The dead donor rule (DDR) prohibits retrieval protocols that would be lethal to the donor. Some argue that compliance with it can be maintained by satisfying the requirements of double‐effect reasoning (DER). If successful, one could support organ donation without reference to the definition of death while being faithful to an ethic that prohibits intentionally killing innocent human life. On the contrary, I argue that DER cannot make lethal organ donation compatible with the DDR, because there are plausible ways it (...) fails DER's requirements. A key takeaway is that the theories of intention and proportionality assumed in DER matter for its plausibility as a constraint on practical reasoning. (shrink)

Background Contemporary societies are rife with moral disagreement, resulting in recalcitrant disputes on matters of public policy. In the context of ongoing bioethical controversies, are uncompromising attitudes rooted in beliefs about the nature of moral truth?Methods To answer this question, we conducted both exploratory and confirmatory studies, with both a convenience and a nationally representative sample (total N = 1501), investigating the link between people’s beliefs about moral truth (their metaethics) and their beliefs about moral value (their normative ethics).Results Across (...) various bioethical issues (e.g., medically-assisted death, vaccine hesitancy, surrogacy, mandatory organ conscription, or genetically modified crops), consequentialist attitudes were associated with weaker beliefs in an objective moral truth. This association was not explained by domain-general reflectivity, theism, personality, normative uncertainty, or subjective knowledge.Conclusions We find a robust link between the way people characterize prescriptive disagreements and their sensibility to consequences. In addition, both societal consensus and personal conviction contribute to objectivist beliefs, but these effects appear to be asymmetric, i.e., stronger for opposition than for approval. (shrink)

There are increasing calls for rejecting the ‘dead donor’ rule and permitting ‘organ donation euthanasia’ in organ transplantation. I argue that the fundamental problem with this proposal is that it would bestow more worth on the organs than the donor who has them. What is at stake is the basis of human equality, which, I argue, should be based on an ineliminable dignity that each of us has in virtue of having a rational nature. To allow mortal harvesting would be (...) to make our worth contingent upon variable quality of life of judgments that can only be based on properties that come in degrees. Thus, rejecting the ‘dead donor’ rule comes at the expense of our egalitarian principles with respect to the value each individual human life has in relation to the protections against killing. (shrink)

In 2019, several US states passed “heartbeat” bills. Should such bills go into effect, they would outlaw abortion once an embryonic heartbeat can be detected, thereby severely limiting an individual’s access to abortion. Many states allow health care professionals to refuse to provide an abortion for reasons of conscience. Yet heartbeat bills do not include a positive conscience clause that would allow health care professionals to provide an abortion for reasons of conscience. I argue that this asymmetry is unjustified. The (...) same criteria that justify protecting conscientious refusals to provide abortion also justify protecting positive conscientious appeals regarding abortion. Thus, if the law provides legal exemptions for health care professionals who, as a matter of conscience, refuse to provide abortions where it is legal, it should also provide exemptions for health care professionals who, as a matter of conscience, feel obligated to provide abortions where it is illegal. (shrink)

According to Aristotle, the medical art aims at health, which is a virtue of the body, and does so in an unlimited way. Consequently, medicine does not determine the extent to which health should be pursued, and “mental health” falls under medicine only via pros hen predication. Because medicine is inherently oriented to its end, it produces health in accordance with its nature and disease contrary to its nature—even when disease is good for the patient. Aristotle’s politician understands that this (...) inherent orientation can be systematically distorted, and so would see the need for something like the Hippocratic Oath. (shrink)

In this short paper I will discuss the ambiguous and, even, controversial term ‘right to die’ in the context of the euthanasia debate and, in particular, in the case of passive euthanasia. First I will present the major objections towards the moral legitimacy of a right to die, most of which I also endorse myself; then I will investigate whether the right to die could acquire adequate moral justification in the case of passive euthanasia. In the light of the Kantian (...) tradition I will argue that since rights are understood as based upon duties, the right to die should also presuppose a corresponding duty, which to me could be either an imperfect, solidarity-related duty, or an autonomy-related one, at least as far as the unwanted prolongation of life is concerned. I will conclude with the view that the right to die could actually be considered a legitimate one in the case of passive euthanasia, when the application of life-supporting techniques is against the wishes and the best interests of the patient. (shrink)

advanced directivesend-of-life decisionsharming the deadposthumous reproductiontransplant ethics.

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the reflective equilibrium between the acknowledgment of the right to end one’s life and the Rawlsian idea of freedom. This article evaluates the possibility of a self-destructive exercise of freedom. It is asserted that this kind of exercise is inconsistent with the highest order interest in freedom. Allowing the self-destructive practice of freedom jeopardizes the Rawlsian foundation of the priority of liberty, a crucial aspect of the justice as fairness. || -/- El (...) presente artículo tiene como objetivo evaluar el equilibrio reflexivo entre el reconocimiento al derecho a disponer de la propia vida y la idea rawlsiana de libertad. Se considera la posibilidad de llevar a cabo un ejercicio autodestructivo de la libertad. Se defiende que este tipo de ejercicios son contrarios al interés de orden supremo en ejercer la libertad. Permitir la práctica autodestructiva de la libertad pone en riesgo la fundamentación rawlsiana de la prioridad de la libertad, un elemento central de la justice as fairness. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIm Blick auf ein Recht auf assistierten Suizid ist nicht nur umstritten, ob es ein solches Recht gibt, es ist auch umstritten, worauf ein solches Recht denn ein Recht wäre. Der vorliegende Artikel versucht deutlich zu machen, dass das, worum es in dieser Diskussion um den selbstbestimmten Suizid geht, die Frage ist, was Entscheidungen von Menschen achtungswürdig macht. Der Artikel plädiert für eine Idee von Achtungswürdigkeit, für welche die selbstbestimmte Ausübung von Rechten über sich selbst leitend ist, eine Idee, die (...) auch in unserer Rechtspraxis wirksam ist. Dabei legen achtungswürdige Entscheidungen fest, was getan werden darf, nicht aber was getan werden soll. (shrink)

This chapter provides empirical evidence about everyday attitudes concerning euthanasia. These attitudes have important implications for some ethical arguments about euthanasia. Two experiments suggested that some different descriptions of euthanasia have modest effects on people’s moral permissibility judgments regarding euthanasia. Experiment 1 (N = 422) used two different types of materials (scenarios and scales) and found that describing euthanasia differently (‘euthanasia’, ‘aid in dying’, and ‘physician assisted suicide’) had modest effects (≈3 % of the total variance) on permissibility judgments. These (...) effects were largely replicated in Experiment 2 (N = 409). However, in Experiment 2, judgments about euthanasia’s moral permissibility were best predicted by the voluntariness of the treatment. Voluntariness was a stronger predictor than some demographic factors and some domain general elements of moral judgments. These results help inform some debates about the moral permissibility of euthanasia (e.g., the slippery slope argument) suggesting that some of the key premises of those arguments are unwarranted. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the idea that physician-assisted death might come into question in the cases of psychiatric patients who are incapable of making autonomous choices about ending their lives. I maintain that the main arguments for physician-assisted death found in recent medical ethical literature support physician-assisted death in some of those cases. After assessing several possible criticisms of what I have argued, I conclude that the idea that physicianassisted death can be acceptable in some cases of psychiatric patients (...) who lack autonomy ought to be taken into account in assessing the moral and legal acceptability of physician-assisted death. (shrink)

Belgium has recently extended its euthanasia legislation to minors, making it the first legislation in the world that does not specify any age limit. I consider two strands in the opposition to this legislation. First, I identify five arguments in the public debate to the effect that euthanasia for minors is somehow worse than euthanasia for adults—viz. arguments from weightiness, capability of discernment, pressure, sensitivity and sufficient palliative care—and show that these arguments are wanting. Second, there is another position in (...) the public debate that wishes to keep the current age restriction on the books and have ethics boards exercise discretion in euthanasia decisions for minors. I interpret this position on the background of Velleman’s “Against the Right to Die” and show that, although costs remain substantial, it actually can provide some qualified support against extending euthanasia legislation to minors. (shrink)

Kant has famously argued that human beings or persons, in virtue of their capacity for rational and autonomous choice and agency, possess dignity, which is an intrinsic, final, unconditional, inviolable, incomparable and irreplaceable value. This value, wherever found, commands respect and imposes rather strict moral constraints on our deliberations, intentions and actions. This paper deals with the question of whether, as some Kantians have recently argued, certain types of (physician-assisted) suicide and active euthanasia, most notably the intentional destruction of the (...) life of a terminally-ill, but rational and autonomous patient in order to prevent certain serious harms, such as enduring or recurring pain or the loss of the meaning in life, from befalling him really are inconsistent with respect for the patient’s human dignity. I focus on two independent, though interrelated explications of the rather vague initial idea that the patient (as well as the doctor), in intending and bringing about his death, treats his person or rational nature merely as a means and so denigrates his dignity: (i) that in doing what he is doing, he does not act for the sake of his person, but for the sake of something else; (ii) that, by trading his person for pain relief, he engages himself in an irrational and hence immoral exchange. After critically discussing some suggestions about how to understand this charge, I eventually find Kantian objections to suicide and (active) euthanasia, based on the idea of human dignity, less than compelling. For all the paper proves, suicide and (active) euthanasia may still be morally impermissible, but then this must be so for some other reason than the one given above. (shrink)

Theorists who support the legalisation of active euthanasia usually base their arguments on the principle of autonomy. In their view the wish of a severely ill person not to continue his or her life must be respected. However, some opponents of the legalisation of active euthanasia refer to the principle of autonomy as well. They are concerned that patients may be held responsible for burdening others with the provision of care. Thus family members, physicians or nurses may exert pressure on (...) patients to opt for active euthanasia. In this article it is argued that these worries are justified; the occurrence of social coercion poses a real danger. However, neither the prohibition nor the permission of active euthanasia enables each individual to make an autonomous choice. Comparing the risks involved in both options, legalisation seems to be preferable to maintaining the status quo. -/- Für die Argumentation von Moralphilosophen, die die Legalisierung der aktiven Sterbehilfe befürworten, spielt das Autonomieprinzip eine wichtige Rolle. Ihrer Auffassung nach verlangt der Respekt vor der Autonomie, die Entscheidung eines schwer kranken Menschen gegen die Fortsetzung des Lebens vorbehaltlos anzuerkennen. Dagegen haben verschiedene Theoretiker auf Gefahren hingewiesen, die die rechtliche Zulassung der Tötung auf Verlangen für die individuelle Autonomie mit sich bringt. Sobald der Kranke über die Möglichkeit der aktiven Sterbehilfe verfüge, falle ihm die Verantwortung für die Inanspruchnahme von Pflegeleistungen zu. In der Folge könne u. a. von Seiten der Familie die Forderung an ihn gestellt werden, den vom Gesetzgeber eröffneten Ausweg zu nutzen und sie von der Last seiner Pflege zu befreien. Die Bedenken erscheinen insofern berechtigt, als Formen sozialen Zwangs vorstellbar sind, die eine freie Entscheidung des Patienten verhindern. Allerdings vermag weder das Verbot noch die Zulassung der aktiven Sterbehilfe eine autonome Entscheidung aller Individuen zu gewährleisten. Die Abwägung der Risiken, mit denen beide Optionen behaftet sind, spricht im Ergebnis für die Legalisierung der Tötung auf Verlangen. (shrink)

Sparrow argues that military robots capable of making their own decisions would be independent enough to allow us denial for their actions, yet too unlike us to be the targets of meaningful blame or praise—thereby fostering what Matthias has dubbed “the responsibility gap.” We agree with Sparrow that someone must be held responsible for all actions taken in a military conflict. That said, we think Sparrow overlooks the possibility of what we term “blank check” responsibility: A person of sufficiently high (...) standing could accept responsibility for the actions of autonomous robotic devices—even if that person could not be causally linked to those actions besides this prior agreement. The basic intuition behind our proposal is that humans can impute relations even when no other form of contact can be established. The missed alternative we want to highlight, then, would consist in an exchange: Social prestige in the occupation of a given office would come at the price of signing away part of one's freedoms to a contingent and unpredictable future guided by another agency. (shrink)

In Humanity’s End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement, Nicholas Agar presents a novel argument against the prospect of radical life-extension. Agar’s argument hinges on the claim that extended lifespans will result in people’s lives being dominated by the fear of death. Here we examine this claim and the surrounding issues in Agar’s discussion. We argue, firstly, that Agar’s view rests on empirically dubious assumptions about human rationality and attitudes to risk, and secondly, that even if those assumptions are granted, (...) the fears that Agar adverts to are unlikely to dominate people’s lives if and when radical life-extension is made possible. Further, we claim that the structure of the decision-making process around life-extension is unlikely to be the way that it would have to be in order for Agar’s claims about fear of death to make sense. Finally, we argue that Agar is implicitly committed to a narrow conception of human value. In response, we suggest that the pursuit of life-extension can itself be seen as an expression of certain important aspects of our distinctively human nature. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that prescription drug laws violate patients' rights to self-medication. Patients have rights to self-medication for the same reasons they have rights to refuse medical treatment according to the doctrine of informed consent (DIC). Since we should accept the DIC, we ought to reject paternalistic prohibitions of prescription drugs and respect the right of self-medication. In section 1, I frame the puzzle of self-medication; why don't the same considerations that tell in favour of informed consent also (...) justify a right of self-medication? In section 2, I show that the prescription drug system was historically motivated by paternalism. In section 3, I outline the justifications for the DIC in more detail. I show that consequentialist, epistemic, and deontic considerations justify the DIC. In sections 4–6, I argue that these considerations also justify rights of self-medication. I then propose that rights of self-medication require non-prohibitive prescription policies in section 7. I consider two objections in sections 8 and 9: that patients ought not to make medically risky or deadly decisions, and that unrestricted access to prescription-grade pharmaceuticals would result in widespread misuse and abuse. Section 10 concludes. (shrink)

Proponents of the legalization of assisted suicide often appeal to our supposed right to "die with dignity" to defend their case. I examine and assess different notions of "dignity" that are operating in many arguments for the legalization of assisted suicide, and I find them all to be deficient. I then consider an alternative conception of dignity that is based on Aristotle's conception of the conditions on the best life. I conclude that, while such a conception of dignity fits best (...) with our intuitions about the conditions under which a life has dignity, it supports the legalization of assisted suicide only under very limited circumstances. (shrink)

In light of the proposed expansion of eligibility for physician aid in dying (PAD) in Canada to people with psychiatric disorders, there is a new subset of individuals seeking PAD—those with poverty-induced depression. The dominant account defending the expansion is known as the “parity argument.” Defenders of the parity argument maintain that the expansion of PAD to those with psychiatric conditions is needed to reflect that the seriousness of a patient's suffering does not depend on the cause of that suffering. (...) Parity accounts, as they stand, would allow cases of poverty-induced depression to qualify. I raise a moral dilemma that the parity theorist must face considering this new subset of cases—expanding access to PAD, without adequate social protections, could produce more social inequality by aiming to reduce it. I propose six recommendations that policy-makers should consider before expanding PAD given these cases, social injustice, and the social determinants of mental health. (shrink)

The question of legalizing physician-assisted suicide has become a serious public debate. Growing interest in assisted suicide reflects a public increasingly fearful of the process of dying, particularly the prospect of dying a painful, protracted, or undignified death. PAS has been proposed as a compassionate response to unrelievable suffering, designed to give terminally or incurably ill individuals direct control over the timing, manner, and circumstances of their death. Although the American Medical Association remains firmly opposed to legalizing PAS, many physicians (...) have begun to express support for the practice, and some have acknowledged that they have helped patients commit suicide despite the existing legal ban.As support for PAS grows, it becomes increasingly likely that the practice will be legalized in at least some states in the not-too-distant future. In 1994, Oregon voters approved a referendum legalizing PAS for competent, terminally ill patients; a federal court injunction preventing the referendum from going into effect is currently on appeal, and it is widely expected that the injunction will be lifted. (shrink)

A prominent defence of a market in organs from living donors says that if we truly care about people in poverty, we should allow them to sell their organs. The argument is that if poor vendors would have voluntarily decided to sell their organs in a free market, then prohibiting them from selling makes them even worse off, at least from their own perspective, and that it would be unconscionably paternalistic to substitute our judgements for individuals' own judgements about what (...) would be best for them. The author shows that this ‘Laissez-Choisir Argument’ for organ selling rests on a mistake. This is because the claim that it would be better for people in poverty to sell their organs if given the option is consistent with the claim that it would be even better for them to not have the option at all. The upshot is that objections to an organ market need not be at all paternalistic, since we need not accept that the absence of a market makes those in poverty any worse off, even from their own point of view. The author goes on to argue that there are strong theoretical and empirical reasons for believing that people in poverty would in fact be harmed by the introduction of a market for live donor organs and that the harm constitutes sufficient grounds for prohibiting a market. (shrink)

In “What is Wrong with Rational Suicide,” Pilpel and Amsel develop a counterexample that allegedly confounds attempts to condition the moral permissibility of suicide on its rationality. In this counterexample, a healthy middle aged woman with significant life accomplishments, but no dependents, disease, or mental disorder opts to end her life painlessly after reading philosophical texts that persuade her that life is meaningless and bereft of intrinsic value. Many people would judge her suicide “a bad mistake” despite its meeting “robust” (...) conditions for rationality. Hence, Pilpel and Amsel conclude, even robust conditions for the rationality of suicide “fail to do their job: to exclude intuitively unacceptable suicides from being permissible.” I argue here that this counterexample fails to cast doubt on philosophical attempts to account for the moral permissibility of suicide in terms of its rationality. (shrink)

Some jurisdictions that allow assisted dying require participating patients to have a terminal illness. This includes all Australian and US states where assisted dying is allowed. 1 Philip Reed 2 argues that this requirement constitutes discrimination against the dying. As Reed 2 argues: ‘assisted death laws that limit their services to the dying discriminate against them because death is offered to them to solve their problems’. This discrimination could take two forms: (1) via harm to dying patients as a group (...) as a result of the existence of assisted dying programmes; (2) via a negative message that such programmes communicate about whether the lives of dying patients are worth living. Assisted dying programmes are not unjustly discriminatory in either sense so long as we assume that unjust discrimination requires harm to the group in question. If assisted dying singles out the terminally ill for a programme... (shrink)

Für die Argumentation von Moralphilosophen, die die Legalisierung der aktiven Sterbehilfe befürworten, spielt das Autonomieprinzip eine wichtige Rolle. Ihrer Auffassung nach verlangt der Respekt vor der Autonomie, die Entscheidung eines schwer kranken Menschen gegen die Fortsetzung des Lebens vorbehaltlos anzuerkennen. Dagegen haben verschiedene Theoretiker auf Gefahren hingewiesen, die die rechtliche Zulassung der Tötung auf Verlangen für die individuelle Autonomie mit sich bringt. Sobald der Kranke über die Möglichkeit der aktiven Sterbehilfe verfüge, falle ihm die Verantwortung für die Inanspruchnahme von Pflegeleistungen (...) zu. In der Folge könne u. a. von Seiten der Familie die Forderung an ihn gestellt werden, den vom Gesetzgeber eröffneten Ausweg zu nutzen und sie von der Last seiner Pflege zu befreien. Die Bedenken erscheinen insofern berechtigt, als Formen sozialen Zwangs vorstellbar sind, die eine freie Entscheidung des Patienten verhindern. Allerdings vermag weder das Verbot noch die Zulassung der aktiven Sterbehilfe eine autonome Entscheidung aller Individuen zu gewährleisten. Die Abwägung der Risiken, mit denen beide Optionen behaftet sind, spricht im Ergebnis für die Legalisierung der Tötung auf Verlangen. (shrink)

After briefly narrating the evolution of Western ethical reflections on suicide and euthanasia, I argue that because people have a prima facie right not to be killed, it is usually unethical to kill anyone who poses no imminent lethal threat to others or who has not committed a capital crime. But I’m also persuaded that some instances of mercy killing in war are not only morally justifiable, they can be more ethical than allowing someone to die in agony and distress (...) from their wounds. Thus I am uncomfortable with the current strict prohibition on battlefield euthanasia in the Geneva Conventions, which I think unfairly punishes some morally justified acts. But after considering the potential consequences of legalizing battlefield euthanasia, I conclude nonetheless that it is best to leave the prohibition intact. (shrink)

Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioethics. Though the claim that there is an important relationship between autonomy and rationality is often treated as uncontroversial in this sphere, there is also considerable disagreement about how we should cash out the relationship. In particular, it is unclear whether a rationalist view of autonomy can be compatible with legal judgments that enshrine a patient's right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether the reasons underpinning the choice (...) are known and rational, or indeed whether they even exist. Jonathan Pugh brings recent philosophical work on the nature of rationality to bear on the question of how we should understand personal autonomy in contemporary bioethics. In doing so, he develops a new framework for thinking about the concept of autonomy, one that is grounded in an understanding of the different roles that rational beliefs and rational desires have to play in it. Pugh's account allows for a deeper understanding of d the relationship between our freedom to act and our capacity to decide autonomously. His rationalist perspective is contrasted with other prominent accounts of autonomy in bioethics, and the revisionary implications it has for practical questions in biomedicine are also outlined. (shrink)

In this dissertation I examine ethical issues that concern fertility preservation (FP) technologies for women from a feminist perspective. FP technologies involve the removal, cryopreservation and subsequent storage of reproductive materials for future use. The aim of these technologies is to preserve the option of future genetic reproduction. FP technologies have been developed in the cancer context because infertility is one of the long-term side-effects of many cancers or cancer therapies. Many FP technologies are still experimental, but some technologies are (...) becoming available to healthy women who wish to guard against age-related infertility. Although FP technologies are expanding women’s reproductive options and benefitting some women by satisfying their desires for genetically-related children, these technologies pose numerous physical, emotional and financial risks to women. I maintain that a feminist examination of choice is necessary for the ethical provision of FP technologies within patriarchal contexts. My analysis begins by demarcating two oppressive social biases from one another: namely pronatalism and biologism. I argue that each of these biases can unduly influence women’s reproductive choices about FP technologies. I then consider how these biases might be identified and challenged in the FP decision-making context. I outline an ethical process of informed choice that is equipped to protect patient autonomy when such autonomy is threatened by these biases. I then consider whether the choice to use FP should be available to both women within and without the cancer contexts. I argue that both disease-related FP and age-related FP can be morally permissible. Finally, I consider whether there should be an upper age limit on women’s access to their stored reproductive materials. I argue that age can be morally relevant to reproduction and thus age limits on access to assisted reproduction are morally permissible. I conclude by suggesting how feminist insights might inform policies on FP technologies and related assisted reproductive technologies. In sum, my dissertation shows that a feminist analysis of choices about FP is essential for ensuring the ethical provision of FP technologies. (shrink)

Saul Smilansky has argued that, since acts of petitionary prayer are best understood as requests, not desires, there may be many more impermissible prayer acts than one might expect. I discuss Smilansky’s analysis and argue that his conclusion follows only for those who do not believe in an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly benevolent deity and take advantage of what Smilansky calls the theist’s ‘moral escape clause’. However, I take my argument to lead us to a variant of the problems of (...) evil and petitionary prayer instead of a problem with Smilansky’s reasoning, requirng us to either abandon at least one of three properties commonly assigned to God or else to abandon an intuitive account of prayer that makes it morally impermissible to pray for morally impermissible ends. (shrink)

Anyone who thinks contemporary American society is hopelessly contentious and lacking in shared values has probably not been paying attention to the way the popular media portray the hospice movement. Over and over, we are told such things as that “Humane care costs less than high-tech care and is what patients want and need,” that hospices are “the most effective and least expensive route to a dignified death,” that hospice personnel are “heroic,” that their “compassion and dedication seem inexhaustible,” and (...) that “few could argue with the powerful message that it is better [for dying patients] to leave wrapped in the love of family and care givers than locked in the cold, metallic embrace of a machine.“. (shrink)

O artigo propõe-se a analisar detidamente as críticas recentemente levantadas por David Velleman àlegalização da eutanásia. Para tanto, parte-se das diversas formulações de suas conclusões e verifi ca-sede modo crítico qual o poder de seus argumentos para chegar até elas, centrando-se na argumentaçãode tipo consequencialista.This article aims to a detailed analysis of Velleman’s recent criticism on the legalization of euthanasia.Therefore, it starts from his various conclusions and check critically his arguments’ power to reach them,mainly the consequence-oriented arguments.

In April 1962, white segregationists paid money to African Americans agreeing to leave New Orleans. In 2010, the British National Party proposed paying non-white migrants money to leave the UK. Five years later, a landlord in New York paid African American tenants to vacate their apartments. This article considers when, if ever, it is morally permissible to pay minorities to leave. I argue that paying minorities to leave is demeaning towards recipients and so wrong. Although the payments are wrong, it (...) is not clear if they are impermissible, given the benefits for the recipients. I argue that payments are impermissible if at least one of two conditions are met: The payments demean or harm other members of society, or the payments are provided to recipients who have failed to consent to the payments. (shrink)

Whereas indirect euthanasia is a common clinical practice, active euthanasia remains forbidden in most countries. The reason for this differentiation is usually seen in the principle of double-effect (PDE). PDE states that there is a morally relevant difference between the intended consequences of an action and merely foreseen, unintended side-effects. This article discloses the fundamental assumptions presenting the basis for this application of the PDE and examines whether these assumptions are compatible with the PDE. It is shown that neither a (...) liberal nor a utilitarian point of view makes the utilization of the PDE possible. In accordance with philosophical tradition, only within the doctrine of the sanctity of life does the PDE seem to be applicable. By analysing the premises of this doctrine, and comparing them with those of the PDE, the inconsistency of this idea is demonstrated. It is suggested that the role of the PDE in the current discussion on euthanasia is largely exaggerated. (shrink)

In the present article the concept of the right to die will be analyzed in English and American literature between 1990 and 1994.

There's no doubt that reproductive technologies can transform lives for the better. Infertile couples and single, lesbian, gay, intersex, and transgender people have the potential to form families in ways that would have been inconceivable years ago. Yet we are concerned about the widespread commercialization of certain egg‐freezing programs, the messages they propagate about motherhood, the way they blur the line between care and experimentation, and the manipulative and exaggerated marketing that stretches the truth and inspires false hope in women (...) of various ages. We argue that although reproductive technology, and egg freezing in particular, promise to improve women's care by offering more choices to achieve pregnancy and childbearing, they actually have the potential to be disempowering. First, commercial motives in the fertility industry distort women's medical deliberations, thereby restricting their autonomy; second, having the option to freeze their eggs can change the meaning of women's reproductive choices in a way that is limiting rather than liberating. (shrink)

ABSTRACTNoncompete clauses, or agreements by employees to not work for a competitor or start a competing business, have recently faced increased public scrutiny and criticism. This article provides a qualified defense of NCCs. I focus on the argument that NCCs should be banned because they unfairly restrict the options of employees. I argue that this argument fails because it neglects the economist Thomas Schelling’s insight that limiting exit options can be beneficial for a person. This employee-based defense of NCCs does (...) not absolve all their uses, but it does give us a rough test for evaluating the permissibility of NCCs. With this test in hand, I turn to some of the more controversial uses of NCCs. For those who weigh heavily the interests of employees, the question is not whether NCCs, but when. (shrink)