This book illustrates the program of Logical-Informational Dynamics. Rational agents exploit the information available in the world in delicate ways, adopt a wide range of epistemic attitudes, and in that process, constantly change the world itself. Logical-Informational Dynamics is about logical systems putting such activities at center stage, focusing on the events by which we acquire information and change attitudes. Its contributions show many current logics of information and change at work, often in multi-agent settings where social behavior is essential, (...) and often stressing Johan van Benthem's pioneering work in establishing this program. However, this is not a Festschrift, but a rich tapestry for a field with a wealth of strands of its own. The reader will see the state of the art in such topics as information update, belief change, preference, learning over time, and strategic interaction in games. Moreover, no tight boundary has been enforced, and some chapters add more general mathematical or philosophical foundations or links to current trends in computer science. The theme of this book lies at the interface of many disciplines. Logic is the main methodology, but the various chapters cross easily between mathematics, computer science, philosophy, linguistics, cognitive and social sciences, while also ranging from pure theory to empirical work. Accordingly, the authors of this book represent a wide variety of original thinkers from different research communities. And their interconnected themes challenge at the same time how we think of logic, philosophy and computation. Thus, very much in line with van Benthem's work over many decades, the volume shows how all these disciplines form a natural unity in the perspective of dynamic logicians (broadly conceived) exploring their new themes today. And at the same time, in doing so, it offers a broader conception of logic with a certain grandeur, moving its horizons beyond the traditional study of consequence relations. (shrink)

This chapter presents a new semantics for inductive empirical knowledge. The epistemic agent is represented concretely as a learner who processes new inputs through time and who forms new beliefs from those inputs by means of a concrete, computable learning program. The agent’s belief state is represented hyper-intensionally as a set of time-indexed sentences. Knowledge is interpreted as avoidance of error in the limit and as having converged to true belief from the present time onward. Familiar topics are re-examined within (...) the semantics, such as inductive skepticism, the logic of discovery, Duhem’s problem, the articulation of theories by auxiliary hypotheses, the role of serendipity in scientific knowledge, Fitch’s paradox, deductive closure of knowability, whether one can know inductively that one knows inductively, whether one can know inductively that one does not know inductively, and whether expert instruction can spread common inductive knowledge—as opposed to mere, true belief—through a community of gullible pupils. (shrink)

As a contribution to the challenge of building game-playing AI systems, we develop and analyse a formal language for representing and reasoning about strategies. Our logical language builds on the existing general Game Description Language and extends it by a standard modality for linear time along with two dual connectives to express preferences when combining strategies. The semantics of the language is provided by a standard state-transition model. As such, problems that require reasoning about games can be solved by the (...) standard methods for reasoning about actions and change. We also endow the language with a specific semantics by which strategy formulas are understood as move recommendations for a player. To illustrate how our formalism supports automated reasoning about strategies, we demonstrate two example methods of implementation: first, we formalise the semantic interpretation of our language in conjunction with game rules and strategy rules in the Situation Calculus; second, we show how the reasoning problem can be solved with Answer Set Programming. (shrink)

We associate the semantic game with chance moves conceived by Blinov with Blamey’s partial logic. We give some equivalent alternatives to the semantic game, some of which are with a third player, borrowing the idea of introducing the pseudo-player called Nature in game theory. We observe that IF propositional logic proposed by Sandu and Pietarinen can be equivalently translated to partial logic, which implies that imperfect information may not be necessary for IF propositional logic. We also indicate that some independent (...) quantifiers can be regarded as dependent quantifiers of indeterminate sequence, using the interjunction connective in partial logic. We conclude our paper by indicating some further research in a more general setting. (shrink)

This book explores the interplay between logic and science, describing new trends, new issues and potential research developments.

Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals with games in which all players have preference orderings over the possible outcomes of the game. This paper gives an informal introduction to the theory and a survey of applications in diverse branches of philosophy. No criticism (...) is reviewed. Game theory is shown at work in discussions about epistemological dependence, liberalism and efficiency, Hume’s concept of convention, morality and rationality, and distributive justice and egalitarianism. A guide to the literature provides hints at applications in collective intentionality, epistemology, ethics, history of philosophy, logic, philosophy of language, and political philosophy. (shrink)

We make a proposal for formalizing simultaneous games at the abstraction level of player's powers, combining ideas from dynamic logic of sequential games and concurrent dynamic logic. We prove completeness for a new system of 'concurrent game logic' CDGL with respect to finite non-determined games. We also show how this system raises new mathematical issues, and throws light on branching quantifiers and independence-friendly evaluation games for first-order logic.

The combination of logic and game theory provides a fine-grained perspective on information and interaction dynamics, a Theory of Play. In this paper we lay down the main components of such a theory, drawing on recent advances in the logical dynamics of actions, preferences, and information. We then show how this fine-grained perspective has already shed new light on the long-term dynamics of information exchange, as well as on the much-discussed question of extensive game rationality.

Information is a notion of wide use and great intuitive appeal, and hence, not surprisingly, different formal paradigms claim part of it, from Shannon channel theory to Kolmogorov complexity. Information is also a widely used term in logic, but a similar diversity repeats itself: there are several competing logical accounts of this notion, ranging from semantic to syntactic. In this chapter, we will discuss three major logical accounts of information.

Statements not only update our current knowledge, but also have other dynamic effects. In particular, suggestions or commands ?upgrade' our preferences by changing the current order among worlds. We present a complete logic of knowledge update plus preference upgrade that works with dynamic-epistemic-style reduction axioms. This system can model changing obligations, conflicting commands, or ?regret'. We then show how to derive reduction axioms from arbitrary definable relation changes. This style of analysis also has a product update version with preferences between (...) actions, as well as worlds. Some illustrations are presented involving defaults and obligations. We conclude that our dynamic framework is viable, while admitting a further extension to more numerical ?utility update'. (shrink)

This paper is based on tutorials on 'Logic and Games' at the 7th Asian Logic Conference in Hsi-Tou, Taiwan, 1999, and until 2002 in Siena, Stuttgart, Trento, Udine, and Utrecht. We present logic games as a topic per se, giving models for dynamic interaction between agents. First, we survey some basic logic games. Then we show how their common properties raise general issues of game structure and 'game logics'. Next, we review logic games in the light of general game logic. (...) Finally, we discuss more 'realistic' influences from game theory into logic games, including players' preferences, and imperfect information. (shrink)

Contents. Introduction. 1. Preliminaries. 2. Normal Form Games. 3. Extensive Games. 4. Applications of Game Theory. 5. The Methodology of Game Theory. Conclusion. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Does game theory—the mathematical theory of strategic interaction—provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory—the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory—is an attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to (...) investigate the applicability of game theory in such fields as economics, philosophy and strategic consultancy. I prove new mathematical theorems about the beliefs, desires and rationality principles of individual human beings, and explore in detail the logical form of game theory as it is used in explanatory and normative contexts. I argue that game theory reduces to rational choice theory if used as an explanatory device, and that game theory is nonsensical if used as a normative device. A provocative account of the history of game theory reveals that this is not bad news for all of game theory, though. Two central research programmes in game theory tried to find the ultimate characterisation of strategic interaction between rational agents. Yet, while the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme has done badly thanks to such research habits as overmathematisation, model-tinkering and introversion, the Epistemic Programme, I argue, has been rather successful in achieving this aim. "The 'epistemic' approach to game theory has emerged over the past twenty-five years. What is this approach? How does it differ from the conventional equilibrium-based approach to game theory? What have been its strengths and weaknesses to date? To find out, read this comprehensive and excellently written account". Adam Brandenburger, J. P. Valles Professor of Business Economics and Strategy, Stern School of Business, New York University "Reading Boudewijn de Bruin's book should be rewarding both for game theorists interested in the conceptual foundations of their discipline and for philosophers who want to learn more about formal analysis of strategic interaction. It provides an in-depth logical study of the currently dominant epistemic approaches to non-cooperative games, with an eye both to the attractions and to the serious challenges facing the Epistemic Programme". Wlodek Rabinowicz, Professor of Practical Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Lund University . (shrink)

This volume presents mathematical game theory as an interface between logic and philosophy.

We develop a logical system that captures two different interpretations of what extensive games model, and we apply this to a long-standing debate in game theory between those who defend the claim that common knowledge of rationality leads to backward induction or subgame perfect (Nash) equilibria and those who reject this claim. We show that a defense of the claim à la Aumann (1995) rests on a conception of extensive game playing as a one-shot event in combination with a principle (...) of rationality that is incompatible with it, while a rejection of the claim à la Reny (1988) assumes a temporally extended, many-moment interpretation of extensive games in combination with implausible belief revision policies. In addition, the logical system provides an original inductive and implicit axiomatization of rationality in extensive games based on relations of dominance rather than the usual direct axiomatization of rationality as maximization of expected utility. (shrink)

A variety of logical frameworks have been developed to study rational agents interacting over time. This paper takes a closer look at one particular interface, between two systems that both address the dynamics of knowledge and information flow. The first is Epistemic Temporal Logic (ETL) which uses linear or branching time models with added epistemic structure induced by agents’ different capabilities for observing events. The second framework is Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) that describes interactive processes in terms of epistemic event (...) models which may occur inside modalities of the language. This paper systematically and rigorously relates the DEL framework with the ETL framework. The precise relationship between DEL and ETL is explored via a new representation theorem characterizing the largest class of ETL models corresponding to DEL protocols in terms of notions of Perfect Recall , No Miracles , and Bisimulation Invariance . We then focus on new issues of completeness . One contribution is an axiomatization for the dynamic logic of public announcements constrained by protocols, which has been an open problem for some years, as it does not fit the usual ‘reduction axiom’ format of DEL. Finally, we provide a number of examples that show how DEL suggests an interesting fine-structure inside ETL. (shrink)

We make a proposal for formalizing simultaneous games at the abstraction level of player’s powers, combining ideas from dynamic logic of sequential games and concurrent dynamic logic. We prove completeness for a new system of ‘concurrent game logic’ CDGL with respect to finite non-determined games. We also show how this system raises new mathematical issues, and throws light on branching quantifiers and independence-friendly evaluation games for first-order logic.

Dynamic update of information states is a new paradigm in logicalsemantics. But such updates are also a traditional hallmark ofprobabilistic reasoning. This note brings the two perspectives togetherin an update mechanism for probabilities which modifies state spaces.

Using epistemic logic, we provide a non-probabilistic way to formalise payoff uncertainty, that is, statements such as ‘player i has approximate knowledge about the utility functions of player j.’ We show that on the basis of this formalisation common knowledge of payoff uncertainty and rationality (in the sense of excluding weakly dominated strategies, due to Dekel and Fudenberg (1990)) characterises a new solution concept we have called ‘mixed iterated strict weak dominance.’.

We construct logical languages which allow one to represent a variety of possible types of changes affecting the information states of agents in a multi-agent setting. We formalize these changes by defining a notion of epistemic program. The languages are two-sorted sets that contain not only sentences but also actions or programs. This is as in dynamic logic, and indeed our languages are not significantly more complicated than dynamic logics. But the semantics is more complicated. In general, the semantics of (...) an epistemic program is what we call aprogram model. This is a Kripke model of ‘actions’,representing the agents' uncertainty about the current action in a similar way that Kripke models of ‘states’ are commonly used in epistemic logic to represent the agents' uncertainty about the current state of the system. Program models induce changes affecting agents' information, which we represent as changes of the state model, called epistemic updates. Formally, an update consists of two operations: the first is called the update map, and it takes every state model to another state model, called the updated model; the second gives, for each input state model, a transition relation between the states of that model and the states of the updated model. Each variety of epistemic actions, such as public announcements or completely private announcements to groups, gives what we call an action signature, and then each family of action signatures gives a logical language. The construction of these languages is the main topic of this paper. We also mention the systems that capture the valid sentences of our logics. But we defer to a separate paper the completeness proof. (shrink)

The notion of perfect recall in extensive games was introduced by Kuhn (1953), who interpreted it as "equivalent to the assertion that each player is allowed by the rules of the game to remember everything he knew at previous moves and all of his choices at those moves''. We provide a characterization and axiomatization of perfect recall based on two notions of memory: (1) memory of past knowledge and (2) memory of past actions.

Contemporary epistemological and cognitive studies, as well as recent trends in computer science and game theory have revealed an increasingly important and intimate relationship between Information, Interaction, and Agency. Agents perform actions based on the available information and in the presence of other interacting agents. From this perspective Information, Interaction, and Agency neatly ties together classical themes like rationality, decision-making and belief revision with games, strategies and learning in a multi-agent setting. Unified by the central notions Information, Interaction, and Agency, (...) the essays in this volume provide refreshing methodological perspectives on belief revision, dynamic epistemic logic, von Neumann games, and evolutionary game theory; all of which in turn are central approaches to understanding our own rationality and that of other agents. (shrink)

Proof, Computation and Agency: Logic at the Crossroads provides an overview of modern logic and its relationship with other disciplines. As a highlight, several articles pursue an inspiring paradigm called 'social software', which studies patterns of social interaction using techniques from logic and computer science. The book also demonstrates how logic can join forces with game theory and social choice theory. A second main line is the logic-language-cognition connection, where the articles collected here bring several fresh perspectives. Finally, the book (...) takes up Indian logic and its connections with epistemology and the philosophy of science, showing how these topics run naturally into each other. (shrink)

This volume seeks to further the use of formal methods in clarifying one of the central problems of philosophy: that of our free human agency and its place in our indeterministic world. It celebrates the important contributions made in this area by Nuel Belnap, American logician and philosopher. Philosophically, indeterminism and free action can seem far apart, but in Belnap’s work, they are intimately linked. This book explores their philosophical interconnectedness through a selection of original research papers that build forth (...) on Belnap’s logical and philosophical work. Some contributions take the form of critical discussions of Belnap's published work, some develop points made in his publications in new directions, and others provide additional insights on the topics of indeterminism and free action. In Nuel Belnap’s work on indeterminism and free action, three formal frameworks figure prominently: the simple branching histories framework known as "branching time;" its relativistic spatio-temporal extension, branching space-times; and the “seeing to it that” logic of agency. As those frameworks provide the formal background for the contributed papers, the volume introduction gives an overview of the current state of their development. It also introduces case-intensional first order logic, a general intensional logic offering resources for a first-order extension of the mentioned frameworks and a recent research focus of Belnap’s. The volume also contains an extended biographical interview with Nuel Belnap. (shrink)

This volume is a collation of original contributions from the key actors of a new trend in the contemporary theory of knowledge and belief, that we call “dynamic epistemology”. It brings the works of these researchers under a single umbrella by highlighting the coherence of their current themes, and by establishing connections between topics that, up until now, have been investigated independently. It also illustrates how the new analytical toolbox unveils questions about the theory of knowledge, belief, preference, action, and (...) rationality, in a number of central axes in dynamic epistemology: temporal, social, probabilistic and even deontic dynamics. (shrink)

In strategic situations, agents base actions on knowledge and beliefs. This includes knowledge about others’ strategies and preferences over strategy profiles, but also about other external factors. Bernheim and Pearce in 1984 independently defined the game theoretic solution concept of rationalizability, which is built on the premise that rational agents will only take actions that are the best response to some situation that they consider possible. This accounts for other agents’ rationality as well, limiting the strategies to which a particular (...) agent must respond, enabling further elimination until the strategies stabilize. We seek to generalize rationalizability to account not only for actions, but knowledge of the world as well. This will enable us to examine the interplay between action based and knowledge based rationality. We give an account of what it means for an action to be rational relative to a particular state of affairs, and in turn relative to a state of knowledge. We present a class of games, Epistemic Messaging Games, with a communication stage that clarifies the epistemic state among the players prior to the players’ actions. We use a history based model, which frames individual knowledge in terms of local projections of a global history. With this framework, we give an account of rationalizability for subclasses of EMG. (shrink)

There are several ways to quantify over public announcements. The most notable are reflected in arbitrary, group, and coalition announcement logics, with the latter being the least studied so far. In the present work, we consider coalition announcements through the lens of group announcements, and provide a complete axiomatisation of a logic with coalition announcements. To achieve this, we employ a generalisation of group announcements. Moreover, we study some logical properties of both coalition and group announcements that have not been (...) studied before. (shrink)

This paper explores the main philosophical approaches of David Hilbert’s theory of proof. Specifically, it is focuses on his ideas regarding logic, the concept of proof, the axiomatic, the concept of truth, metamathematics, the a priori knowledge and the general nature of scientific knowledge. The aim is to show and characterize his epistemological approach on the foundation of knowledge, where logic appears as a guarantee of that foundation. Hilbert supposes that the propositional apriorism, proposed by him to support mathematics, sustains (...) — on its turn — a general method for the treatment of the problem in other areas such as natural sciences. This method is axiomatic. Broadly speaking, we intend to recover and update the Hilbert’s philosophical thinking about the role of logic for scientific knowledge. (shrink)

We present a new notion of game equivalence that captures basic powers of interacting players. We provide a representation theorem, a complete logic, and a new game algebra for basic powers. In doing so, we establish connections with imperfect information games and epistemic logic. We also identify some new open problems concerning logic and games.

We present a new notion of game equivalence that captures basic powers of interacting players. We provide a representation theorem, a complete logic, and a new game algebra for basic powers. In doing so, we establish connections with imperfect information games and epistemic logic. We also identify some new open problems concerning logic and games.

The paper analyzes dynamic epistemic logic from a topological perspective. The main contribution consists of a framework in which dynamic epistemic logic satisfies the requirements for being a topological dynamical system thus interfacing discrete dynamic logics with continuous mappings of dynamical systems. The setting is based on a notion of logical convergence, demonstratively equivalent with convergence in Stone topology. Presented is a flexible, parametrized family of metrics inducing the latter, used as an analytical aid. We show maps induced by action (...) model transformations continuous with respect to the Stone topology and present results on the recurrent behavior of said maps. (shrink)

This thesis is on information dynamics modeled using *dynamic epistemic logic*. It takes the simple perspective of identifying models with maps, which under a suitable topology may be analyzed as *topological dynamical systems*. It is composed of an introduction and six papers. The introduction situates DEL in the field of formal epistemology, exemplifies its use and summarizes the main contributions of the papers.Paper I models the information dynamics of the *bystander effect* from social psychology. It shows how augmenting the standard (...) machinery of DEL with a decision making framework yields mathematically self-contained models of dynamic processes, a prerequisite for rigid model comparison.Paper II extrapolates from Paper I's construction, showing how the augmentation and its natural peers may be construed as maps. It argues that under the restriction of dynamics produced by DEL dynamical systems still falls a collection rich enough to be of interest. Paper III compares the approach of Paper II with *extensional protocols*, the main alternative augmentation to DEL. It concludes that both have benefits, depending on application. In favor of the DEL dynamical systems, it shows that extensional protocols designed to mimic simple, DEL dynamical systems require infinite representations. Paper IV focuses on *topological dynamical systems*. It argues that the *Stone topology* is a natural topology for investigating logical dynamics as, in it, *logical convergence* coinsides with topological convergence. It investigates the recurrent behavior of the maps of Papers II and III, providing novel insigths on their long-term behavior, thus providing a proof of concept for the approach.Paper V lays the background for Paper IV, starting from the construction of metrics generalizing the Hamming distance to infinite strings, inducing the Stone topology. It shows that the Stone topology is unique in making logical and topological convergens coinside, making it the natural topology for logical dynamics. It further includes a metric-based proof that the hitherto analyzed maps are continuous with respect to the Stone topology. Paper VI presents two characterization theorems for the existence of *reduction laws*, a common tool in obtaining complete dynamic logics. In the compact case, continuity in the Stone topology characterizes existence, while a strengthening is required in the non-compact case. The results allow the recasting of many logical dynamics of contemporary interest as topological dynamical systems. (shrink)

Our preferences determine how we act and think, but exactly what the mechanics are and how they work is a central cause of concern in many disciplines. This book uses techniques from modern logics of information flow and action to develop a unified new theory of what preference is and how it changes. The theory emphasizes reasons for preference, as well as its entanglement with our beliefs. Moreover, the book provides dynamic logical systems which describe the explicit triggers driving preference (...) change, including new information, suggestions, and commands. In sum, the book creates new bridges between many fields, from philosophy and computer science to economics, linguistics, and psychology. For the experienced scholar access to a large body of recent literature is provided and the novice gets a thorough introduction to the action and techniques of dynamic logic. (shrink)

In this paper we study connections between game theoretical concepts and results, and features of IF-predicate logic, extending observations from J. van Benthem (2001) for IF-propositional logic. We highlight how both characteristics of perfect recall can fail in the semantic games for IF-formulas, and we discuss the four Thompson transformations in relation with IF-logic. Many (strong) equivalence schemes for IF-logic correspond to one or more of the transformations. However, we also find one equivalence that does not fit in this picture, (...) by the type of imperfect recall involved. We point out that the connection between the transformations and logical equivalence schemes is less direct in IF-first order logic than in the propositional case. The transformations do not generate a reduced normal form for IF-logic, because the IF-language is not flexible enough. (shrink)

In this survey and position paper, we discuss some issues in logical modeling of interactive behavior. We draw together a number of lines in current logics for social action, emphasizing uses of ‘small models’ rather than complex spaces.

We introduce and study a PDL-style logic for reasoning about protocols, or plans, under imperfect information. Our paper touches on a number of issues surrounding the relationship between an agent’s abilities, available choices, and information in an interactive situation. The main question we address is under what circumstances can the agent commit to a protocol or plan, and what can she achieve by doing so?

We formulate a formal framework in which we combine the theory of dynamic epistemic logic and the theory of games. In particular, we show how we can use tools of dynamic epistemic logic to reason about information change ? and in particular, the effect of communication acts ? in such a game of imperfect information. We show how this framework allows for the formulation of specific assumptions in pragmatics of communication, as well as the formulation of general results about the (...) value of information. (shrink)

We propose strategic games wherein the strategies consist of players asking each other questions and answering those questions. We study simplifications of such games wherein two players simultaneously ask each other a question that the opponent is then obliged to answer. The motivation for our research is to model conversation including the dynamics of questions and answers, to provide new links between game theory and dynamic logics of information, and to exploit the dynamic/strategic structure that, we think, lies implicitly inside (...) epistemic models for epistemic languages, and to make that structure an explicit subject of logical study. Our main contributions are: the notion of a two-person question-answer game with information goals, the existence and computation of equilibria for these games, the correspondence with Bayesian games and their equilibria, and a connection between logic and game theory namely the existence of equilibria for positive goal formulae. (shrink)

is used to give a formalization of Artemov’s knowledge based reasoning approach to game theory, (KBR), [ 4 , 5 ]. Epistemic states of players are represented explicitly and reasoned about formally. We give a detailed analysis of the Centipede game using both proof theoretic and semantic machinery. This helps make the case that PDL + E can be a useful basis for the logical investigation of game theory.

Over the past decades, logicians interested in rational agency and intelligent interaction studied major components of these phenomena, such as knowledge, belief, and preference. In recent years, standard ‘static’ logics describing information states of agents have been generalized to dynamic logics describing actions and events that produce information, revise beliefs, or change preferences, as explicit parts of the logical system. Van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek & Kooi 2007, Baltag, van Ditmarsch & Moss 2008, van Benthem, to appear A, are up-to-date (...) accounts of this dynamic trend (the present paper follows Chapter 9 of the latter book). But in reality, concrete rational agency contains all these dynamic processes entangled. A concrete setting for this entanglement are games – and this paper is a survey of their interfaces with logic, both static and dynamic. Games are intriguing also since their analysis brings together two major streams, or tribal communities: ‘hard’ mathematical logics of computation, and ‘soft’ philosophical logics of propositional attitudes. Of course, this hard/soft distinction is spurious, and there is no natural border line between the two sources: it is their congenial mixture that makes current theories of agency so lively. (shrink)

Dov Gabbay is a prolific logician just by himself. But beyond that, he is quite good at making other people investigate the many further things he cares about. As a result, King's College London has become a powerful attractor in our field worldwide. Thus, it is a great pleasure to be an organizer for one of its flagship events: the Augustus de Morgan Workshop of 2005. Benedikt Loewe and I proposed the topic of 'interactive logic' for this occasion, with an (...) emphasis on social software – the logical analysis and design of social procedures – and on games, arguably the formal interactive setting par excellence. This choice reflects current research interests in our logic community at ILLC Amsterdam and beyond. In this broad area of interfaces between logic, computer science, and game theory, this paper is my own attempt at playing Dov. I am, perhaps not telling, but at least asking other people to find out for me what I myself cannot. (shrink)