.” After formulating the view, I identify five ways that the view appears self-refuting. Moreover, I argue that this cannot be fixed by semantic ascent or (...)
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  • The fictionalist paradigm.John Paley - 2011 - Nursing Philosophy 12 (1):53-66.
    The fictionalist paradigm is introduced, and differentiated from other paradigms, using the Lincoln & Guba template. Following an initial overview, the axioms of fictionalism are delineated by reference to standard metaphysical categories: the nature of reality, the relationship between knower and known, the possibility of generalization, the possibility of causal linkages, and the role of values in inquiry. Although a paradigm's ‘basic beliefs’ are arbitrary and can be assumed for any reason, in this paper the fictionalist axioms are supported with (...)
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  • Where redescriptions come from.David R. Olson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):725-725.
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  • The role of concepts in perception and inference.David R. Olson & Janet Wilde Astington - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):65-66.
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  • Vicious minds: Virtue epistemology, cognition, and skepticism.Lauren Olin & John M. Doris - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):665-692.
    While there is now considerable anxiety about whether the psychological theory presupposed by virtue ethics is empirically sustainable, analogous issues have received little attention in the virtue epistemology literature. This paper argues that virtue epistemology encounters challenges reminiscent of those recently encountered by virtue ethics: just as seemingly trivial variation in context provokes unsettling variation in patterns of moral behavior, trivial variation in context elicits unsettling variation in patterns of cognitive functioning. Insofar as reliability is a condition on epistemic virtue, (...)
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  • Representational change, generality versus specificity, and nature versus nurture: Perennial issues in cognitive research.Stellan Ohlsson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):724-725.
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  • The Heartbreak of Semantics.Norbert Hornstein - 1988 - Mind and Language 3 (1):9-27.
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  • Replies to Kane, McCormick, and Vargas.Shaun Nichols - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (10):2511-2523.
    This is a reply to discussions by Robert Kane, Kelly McCormick, and Manuel Vargas of Shaun Nichols, Bound: Essays on Free Will and Responsibility.
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  • Developmental evidence and introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64-65.
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  • Ambiguous Reference.Shaun Nichols, N. Ángel Pinillos & Ron Mallon - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):145-175.
    One of the central debates in the philosophy of language is that between defenders of the causal-historical and descriptivist theories of reference. Most philosophers involved in the debate support one or the other of the theories. Building on recent experimental work in semantics, we argue that there is a sense in which both theories are correct. In particular, we defend the view that natural kind terms can sometimes take on a causal-historical reading and at other times take on a descriptivist (...)
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  • Machine understanding and the chinese room.Natika Newton - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (2):207-15.
    John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the intentional component with or without the formal (...)
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  • Feminist Philosophy of Science.Lynn Hankinson Nelson - 2002 - In Peter Machamer & Michael Silberstein (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312–331.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Highlights of Past Literature Current Work Future Work.
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  • Entity Realism About Mental Representations.Bence Nanay - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):75-91.
    The concept of mental representation has long been considered to be central concept of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. But not everyone agrees. Neo-behaviorists aim to explain the mind without positing any representations. My aim here is not to assess the merits and demerits of neo-behaviorism, but to take their challenge seriously and ask the question: What justifies the attribution of representations to an agent? Both representationalists and neo-behaviorists tend to take it for granted that the real question about (...)
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  • The past and future of experimental philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.
    Experimental philosophy is the name for a recent movement whose participants use the methods of experimental psychology to probe the way people think about philosophical issues and then examine how the results of such studies bear on traditional philosophical debates. Given both the breadth of the research being carried out by experimental philosophers and the controversial nature of some of their central methodological assumptions, it is of no surprise that their work has recently come under attack. In this paper we (...)
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  • Can psychiatry refurnish the mind?Dominic Murphy - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (2):160-174.
    In this paper, I will argue that the NIMH’s new Research Domain of Criteria is a useful test of the philosophical hypothesis of eliminative materialism and demonstrates the superiority of a moderate eliminativism over integrationism, which is a rival philosophical framework for the cognitive sciences. I begin by going over the motivation for RDOC, which rests on the problems with the existing Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders framework in psychiatry. Then, I introduce the main tenets of RDoC before (...)
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  • Pictures, Plants, and Propositions.Alex Morgan - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):309-329.
    Philosophers have traditionally held that propositions mark the domain of rational thought and inference. Many philosophers have held that only conceptually sophisticated creatures like us could have propositional attitudes. But in recent decades, philosophers have adopted increasingly liberal views of propositional attitudes that encompass the mental states of various non-human animals. These views now sit alongside more traditional views within the philosophical mainstream. In this paper I argue that liberalized views of propositional attitudes are so liberal that they encompass states (...)
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  • Mismatching categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62-63.
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  • Heuristics and counterfactual self-knowledge.Adam Morton - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):63-64.
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  • Knowledge of the psychological states of self and others is not only theory-laden but also data-driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.
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  • The reductionist ideal in cognitive psychology.Richard Montgomery - 1990 - Synthese 85 (November):279-314.
    I offer support for the view that physicalist theories of cognition don't reduce to neurophysiological theories. On my view, the mind-brain relationship is to be explained in terms of evolutionary forces, some of which tug in the direction of a reductionistic mind-brain relationship, and some of which which tug in the opposite direction. This theory of forces makes possible an anti-reductionist account of the cognitive mind-brain relationship which avoids psychophysical anomalism. This theory thus also responds to the complaint which arguably (...)
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  • Les conditions de l'interprétation.Martin Montminy - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (3):505-528.
    Donald Davidson considère qu'une théorie de l'interprétation doit êtreradicale, c'est-à-dire qu'elle ne doit présupposer aucune connaissance de la langue à interpréter. Cette exigence repose sur l'idée suivante: si une théorie de l'interprétation pour une langue L présuppose une certaine compréhension de L, alors elle perd son pouvoir explicatif et échoue à rendre compte de ce qui permet la compréhension de L. L'interpr'tation radicale a l'avantage de nous forcer à rendre explicite ce qui est à l'œuvre dans le processus d'interprétation du (...)
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  • Holisme, référence et irréductibilité du mental.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (3):419-437.
    I examine in detail the argument vaguely suggested by Davidson to the effect that holism entails the irreducibility of the mental. I defend this argument against two objections often made against arguments that attempt to derive metaphysical theses from premises that concern our ordinary criteria for applying terms. I appeal to two-dimensional semantics to explain the links between these criteria and issues about reference and reduction. I show how the irreducibility of the mental follows from the holistic and flexible character (...)
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  • Does epistemology reduce to cognitive psychology?Richard Montgomery - 1989 - Philosophia 19 (2-3):245-263.
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  • Contextualist resolutions of philosophical debates.Martin Montminy - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):571-590.
    Abstract: Despite all the critical scrutiny they have received recently, contextualist views in philosophy are still not well understood. Neither contextualists nor their opponents have been entirely clear about what contextualist theses amount to and what they are based on. In this article I show that there are actually two kinds of contextualist view that rest on two very different semantic phenomena, namely, semantic incompleteness and semantic indeterminacy . I explain how contextualist approaches can be used to dissolve certain debates (...)
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  • Content Pragmatism Defended.Dimitri Coelho Mollo - 2017 - Topoi 39 (1):103-113.
    In the literature on the nature and role of cognitive representation, three positions are taken across the conceptual landscape: robust realism, primitivism, and eliminativism. Recently, a fourth alternative that tries to avoid the shortcomings of traditional views has been proposed: content pragmatism. My aim is to defend pragmatism about content against some recent objections moved against the view. According to these objections, content pragmatism fails to capture the role played by representation in the cognitive sciences; and/or is an unstable view (...)
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  • Applying the causal theory of reference to intentional concepts.John Michael & Miles MacLeod - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (2):212-230.
    We argue that many recent philosophical discussions about the reference of everyday concepts of intentional states have implicitly been predicated on descriptive theories of reference. To rectify this, we attempt to demonstrate how a causal theory can be applied to intentional concepts. Specifically, we argue that some phenomena in early social de- velopment ðe.g., mimicry, gaze following, and emotional contagionÞ can serve as refer- ence fixers that enable children to track others’ intentional states and, thus, to refer to those states. (...)
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  • The Methodologically Flawed Discussion about Deep Disagreement.Guido Melchior - forthcoming - Episteme.
    Questions surrounding deep disagreement have gained significant attention in recent years. One of the central debates is metaphysical, focusing on the features that make a disagreement deep. Proposals for what makes disagreements deep include theories about hinge propositions and first epistemic principles. In this paper, I criticize this metaphysical discussion by arguing that it is methodologically flawed. Deep disagreement is a technical or semi-technical term, but the metaphysical discussion mistakenly treats it as a common-sense concept to be analyzed and captured (...)
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  • Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.
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  • Kant's Anti-Scientism and the Origins of Phenomenology.Richard McDonough - 1998 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 29 (3):281-298.
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  • Book reviews. [REVIEW]Robert J. Matthews - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):576-578.
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  • The right stuff.J. Christopher Maloney - 1987 - Synthese 70 (March):349-72.
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