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  1. On the Nature and Sources of Practical Necessity.Ted J. Smith - 1980 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 10 (4):379.
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  • Practical Reasoning.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter presents two contemporary pictures of practical reasoning. According to the Rule-Guidance Conception, roughly, practical reasoning is a rule-guided operation of acquiring (or retaining or giving up) intentions so as to meet synchronic requirements of rationality. According to the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception, practical reasoning is a process of responding to reasons we take ourselves to have, and its standards of correctness derive from what we objectively have reason to do, if things are as we suppose them to be. I argue (...)
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  • Formation of character and practical reasoning. [Spanish].Julián Fernando Trujillo Amaya & Ximena Vallejo Álvarez - 2008 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 8:10-65.
    En este artículo se sostiene que existe una primacía de la práctica y la acción sobre el conocimiento intelectual y la contemplación. Si esta tesis fuese falsa, no resulta comprensible por qué la prudencia y el hombre prudente son la virtud suprema y el modelo de la vida buena en Aristóteles. La cuestión inicial es 1) ¿Cómo entender la racionalidad del deseo o qué significa deseo razonado?, y esto implica dos cuestiones adicionales: 2) ¿Qué es el silogismo práctico y qué (...)
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  • Means-End Relations and a Measure of Efficacy.Jesse Hughes, Albert Esterline & Bahram Kimiaghalam - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):83-108.
    Propositional dynamic logic (PDL) provides a natural setting for semantics of means-end relations involving non-determinism, but such models do not include probabilistic features common to much practical reasoning involving means and ends. We alter the semantics for PDL by adding probabilities to the transition systems and interpreting dynamic formulas 〈α〉 ϕ as fuzzy predicates about the reliability of α as a means to ϕ. This gives our semantics a measure of efficacy for means-end relations.
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  • Classifying the Patterns of Natural Arguments. Macagno & Walton - 2015 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 48 (1):26.
    The representation and classification of the structure of natural arguments has been one of the most important aspects of Aristotelian and medieval dialectical and rhetorical theories. This traditional approach is represented nowadays in models of argumentation schemes. The purpose of this article is to show how arguments are characterized by a complex combination of two levels of abstraction, namely, semantic relations and types of reasoning, and to provide an effective and comprehensive classification system for this matrix of semantic and quasilogical (...)
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  • Two Jobs for Aristotle’s Practical Syllogism?Klaus Corcilius - 2008 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 11 (1):163-184.
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  • Aristoteles’ praktische Syllogismen in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts.Klaus Corcilius - 2008 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 11 (1):101-132.
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  • Dynamic Semantics, Imperative Logic and Propositional Attitudes.Berislav Žarnić - 2002 - Uppsala Universitet.
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  • The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.
    According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that (...)
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  • Positive Economics and the Normativistic Fallacy: Bridging the Two Sides of CSR.Philipp Schreck, Dominik van Aaken & Thomas Donaldson - 2013 - Business Ethics Quarterly 23 (2):297-329.
    In response to criticism of empirical or “positive” approaches to corporate social responsibility, we defend the importance of these approaches for any CSR theory that seeks to have practical impact. Although we acknowledge limitations to positive approaches, we unpack the neglected but crucial relationships between positive knowledge on the one hand and normative knowledge on the other in the implementation of CSR principles. Using the structure of a practical syllogism, we construct a model that displays the key role of empirical (...)
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  • Normativity, Necessity and Tense: A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 5. Oxford University Press. pp. 57-85.
    Normative concepts have a special taste, which many consider to be proof that they cannot be reductively analyzed into entirely nonnormative components. This paper demonstrates that at least some intuitively normative concepts can be reductively analyzed. I focus on so-called ‘hypothetical imperatives’ or ‘anankastic conditionals’, and show that the availability of normative readings of conditionals is determined by features of grammar, specifically features of tense. Properly interpreted, these grammatical features suggest that these deontic modals are analyzable in terms of conditional (...)
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  • Intentions Are Optimality Beliefs – But Optimizing What?Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):235-262.
    In this paper an empirical theory about the nature of intention is sketched. After stressing the necessity of reckoning with intentions in philosophy of action a strategy for deciding empirically between competing theories of intention is exposed and applied for criticizing various philosophical theories of intention, among others that of Bratman. The hypothesis that intentions are optimality beliefs is defended on the basis of empirical decision theory. Present empirical decision theory however does not provide an empirically satisfying elaboration of the (...)
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  • Mood and Gradability: An Investigation of the Subjunctive Mood in Spanish.Elisabeth Villalta - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (4):467-522.
    In Spanish (and other Romance languages) certain predicates select the subjunctive mood in the embedded clause, while others select the indicative mood. In this paper, I present a new analysis for the predicates that select the subjunctive mood in Spanish that is based on a semantics of comparison. The main generalization proposed here is the following: in Spanish, a predicate selects the subjunctive mood in its embedded proposition if the proposition is compared to its contextual alternatives on a scale introduced (...)
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  • Reasoning Beyond Belief Acquisition.Daniel Drucker - forthcoming - Noûs.
    I argue that we can reason not only to new beliefs but to basically any change in attitude we can think of, including the abandonment of belief (contra John Broome), the acquisition of non-belief attitudes like relief and admiration, and the elimination of the same. To argue for this position, which I call generalism, I defend a sufficient condition on reasoning, roughly that we can reason to any change in attitude that is expressed by the conclusion of an argument we (...)
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  • Anscombe and the Unity of Intention.Noam Melamed - 2020 - Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 64:113-133.
    The conviction that ‘intention’ is not semantically ambiguous but has a single and distinctive meaning frames the argument of Anscombe’s masterwork Intention. What this meaning is, however, is barely recognizable in her book. One reason for this difficulty is that Intention starts from a threefold division of the appearance of the concept in our natural language and proceeds to develop its various accounts piecemeal. Another is the obscurity of the notion of ‘practical knowledge’ it introduces, precisely for shedding the light (...)
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  • The Practical Syllogism: Analyses of an Aristotelian Concept.Christof Rapp & Philipp Brüllmann - 2008 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 11 (1):93-100.
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  • From Oughts to Goals: A Logic for Enkrasia.Dominik Klein & Alessandra Marra - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (1):85-128.
    This paper focuses on the Enkratic principle of rationality, according to which rationality requires that if an agent sincerely and with conviction believes she ought to X, then X-ing is a goal in her plan. We analyze the logical structure of Enkrasia and its implications for deontic logic. To do so, we elaborate on the distinction between basic and derived oughts, and provide a multi-modal neighborhood logic with three characteristic operators: a non-normal operator for basic oughts, a non-normal operator for (...)
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  • Artykuł O Treści Logicznej Zawarte W Czasopismach Nadesłanych Do Redakcji.Stanisław Surma, Klemens Szaniawski, Jan Franciszek Drewnowski, Ewa Żarnecka-Biały, Jerzy Kmita, Jerzy Giedymin & Leon Koj - 1964 - Studia Logica 15 (1):311-343.
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  • An Artifact is to Use: An Introduction to Instrumental Functions.Jesse Hughes - 2009 - Synthese 168 (1):179-199.
    Because much of the recent philosophical interest in functions has been motivated by their application in biology and other sciences, most of the ensuing discussions have focused on functional explanations to the neglect of the practical role of functional knowledge. This practical role is essential for understanding how users form plans involving artifacts. We introduce the concept of instrumental function which is intended to capture the features of functional claims that are relevant to practical—in particular, instrumental—reasoning. We discuss the four (...)
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  • Practical Reasoning in Corporate Communication with Multiple Audiences.Rudi Palmieri & Sabrina Mazzali-Lurati - 2017 - Journal of Argumentation in Context 6 (2):167-192.
    Corporate strategic communication has to be designed by considering multiple audiences of stakeholders. In this paper, we study the connection between the audience structure of corporate messages and the structure of the practical argumentation advanced to persuasively justify a business proposal. To this purpose, we combine a conceptual and analytical framework for the reconstruction of multiple audiences – the Text Stakeholders model, with a conceptual and analytical framework for the reconstruction of argument schemes – the Argumentum Model of Topics. A (...)
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  • A Semantics for Means-End Relations.Jesse Hughes, Peter Kroes & Sjoerd Zwart - 2007 - Synthese 158 (2):207-231.
    There has been considerable work on practical reasoning in artificial intelligence and also in philosophy. Typically, such reasoning includes premises regarding means–end relations. A clear semantics for such relations is needed in order to evaluate proposed syllogisms. In this paper, we provide a formal semantics for means–end relations, in particular for necessary and sufficient means–end relations. Our semantics includes a non-monotonic conditional operator, so that related practical reasoning is naturally defeasible. This work is primarily an exercise in conceptual analysis, aimed (...)
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  • Defining Rhetorical Argumentation.Christian Kock - 2013 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 46 (4):437-464.
    If there is a specifically rhetorical approach to argumentation, I believe it is one that studies argumentation that is specifically rhetorical. So if we want to ask, “What is the rhetorical approach to argumentation?” we should first ask, “What is rhetorical argumentation?” It is worthwhile focusing on this question because various misleading definitions of rhetorical argumentation have been in circulation for almost as long as rhetoric has existed. Some misleading definitions see the defining property of rhetorical argumentation in the arguer’s (...)
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  • Ad Hominem Arguments in Practical Argumentation.Eerik Lagerspetz - 1995 - Argumentation 9 (2):363-370.
    This paper is ultimately about the nature of argumentation in general and about the nature of practical argumentation in particular. (Practical argumentation is the form of argumentation which aims at answering the question: ‘What is to be done?’) The approach adopted here is an indirect one. I analyze one traditional form of argumentive fallacyargumentum ad hominem and try to show that in some argumentative situations it is an intuitively legitimate move. These intuitions can be explained if we accept that practical (...)
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  • The Functional Bias of the Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts Program.Krist Vaesen - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):190-197.
    In 2006, in a special issue of this journal, several authors explored what they called the dual nature of artefacts. The core idea is simple, but attractive: to make sense of an artefact, one needs to consider both its physical nature—its being a material object—and its intentional nature—its being an entity designed to further human ends and needs. The authors construe the intentional component quite narrowly, though: it just refers to the artefact’s function, its being a means to realize a (...)
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  • Human Action.R. N. McLaughlin - 1967 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):141 – 158.
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