After a brief survey of the literature on ceteris paribus clauses and ceteris paribus laws (1), the problem of exceptions, which creates the need for cp laws, is discussed (2). It emerges that the so-called skeptical view of laws of nature does not apply to laws of any kind whatever. Only some laws of physics are plagued with exceptions, not THE laws (3). Cp clauses promise a remedy, which has to be located among the further reactions to the skeptical view (...) (4). After inspecting various translations of the Latin term 'ceteris paribus' (5), the paper arrives at the conclusion that, on the most reasonable translation, there are no such things as cp laws, for reasons of logical form. Cp clauses have an indexical content, so that they need singular propositions as their habitat, not general ones. Cp clauses and the universal generalizations they are supposed to modify are not fit for each other (6). (shrink)

Philosophers have made numerous and varied attempts to analyse the concept of a miracle. To the end, an assortment of necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth an instantiation of a miracle have been offered. In this paper we discuss one of the most common of these conditions - the violation restriction. This restriction holds that all miracles involve a violation of a law of nature.

Humean compatibilism is the combination of a Humean position on laws of nature and the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. This article's aim is to situate Humean compatibilism in the current debate among libertarians, traditional compatibilists, and semicompatibilists about free will. We argue that a Humean about laws can hold that there is a sense in which the laws of nature are 'up to us' and hence that the leading style of argument for incompatibilism?the consequence argument?has a (...) false premiss. We also display some striking similarities between Humean compatibilism and libertarianism, an incompatibilist view. For example, standard libertarians face a problem about luck, and we show that Humean compatibilists face a very similar problem. (shrink)

In this article, I will provide a critical overview of the form of non-deductive reasoning commonly known as “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE). Roughly speaking, according to IBE, we ought to infer the hypothesis that provides the best explanation of our evidence. In section 2, I survey some contemporary formulations of IBE and highlight some of its putative applications. In section 3, I distinguish IBE from C.S. Peirce’s notion of abduction. After underlining some of the essential elements of IBE, (...) the rest of the entry is organized around an examination of various problems that IBE confronts, along with some extant attempts to address these problems. In section 4, I consider the question of when a fact requires an explanation, since presumably IBE applies only in cases where some explanation is called for. In section 5, I consider the difficult question of how we ought to understand IBE in light of the fact that among philosophers, there is significant disagreement about what constitutes an explanation. In section 6, I consider different strategies for justifying the truth-conduciveness of the explanatory virtues, e.g., simplicity, unification, scope, etc., criteria which play an indispensable role in any given application of IBE. In section 7, I survey some of the most recent literature on IBE, much of which consists of investigations of the status of IBE from the standpoint of the Bayesian philosophy of science. (shrink)

Difficulties in learning Ohm’s Law suggest a need to refocus it from the law for a part of the circuit to the law for the whole circuit. Such a revision may improve understanding of Ohm’s Law and its practical applications. This suggestion comes from analysis of the history of the law’s discovery and its teaching. The historical materials this paper provides can also help teacher to improve students’ insights into the nature of science.

Recently several thought experiments have been developed (by John Carroll amongst others) which have been alleged to refute the Ramsey-Lewis view of laws of nature. The paper aims to show that two such thought experiments fail to establish that the Ramsey-Lewis view is false, since they presuppose a conception of laws of nature that is radically at odds with the Humean conception of laws embodied by the Ramsey-Lewis view. In particular, the thought experiments presuppose that laws of nature govern the (...) behavior of objects. The paper argues that the claim that laws govern should not be regarded as a conceptual truth, and shows how the governing conception of laws manifests itself in the thought experiments. Hence the thought experiments do not constitute genuine counter-examples to the Ramsey-Lewis view. since the Humean is free to reject the conception of laws which the thought experiments presuppose. (shrink)

Para el realismo nomológico, la mejor explicación del mundo afirma la existencia de leyes naturales que lo fundamentan. Si el estatuto de estas es controvertido, sus partidarios coinciden en que implican una adición de ser con respecto a las regularidades de Hume. Se busca mostrar cómo el argumento nomológico, que todos ellos utilizan de alguna forma, se asemeja en su estructura a diversos argumentos teístas, como el de la quinta vía de Tomás de Aquino. Ante el carácter no conclusivo del (...) argumento, se sostiene que la adopción de un realismo nomológico proviene de una mera preferencia subjetiva. According to nomological realism, the best explanation of the world is one that appeals to the existence of natural laws which ground it. Althought there are controversies regarding the status of such laws, those who defend this position agree they involve a plus of being regarding Hume's regularities. In this paper we show how the nomological argument, which they all use somehow, has a structural similarity with various theistic arguments such as Thomas Aquina's fifth way. Finally, in the absence of conclusiveness of the argument, we hold that the adoption of a nomological realism comes from a mere subjective preference. (shrink)

Why do the fundamental forces of nature (i.e., the forces that appear to cause all the movements and interactions in the universe) manifest in the way, shape, and form that they do? This is one of the greatest ontological questions that science can investigate. In this article, we are going to consider this crucial question (and relevant issues) via a new axiomatic mathematical formalism. -/- In Part I (pp. 1-10) of this article we provide a general overview (and analysis) of (...) the basic properties of a number of current notable discontinuous approaches to fundamental physics. -/- In Part II (the main part, pp.11-99, Ref. [37]) of this article, as a new mathematical approach to origin of the laws of nature, using a new basic algebraic axiomatic (matrix) formalism based on the ring theory and Clifford algebras (presented in Sec.2), “it is shown that certain mathematical forms of fundamental laws of nature, including laws governing the fundamental forces of nature (represented by a set of two definite classes of general covariant massive field equations, with new matrix formalisms), are derived uniquely from only a very few axioms”; where in agreement with the rational Lorentz group, it is also basically assumed that the components of relativistic energy-momentum can only take rational values. In essence, the main scheme of this new mathematical axiomatic approach to fundamental laws of nature is as follows. First based on the assumption of rationality of D-momentum, by linearization (along with a parameterization procedure) of the Lorentz invariant energy-momentum quadratic relation, a unique set of Lorentz invariant systems of homogeneous linear equations (with matrix formalisms compatible with certain Clifford, and symmetric algebras) is derived. Then by first quantization (followed by a basic procedure of minimal coupling to space-time geometry) of these determined systems of linear equations, a set of two classes of general covariant massive (tensor) field equations (with matrix formalisms compatible with certain Clifford, and Weyl algebras) is derived uniquely as well. Each class of the derived general covariant field equations also includes a definite form of torsion field appeared as generator of the corresponding field’ invariant mass. In addition, it is shown that the (1+3)-dimensional cases of two classes of derived field equations represent a new general covariant massive formalism of bispinor fields of spin-2, and spin-1 particles, respectively. In fact, these uniquely determined bispinor fields represent a unique set of new generalized massive forms of the laws governing the fundamental forces of nature, including the Einstein (gravitational), Maxwell (electromagnetic) and Yang-Mills (nuclear) field equations. Moreover, it is also shown that the (1+2)-dimensional cases of two classes of these field equations represent (asymptotically) a new general covariant massive formalism of bispinor fields of spin-3/2 and spin-1/2 particles, corresponding to the Dirac and Rarita–Schwinger equations. -/- As a particular consequence, it is shown that a certain massive formalism of general relativity – with a definite form of torsion field appeared originally as the generator of gravitational field’s invariant mass – is obtained only by first quantization (followed by a basic procedure of minimal coupling to space-time geometry) of a certain set of special relativistic algebraic matrix equations. It has been also proved that Lagrangian densities specified for the originally derived new massive forms of the Maxwell, Yang-Mills and Dirac field equations, are also gauge invariant, where the invariant mass of each field is generated solely by the corresponding torsion field. In addition, in agreement with recent astronomical data, a new form of massive boson is identified (corresponding to U(1) gauge group) with invariant mass: m_γ ≈ 4.90571×10^-50 kg, generated by a coupled torsion field of the background space-time geometry. -/- Moreover, based on the definite mathematical formalism of this axiomatic approach, along with the C, P and T symmetries (represented basically by the corresponding quantum operators) of the fundamentally derived field equations, it has been concluded that the universe could be realized solely with the (1+2) and (1+3)-dimensional space-times (where this conclusion, in particular, is based on the T-symmetry of these equations). It is shown that CPT is the only combined form of C, P, and T symmetries of interacting fields. In addition, on the basis of these discrete symmetries of derived field equations, it has been also shown that only left-handed particle fields (along with their complementary right-handed fields) could be coupled to the corresponding (any) source currents. Furthermore, it has been shown that the metric of background space-time is diagonalized for the uniquely derived fermion field equations (defined and expressed solely in (1+2)-dimensional space-time), where this property generates a certain set of additional symmetries corresponding uniquely to the "SU(2)_L x U(2)_R" symmetry group for spin-1/2 fermion fields (representing “1+3” generations of four fermions, including a group of eight leptons and a group of eight quarks), and also the "SU(2)_L x U(2)_R" and "SU(3)" gauge symmetry groups for spin-1 boson fields coupled to the spin-1/2 fermionic source currents. Hence, along with the known elementary particles, eight new elementary particles, including four new charge-less right-handed spin-1/2 fermions (including two leptons and two quarks), a spin-3/2 fermion, and also three new spin-1 (massive) bosons are predicted uniquely by this axiomatic approach. As a particular result, based on the definite formulation of the derived Maxwell (and Yang-Mills) field equations, it has been also concluded that magnetic monopoles could not exist in nature. -/- Comments: 99 Pages. A summary of a submitted and accepted research project (On "Foundations of Physics"), Ramin Zahedi, Japan, 2012 - 2015. -/- Invited and Presented Research Article at: The 4th International Conference on New Frontiers in Physics ICNFP2015, Europe (CERN), (https://indico.cern.ch/e/icnfp2015); The 2016 SIAM International Conference on Mathematical Aspects of Materials Science, Philadelphia, USA, (https://www.siam.org/meetings/ms16/); The 17th International Conference on Quantum Foundations: Quantum and Beyond, International Centre for Mathematical Modeling in Physics, Engineering and Cognitive Sciences ( ICMM), Linnaeus University, Sweden, 2016, (https://lnu.se/en/qb/); The 2016 International Conference on Algebraic Geometry and Mathematical Physics (AGMP 2016), University of Tromsø, Norway, (https://site.uit.no/); International Conference on Noncommutative Geometry, Quantum Symmetries and Quantum Gravity (II), XXXVII Max Born International Symposium, Wroclaw University, Poland, 2016, (http://ift.uni.wroc.pl/~mborn37/); 2016 GRavitational-wave Astronomy International Conference (Meeting) in Paris, The Institute d’Astrophysique de Paris (IAP), The University of Paris VI - Sorbonne University, CNRS, LERU, EUA, France, 2016, (Supported by the European Union's Seventh Framework Program: FP7/PEOPLE-2011-CIG); The 22nd Internnational Australian Institute of Physics Congress (AIP), University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia, 2016, (http://appc-aip2016.org.au/); The 21st International Conference on General Relativity and Gravitation, Columbia University, New York, USA, 2016, (http://www.gr21.org/). -/- Acknowledgements: Special thanks are extended to Prof. and Academician Vitaly L. Ginzburg (Russia), Prof. and Academician Dmitry V. Shirkov (Russia), Prof. Leonid A . Shelepin (Russia), Prof. Vladimir Ya. Fainberg (Russia), Prof. Wolfgang Rindler (USA), Prof. Roman W. Jackiw (USA), Prof. Roger Penrose (UK), Prof. Steven Weinberg (USA), Prof. Ezra T. Newman (USA), Prof. Graham Jameson (UK), Prof. Sergey A. Reshetnjak (Russia), Prof. Sir Michael Atiyah (UK) (who, in particular, kindly encouraged me to continue this work as a new unorthodox (primary) mathematical approach to fundamental physics), and many others for their support and valuable guidance during my studies and research. -/- External URLs of the Article (Including updated versions): https://inspirehep.net/record/1387680/, https://indico.cern.ch/event/344173/session/22/contribution/422/attachments/1140145/1646101/R.a.Zahe di--OnDiscretePhysics-Jan.2015-signed.pdf, https://cds.cern.ch/record/1980381/, https://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/TDS-MACS/hal-01476703 , http://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/handle/2115/59279/. DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/PQGA9 . (shrink)

Determinism is a claim about the laws of nature: very roughly, it is the claim that everything that happens is determined by antecedent conditions together with the natural laws. Incompatibilism is a philosophical thesis about the relevance of determinism to free will: that the truth of determinism rules out the existence of free will. The incompatibilist believes that if determinism turned out to be true, it would also be true that we don't have, and have never had, free will. The (...) compatibilist denies that determinism has the consequences the incompatibilist thinks it has. According to the compatibilist, the truth of determinism does not preclude the existence of free will. (Even if we learned tomorrow that determinism is true, it might still be true that we have free will.) The philosophical problem of free will and determinism is the problem of understanding, how, if at all, the truth of determinism might be compatible with the truth of our belief that we have free will. That is, it's the problem of deciding who is right: the compatibilist or the incompatibilist. (shrink)

Humeans about laws maintain that laws of nature are nothing over and above the complete distribution of non-modal, categorical properties in spacetime. ‘Humean compatibilists’ argue that if Humeanism about laws is true, then agents in a deterministic world can do otherwise than they are lawfully determined to do because of the distinctive nature of Humean laws. More specifically, they reject a central premise of the Consequence argument by maintaining that deterministic laws of nature are ‘up to us’. In this paper, (...) we present a new argument for Humean compatibilism. We argue that Humeans about laws indeed have resources for defending compatibilism that non-Humeans lack. Moreover, we show that utilizing these resources does not lead to objectionable consequences. Humeans about laws should thus embrace Humean compatibilism. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the ways in which epistemic anxiety promotes well-being, specifically by examining the positive contributions that feelings of epistemic anxiety make toward intellectually virtuous inquiry. While the prospects for connecting the concept of epistemic anxiety to the two most prominent accounts of intellectual virtue, i.e., “virtue-reliabilism” and “virtue-responsibilism”, are promising, I primarily focus on whether the capacity for epistemic anxiety counts as an intellectual virtue in the reliabilist sense. As I argue, there is a close yet (...) unexplored connection between feelings of epistemic anxiety and the form of inference commonly known as “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE). Specifically, I argue that both the recognition that some fact requires an explanation—a necessary first step in applying IBE—and the subsequent motivation to employ IBE are typically facilitated by feelings of epistemic anxiety. So, provided IBE is truth-conducive the capacity for epistemic anxiety should count as an intellectual virtue in the reliabilist sense. After outlining my main argument, I address the challenge that the capacity for epistemic anxiety has the potential to be misleading. To respond to this challenge, I discuss how our recognition that a fact requires an explanation must in part be a species of practical knowledge, rather than theoretical knowledge. For the agent to skillfully distinguish between facts that require an explanation and facts that do not, she must develop the virtuous disposition to feel the appropriate amount of epistemic anxiety. Despite the many negative aspects associated with anxiety, as I conclude, being disposed to feel the appropriate amount of epistemic anxiety is ultimately good for us. (shrink)

In this paper, we show that it is not a conceptual truth about laws of nature that they are immutable (though we are happy to leave it as an open empirical question whether they do actually change once in a while). In order to do so, we survey three popular accounts of lawhood—(Armstrong-style) necessitarianism, (Bird-style) dispositionalism and (Lewis-style) ‘best system analysis’—and expose the extent, as well as the philosophical cost, of the amendments that should be enforced in order to leave (...) room for the possibility of changing laws. (shrink)

Humeans take reality to be devoid of ‘necessary connections’: things just happen. Laws of nature are to be understood in terms of what ‘just happens’, not vice versa. Here the Humean needs some conception of what it is that ‘just happens’ – a conception of the Humean mosaic. Lewis’s Humeanism incorporates such a conception in the form of a Lewis-style metaphysics of objects, properties, and modality. Newer versions of Humeanism about laws of nature, such as the Better Best Systems approach, (...) typically reject such a Lewisian metaphysics, but it remains unclear what they can offer in its place. By exploring different candidate conceptions, this paper sheds light on the limits of Humeanism about laws of nature: not all conceptions of the Humean mosaic form a suitable basis for a Humean theory of laws. In fact, only a metaphysics roughly in line with Lewis’s will do. The paper ends with a tentative generalization of this result, thus pointing to the ‘limit’ of Humeanism in general: taking the Humean way of thinking to its limit results in a rejection of the whole idea of such a mosaic – and hence of Humean mosaic-based accounts of anything. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, I propose a variant of a Humean account of laws called "Open Future Humeanism", which holds that since the laws supervene partly on future events, there are at any instant infinitely many possible future courses of events. I argue that if one wants to take the openness of the future that OFH proposes ontologically serious, then OFH is best represented within a growing block view of time. I further discuss some of OFH's problems which stem from (...) the fact that in this view, there are no laws as long as time progresses. These problems can be solved by adding a temporal operator to the laws, so that at any instant, we get a set of tensed laws which held up to and including that instant. (shrink)

In a series of recent papers we have introduced a new interpretation of quantum mechanics, which for brevity we will call the Montevideo interpretation. In it, the quantum to classical transition is achieved via a phenomenon called “undecidability” which stems from environmental decoherence supplemented with a fundamental mechanism of loss of coherence due to gravity. Due to the fact that the interpretation grew from several results that are dispersed in the literature, we put together this straightforward-to-read article addressing some of (...) the main points that may confuse readers. (shrink)

Showcasing original arguments for well-defined positions, as well as clear and concise statements of sophisticated philosophical views, this volume is an ...

The question about divine action remains contested in the discussion between theology and science. This issue is further exacerbated with the entry of pentecostals and charismatics into the conversation, especially with their emphases on divine intervention and miracles. I explore what happens at the intersection of these discourses, identifying first how the concept of "laws of nature" has developed in theology and science and then probing what pentecostal-charismatic insights might add into the mix. Drawing from the triadic and evolutionary metaphysics (...) of Charles Sanders Peirce, I propose a reconsideration of the "laws of nature" as habitual, dynamic, and general but nevertheless real tendencies through which the Holy Spirit invites the world to inhabit the coming kingdom of God. This proposal contributes to the articulation of an authentic Pentecostal-charismatic witness at the theology-and-science table while also enabling a more plausible and coherent account of divine action for pentecostal-charismatic piety and Christian practice in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

After reviewing several failed arguments that laws cannot change, I use the laws' special relation to counterfactuals to show how temporary laws would have to differ from eternal but time-dependent laws. Then I argue that temporary laws are impossible and that neither Lewis's nor Armstrong's analyses of law nicely accounts for the laws' immutability. *Received September 2006; revised September 2007. ‡Many thanks to John Roberts and John Carroll for valuable comments on earlier drafts, as well as to several anonymous referees (...) for their good suggestions. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, CB #3125, Caldwell Hall, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125;. (shrink)

For a long time, regularity accounts of causation have virtually vanished from the scene. Problems encountered within other theoretical frameworks have recently induced authors working on causation, laws of nature, or methodologies of causal reasoning – as e.g. May (Kausales Schliessen. Eine Untersuchung über kausale Erklärungen und Theorienbildung. Ph.D. thesis, Universität Hamburg, Hamburg, 1999), Ragin (Fuzzy-set social science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), Graßhoff and May (Causal regularities. In W. Spohn, M. Ledwig, & M. Esfeld (Eds.), Current issues in (...) causation (pp. 85–114). Paderborn: Mentis, 2001), Swartz (The concept of physical law (2nd ed.). http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/physical-law/, 2003), Halpin (Erkenntnis, 58, 137–168, 2003) – to direct their attention back to regularity theoretic analyses. In light of the latest proposals of regularity theories, the paper at hand therefore reassesses the criticism raised against regularity accounts since the INUS theory of causation of Mackie (The cement of the universe. A study of causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). It is shown that most of these objections target strikingly over-simplified regularity theoretic sketches. By outlining ways to refute these objections it is argued that the prevalent conviction as to the overall failure of regularity theories has been hasty. (shrink)

Causation has always been a philosophically controversial subject matter. While David Hume’s empiricist account of causation has been the dominant influence in analytic philosophy and science during modern times, a minority view has instead connected causation essentially to agency and manipulation. A related approach has for the first time gained widespread popularity in recent years, due to new powerful theories of causal inference in science that are based in a technical notion of intervention, and James Woodward’s closely connected interventionist theory (...) of causation in philosophy. This monograph assesses five manipulationist or interventionist theories of causation, viewed as theories that purport to tell us what causation is by providing us with the meaning of causal claims. It is shown that they cannot do this, as the conditions on causation that they impose are too weak, mainly due to ineliminable circularities in their definitions of causal terms. It is then argued that a subset of Woodward’s theory can nevertheless contribute crucially to an explanation of the unique role that manipulation has in our acquisition of causal knowledge. This explanation differs from the common regularist explanation of the epistemic utility of manipulation and experiment, and it is taken to confirm several important manipulationist intuitions. However, the success of the explanation depends on (this subset of) interventionism not itself being understood as a theory of causation, but as a theory of intervention. (shrink)

In this article, as a new mathematical approach to origin of the laws of nature, using a new basic algebraic axiomatic (matrix) formalism based on the ring theory and Clifford algebras (presented in Sec.2), “it is shown that certain mathematical forms of fundamental laws of nature, including laws governing the fundamental forces of nature (represented by a set of two definite classes of general covariant massive field equations, with new matrix formalisms), are derived uniquely from only a very few axioms”; (...) where in agreement with the rational Lorentz group, it is also basically assumed that the components of relativistic energy-momentum can only take rational values. In essence, the main scheme of this new mathematical axiomatic approach to fundamental laws of nature is as follows. First based on the assumption of rationality of D-momentum, by linearization (along with a parameterization procedure) of the Lorentz invariant energy-momentum quadratic relation, a unique set of Lorentz invariant systems of homogeneous linear equations (with matrix formalisms compatible with certain Clifford, and symmetric algebras) is derived. Then by first quantization (followed by a basic procedure of minimal coupling to space-time geometry) of these determined systems of linear equations, a set of two classes of general covariant massive (tensor) field equations (with matrix formalisms compatible with certain Clifford, and Weyl algebras) is derived uniquely as well. Each class of the derived general covariant field equations also includes a definite form of torsion field appeared as generator of the corresponding field’ invariant mass. In addition, it is shown that the (1+3)-dimensional cases of two classes of derived field equations represent a new general covariant massive formalism of bispinor fields of spin-2, and spin-1 particles, respectively. In fact, these uniquely determined bispinor fields represent a unique set of new generalized massive forms of the laws governing the fundamental forces of nature, including the Einstein (gravitational), Maxwell (electromagnetic) and Yang-Mills (nuclear) field equations. Moreover, it is also shown that the (1+2)-dimensional cases of two classes of these field equations represent (asymptotically) a new general covariant massive formalism of bispinor fields of spin-3/2 and spin-1/2 particles, corresponding to the Dirac and Rarita–Schwinger equations. -/- As a particular consequence, it is shown that a certain massive formalism of general relativity – with a definite form of torsion field appeared originally as the generator of gravitational field’s invariant mass – is obtained only by first quantization (followed by a basic procedure of minimal coupling to space-time geometry) of a certain set of special relativistic algebraic matrix equations. It has been also proved that Lagrangian densities specified for the originally derived new massive forms of the Maxwell, Yang-Mills and Dirac field equations, are also gauge invariant, where the invariant mass of each field is generated solely by the corresponding torsion field. In addition, in agreement with recent astronomical data, a new form of massive boson is identified (corresponding to U(1) gauge group) with invariant mass: m_γ ≈ 1.47069×10^-41 kg, generated by a coupled torsion field of the background space-time geometry. -/- Moreover, based on the definite mathematical formalism of this axiomatic approach, along with the C, P and T symmetries (represented basically by the corresponding quantum operators) of the fundamentally derived field equations, it has been concluded that the universe could be realized solely with the (1+2) and (1+3)-dimensional space-times (where this conclusion, in particular, is based on the T-symmetry of these equations). It is shown that CPT is the only combined form of C, P, and T symmetries of interacting fields. In addition, on the basis of these discrete symmetries of derived field equations, it has been also shown that only left-handed particle fields (along with their complementary right-handed fields) could be coupled to the corresponding (any) source currents. Furthermore, it has been shown that the metric of background space-time is diagonalized for the uniquely derived fermion field equations (defined and expressed solely in (1+2)-dimensional space-time), where this property generates a certain set of additional symmetries corresponding uniquely to the "SU(2)_L x U(2)_R" symmetry group for spin-1/2 fermion fields (representing “1+3” generations of four fermions, including a group of eight leptons and a group of eight quarks), and also the "SU(2)_L x U(2)_R" and "SU(3)" gauge symmetry groups for spin-1 boson fields coupled to the spin-1/2 fermionic source currents. Hence, along with the known elementary particles, eight new elementary particles, including four new charge-less right-handed spin-1/2 fermions (including two leptons and two quarks), a spin-3/2 fermion, and also three new spin-1 (massive) bosons are predicted uniquely by this axiomatic approach. As a particular result, based on the definite formulation of the derived Maxwell (and Yang-Mills) field equations, it has been also concluded that magnetic monopoles could not exist in nature. -/- Comments: 99 Pages. A summary of a submitted and accepted research project (On "Foundations of Physics"), Ramin Zahedi, Japan, 2012 - 2015. -/- Invited and Presented Research Article at: The 4th International Conference on New Frontiers in Physics ICNFP2015, Europe (CERN), (https://indico.cern.ch/e/icnfp2015); The 2016 SIAM International Conference on Mathematical Aspects of Materials Science, Philadelphia, USA, (https://www.siam.org/meetings/ms16/); The 17th International Conference on Quantum Foundations: Quantum and Beyond, International Centre for Mathematical Modeling in Physics, Engineering and Cognitive Sciences ( ICMM), Linnaeus University, Sweden, 2016, (https://lnu.se/en/qb/); The 2016 International Conference on Algebraic Geometry and Mathematical Physics (AGMP 2016), University of Tromsø, Norway, (https://site.uit.no/); International Conference on Noncommutative Geometry, Quantum Symmetries and Quantum Gravity (II), XXXVII Max Born International Symposium, Wroclaw University, Poland, 2016, (http://ift.uni.wroc.pl/~mborn37/); 2016 GRavitational-wave Astronomy International Conference (Meeting) in Paris, The Institute d’Astrophysique de Paris (IAP), The University of Paris VI - Sorbonne University, CNRS, LERU, EUA, France, 2016, (Supported by the European Union's Seventh Framework Program: FP7/PEOPLE-2011-CIG); The 22nd Internnational Australian Institute of Physics Congress (AIP), University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia, 2016, (http://appc-aip2016.org.au/); The 21st International Conference on General Relativity and Gravitation, Columbia University, New York, USA, 2016, (http://www.gr21.org/). -/- Acknowledgements: Special thanks are extended to Prof. and Academician Vitaly L. Ginzburg (Russia), Prof. and Academician Dmitry V. Shirkov (Russia), Prof. Leonid A . Shelepin (Russia), Prof. Vladimir Ya. Fainberg (Russia), Prof. Wolfgang Rindler (USA), Prof. Roman W. Jackiw (USA), Prof. Roger Penrose (UK), Prof. Steven Weinberg (USA), Prof. Ezra T. Newman (USA), Prof. Graham Jameson (UK), Prof. Sergey A. Reshetnjak (Russia), Prof. Sir Michael Atiyah (UK) (who, in particular, kindly encouraged me to continue this work as a new unorthodox (primary) mathematical approach to fundamental physics), and many others for their support and valuable guidance during my studies and research. -/- External URLs of the Article (Including updated versions): https://inspirehep.net/record/1387680/, https://indico.cern.ch/event/344173/session/22/contribution/422/attachments/1140145/1646101/R.a.Zahe di--OnDiscretePhysics-Jan.2015-signed.pdf, https://cds.cern.ch/record/1980381/, https://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/TDS-MACS/hal-01476703 , http://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/handle/2115/59279/. DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/ZCHTP. (shrink)

We have two main aims: to construct mathematical models for analysing determinism, causality and supervenience; and then to use these to demonstrate the possibility of constructing an ontic construal of the operation of free will - one requiring both the presentation of genuine alternatives to an agent and their selecting between them in a manner that permits the attribution of responsibility. Determinism is modelled using trans-temporal ontic links between discrete juxtaposed universe states and shown to be distinct from predictability. Causality (...) is defined on a temporal sequence of δ-algebras and quantified using a measure. The measure leads to definitions of causal overdetermination and epiphenomena. Proofs are constructed to demonstrate deterministic universes must carry their properties essentially but not necessarily locally. We argue determinism and causality are separate doctrines. These models and results are marshalled to put the case that a counterfactual construal of ontic choice cannot work. In response we propose ‘immanence’ - a modified form of indeterminism whereby a universe can present choices to its denizens. We prove that beings subsumed within a universe cannot pilot their own actions. We then argue these beings can exercise free will only when selecting between choices inhering within immanent relata. A being is responsible for its selections if and only if it is constituted of a temporally evolving deterministic substructure. Our proposal is novel: it avoids injecting indeterminism into the decision process. Topological models for property supervenience are developed and used to reconstruct standard definitions from the literature. These are then used to demonstrate considerations of supervenience do not affect our arguments. We have demonstrated that a model of the exercise of free will involving both genuine choices and responsibility is possible but can only operate within a non-deterministic universe possessing specific traits. (shrink)

This paper discusses the constitution relation within the framework of the mechanistic approach to neurobiological explanation. It develops a regularity theory of constitution as an alternative to the manipulationist theory of constitution advocated by some of the proponents of the mechanistic approach. After the main problems of the manipulationist account of constitution have been reviewed, the regularity account is developed based on the notion of a minimal type relevance theory. A minimal type relevance theory expresses a minimally necessary condition of (...) a given type that consists of a disjunction of minimally sufficient conditions of that type. Afterwards, the attained definition is successfully applied in an analysis of the logical structure of the explanation of spatial learning and memory in rats as a paradigm neurobiological explanation. The overall result is a more robust and more precise version of the mechanistic approach to neurobiological explanations. (shrink)

This article is a summary of an expanded version of my previous publication Ref. [ 1 ]. In particular, in Ref. [1] using a new axiomatic matrix approach – which has been formulated on the basis of ring theory and Clifford algebra – by first quantization (followed by a basic procedure of minimal coupling to the space-time geometry) of a special relativistic algebraic matrix equation, a certain massive form of gravitational field equations – with new matrix formalism and also a (...) definite form of torsion which generates the gravitational field's invariant mass – is derived uniquely. It is shown that the massless case of these derived equations is equivalent to the Einstein field equations (including a cosmological constant). Moreover, it has been shown that the matrix formalism of derived gravitational field equations, is compatible with matrix representations of certain Clifford algebras. (shrink)

Most philosophers who advocate Scientific Realism endorse also Modal Realism, i.e., assume commitments with objective modality. However, the precise relationship between these positions has been scarcely explored. In this paper I argue that there is an indirect implication from SR to MR. Although the basic thesis of SR does not imply MR, both the main argument for SR and the best realist theory of reference do imply modal commitments.

RESUMO Os debates sobre o Realismo Científico não só tiveram um começo e um desenvolvimento contemporâneos aos do Realismo Modal e Realismo Nomológico, mas suas temáticas estiveram também profundamente entrelaçadas. Certa atitude realista em relação às teorias científicas tem sido muitas vezes acompanhada pela adoção de compromissos com a modalidade objetiva e as leis naturais. No entanto, as relações entre estas três posições têm sido pouco exploradas. Neste artigo defendo que manter o RC indiretamente envolve assumir compromissos com o RM (...) e o RN. No primeiro caso, por causa dos argumentos que dão suporte ao RC; no segundo, uma vez que, dentro das alternativas disponíveis no debate sobre as leis, o RN é comparativamente melhor para o realista científico. ABSTRACT Debates on scientific realism not only had a beginning and contemporary developments before those on Modal Realism and on Nomological Realism, also their thematics were deeply entangled. Some realist attitude regarding other scientific theories has many times been followed by the adoption of commitments with an objective modality and the natural laws. Nevertheless, the relations among these three positions have been little explored. In this article I hold that keeping SR indirectly means committing to MR and NR. In the first case, because of the arguments supporting SR, in the second case, once within the options available in the debate on the laws, NR is - by comparison - better for the scientific realism. (shrink)

Super-Humeanism is an even more parsimonious ontology than Lewisian standard Humean metaphysics in that it rejects intrinsic properties. There are point objects, but all there is to them are their relative positions and the change of them. Everything else supervenes on the Humean mosaic thus conceived. Hence, dynamical parameters come in on a par with the laws through their position in the best system. The paper sets out how Super-Humeanism has the conceptual means to reject van Inwagen’s consequence argument not (...) by taking the laws to depend on us, but by taking the initial values of the dynamical parameters that enter into the laws to be dependent on the motions that actually occur in the universe, including the motions of human bodies. The paper spells out the advantages of this proposal. (shrink)

In this paper we provide an analysis and overview of some notable definitions, works and thoughts concerning discrete physics that mainly suggest a finite and discrete characteristic for the physical world, as well as, of the cellular automaton, which could serve as the basis of a perfect mathematical deterministic model for the physical reality. In particular and as a confirmation, in the reference [37] also has been shown that all the fundamental field equations of physics, mathematically and uniquely, could be (...) derived - where it is assumed that certain physical quantities are discrete. (shrink)