- On representationalism, common-factorism, and whether consciousness is here and now.Pär Sundström - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-12.details
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On representationalism, common-factorism, and whether consciousness is here and now.Pär Sundström - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2539-2550.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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Nagel's case against physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2002 - SATS 3 (2):91-108.details
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Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
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Phenomenological Naturalism.David Suarez - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (4):437-453.details
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Consciousness Without Content: A Look at Evidence and Prospects.Narayanan Srinivasan - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
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Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible.Jeff Speaks - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (3):339-361.details
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Attention and intentionalism.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):325-342.details
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Encapsulated social perception of emotional expressions.Joulia Smortchkova - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 47:38-47.details
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The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.details
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Tropes and Some Ontological Prerequisites for Knowledge.R. Scott Smith - 2019 - Metaphysica 20 (2):223-237.details
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Representation and knowledge are not the same thing.Leslie Smith - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):784-785.details
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Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action.Declan Smithies & Jeremy Weiss - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):27-54.details
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Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument.Paul Skokowski - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):287-299.details
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Is the Pain in Jane Felt Mainly in Her Brain?Paul Skokowski - 2007 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 15 (1):58-71.details
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Hidden Qualia.Derek Shiller - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):165-180.details
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Why do we need perceptual content?Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):776-788.details
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Russellian Representationalism and the Stygian Hues.William A. Sharp - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):777-797.details
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Introspection and the Elementary Acts of Mind.William Seager - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (1):53-76.details
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The represented object of color experience.Elizabeth Schier - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):1 – 27.details
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The Goldilocks Problem of the specificity of visual phenomenal content.Robert Schroer - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):476-495.details
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The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):665-682.details
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Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.details
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In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.details
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The Structure of Unpleasantness.Abraham Sapién - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):805-830.details
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Theories of understanding others: the need for a new account and the guiding role of the person model theory.Sabrina Coninx & Albert Newen - 2018 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 31:127-153.details
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The Relativity Of Color.Peter W. Ross - 2000 - Synthese 123 (1):105-129.details
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The location problem for color subjectivism.Peter W. Ross - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):42-58.details
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Synthetic phenomenology.Ron Chrisley - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):53-70.details
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Red is the Hardest Problem.William S. Robinson - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):5-16.details
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Intrinsic qualities of experience: Surviving Harman's critique. [REVIEW]William S. Robinson - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (3):285-309.details
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What is an altered state of consciousness?Antti Revonsuo, Sakari Kallio & Pilleriin Sikka - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):187 – 204.details
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Putting pain in its proper place.Kevin Reuter, Michael Sienhold & Justin Sytsma - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):72-82.details
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Consciousness.Nicholas Rescher - 2015 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 2 (1):11-18.details
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Even zombies can be surprised: A reply to Graham and Horgan.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):189-202.details
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A set of solutions to Parfit's problems.Stuart Rachels - 2001 - Noûs 35 (2):214–238.details
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Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.details
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Perceptual content is indexed to attention.Adrienne Prettyman - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4039-4054.details
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Putnam's intuition.Thomas W. Polger - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 109 (2):143-70.details
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Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity.Michal Polák & Tomáš Marvan - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:381399.details
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A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.details
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Qualitative Attribution, Phenomenal Experience and Being.Mark Pharoah - 2018 - Biosemiotics 11 (3):427-446.details
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Causation and Information: Where Is Biological Meaning to Be Found?Mark Pharoah - 2020 - Biosemiotics 13 (3):309-326.details
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Teleosemantics, Swampman, and Strong Representationalism.Uwe Peters - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1):273–288.details
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Looks as powers.Philip Pettit - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52.details
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The Singular Relational plus Relativistic Content View.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (1):93-114.details
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There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese:1-30.details
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There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese 195 (10):4637-4666.details
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Developmental aspects of consciousness: How much theory of mind do you need to be consciously aware?Josef Perner & Zoltán Dienes - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (1):63-82.details
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