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  1. Legal Reasoning as Fact Finding? A Contribution to the Analysis of Criminal Adjudication.Federico Picinali - 2014 - Jurisprudence 5 (2):299-327.
    This paper attempts to shed light on the dynamics of criminal adjudication. It starts by exploring some significant—and often ignored—similarities and dissimilarities between the practices and disciplines of, respectively, legal reasoning and fact finding. It then discusses the problem of defining the nature of these processes—legal reasoning, in particular—in terms of their being instances of practical or theoretical reasoning. Thus understood, the problem is shown to be distinct from two traditional questions of jurisprudence, namely whether law consists of facts and, (...)
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  • Are There Moral Truths?Bart Streumer - manuscript
    A brief overview of metaethics, written for students.
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  • Reconsidering the Meta‐Ethical Implications of Motivational Internalism and Externalism.Ragnar Francén - 2020 - Theoria 86 (3):359-388.
    Motivational internalism and externalism – that is, theories about moral motivation – have played central roles in meta‐ethical debate mainly because they have been thought to have implications for the constitutive nature of moral judgements. Thus, internalism and externalism have been adduced in favour of and against various versions of cognitivism and non‐cognitivism. This article aims to question a fundamental presupposition behind such arguments. It has standardly been assumed (i) that if motivational internalism is true then moral judgements must consist (...)
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  • General Dynamic Triviality Theorems.Jeffrey Sanford Russell & John Hawthorne - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (3):307-339.
    Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A (...)
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  • Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference.Mark Bryant Budolfson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.
    Non-cognitivism might seem to offer a plausible account of evaluative judgments, at least on the assumption that there is a satisfactory solution to the Frege-Geach problem. However, Cian Dorr has argued that non-cognitivism remains implausible even assuming that the Frege-Geach problem can be solved, on the grounds that non-cognitivism still has to classify some paradigmatically rational inferences as irrational. Dorr's argument is ingenious and at first glance seems decisive. However, in this paper I will show that Dorr's argument equivocates between (...)
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  • Communities of Judgment : Towards a Teleosemantic Theory of Moral Thought and Discourse.Karl Bergman - 2019 - Dissertation, Uppsala University
    This thesis offers a teleosemantic account of moral discourse and judgment. It develops a number of views about the function and content of moral judgments and the nature of moral discourse based on Ruth Millikan’s theory of intentional content and the functions of intentional attitudes. Non-cognitivists in meta-ethics have argued that moral judgments are more akin to desires and other motivational attitudes than to descriptive beliefs. I argue that teleosemantics allows us to assign descriptive content to motivational attitudes and hence (...)
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  • Morals, Meaning and Truth in Wittgenstein and Brandom.Jordi Fairhurst - 2019 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 9 (8).
    The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it analyses the similarities that stem from Wittgenstein’s (Philosophical Investigations (1953)) and Brandom’s (Making it Explicit (1994)) commitment to pragmatics in the philosophy of language to account for moral utterances. That is, the study of the meaning of moral utterances is carried out resorting to the study of the acts being performed in producing or exhibiting these utterances. Both authors offer, therefore, a pragmatic solution in order to account for the meaning of (...)
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  • Realismo Moral: Uma Introdução.Alcino Eduardo Bonella - 2014 - Dissertatio 39:31-41.
    Para Russ Shafer-landau, enquanto as teorias metaéticas denominadas por ele de céticas implicariam na impossibilidade do progresso moral, na equivalência moral entre posições morais antagônicas, e na infalibilidade moral, a teoria não-cética denominada objetivismo incorreria, aparentemente, no absolutismo moral, na negação da diversidade e da divergência morais, e na adoção de uma metafísica incompatível com a visão científica de mundo. Shafer-Landau, no entanto, discorda que isso valha para o realismo moral. Esta comunicação apresenta e analisa parte dos passos argumentativos presentes (...)
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  • Moral Skepticism: An Introduction and Overview.Diego E. Machuca - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-31.
    In this introductory chapter, I not only present the essays that make up this volume but also I offer an extensive critical overview of moral skepticism with the hope that it will turn out to be useful particularly to the uninitiated reader. I first provide a taxonomy of varieties of moral skepticism, then discuss the main arguments advanced in their favor, and finally summarize the ten essays here collected, which deal with one or more of those skeptical stances and arguments.
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  • Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and Skepticism About Folk Psychology.James Harold - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):165 - 185.
    In recent years it has become more and more difficult to distinguish between metaethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism. For example, proponents of the minimalist theory of truth hold that moral claims need not express beliefs in order to be (minimally) truth-apt, and yet some of these proponents still reject the traditional cognitivist analysis of moral language and thought. Thus, the dispute in metaethics between cognitivists and non-cognitivists has come to be seen as a dispute over the correct way to characterize our (...)
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  • Epistemic Reactive Attitudes.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):353-366.
    Although there have been a number of recent discussions about the emotions that we bring with us to our epistemic endeavors, there has been little, if any, discussion of the emotions we bring with us to epistemic appraisal. This paper focuses on a particular set of emotions, the reactive attitudes. As Peter F. Strawson and others have argued, our reactive attitudes reveal something deep about our moral commitments. A similar argument can be made within the domain of epistemology. Our "epistemic (...)
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  • Ex Aequo Et Bono Versus Hard Cases in the Light of Modern Metaethics.Izabela Skoczeń - 2018 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 9 (1):91-110.
    In the present paper, I argue against the claim that ex aequo and bono adjudication cannot be epistemically objective. I start with a survey of legal rules allowing the parties to resort to ex aequo et bono adjudication. Next, I argue that decisions taken on ex aequo et bono basis are not subjective for three main reasons. First, they are analogous to decision making in hard cases. Second, theories of practical reasoning and hybrid expressivism provide a precise theoretical account of (...)
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  • Gilberto Gomes é mesmo um compatibilista?Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (3):179-188.
    This paper focuses on Gilberto Gomes’ work on free will. In a series of contributions that have had a significant impact on the respective literature, Gomes developed a conception about free will and argued that its existence is consistent with recent scientific findings, specially in neuroscience. In this paper, I object to a claim of Gomes about his conception of free will, namely the claim that it is a compatibilist conception. I seek to show that Gomes does not use the (...)
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  • The Dark Side of Morality: Group Polarization and Moral Epistemology.Marcus Arvan - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (1):87-115.
    This article argues that philosophers and laypeople commonly conceptualize moral truths or justified moral beliefs as discoverable through intuition, argument, or some other purely cognitive or affective process. It then contends that three empirically well-supported theories all predict that this ‘Discovery Model’ of morality plays a substantial role in causing social polarization. The same three theories are then used to argue that an alternative ‘Negotiation Model’ of morality—according to which moral truths are not discovered but instead created by actively negotiating (...)
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  • جعل معنا از نگاه سارتر و نقد و بررسی آن بر اساس مبانی شناخت‌گرایی.داود صدیقی & امیر عباس علیزمانی - 2016 - پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین 14 (1):119-142.
    جعل و کشف معنا دو دیدگاه بنیادین در معنای زندگی هستند که هر کدام موافقان و مخالفانی را به خود اختصاص داده‌اند. سارتر با تبیین وجودِ فی‌نفسه و وجودِ‌ لنفسه، و همچنین مفاهیمی همچون امکان ناضرور، آزادی و فردیت، ابتدا جهان را از هر معنایی تهی می‌کند و سپس برای استعلای خویش و همچنین عدم انفعال، در پی جعل معناست. بنابراین، در این حوزه، سارتر را می‌توان یک ناشناخت‌گرا و سوبژکتیویست خواند و از این رو انتقادات مربوط به این دو (...)
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  • Should Visual Arguments Be Propositional in Order to Be Arguments?Georges Roque - 2015 - Argumentation 29 (2):177-195.
    An important issue for visual argumentation is its relationship to propositions, since it has been argued that, in order to be arguments, images should be propositional. The first part of the paper will approach this debate from a theoretical perspective. After quickly surveying the field on the issue, I will address the relationship between images and propositions. Three specific questions will be examined: can propositions accurately account for the way images express arguments?; are verbal propositions necessary to reconstruct arguments that (...)
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  • The Epistemic Value of Public Opinion: Theoretical and Practical Considerations.Marcos Engelken-Jorge - 2015 - Critical Horizons 16 (3):264-279.
    This paper discusses the claim that citizens lack sufficient political knowledge to make sound judgements on public matters. It is contended that practical judgements raise essentially two types of claims, namely a claim to empirical truth and a claim to normative rightness, and that there are good reasons to believe that people's insufficient political knowledge undermines both of them. Yet, an examination of the dynamics of public opinion formation reveals that there is an epistemic potential in public opinion, though it (...)
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  • How to Be a Normative Expressivist.Michael Pendlebury - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):182-207.
    Abstract. Expressivism can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes that can be correct or incorrect. And it can answer the logical challenges that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a normative stance, but as an expression of the endorsement of a proposition that is true if and only if that normative stance is correct. Although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism, it does (...)
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  • Charles Leslie Stevenson.Daniel R. Boisvert - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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